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Terence Graham

The "Interests of Civilization"?:
Reaction in the United States
Against the "Seizure" of the
Panama Canal Zone, 1903–1904




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✠ ESSELTE STUDIUM

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Against the "Belmont" of the
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Against the "Seizure" of the
Panama Canal Zone, 1903-1904**

av
Terence Graham
M.A., Lu

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INTRODUCTION

On August 12, 1903 the Colombian Senate rejected the Hay-Herrán Treaty between the United States and Colombia, which had provided for the construction of a Canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Then the Colombian Senate adjourned on October 31, ending any chance of its reconsideration of the rejection, at least in the immediate future. Three days later, the third of November, 1903, a revolution occurred in the Colombian Department of Panama for the purpose of seceding from Colombia. The United States president, Theodore Roosevelt, recognized the de facto independence of the Republic of Panama November 6, with formal recognition being extended November 13. Soon after, on November, 18, 1903, the United States and Panama signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which provided for a Canal Zone across Panama under the control of the United States.¹

During the next several months the Roosevelt Administration was attacked in newspapers; in the U. S. Congress; and in speeches, petitions and periodicals for its part in the above events. It is the purpose of this study to investigate this reaction in the United States against the actions of the Roosevelt Administration in regard to the Panama Revolution and the acquiring of the Canal Zone.

The reaction will be analyzed: (1) as a part of the active and influential anti-imperialist movement in the United States at the turn of the century; (2) as a party-political issue in Congress; and (3) as a product of competing regional and economic interests.

The aim is to study the outward thrust by the Roosevelt Administration as part of an interventionist "imperial paradigm," and the reaction to it as part of the opposite phenomenon-an "idealist" "non-interventionist paradigm."

The attacks began, first of all, in the newspapers. What was the editorial reaction among Democratic, Republican, Independent and other papers? What was the geographical distribution of these newspapers? What were the arguments used in the attack? How did the reaction of traditional anti-imperialist papers compare with their earlier stand on comparable issues?

In the U. S. Senate four specific charges were laid against President Roosevelt and his Administration: (1) violation of international law; (2) violation of the U. S. Constitution; (3) violation of the Treaty of 1846; and (4) violation of a law of the U. S. Congress--the Spooner Law.² The Senate debate lasted for three months, from December, 1903 to February, 1904.³ What were the arguments used in this debate? Did party affiliations and geographical distributions affect the positions taken by the various Senators? How did personal conviction versus pressure from state legislatures and constituents affect the Senators' vote on the ratification of

the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty? How was the reaction affected by the possible desire for a Nicaragua canal route rather than a Panama route? Was it a personal attack upon President Roosevelt or were there deep principle's involved? How did the Senators' vote on this issue compare with their stand on other anti-imperialist issues of the period? What was the effect of the debate on the election of 1904?

The Anti-Imperialists attacked the Administration's Panama policy in speeches, petitions, periodicals and books. Did they have any influence on the Senate debate on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and the election of 1904? What was the status of the Anti-Imperialist League at this time? Was there any similar reaction in farm, labor, business, religious, and peace periodicals?

As an aftermath there was a renewal of the debate in 1908; from 1911-1914 (after Roosevelt's "I took the Isthmus" speech and the following Rainey Committee investigation); and during the years leading up to and including 1921-1922 (when Colombia was paid an indemnity for the loss of Panama in 1903-after Roosevelt's demise).⁴

CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During his fourth voyage Columbus anchored his ships in the harbor he named Puerto Bello, November 2, 1502, but even earlier the Spanish explorer Rodrigo de Bastidas had become the first European to land in the area now called Panama. In the spring of 1501 Bastidas explored a hundred-mile zone in search of treasure before leaving empty-handed. However, one of his crew, Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, returned in 1510 to settle on the Isthmus and on September 25, 1513 viewed the Pacific Ocean.¹ Balboa surveyed the route across the Isthmus of Panama and found an apparent difference in the levels of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.² He planned ways to create a commercial route across and actually moved parts of dismantled ships along a path over the continental divide, reassembling the ships on the Pacific side with the aid of local materials.³

Pedro Arias Dávila founded the city of Panama on the Pacific shore in 1519. Following this Charles V of Spain, in 1534, ordered the first official survey of a proposed Canal route across the Isthmus of Panama, from the new city to the port of Nombre de Dios (Portobelo) on the Atlantic side. After thirty years consideration by Spanish officials, the plan was finally rejected by Philip II. Instead Spain built a stone "Royal Road" across the Isthmus, making Panama a center of the world as Spanish gold and silver passed from the Pacific to the Atlantic side on mule trains.⁴ Numerous other surveys were made by the Spanish during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵

Benjamin Franklin was the first American leader to show an interest in constructing an Isthmian Canal. While minister to France he received a manuscript in 1779 from a French convict, Pierre-André Gargáz, advocating canals at Panama and Suez. After the American Revolution Franklin printed the manuscript in French on his private press at Passy. In 1787, while also minister to France. Thomas Jefferson read a copy of the Gargáz thesis published by Franklin. As a result Jefferson became suspicious of British and Spanish interest in an Isthmian Canal.⁶ In 1809 Jefferson corresponded with the German scientist Alexander von Humboldt after reading his *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*.⁷ Humboldt, in his book, discussed the merits and demerits of nine possible routes for an interoceanic Canal and/or river system from British Columbia in the north to Patagonia in the south. The Isthmus of Panama and Nicaragua were two of the routes considered.⁸

In June, 1825 the newly created Congress of Central America offered concessions for the construction of a Canal, and a group of New York businessmen formed the Central American and United States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company with a capital of five million dollars. But this amount proved insufficient.⁹

A Congress of the American nations was called by Simon Bolívar to meet in Panama in the summer of 1826.¹⁰ (Upon independence from Spain in 1822 Panama had joined Bolívar's Republic of Gran Colombia. This continued Colombian control over the Isthmus of Panama that extended back into colonial times. In 1830 Gran Colombia was separated into Venezuela, Ecuador and the Republic of New Granada--the latter including Panama. In 1858 New Granada became the Granadine Confederation; in 1861 the United States of Colombia; and in 1886 the Republic of Colombia.)¹¹ President John Quincy Adams accepted a delayed invitation for the United States to attend the Congress in December, 1825, and appointed two delegates on December 26. After much opposition, caused by factional and partisan bickerings and the fear that the objects of the Congress of Panama were inimical to slavery, both houses of the U. S. Congress finally voted for participation. But this action was too late for the delegates sent to Panama to arrive in time for the conference.¹² This incident had negative consequences for a Canal as Secretary of State Clay had instructed the delegates on May 8, 1826 that: "A cut or canal for purposes of navigation somewhere through the isthmus that connects the two Americas, to unite the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, will form a proper subject of consideration at the congress."¹³

Following a Senate resolution adopted March 3, 1835 requesting the President to open negotiations with the governments of Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of protecting by treaty individuals or companies interested in building an isthmian Canal, President Andrew Jackson appointed Charles Biddle to make an investigation of transit routes.¹⁴ However Biddle used this government mission as an opportunity to obtain a private concession for road, railroad, and steam navigation, causing the United States to disclaim all connection with his project.¹⁵

John L. Stephens was sent by President Martin Van Buren in 1839 to obtain the information not received from Biddle. Stephen's report stated that a Nicaragua canal was practical, but that conditions were too unsettled there to risk the estimated 25 million dollars needed. Thereafter, during the years 1842-1843, at least four surveys of the Panama route were made by French, British and American citizens.¹⁶

After failure in negotiations with Britain and France for a Canal (1844-1845), with Britain refusing to guarantee the neutrality of the Isthmus and France hesitating, President Tomás de Masquera of New Granada turned to the United States. His immediate interest was to neutralize possible French power on the Isthmus and obstruct British territorial ambitions on the Mosquito Coast. A treaty with the United States would accomplish both ends. Meanwhile, the United States had become interested in a treaty of commerce with New Granada, as well as in preventing other nations from getting a grant of privileges for any communication on the Isthmus of Panama.¹⁷

On December 12, 1846 the U. S. chargé d'affaires at Bogotá, Benjamin A. Bidlack, signed a treaty of peace, amity, navigation and commerce with Manuel M. Mallarino, the secretary of state and foreign relations of New Granada. Entirely on his own responsibility and without instructions, as President Polk explained in his message submitting the Treaty of 1846 for Senate approval February 10, 1847, Bidlack had committed the United States by Article 35 to guarantee the neutrality of the Isthmus so that transit would not be disturbed as well as to guarantee the sovereignty of New Granada over the Isthmus of Panama. In return the United States received commercial privileges in New Granada, and the latter guaranteed the rights of transit across the Isthmus for the United States. Despite much Senate objection to Article 35 the Treaty was finally ratified June 3, 1848.¹⁸

Article 35 was to become the controversial part of the Treaty of 1846 in the 1903-1904 debate:

The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the Government and citizens of the United States . . . ; that no other tolls or charges shall be levied or collected upon the citizens of the United States, or their said merchandise thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by the Government of New Granada, or by the authority of the same, than is, under like circumstances, levied upon and collected from the Granadian citizens And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.¹⁹

On June 21, 1849, in the midst of U. S. -British competition for control in Central America, the United States chargé d'affaires in Central America, Elijah Hise, signed a canal treaty with Nicaragua. It granted exclusive right to the United States to build a canal, road, or railroad across Nicaragua. But this treaty was never submitted to the Senate for ratification, as Secretary of State Clayton was in the midst of negotiations with England to settle the difference between the two countries in Central

America.²⁰

The resulting Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 provided that: "The Governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said Ship Canal; agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Cental America" ²¹

The California gold rush greatly increased U. S. interest in the Isthmus, and between 1851 and 1855 the Panama Railroad was built between Panama City and Colón by three New York financiers--Henry Aspinwall, John Lloyd Stephens, and Henry Chauncey. They took over a concession given by New Granada to a French company, which lacked the money to proceed. The world's first transcontinental railroad cost eight million dollars to construct up to January, 1859, was 47-48 miles long, and took three hours per trip. About 9000 laborers died during its construction. The Panama Railroad Company made a profit of almost six million dollars out of gross earnings of over eight million dollars by January, 1859, so again great interest was shown in a Canal.²² Surveys for the railroad had discovered two important things for a future Canal: a gap in the mountains twelve miles from Panama City, at a point called Culebra, with an elevation of 275 feet (200 feet below the lowest estimate earlier); and the fact that there was no difference in the levels of the two oceans-- the difference was in the size of their tides (18-20 feet on the Pacific side while negligible on the Atlantic-Caribbean side).²³

But preoccupation with domestic issues prevented any treaty for a Canal for the time being. After the Civil War Secretary of State Seward negotiated a treaty with Colombia for exclusive U. S. rights to construct a Canal across its territory. However this 1868 treaty was not ratified by either country. The Andrew Johnson Administration was embroiled in conflict with Congressional Radicals, and there were unfavorable provisions in the treaty. (Colombia was to get 25% of net proceeds from the Canal operation, there was a time limit for a preliminary survey and construction, and the United States could only have a token force to defend the Canal).²⁴

In 1870 President Ulysses S. Grant, interested in a Canal since 1852 when he crossed Panama as a Brevet Captain with the 4th U. S. Infantry Regiment, appointed the first InterOceanic Canal Commission to survey the situation and decide on the best route. A few years before Admiral Charles H. Davis had informed Congress that there were no fewer than nineteen possible locations for an isthmian Canal. The first expedition was

to the Isthmus of Darien in 1870, under the command of Commander Thomas O. Selfridge. Later expeditions went to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, and Panama. Four other Darien routes were also examined. The Commission reported unanimously on February 7, 1876, in favor of a route across Nicaragua.²⁵

The Commission's report recommended an international guaranty of the Canal, despite President Grant's desire to go against the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by constructing a Canal under the control of the United States. Negotiations for a treaty were carried on between Nicaragua and the United States during the years 1876-1877; but they failed due to inability to agree on concessions to Nicaragua, disagreement over the amount of foreign control to be allowed, and the lack of enthusiasm by Secretary of State Fish for the project. Of the three obstacles facing Grant in 1869--the choice of route, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the lack of a Canal treaty--he had eliminated only the first.²⁶

Then in 1878 the United States saw itself facing a serious threat to its position on the Isthmus and throughout Central America. On March 20, 1878, a French citizen, Lieutenant Lucien Napoleon-Bonaparte Wyse, received a contract from Colombia for the exclusive right to construct and operate a Canal across Panama. Wyse was representing the Civil International Interoceanic Canal Association in France, of which he was a director. The Wyse Concession was good for 99 years after the Canal was opened. A route had to be chosen by 1881 and a universal joint stock company had to be organized within two years after that. Then the company had twelve years in which to construct the Canal. (A six-year extension was possible). The company received a belt of land 200 meters wide on each side of the Canal. Article 21 was of particular importance to the United States: "The grantees, or those who in the future may succeed them in their rights, may transfer these rights to other capitalists or financial companies, but it is absolutely prohibited to cede or mortgage them under any consideration whatever to any nation or foreign government." According to Article 3 the Canal company would have to "enter into some amicable arrangement with the Panama Railroad Company, or pay an indemnity" if the Canal was to be built in the area of the railroad. A sum of 750,000 francs had to be paid as security for the execution of the work; and Colombia was to receive 5% of the gross revenue from the Canal for the first 25 years, to be increased by 1% each following 25 years.²⁷

In 1879, Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, purchased the Wyse Concession for ten million francs (two million dollars), and the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique de Panama* was capitalized. In 1881 de Lesseps turned over all rights under the Wyse

Concession to this Universal Panama Canal Company, of which he was president. The Company was officially incorporated March 3, 1881. Three months later it purchased the Panama Railroad for seventeen million dollars, buying 68,500 of the existing 70,000 shares. But the Panama Railroad's legal status remained the same--it was still a United States company incorporated under the laws of New York. Work began on the Panama Canal in early 1881. The French were preeminent in engineering, but things were more difficult at Panama than at Suez except the distance: the humidity was 98% for eight months of the year; the annual rainfall on the Caribbean slope was ten feet; the maximum elevation would prove to be 330 feet (50 at Suez); and the jungle, Chagres River, and disease had to be overcome.²⁸

The end came for de Lesseps on February 4, 1889, after an estimated 287 million dollars and possibly 20,000 lives had been spent. The bankrupt company was put into the hands of a liquidator, who then arranged ten-year extensions of the Wyse Concession from Colombia in December, 1890 and April, 1893. And on October 20, 1894 the Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de Panama was formed. The New Panama Canal Company continued work on the Canal, though at a greatly reduced level.²⁹

De Lesseps might have succeeded despite the odds--at least one-fourth of the digging had been done--had (he) received the necessary financial backing. But when private financing failed, United States disapproval probably helped to persuade the French government not to give direct financial aid to de Lesseps. (The United States had been against the French project all along, but could do nothing as long as it was a private venture--despite editorial cries that it was against the Monroe Doctrine).³⁰ And then there was the corruption; the scandal broke in 1892. Charges of political bribery, fraud, and payment to newspapers were laid. A government fell and two trials occurred.³¹

In the early 1880s the policy of the United States began to shift from the idea of a private enterprise Canal under international control to a policy of a government-built Canal under U. S. control. In a message to Congress on March 8, 1880 President Hayes declared that: "The policy of this country is a canal under American control."³² And on December 1, 1884 Secretary of State Frelinghuysen signed a treaty with Nicaragua for a Canal to be constructed by the United States. Ownership and management would be under joint U. S.--Nicaraguan control.³³ This joint control was an attempt to get around the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Britain. The treaty was submitted to the Senate December 10, 1884, but the Democrats were about to regain power under Cleveland and the "lame duck" session adjourned in March, 1885 without taking final action on the agreement. It was

withdrawn from the Senate by President Grover Cleveland on March 5, 1885--the day after he took office. His stated reasons were that it created an entangling alliance and contained a guaranty to protect the sovereignty of Nicaragua. The Administration also felt that private persons should still build the Canal. Accordingly the Government gave encouragement to the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, which had purchased a private concession going back to May 22, 1880. This Company began construction of a Canal near Greytown, Nicaragua in June, 1890, but the Panic of 1893 ended its financial support. In 1895 a new firm, the Maritime Company, tried to keep the concession going, but financial problems and the failure of Congress to pass a guarantee bill resulted in the concession expiring in August, 1900, after yet another company had tried to continue it in 1899.³⁴

The suspenseful two-month voyage of the *Oregon*, one of the first true battleships, during the Spanish-American War of 1898 from the Pacific coast to the Caribbean fighting zone by way of the Horn, a distance of 12,000 miles, both dramatized the imperativeness of a Canal and made the cry for a Canal enormously popular. Victory in the Caribbean was said to depend upon the *Oregon's* arriving in time. The gains of the War, particularly the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines, also emphasized the urgency of a Canal.³⁵

President McKinley stated in his Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1898, that the building of an Isthmian Canal was intended to afford "that intimate and ready intercommunication between our eastern and western seaboard demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific."³⁶ More imperatively than ever, he asserted, national policy called for its control by the United States.³⁷

Soon after, Secretary of State John Hay opened negotiations with the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Julian Pauncefote, to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty so the United States could have a free hand in building a Canal. The British were involved in South Africa and alarmed at their political isolation in Europe, so they were looking for friendship with the United States even if it meant recognizing U. S. supremacy in Central America. The first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was sent to the Senate February 5, 1900, but it was ratified with three amendments unacceptable to Great Britain. The Senate had insisted on a declaration that this agreement superseded the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, more liberal provisions for U. S. defense of the Canal, and the exclusion of other nations from the pact.³⁸ Secretary Hay felt so bad about the failure of the treaty that he sent a letter of resignation to President McKinley, but McKinley refused to accept it.³⁹

Hay reopened negotiations and a second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was signed November 18, 1901. It specifically superseded the Clayton-Bulwer

Treaty; provided for the construction and control of the Canal by the United States, and embodied the principle of neutralization for the Canal--the Canal would be open to vessels of all nations on an equal basis. The United States was allowed to maintain military police to protect the Canal against lawlessness and disorder, but it should never be blockaded. The treaty was ratified by the Senate on December 16, 1901.⁴⁰

THE BATTLE OF THE ROUTES⁴¹

It had been assumed for years that the Canal would be built across Nicaragua. Not only was this route assumed superior, but the New Panama Canal Company of France had the rights for a Panama Canal. As one Panama Canal supporter put it: "Public opinion demanded the Nicaraguan Canal. The only canal known, the only wanted, the only spoken of was the Nicaraguan Canal. The Panama Canal was looked upon as a vanished dream."⁴²

An Isthmian Canal Commission headed by Rear-Admiral John G. Walker had been appointed in March, 1899 to make the final decision as to the best route. The Commission's report, transmitted to Congress by President Theodore Roosevelt on December 4, 1901, concluded that: "After considering all the facts developed by the investigation made by the Commission and the actual situation as it now stands, and having in view the terms offered by the new Panama Canal Company, this Commission is of the opinion that 'the most practicable and feasible route' for an isthmian canal, to be 'under the control, management, and ownership of the United States,' is that known as the Nicaragua route."⁴³

On January 9, 1902 the Hepburn Bill, appropriating 108 million dollars for a Nicaragua canal, passed the House of Representatives 308 to 2.⁴⁴

But on the same day President Bô of the New Panama Canal Company sent a telegram to Admiral Walker offering to sell its Canal property and concessions to the United States for 40 million dollars. The Isthmian Canal Commission met again and issued a supplementary report transmitted to Congress by President Roosevelt on January 20, 1902. It stated that "the new proposition submitted by the New Panama Canal Company makes a reduction of nearly \$ 70,000,000 in the cost of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, according to the estimates contained in the former report, and with this reduction a canal can be there constructed for more than \$ 5,500,000 less than through Nicaragua. The unreasonable sum asked for the property and rights of the New Panama Canal Company when the Commission reached its former conclusion overbalanced the advantages of that route" So "the Commission is of the opinion that 'the most practicable and feasible route' for an isthmian canal, to be 'under the control, management, and ownership of the United States,' is that known as the Panama route."⁴⁵

The New Panama Canal Company's franchise, which had been due to expire in the fall of 1904, had been extended for six years to 1910 by the Colombian legislative decree No. 721 of 1900.⁴⁶ But Colombia gave no permission to the Company to sell its concession to the United States.

Senator Spooner of Wisconsin introduced in the Senate a radical amendment to the Hepburn Bill. It later became known as the Spooner Law. It stated:

That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to acquire for and on behalf of the United States, at a cost not exceeding \$ 40,000,000, the rights, privileges, franchises, concessions, grants of land, right of way, unfinished work, plants, and other property, real, personal, and mixed, of every name and nature, owned by the New Panama Canal Company, of France, on the Isthmus of Panama, and all its maps, plans, drawings, records on the Isthmus of Panama and in Paris, including all the capital stock, not less, than 68,863 shares of the Panama Railroad Company, owned by or held for the use of said canal company, provided a satisfactory title to all of said property can be obtained.

Sec. 2. That the President is hereby authorized to acquire from the Republic of Colombia, for and on behalf of the United States, upon such terms as he may deem reasonable, perpetual control of a strip of land, the territory of the Republic of Colombia, not less than 6 miles in width, extending from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and the right to use and dispose of the waters thereon, and to excavate, construct, and to perpetually maintain, operate and protect thereon a canal

Sec. 4. That should the President be unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia and the rights mentioned in sections 1 and 2 of this act within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then the President, having first obtained for the United States perpetual control by treaty of the necessary territory from Costa Rica and Nicaragua . . . shall cause to be excavated and constructed a ship canal and waterway from a point on the shore of the Caribbean Sea near Greytown, by way of Lake Nicaragua, to a point near Brito, on the Pacific Ocean.⁴⁷

An initial ten million dollars was appropriated for either route, with additional appropriations to be made not exceeding 135 million dollars should the Panama route be adopted, or 180 million dollars should the Nicaragua route be adopted. And the law created an Isthmian Canal Commission of seven members to direct the construction of the Canal.⁴⁸

William Nelson Cromwell and Philippe Bunau-Varilla led out in a lobby for the passage of the Spooner amendment to the Hepburn Bill. Cromwell,

a prominent New York lawyer, had become general counsel for the Panama Railroad Company in 1893, and in 1896 began to represent the New Panama Canal Company. Mark Hanna and other members of the Republican National Committee were impressed with the engineering data supplied by Cromwell, and the Republican platform in 1900 spoke only for an Isthmian Canal instead of for a Nicaragua Canal as in 1896.⁴⁹ In January, 1902 Cromwell had urged the New Panama Canal Company to sell its properties to the United States. Now he supplied Senator Mark Hanna with marine charts, maps, engineering data, sketches and models to be used in the fight for the Panama route.⁵⁰

Philippe Bunau-Varilla was a former acting director and engineer of the de Lesseppe's Panama Canal Company.⁵¹ He wanted to vindicate French genius and his own reputation.⁵² So he had been trying to sell the French canal rights since 1894. In that year he went to St. Petersburg to try to interest Russia in helping to finish the Panama Canal as a complement to its own great work just begun--the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Here he held talks with the Russian Finance Minister M. de Witte, but nothing ever came out of this scheme.⁵³ In 1899 he conversed with members of the Isthmian Canal Commission then in Paris, and in January, 1901 began a lecture tour of the United States speaking on the advantages of the Panama route over the Nicaragua route. In New York he wrote a pamphlet called *Panama or Nicaragua*, of which 15,000 copies were published.⁵⁴

After hearings before the Senate Committee on Inter-oceanic Canals, headed by Senator Morgan, the Committee reported on March 13, 1902 in favor of the original unamended Hepburn Bill for a Nicaragua Canal by a vote of 7 to 4. The dissenters signed the "Hanna Minority Report" in favor of Panama.⁵⁵

The Senate debate on the Hepburn Bill began June 4, 1902, and already the next day Senator Mark Hanna of Ohio began a speech that was termed the greatest of his Senate career. He had been making an exhaustive independent investigation of the two routes for over a year now, and was convinced of Panama's superiority. His secretary sat behind him as he spoke with some fifteen books and pamphlets containing reports and other references for him to use. These included a large number of letters Hanna had solicited from sailing masters of ocean-going ships which unanimously and emphatically testified to the superiority of the shorter and straighter Panama route for navigation. All around the chamber hung enormous maps and plans, including a map reaching from the gallery railing to the floor showing every principal volcano in Central America and the Caribbean (red dots for active and black dots for extinct volcanoes). There were no red dots in Panama, but eight red dots in Nicaragua--and Mount Pelée, a volcano which had just exploded on May 8, 1902 on the Caribbean island of

Martinique killing almost 30,000 people, was indicated as extinct.⁵⁶

Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut said it was the most effective address made in the Senate during his career, and Senator Frye of Maine stated that after a lifetime advocacy of the Nicaragua route he was now voting for a "Hannama canal."⁵⁷

A few days before the final Senate vote, Bunau-Varilla went around to all the postage-stamp dealers in Washington and found ninety stamps showing an erupting Mount Momotombo in Nicaragua. The foreground of the stamp showed a locomotive and wharf destroyed when an earthquake followed an eruption of Mount Momotombo on March 24, 1902. Bunau-Varilla sent one of these stamps to each of the Senators on June 16, 1902, pasted on sheets of paper bearing the inscription at the top: "POSTAGE STAMP OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA." Below the stamp was inscribed the words: "An official witness of the volcanic activity on the Isthmus of Nicaragua."⁵⁸

The main test came on the afternoon of June 19 when a motion to substitute the minority report for that of the majority passed 42 to 34, with 12 abstaining. Fourteen Senators who had voted for the Nicaragua bill of January 21, 1899, including Republicans Cullom, Hanna, Hoar, Lodge, and Spooner, now voted for Panama. Those voting against the substitution were mainly Democrats. Later the same day, on the final roll call on the Bill itself, the Spooner Law passed 67 to 6. After having been beaten, the Senators for Nicaragua did not want to go on record as against any Canal at all.⁵⁹ The House of Representatives finally yielded a few days later with only 8 nays; again with the Nicaragua supporters preferring the Spooner Law to no Canal at all, feeling that Colombia would not grant a satisfactory treaty, and believing that the New Panama Canal Company could not show a valid title to its concession. In other words, that the President would be forced within "reasonable time" to turn to Nicaragua.⁶⁰

THE REVOLUTION

The Hay-Herrán Treaty with Colombia was signed January 22, 1903, after long negotiations carried on throughout the previous year (including the unsuccessful Hay-Concha draft). The treaty authorized the New Panama Canal Company to sell "its rights, privileges, properties, and concessions" to the United States; and granted the United States the right to construct a Canal and control a Canal zone 6 miles wide from Colón to Panama City. Colombia would receive ten million dollars outright and 250 thousand dollars annually beginning nine years hence. However Colombia would cease to receive its 250 thousand dollar annuity for the Panama Railroad which the United States would purchase from the French Company. Colombian sovereignty over the Canal zone was recognized, but

there would be joint law courts in the zone. Police protection would be provided by Colombia unless it was unable to do so. In such case the United States could act with Colombia's consent, or in an emergency without such consent. The franchise was for 100 years and renewable at the option of the United States. The treaty ratifications were to be exchanged by September 22, 1903.⁶¹

Dr. Tomás Herrán signed the treaty after receiving a veiled threat from Secretary Hay the same day to turn to Nicaragua: "I am commanded by the President to say to you that the reasonable time that the statute accords for the conclusion of negotiations with Colombia for the excavation of a canal of the Isthmus has expired, and he has authorized me to sign with you the treaty of which I had the honor to give you a draft, with the modification that the sum of \$ 100,000, fixed therein as the annual payment, be increased to \$ 250,000. I am not authorized to consider or discuss any other change."⁶² Three days after signing the treaty, Herrán received a wire from President Marroquín directing him not to sign and advising him that additional instructions were being sent by letter the same day.⁶³

After a sharp debate, in which Senator John T. Morgan (Democrat, Alabama) tried to block the treaty by offering dozens of amendments to it, the Hay-Herrán Treaty was ratified by the U. S. Senate March 17, 1903, by a vote of 73 to 5.⁶⁴

There are several suggested reasons why the Colombian Senate rejected the Hay-Herrán Treaty on August 12, 1903: the price was considered inadequate;⁶⁵ there was opinion favoring the idea of forcing the New Panama Canal Company to pay Colombia ten million dollars for the right to transfer its rights to the United States;⁶⁶ there was even talk of annulling the extension given to the New Panama Canal Company in 1900 so that Colombia could get 40,000,000 additional dollars by delaying the treaty until the fall of 1904;⁶⁷ it was feared that the perpetual lease meant surrender of sovereignty and thus loss of national honor;⁶⁸ there was objection to the establishment of U. S. judicial authority in the Canal zone;⁶⁹ and there was a strong reaction against threats by the United States to sign or face the consequences. On June 9, 1903, Secretary Hay cabled the U. S. consul at Bogotá: "If Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its ratification, the friendly understanding between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that action might be taken by the Congress next winter which every friend of Colombia would regret. Confidential. Communicate substance of this verbally to the minister of foreign affairs. If he desires it give him a copy in form of memorandum."⁷⁰

The Colombian Senate continued to discuss its options even after the rejection of the treaty, until its adjournment October 31, 1903.⁷¹

President Theodore Roosevelt was angry as it became apparent in the fall of 1903 that Colombia would reject the Herrán Treaty. He called Colombia "a corrupt pithecoïd community" and its rulers "inefficient bandits."⁷² In the middle of August he wrote John Hay: ". . . I do not think that the Bogota lot of jack rabbits should be allowed permanently to bar one of the future highways of civilization. Of course under the terms of the Act we could now go ahead with Nicaragua and perhaps would technically be required to do so. But what we do now will be of consequence, not merely decades, but centuries hence, and we must be sure we are taking the right step before we act."⁷³

In August President Roosevelt began planning his alternatives. Stated in his own words these were: (1) "One was that Colombia would at the last moment see the unwisdom of her position. That there might be nothing omitted, Secretary Hay, through the minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow her rejection of the treaty."⁷⁴ (2) If Colombia rejected the treaty and there was no action by Panama, "My intention was to consult the Congress as to whether under such circumstances it would not be proper to announce that the canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms that we had offered and no others; and that if such terms were not agreed to we would enter into an arrangement with Panama direct, or take what other steps were needful in order to begin the enterprise."⁷⁵ (3) "A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus. . . might. . . declare their independence upon just grounds, and establish a government competent and willing to do its share in this great work of civilization. This third possibility is what actually occurred. Everyone knew that it was a possibility, but it was not until towards the end of October that it appeared to be an imminent probability. Although the administration, of course, had special means of knowledge, no such means were necessary. . . . It was a matter of common notoriety. Quotations from the daily papers could be indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs. . . ."⁷⁶

Already on July 5, 1903, the U. S. consul at Bogotá had informed the Administration that members of the Colombian Congress from Panama had stated Panama would revolt if the Hay-Herrán Treaty was not passed.⁷⁷ Then consul Beaupré sent a message on September 11 that Senator Obaldia, whose separatist sentiments were well known, had been appointed Governor of Panama by the Colombian Government. Possibly he was being sent to help prepare for a Colombian presidential election.⁷⁸ Further on October 21 Beaupré wrote:

This alarm took the form of a heated debate in the Senate yesterday, when the Government was again attacked for the appointment of Señor Obaldia as governor of Panama. The reply elicited from the minister of foreign affairs was rather significant. He read an extract from the

treaty of 1846, in which the United States guaranteed Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus, and assured the Senate that in case of an insurrection in the department of Panama the United States would be bound to support the Government.⁷⁹

On October 16 President Roosevelt received a personal report from Captain C. B. Humphrey and Lieutenant Grayson M.-P. Murphy, who had just returned from Panama. They reported that a revolutionary party was being organized under the leadership of Dr. Richard Arango, to separate Panama from Colombia. Guns and ammunition were being smuggled into Colón in piano boxes and crates, etc., and a fire brigade was being organized in Panama City which was really intended for a revolutionary military organization.⁸⁰

Dr. Arango was the Panama Railroad's attorney. (The railroad was owned by the New Panama Canal Company). In May, 1903 he met with Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero, the Panama Railroad's physician, and Tomás Arias, to begin planning a revolution in case the Canal Treaty failed. According to a dispatch from Panama by Merrill A. Teague, staff correspondent of the *Baltimore American*, sent December 10, 1903, four Americans were advisors to the conspirators: Colonel J. S. Shaler, superintendent of the Panama Railroad; H.G. Prescott, assistant superintendent of the Panama Railroad; Captain John R. Beers, terminal superintendent of the Panama Railroad at the Pacific end; and Colonel William Black, a U. S. Army engineer representing the United States Government at the work being done by the New Panama Canal Company at the Culebra Cut. In September Dr. Amador sailed for the United States to line up Government support and financial aid. He met with Cromwell during the first week in September.⁸¹

Philippe Bunau-Varilla met Amador on September 24. Then he had a meeting with Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, a close friend of President Roosevelt, on September 29. From Moore's unwillingness to publicly express, as urged, his ideas on the Treaty of 1846, Bunau-Varilla surmised that President Roosevelt "was thinking at this very moment of coercing Colombia on the strength of the Treaty of 1846." Henceforth he could act.⁸²

On October 10, 1903, Bunau-Varilla met with President Roosevelt at the White House, where his conclusion was confirmed to his own satisfaction: "I was henceforth certain of this capital point, as certain as if a solemn contract had been signed between us. No word had been pronounced, no concealed meaning had been attached to any sentence which could constitute a tie between us."⁸³ Roosevelt described the situation in a letter to his friend John Bigelow:

Of course I have no idea what Bunau-Varilla advised the revolutionists, or what he said in any telegrams to them as to either

Hay or myself; but I do know, of course, that he had no assurances in any way, either from Hay or myself, or from anyone authorized to speak for us. He is a very able fellow, and it was his business to find out what he thought our Government would do. I have no doubt that he was able to make a very accurate guess, and to advise his people accordingly. In fact, he would have been a very dull man had he been unable to make such [a] guess.⁸⁴

A week later Bunau-Varilla met Secretary of State John Hay, from whom he inadvertently learned that the United States had taken military precautions in case of a revolution. As Bunau-Varilla put it: "It only remained for me to act. The United States would have a sufficient military force in the neighbourhood of the Canal if the revolution broke out."⁸⁵

At a meeting with Bunau-Varilla at the Waldorf Hotel in New York October 17, Dr. Amador was promised 100 thousand dollars for necessary expenses for the revolution, including bride money, and received assurance that the junta would be protected by United States forces within 48 hours after they had proclaimed their new Republic. But they must agree to make Bunau-Varilla the diplomatic representative of Panama at Washington. On his way to the harbor to sail back to Panama, Amador once again met with Bunau-Varilla, receiving a secret code and other materials. After Amador arrived in Panama, Bunau-Varilla received a coded message asking for a ship to be sent immediately. Bunau-Varilla saw this message, received October 29, as a test of his power with the Washington Government. Reading in the newspaper that the *Nashville* was at Kingston, Jamaica, closest to the Isthmus, he guessed that it would depart for Colón the next day. So he sent a wire to the revolutionists that a ship would arrive in to two and a half days. The *New York Times* of November 1, 1903 informed him that the *Nashville* had left October 31, 18 hours later than he had counted on, but it also traveled faster than his estimate.⁸⁶

President Roosevelt had directed the Navy Department to have ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of need arising. Orders were given on October 19 to the *Boston* to proceed to Nicaragua; to the *Dixie* to prepare to sail; and to the *Atlanta* to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 30, 1903 the *Nashville* was ordered to proceed to Colón in Panama.⁸⁷

On November 2, 1903, the day before the revolution in Panama, the Navy Department in Washington sent the following cable to the *Nashville*, care of the U. S. consul at Colón:

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point. Send copy of instructions to the senior officer present at Panama upon arrival of *Boston*. Have sent copy

of instructions and have telegraphed *Dixie* to proceed with all possible dispatch from Kingston to Colon. Government force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate a conflict. Acknowledgement is required.⁸⁸

The same day the Navy Department cabled the *Marblehead* at Acapulco:

Proceed with all possible dispatch to Panama. Telegraph in cipher your departure. Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of the railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force, either Government or insurgent, with hostile intent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intention of any armed force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artillery. . . .⁸⁹

At 3.40 p.m. on November 3, 1903, a few hours before the revolution began, Assistant Secretary of State Francis Loomis cabled the U. S. vice-consul-general at Panama City: "Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed."⁹⁰ Vice-consul Ehrman cabled back (received 8.15 p.m. in Washington): "No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night. Situation is critical."⁹¹ Then in a cable received at 9.50 p. m. Ehrman said:

Uprising occurred to-night, 6; no bloodshed. Army and navy officials taken prisoners. Government will be organized to-night, consisting three consuls, also cabinet. Soldiers changed. Supposed same movement will be effected in Colon. Order prevails so far. Situation serious. Four hundred soldiers landed Colon to-day. Barranquilla.⁹²

Meanwhile at Colón, U. S. consul Malmros had cabled Hay (received 5.32 p.m.):

Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isthmus about 500 men. Their officers promised support revolution. Fire department Panama, 441, are well organized and favor revolution. Government vessel, *Cartagena*, with about 400 men, arrived early to-day with new commander in chief, Tobar. Was not expected until November 10. Tobar's arrival is not probable to stop revolution.⁹³

Not having received in time the November 2 orders to prevent the landing of Government troops, the Commander of the *Nashville* had allowed the Colombian forces from the *Cartagena* to land at Colón on the morning of November 3.⁹⁴

So the next step was to prevent the 400 Government troops from getting from Colón to Panama City. Loomis cabled Ehrman at 11.18 p.m., November 3:

Message sent to *Nashville* to Colon may not have been delivered. Accordingly see that following message is sent to *Nashville* immediately: Nashville, Colon:

In the interests of peace make every effort to prevent Government

troops at Colon from proceeding to Panama. The transit of the Isthmus must be kept open and order maintained. Acknowledge.

Darling, *Acting*. Secure special train, if necessary. Act promptly. Loomis.⁹⁵

And Loomis cabled Malmros at 8.45 p.m.: "The troops which landed from the *Cartagena* should not proceed to Panama."⁹⁶

Colonel Shaler, superintendent of the Panama Railroad, persuaded the officers of the Colombian troops that had landed from the *Cartagena* at Colón to leave immediately for Panama City in a special train car ordered. General Tobar was promised that his troops could follow shortly after. But Tobar and his fellow officers were arrested in Panama City, when the revolution began there, by the bribed General Esteban Huertas and his troops. The municipal council at Panama City met to give the new Junta formal recognition. The next morning, November 4, Commander Hubbard of the *Nashville* issued an order to Shaler forbidding the movement of any troops on the railroad. Colonel Eliseo Torres, who had been left in charge of the Government troops in Colón, became aggressive when informed of the events at Panama City and that his troops could not move on the railroad to come to the aid of General Tobar. Because of his threats, Commander Hubbard landed a force of 42 men from the *Nashville* early in the afternoon of the 4th. On the 5th, without any fighting having occurred, Torres and his troops from the *Cartagena* were bribed to leave Colón on the Royal Mail steamer *Orinoco*.⁹⁷

On the same day, November 5, Secretary of State Hay received the following telegram sent by the Junta in Panama: "We notify you that we have appointed Señor Philippe Bunau-Varilla confidential agent of the Republic of Panama near your Government. . . ." It was signed Arango, Boyd, Arias.⁹⁸

Secretary Hay cabled Ehrman on November 6 to enter into relations with Panama when he was "satisfied that a de facto government, republican in form, and without substantial opposition from its own people, has been established. . . ."⁹⁹ That Ehrman was being ordered to recognize Panama is shown by the fact that he was sent by Hay the same day a copy of the instructions sent November 6 to the U. S. minister at Bogotá:

The people of Panama having by an apparently unanimous movement dissolved their political connection with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, and having adopted a government of their own, republican in form, *with which the Government of the United States of America has entered into relations*, the President of the United States, in accordance with the ties of friendship which have so long and so happily existed between the respective nations, most earnestly commends to the Governments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful

and equitable settlement of all questions at issue between them. He holds that he is bound, not merely by *treaty obligations*, but by the *interests of civilization*, to see that the peaceable traffic of the world across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and wasteful civil wars.¹⁰⁰

Between Sunday the 15th and Tuesday the 17th of November, the Frenchman Bunau-Varilla wrote out a treaty favoring the United States much more than the Hay-Herrán Treaty had done. His proposed treaty was sent to Secretary Hay on the 17th, the same day that a special Commission from Panama headed by Amador landed in New York to participate in making the treaty. Bunau-Varilla sent a telegram telling them to remain in New York and "to observe the greatest secrecy with regard to their mission," and to say nothing to the newspapers. The next day, November 18, 1903, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was signed. In another two hours Bunau-Varilla was at the train station to meet the Panama delegation with the astounding news that the treaty was already negotiated. On the 25th Bunau-Varilla sent a cable to Panama's Minister of Exterior Relations, de la Espriella, threatening that if Panama did not ratify the Treaty the most probable consequence would be "the immediate suspension of the protection and the signature of a final treaty with Bogota in accord with the constitutional laws of Colombia in case of war." The Panamanian ratification took place on December 2, 1903. Now it was up to the U. S. Senate.¹⁰¹

The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted to the United States "in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of said canal of the width of 10 miles," and "in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of any other lands and waters outside of the zone above described which may be necessary and convenient for the . . . enterprise." Four islands in the Bay of Panama were granted to the United States. Colón and Panama City were not to be part of the Canal Zone but the United States obtained control of the sewage, sanitation, water supply, and the maintenance of public order (if Panama was unable to maintain order in the judgment of the United States) in these cities. Article III stated: "The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone. . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power, or authority." The New Panama Canal Company was authorized to transfer its concessions and property, including the Panama Railroad, to the United States. Panama was to receive ten million dollars upon the exchange of ratifications and 250 thousand dollars annually commencing nine years

hence. And in Article I the United States guaranteed the independence of the Republic of Panama.¹⁰²

CHAPTER II: THE CANAL ZONE AND IMPERIALISM¹

It was not necessary to be an imperialist to want a Canal. The question of a "Canal or not" was not the issue for most critics of the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration. Several of the Senators stated that even though they wanted a Canal they did not want one taken under such questionable circumstances. Senator Edward Carmack (Democrat, Tennessee) stated during the Senate debates on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty: "Nobody here, Mr. President, is trying to make an issue of the Panama Canal or to make an issue of the canal at all. The issue that arises out of this matter is the simple question of whether the President of the United States can substitute his own will for the law of the land."² A little later in the same speech he added, "I stand here for the canal; but I stand here for the law."³ Senator Thomas Patterson (Democrat, Colorado) stated the situation even more bluntly: ". . . I feel that, unless one can justify the possession and retention of stolen property, he can not justify the ratification of a treaty that will give the United States a zone for a canal that was stolen in a most bare-faced manner from Colombia."⁴ And Senator Benjamin R. Tillman (Democrat, South Carolina) echoed this sentiment when he proclaimed, "I want a canal, and I want one at Panama, provided we do not have to steal it."⁵

Did the imperialistic spirit of the turn of the century lead to such a desire for a United States-controlled Canal Zone that questionable acts were committed by the Roosevelt Administration in the attainment of this goal? William McCain has called this action a "sordid deed of imperialism."⁶ William Appleman Williams has declared that President Roosevelt "took the Panama Canal Zone from Colombia in as brazen a bit of imperial land-grabbing as is recorded in modern history."⁷ Senator Carmack compared the events in Panama to the imperialistic venture in Hawaii at the beginning of the 1890s: "The Hawaiian infamy had several things in common with this Panama coup. An American minister engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the very government to which he was accredited and with which we professed to be at peace, and American marines were landed on a false pretext to aid that conspiracy."⁸

The desire for a Canal was a central part of the imperialist philosophy. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the leading military strategist of the time, claimed that "the fundamental meaning of the canal will be that it advances by thousands of miles the frontiers of European civilization in general, and of

the United States in particular; that it knits together the whole system of American states enjoying that civilization as in no other way they can be bound."⁹ The Caribbean and Hawaii were but outposts of the Canal.¹⁰ The United States has a "reasonable, natural-it might almost be called moral-claim to preponderant influence at the Isthmus. . . ." ¹¹ Furthermore: "The canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines. . . are important as facilitating our access to the seas of China and to the valley of the Yangtse, and as furnishing territorial support to our action there."¹² And the Canal would give the greatest motive to the build-up of the United States Navy.¹³

Brooks Adams linked the necessity of a Canal to the large industrial surplus in the United States. He declared that since "China is the only region which now provides almost boundless possibilities of absorption," an isthmian Canal "to the Pacific must be built."¹⁴ Furthermore he stated: "The West Indies are gravitating toward the United States; therefore, the West Indies must be consolidated, and the lines of communication with them shortened and cheapened. Therefore, a canal to the Pacific must be built, and Central America must become an integral part of the economic mass, much as Egypt has become a part of England in order to guarantee her communications with India."¹⁵

Reverend Josiah Strong asserted that "the Pacific will be transferred by the Nicaragua Canal from the commercial control of England to that of the United States."¹⁶ And "influences which have hitherto caused westward migrations will likely, after the canal is opened, to stimulate a movement of population and capital southward. That political results will follow such a movement can hardly be doubted."¹⁷

Frederick Jackson Turner explained:

For nearly three centuries the dominant fact in American life has been expansion. With the settlement of the Pacific coast and the occupation of the free lands, this movement has come to a check. That these energies of expansion will no longer operate would be a rash prediction; and the demands for a vigorous foreign policy, for an interoceanic canal, for a revival of our power upon the seas, and for the extension of American influence to outlying islands and adjoining countries, are indications that the movement will continue.¹⁸

Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana stated in an address on expansion April 27, 1898: "If this means the Stars and Stripes over an Isthmian canal. . . over Hawaii. . . over Cuba and the southern seas. . . then let us meet that meaning with a mighty joy and make the meaning good, no matter what barbarism and all our foes may do or say."¹⁹

In his Annual Message of December, 1898, President William McKinley emphasized that a U. S.-controlled Canal was "demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific."²⁰

As early as 1894 Theodore Roosevelt declared: "I do wish our Republicans would go in avowedly to annex Hawaii and build an oceanic canal with the money of Uncle Sam."²¹ In a speech on April 10, 1899 he noted that "if we are to hold our own in the struggle for naval and commercial supremacy, we must build up our power without our borders. We must build the isthmian canal, and we must grasp the points of vantage which will enable us to have our say in deciding the destiny of the oceans of the East and West."²² Roosevelt had known Captain Mahan since 1888, and was deeply influence by his writings. He wrote several laudatory reviews of Mahan's books and articles, beginning with a review of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* in the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1890.²³

An Isthmian Canal was considered essential in order for the United States to compete in the opening Asian markets, especially in China. And a Canal would allow the U. S. Navy to operate on two oceans.

The proposed Canal also provided expansionists like Henry Cabot Lodge with arguments for the annexation of Hawaii and Cuba (even Santo Domingo and St. Thomas were mentioned), as the United States would need to control the approaches to the Canal both in the East and the West.²⁴

Out of the many arguments used to justify expansion at the turn of the century (economic, humanitarian-- "the White Man's Burden," strategic, religious, social evolutionist, etc.), one argument in particular was used to justify the Panama action. This was the thesis that the United States is justified in seizing territory where the present occupying country hinders the interests of "collective civilization" by its refusal or inability to cultivate the potential of the area under its jurisdiction. The Roosevelt Administration felt that the United States had a mandate from world civilization to coerce a nation which, by its "selfish" actions (Colombia's rejection of the Hay-Herrán Treaty), stood in the way of measures (a Canal) that would benefit the world as a whole.²⁵ In a special Message to Congress January 4, 1904, President Roosevelt said:

The proper position for the United States to assume in reference to this canal, and therefore to the governments of the Isthmus, had been clearly set forth by Secretary Cass in 1858. In my annual message I have already quoted what Secretary Cass said; but I repeat the quotation here, because the principle it states is fundamental:

"While the rights of sovereignty of the states occupying this region (Central America) should always be respected, we shall expect that these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the occasion and the wants and circumstances that have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none of these local governments, even if administered with

more regard to the just demands of other nations than they have been, would be permitted in a spirit of Eastern isolation to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world and justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations as would prevent their general use."

The principle thus enunciated by Secretary Cass was sound then and it is sound now.²⁶

Roosevelt continued:

The enterprise (canal) was recognized as responding to an international need; and it would be the veriest travesty on right and justice to treat the governments in possession of the Isthmus as having the right, in the language of Mr. Cass, "to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them."²⁷

Further Roosevelt stated:

... I confidently maintain that the recognition of the Republic of Panama was an act justified by the interests of collective civilization. If ever a government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization to effect an object the accomplishment of which was demanded in the interest of mankind, the United States holds that position with regard to the interoceanic canal.²⁸

The control of an Isthmian Canal was also a corollary to the United States policy of dominating the Gulf and Caribbean region in order to prevent its domination by Europe.²⁹

The Canal was for President Roosevelt the indispensable path to a global destiny for the United States.³⁰

CHAPTER III: THE PRESS AND THE PANAMA ISSUE: THE ATTACKERS

There was a virtual deluge of editorial comment in the press in the weeks following the Panama Revolution, with some papers commenting daily or almost daily. Many of these newspapers criticized the Panama events. Why? What were the influences affecting the decision to criticize and what were the arguments used to justify the choice? Did this criticism lead to a rejection of the Panama Canal, or did it stop with a condemnation of the means used to gain the Canal while accepting the results of the Panama policy?

THE ATLANTIC STATES

The following were among the newspapers in the Atlantic states which criticized the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration: *Philadelphia Record* (Ind. Dem.);¹ *Philadelphia Public Ledger* (Ind. Rep.);² *New York Times* (Ind. Dem.);³ *New York American* (Dem.);⁴ *New York Evening Post* (Ind. Rep.);⁵ *Pittsburg Post* (Dem.);⁶ *Pittsburg Dispatch* (Ind. Rep.);⁷ *Wilmington, Delaware, Every Evening*;⁸ *Washington Post* (Ind.);⁹ *Baltimore Sun* (Dem.);¹⁰ *Baltimore News* (Ind.);¹¹ *New York Staats Zeitung* (Ind.).¹²

NEW ENGLAND STATES

New England newspapers criticizing the Panama policy included the: *Springfield, Massachusetts, Daily Republican* (Ind.);¹³ *Boston Post* (Ind. Dem.);¹⁴ *New Haven, Connecticut, Evening Register* (Ind. Dem.);¹⁵ *Manchester, New Hampshire, Union* (Ind. Dem.).¹⁶

THE WEST

Newspapers criticizing the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration in the West included the: *Seattle Daily Times* (Ind.);¹⁷ *Portland Daily Journal* (Ind.);¹⁸ *San Francisco Examiner* (Dem.);¹⁹ *Denver, Colorado, Rocky Mountain News* (Ind. Rep.);²⁰ *Helena, Montana, Independent* (Ind.);²¹ *Tucson, Arizona, Citizen* (Ind.);²² *Salt Lake, Utah, Herald* (Dem.).²³

MIDWEST STATES

The Following newspapers were among those criticizing in the Midwest states: *Omaha, Nebraska, Morning World-Herald* (Ind.);²⁴ *Indianapolis Sentinel* (Dem.);²⁵ *Milwaukee Journal* (Dem.);²⁶ *Topeka, Kansas, Daily Capital* (Rep.);²⁷ *Springfield, Illinois State Register* (Ind. Dem.);²⁸ *Chicago Chronicle* (Dem.);²⁹ *Chicago American* (Dem.);³⁰ *Chicago Evening Post* (Ind.);³¹ *St. Paul Globe* (Ind. Dem.).³²

THE SOUTH

In the South the following were among the papers critical of the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration: *Louisville Courier-Journal* (Ind. Dem.);³³ *Colombia, South Carolina, State* (Dem.);³⁴ *Memphis Commercial Appeal* (Dem.);³⁵ *Raleigh, North Carolina, News and Observer* (Dem.);³⁶ *Atlanta Journal* (Dem.);³⁷ *Wheeling, West Virginia, Register* (Ind. Dem.);³⁸ *Nashville Banner* (Ind. Dem.);³⁹ *Chatanooga, Tennessee, Daily Times* (Ind. Dem.);⁴⁰ *Wilmington, North Carolina, Morning Star* (Ind.);⁴¹

Richmond, Virginia, *Times-Dispatch* (Dem.);⁴² Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette* (Dem.);⁴³ Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat* (Ind. Dem.);⁴⁴ Jackson, Mississippi, *Weekly Clarion-Ledger* (Dem.);⁴⁵ Augusta, Georgia, *Chronicle* (Ind. Dem.);⁴⁶ New Orleans *Daily Picayune* (Dem.);⁴⁷ Charleston, South Carolina, *News and Courier* (Dem.);⁴⁸ Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union* (Dem.);⁴⁹ Birmingham, Alabama, *Age-Herald* (Dem.);⁵⁰ Montgomery, Alabama, *Advertiser* (Dem.);⁵¹ Houston *Post* (Dem.);⁵² Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman* (Dem.);⁵³ Norfolk *Virginian-Pilot* (Dem.);⁵⁴ Savannah, Georgia, *Press* (Ind.);⁵⁵ Selma, Alabama, *Times* (Dem.);⁵⁶ Nashville, Tennessee, *News*; ⁵⁷ Memphis, Tennessee, *News*.⁵⁸

CANAL DESIRE, LACK OF MORALS, and IMPERIALISM

Many papers agreed with the New York *Times* that the United States had wrested Panama from Colombia because it wanted a Canal.⁵⁹ The Birmingham *Age-Herald* declared that the Panama Revolution "is a revolution of the canal, by the canal, for the canal. . . ." ⁶⁰ The Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette* charged: "Finding that Colombia was dissatisfied with the treaty that would have given the right to build the waterway, President Roosevelt actively supports with the ships of our navy a rebellion in Panama with the implied understanding that, in consideration of our keeping Colombia off the new republic it is to give us the canal franchise we want." ⁶¹ The Springfield *Daily Republican* put it this way: "Stripped to its skin, what does the performance at the isthmus mean other than that we have sandbagged Colombia when she was not looking and now have the goods?" ⁶²

The Philadelphia *Public Ledger* believed that in joining the land-grabbing powers of the world the United States had put its own interests ahead of the moral law; its Panama action was tantamount to overthrowing the Ten Commandments.⁶³ The *Public Ledger* retold the story of King Ahab of Samaria who desired ownership of the vineyard of Naboth the Jezreelite in the interests of civilization. The cause of progress was blocked when Naboth refused to sign a treaty with the king, so the king's counselors came to an understanding with the elders and nobles of Jezreel who then stoned Naboth to death. Thereafter the Jezreelites offered the vineyard to King Ahab.⁶⁴ The Denver *Rocky Mountain News* explained that: "We have coveted the Colombian Naboth's vineyard and have taken it away from him. . . ." ⁶⁵ And the Topeka *Daily Capital* felt the same way: "We have adopted the old-world idea in dealing with 'tenth-rate' states, which may properly be style[d] the Naboth's Vineyard principle of diplomacy." ⁶⁶

The Manchester *Union* told a parable of a strong man who persuaded the son of a poor man to steal his father's horse. The poor man's son brought the horse to the strong man and became a member of his household. Then

"the strong man went forth with a club, and walked up and down, and declared that the feeble father must in no case resort to violence to recover either horse or son. . . ." ⁶⁷ And the *Baltimore Sun* told the story of an invasion in olden times: "The people of the country invaded asked the general of the invading army by what right he assumed to take their country. The general frankly replied: 'By the right of our swords.' Everybody knows that is the right and the only right we have to give aid and comfort to Panama. Why don't we say so honestly and frankly?" ⁶⁸

The *Springfield, Illinois State Register* regretted that "this piratical proceeding has not awakened severe protest and denunciation from the churches, and from people who are honest though perhaps not religiously inclined. The course of the United States government in the Panama robbery is high handed and without parallel in the history of this country." ⁶⁹ According to the *Louisville Courier-Journal* it "is the United States that leads the way and sets the example of ruthless robbery. It is the United States that steps down from its lofty pedestal and high pretensions of justice and honor to become a very thief among the Nations and a sneak-thief at that." ⁷⁰ In the opinion of the *New York American* everybody was thinking and talking about "the theft of the Isthmus of Panama by the President of the United States." ⁷¹ The *Milwaukee Journal* believed that: "Morally speaking, we are on a little lower plane than before the incident." ⁷² And the *Raleigh News and Observer* noted that: "When strong men steal from the weak, they rarely have the courage of their dishonesty, and invent some other reason than that they grabbed the possession of the weak because they wanted it." "But there is no other reason why this country was the wet nurse of the infant republic of Panama." ⁷³

The *New York Times* warned: "It is not good for a party or a candidate to get upon the wrong side of a moral issue when an appeal is to be made to the voters of this nation. The Panama policy of the President is a moral issue." ⁷⁴ Referring to Colombia's protests to the United States, The *New York Evening Post* asserted that for a moral and Christian government to be approached with reasonings about right and justice "is the particularly hard thing for a churchgoing President to have to face. What shall it profit him to gain a canal and lose his self-respect?" ⁷⁵ Numerous other papers condemned the philosophies of "the end justifies the means," and "might makes right." ⁷⁶

The *Springfield Daily Republican*, one of the leading spokesmen for the anti-imperialist movement, explained that the imperialism of the last five years, witnessing the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines, etc., has "given us a taste for blood and adventure and a ready aptitude for the sophisms which disguise plunder as holy sacrifices to the Lord." ⁷⁷ Calling this moment "an hour that thrills the jingo soul," it charged that: "The

expulsion of Colombia from the isthmus is on the same moral plane with German and Russian aggressions in China, with the French appropriation of Madagascar, and with the third Napoleon's shoddy conquest of Mexico. It is a mercenary act of grab, done in behalf of the domineering commercialism of the time. . . ."78 The *Daily Republican* noted that: "Every such departure from a high standard of national honor, especially when it is loudly indorsed by a powerful political and even religious press, leaves its imprint upon national character."⁷⁹ "Of irreproachable private character, our ruling statesmen still do things in their public capacity whose morality they would immediately condemn in a private transaction between man and man."⁸⁰

The Denver *Rocky Mountain News* charged that the "policy of imperialism which led us to hold lands far away across the Pacific as a trophy of successful war has developed naturally into intrigue to seize the territory of a friendly country in time of peace."⁸¹ "By the Panama raid we subscribe to the often condemned doctrine that small and weak nations have no rights which large and powerful nations are bound to respect; we commit an act of aggression as indefensible ethically as the partition of Poland, the subjugation of Finland, the ravaging of the Chinese empire or the division of South Africa."⁸²

The Pittsburg *Post* charged that "President Roosevelt wants to do things regardless of international law, common honesty and American precedents, and it appears will have the support of his party in Congress, from which almost anything can be expected after the Philippine experience. This is another step in the imperial policy. 'Might makes right'--steal from the weak. . . ."83 The Baltimore *News* asserted that "we have added one more precedent to that of Hawaii, and that of the Philippines, along the line of those things which take us out of the category of non-grabbing nations, and put our international morality upon a level with that of the European Powers."⁸⁴

According to the Topeka *Daily Capital*, Colombia had "been treated as a contemptible little state, to be elbowed aside when it gets in the way of 'manifest destiny,' in other words, the interests of the United States. . . . We are booming along on the new course of expansion at ninety miles an hour, under open orders to sidetrack whatever happens to be in the way."⁸⁵ The Omaha *Morning World-Herald* charged that: "We are becoming quite accustomed these days, to imperialism. We seem to have convinced ourselves that whatever the United States may do is right."⁸⁶ The Washington *Post* satirically hailed the situation "with respectful wonder as another and a still more glorious step in the path of that national progress, and a fresh and vivid illustration of that beneficent diplomacy which, during the past five years, has won for us the envy and admiration of the

world.”⁸⁷

In an editorial entitled "A Dream of Empire," the *Boston Post* noted that there was already talk of annexation of Panama, but even a protectorate was "empire in embryo." To bring the whole continent under the eagle's wings would require a departure from traditional principles of government, and the people of the United States would become "subjects of an empire rather than citizens of a republic."⁸⁸ In an editorial entitled "Another Step of Imperialism," the *Philadelphia Record* predicted that after the establishment of the Panama Republic the next step would be its annexation "in the march of imperialism."⁸⁹

To the *Charleston News and Courier* it appeared "that the Panama coup d'état is another far step in the imperial policy. . . ."⁹⁰ With "an imperial President at the head of an imperial party, all limits to the power of the Executive will in time be abolished."⁹¹ The *Chatanooga Daily Times* had a suspicion that as soon as President Roosevelt got the Panama Canal he would "go off marauding somewhere else. The taste for 'expansion,' it is said, is about as strong as the taste for blood. . . ."⁹²

References to imperialism were also heard from the *Tucson Citizen*⁹³ and the *Louisville Courier-Journal*,⁹⁴ while the *Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman* believed that the entire proceeding was "so tainted with unwarranted interference and national dishonor that our discreditable history in connection with the conquest of the Filipinos seems tame and commonplace."⁹⁵ And several papers joined the *New York Times* in comparing the Panama Revolution to the Hawaiian Revolution of 1893,⁹⁶ with the *Nashville Banner* seeing U. S. interference in Hawaii as "mild" compared to its interference on the Isthmus of Panama.⁹⁷

TREATY OF 1846

The Roosevelt Administration was accused of misusing and violating the Treaty of 1846 by which the United States guaranteed to Colombia the neutrality of the Isthmus so free transit would not be interrupted (with Colombia also guaranteeing to the United States free and open transit), and by which the United States guaranteed the sovereignty and property of Colombia on the Isthmus. It was pointed out in essence that the United States, by preventing Colombia from putting down rebellion on the excuse that fighting would block transit, was using its guarantee of transit to justify the destruction of the likewise guaranteed Colombian sovereignty. Even if Colombian sovereignty had only been guaranteed against foreign invasion, as stated by the Roosevelt Administration, then Colombia should have been left free to put down the domestic revolution. And the United States itself should not become the foreign invader.

The *New York Times* accused the Administration of going beyond the

limited object of the guarantee of transit in the Treaty of 1846: "We now execute that guarantee in a manner and by measures which rob the Republic of Colombia of her richest State. We intervene between her and her revolted citizens by force and show of force sufficient to deter her from taking effective measures to suppress the insurrection."⁹⁸ Furthermore: "We guaranteed Colombian sovereignty as against foreign assault--all foreign assault. Obviously that includes ourselves."⁹⁹ "Yet we are now the assailant. We forbid Colombia to send troops, we compel her to stand idle while the insurgents have their way."¹⁰⁰ "It is impossible that this guarantee should have been given by us or accepted by Colombia with the understanding that we ourselves might seize or cause to be seized Colombian territory which we forbade all other foreign nations to invade."¹⁰¹ "No treaty ever authorized acts destructive of the sovereignty of the power that made it."¹⁰² Treaties are essentially acts of good faith and it is essential above all to inquire as to the purpose of the contracting parties.¹⁰³ As interpreted by the Administration, the Treaty of 1846 binds us "to take all we can get on the Isthmus and do with it as we please."¹⁰⁴ "It is, then, an act of conquest in which we are engaged, and conquest lies outside the domain of law."¹⁰⁵

The *New York Times* further stated that although the United States did not guarantee in the Treaty of 1846 to suppress domestic insurrections, Colombia could easily do that "if we would take our hands off, or if we would confine ourselves to the strict performance of our duty under the treaty--the protection of transit."¹⁰⁶ It pointed out that this is what President Cleveland had done earlier, quoting from Cleveland's first Annual Message to Congress, December, 1885:

Emergencies growing out of civil war in the United States of Colombia demanded of the Government, at the beginning of this Administration, the employment of armed force to fulfill its guarantees under the thirty-fifth article of the treaty of 1846, in order to keep the transit open across the Isthmus of Panama. Desirous of exercising only the powers expressly reserved to us by the treaty, and mindful of the rights of Colombia, the forces sent to the Isthmus were instructed to confine their action to "positively and efficaciously prevent the transit and its accessories from being interrupted or embarrassed." The execution of this delicate and responsible task necessarily involved police control, while the local authority was temporarily powerless, but always in aid of the sovereignty of Colombia.¹⁰⁷

The *Philadelphia Record* also noted that in 1885 President Cleveland "carried out the treaty stipulations to keep the transit open and to respect the sovereignty of Colombia."¹⁰⁸ The United States, it explained, had no power to anticipate possibilities, only to deal with actualities; its privileges

of safeguarding traffic became operative only when danger threatened the traffic, not before. And the "right of a State to maintain its territorial integrity is paramount to all other considerations. It is superior to treaties and all other obligations."¹⁰⁹ Yet, what had been done by the United States during the Panama Revolution of November, 1903: "The highest right of a nation--namely, the right to preserve its existence and to maintain its territorial integrity--has been denied. This is the salient fact in the controversy; this is the wrong which makes the United States Government not merely particeps criminis but the principal actor in the dismemberment of an American State."¹¹⁰

The New York *Evening Post* charged that Theodore Roosevelt has "put a strained and false interpretation upon a treaty--as if it were possible that Colombia, or any other country, could ever give a foreign nation a treaty right to dismember it!"¹¹¹ As put by the Baltimore *Sun*: "The fact is, we appear to be promoting the disintegration of the Colombia Republic, giving to the treaty with Colombia a twist which does credit to our ingenuity into reading into that convention a meaning nobody had ever imagined could be found within its lines. Our construction of that treaty is that Colombia gave us permission to disintegrate her whenever the spirit moved us and the opportunity was presented."¹¹² And the Springfield *Daily Republican* pointed out that "Colombia was prevented by the action of our government from performing her own treaty obligations to keep transit open."¹¹³

The Memphis *Commercial Appeal* stated that whenever the United States had interfered on the Isthmus in the past it had protected Colombian sovereignty, but it "is now interfering to destroy Colombian sovereignty and to prevent the assertion of that sovereignty. It is acting in plain and unequivocal violation of the treaty of 1846."¹¹⁴ Mr. Roosevelt "has sent an American fleet down there for the avowed purpose of destroying the sovereignty of Colombia on the isthmus."¹¹⁵ The Topeka *Daily Capital* explained that instead of protecting the sovereignty of Colombia on the Isthmus, "we appear to have actually made it impossible even for Colombia to protect and defend her own sovereignty."¹¹⁶ And the Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union* said that the U. S. Government could keep the Panama secessionists from obstructing the Panama Railroad as easily as it could keep Colombia from attacking.¹¹⁷

RECOGNITION OF PANAMA

The New York *Times* attacked the haste of recognition as contravening international custom and breaking violently with United States practice and tradition.¹¹⁸ It charged that President Roosevelt recognized Panama "before he had a scrap of documentary evidence to show that it existed.

Cable dispatches were his only attestations. He did not know, and could not have known, that the new republic was capable of maintaining its place among nations and fulfilling its obligations--knowledge which is by universal practice the prerequisite of recognition."¹¹⁹ "If the President did know enough about the affair to justify his indecently swift recognition of independence, he knew too much. If he did not know, if he had no other evidence than the impressions hastily gathered by our Consuls and the representations of the rebels, he knew far too little to justify recognition in a week."¹²⁰

To those who would say that Colombia had failed to prevent the establishment of Panama, the New York *Times* declared: "That is the very soul and body of our offending. Colombia as yet hardly knows what has been done on the Isthmus. We have given her no time to set in motion armed force to quell the rebellion. Worse than that, we have with force and show of force intervened to stay her hand."¹²¹ It quoted earlier Presidents Jackson, Monroe, and Grant to prove that the recognition had been too hasty. Grant, in his Annual Message of December, 1875, said on the subject of recognizing Cuban independence, that there must be a government "capable of performing the corresponding international duties resulting from its acquisition of the rights of sovereignty. A power shall exist complete in its organization ready to take and able to maintain its place among the nations of the earth."¹²²

On the subject of recognition the Baltimore *Sun* noted: "The world moves swiftly in the twentieth century. A week is sufficient to decide matters which Monroe and the early school of American statesmen required years to consider." "How long, to quote President Grant, would it [Panama] be 'able to maintain its place among the nations of the earth' if Colombia were not held in check by Uncle Sam? Is not Uncle Sam virtually recognizing himself when he extends recognition to his protégé in Panama?"¹²³

The Salt Lake *Herald* believed it was as wrong for the United States to recognize the Provisional Government of Panama as it would be for England to recognize the provisional government of a seceded state of Utah: "And what a howl would go up if the latter suggestion became a fact; and what a just howl it would be, too."¹²⁴ Similarly the Birmingham *Age-Herald* asked what would happen if a seceded state of Washington was recognized by England on the second day of its installation, on the score of peace and coal mines and Alaskan lines: "Would there not be a call to arms at once?" Yet this "is exactly what we have done at Panama, no matter how much we may try to conceal our hand."¹²⁵ And the Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman* asked: "What would President Lincoln and Secretary Seward think of the record-breaking feat just performed by President Roosevelt

and Secretary Hay, in granting recognition almost before it had been asked and before a single gun had been fired or a single drop of blood had been shed?"¹²⁶

The Memphis *Commercial Appeal* accused President Roosevelt of violating "international law, which requires that there shall be a stable government which has actually accomplished its independence before it can be recognized. There is, as a matter of fact, no government at all in Panama, only a self-constituted committee claiming to be a government."¹²⁷ The United States Government "might just as well have established official relations with a case of measles, or recognized the independence of a comic opera as to have gravely received the envoy most extraordinary of the Republic of Panama."¹²⁸ It is absurd to expect Colombia to suppress the rebellion within a week; yet the "administration bluffs off Colombia from Panama, and then explains to the public that Panama was recognized because Colombia could not maintain her sovereignty on the isthmus."¹²⁹

In the opinion of the New Haven *Evening Register*, if Germany or Great Britain had been dismembered instead of Colombia, the insurgents would have been recognized as belligerents at most.¹³⁰ Maybe Roosevelt should tauntingly be asked why Panama was recognized when recognition was withheld from Cuba and the Boers.¹³¹ "The ugly fact that there would have been no recognition had there been no canal profit in the transaction for us will not down. . . ."¹³²

The Houston *Post* charged that the United States Government had recognized a state in open rebellion.¹³³ The Springfield *Daily Republican* accused the Administration of prematurely meddling in Colombian affairs by recognizing Panama before Colombia had a fair chance to suppress the Revolution.¹³⁴ It pointed out that the United States had threatened to fight England if the South was recognized, even after Lee's greatest victories.¹³⁵ But by the same tests of recognition used for Panama, the South should have been recognized three days after Fort Sumter was fired upon.¹³⁶ And the Manchester *Union* noted that "we are getting accustomed to seeing old-time principles repudiated with great ease and rapidity."¹³⁷

According to the New York *Evening Post* recognition of Panama was not only taken in "hot haste, but with wild impetuosity the Administration has gone the full length of entering into relations with a government of which it has no reason to believe in either the sincerity, validity, or stability. This is diplomacy gone mad. This is to adopt bullying insult as the true guide to foreign relations."¹³⁸ The Helena *Independent* pointed out that: "Ten days from a revolution to a new nation is quick work--altogether too quick work to suit most people who believe in observing some of the forms of international courtesy and decency."¹³⁹ And the Chicago

Chronicle charged that: "In defiance of common sense and law alike, Mr. Roosevelt accorded official recognition to a fake republic within 100 hours of its illegitimate birth."¹⁴⁰ Many other papers also attacked the recognition of Panama.¹⁴¹

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, LAW, and TRADITION

The *Memphis Commercial Appeal* claimed that the President had violated the U.S. Constitution "which does not give him any right to recognize new governments, to embroil us in South American revolutions or to declare war, as he has practically done, against Colombia."¹⁴² "He forbids Colombia to land troops in her rebellious province, thus making this country an ally of a seceding State, and preventing the central government from suppressing a rebellion within its confines. Authorities on international law all agree this is an act of war."¹⁴³ The *Louisville Courier-Journal* concluded that President Roosevelt had "assumed powers no Constitutional authority can approve and no Constitutional argument maintain."¹⁴⁴

The *Philadelphia Public Ledger* accused President Roosevelt of taking the Canal matter into his "own hands" by Executive act,¹⁴⁵ while the *New York Times* proclaimed that the right to build a Canal was acquired "by the mixed title of intrigue and war--for intervention is war."¹⁴⁶

President Roosevelt was also accused of violating or flouting the Spooner Law, which required turning to a Nicaragua route if the Panama Canal was not secured within "reasonable time" from Colombia.¹⁴⁷

The *Denver Rocky Mountain News* pointed out that the "reasonable time" for turning to Nicaragua had long since elapsed.¹⁴⁸ The *Chatanooga Daily Times* charged that instead of obeying the Spooner Law, President Roosevelt "appears to have waited such an unreasonable time that the state of Panama, taking his delayed action as proof that the route through their territory was still practicable, have set up for themselves a separate state. . . ."¹⁴⁹ According to the *New York American*: "Instead of obeying the law, President Roosevelt has chosen to commit a deed of lawlessness, in the seizure of the Isthmus of Panama, the like of which has never stained the history of this Republic."¹⁵⁰

The *New York Times* felt that the Spooner Law would not cover the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama. The Spooner Law specifically referred to Colombia, not Panama, so the House of Representatives would be required to pass again on any appropriations for a Panama Canal.¹⁵¹ It accused the President of intending "a dangerous executive usurpation of power" in not seeking further authority from Congress than was contained in the Spooner Law.¹⁵² The *Memphis Commercial Appeal* likewise believed

that the President had no authority to deal with Panama for a Canal.¹⁵³

According to the Louisville *Courier-Journal* a hundred years of honorable international policy had been reversed in the Panama events. The United States had abrogated the Monroe Doctrine, cut away the last moorings of Republicanism, scattered the teachings of the Fathers of Democracy to the four winds, swung into imperial greed flourishing might over right, and begun a career of aggression.¹⁵⁴ The Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union* believed that the United States had broken all the traditions of a century and interfered in the domestic relations of Colombia because there were Canals to consider.¹⁵⁵

The Tucson *Citizen* thought the traditions of the Fathers and the principles of the Declaration of Independence had been broken;¹⁵⁶ and the Milwaukee *Journal* charged that the Washington Government had overturned all precedents and principles.¹⁵⁷

INTERESTS OF CIVILIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL EMINENT DOMAIN

The Philadelphia *Record* was among the papers attacking the doctrines of the interests of civilization and international eminent domain used in defense of the Panama action. It called the attempt to justify the action to attain the Canal on the basis that it was in the interests of civilization "the old argument employed by the 'bearers of civilization' to justify their exploitation of the undeveloped nations."¹⁵⁸ And the doctrine of eminent domain could not be applied on the international level, for where were the tribunals to decide that a seizure of territory was "for the general good" and the question of compensation.¹⁵⁹ It was "a fiction invented merely for the purpose of investing an act of spoliation with the form of legality."¹⁶⁰

The Philadelphia *Public Ledger* compared Secretary Hay's apology for the "Panama aggression" with Russian arguments justifying extension of influence on the basis of "the interests of civilization."¹⁶¹

The New York *Evening Post* believed the doctrine of eminent domain could not be used to justify the Administration's actions, for no state exercises such international peremptory rights--condemnation by courts, appraisement and indemnification were all necessary parts of that process.¹⁶² And the Pittsburg *Post*, noting that the law of state necessity had been pleaded in defense, declared: "Having once made up our mind to steal, reasons can be found plenty as blackberries, and the people, under the lead of President and secretaries, will be found eager to accept the boodle."¹⁶³ "There are bullies and hidebound partisans who would approve the robbery of the Indians in their sheer desperation to find excuse for this deplorable act."¹⁶⁴

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

The Philadelphia *Public Ledger* claimed that: "There is no precedent in our history for the hasty action at Panama. It is modeled after Russian aggressions in Asia, against which it has been the proud privilege of this country always to protest, and it must make such protests henceforth valueless."¹⁶⁵ The New York *Evening Post* declared that the "President has made it possible for the Cossacks themselves to point the finger of scorn at us."¹⁶⁶ In the opinion of the Baltimore *Sun* the position of the United States had been weakened in regard to Russia's venture in Manchuria, where Russia had at least made a show of regard for China's sovereignty.¹⁶⁷ And the New Orleans *Daily Picayune* called the interference by the U. S. Government in Colombia "a premeditated and unjustifiable participation in the spoliation of a weak and friendly nation comparable only to the almost universally denounced seizure by Russia of the Chinese province of Manchuria."¹⁶⁸ In fact, it felt that Panama spelled the death knell for China, as other nations realize "they can now carry on the dividing and parceling out of China without fear of further remonstrance from the over-conscientious and extra-scrupulous Americans, who were formerly such sticklers for the rights of other nations."¹⁶⁹ It claimed that "not even Russia in her worst moods ever was guilty of such a barefaced bit of land piracy as that perpetrated by the great American Republic on the Isthmus of Panama."¹⁷⁰

The Philadelphia *Record* listed the partition of Poland and the invasion of Spain by Napoleon among the historic precedents of the Panama affair,¹⁷¹ while the New York *Evening Post* exclaimed: "Who could have imagined that an American Administration would make the Jameson Raid look respectable? But that is precisely what the Government at Washington has done. Dr. Jameson could at least pretend to be actuated by humane motives; this mad plunge of ours is simply and solely a vulgar and mercenary venture, without a rag to cover its sordidness and its shame."¹⁷²

The Washington *Post* pointed out that there could be no greater contrast than between former President McKinley's attempts to keep the United States from intervening in Cuba and "the relation of our government to recent events on the isthmus of Panama."¹⁷³

The Springfield *Daily Republican* compared President Roosevelt's original draft for his December 7, 1903 Annual Message to Congress, written before the Revolution, in which he was going to recommend that if Colombia failed to come to agreement with the United States on the Hay-Herrán Treaty "we must forthwith take the matter into our own hands," with the Ostend Manifesto of 1854. In the latter the U. S. Ministers

at Madrid, Paris and London advised seizing Cuba by force if Spain refused to sell the island. The Republican platform of 1856 denounced the Ostend Manifesto as embodying "the highwayman's plea, that 'might makes right'"¹⁷⁴ The *Chicago Chronicle* compared the Panama affair with the Ostend Manifesto, recalling that the Democratic Pierce Administration had also repudiated that manifesto: "Much more reason is there for denouncing an act worse than that proposed by Soule, but never attempted because it was so atrociously bad."¹⁷⁵

In the opinion of the *New York Times* a precedent had been set in the Panama situation for Germany. When the 400,000 Germans in Rio Grande do Sul throw off the authority of Brazil, it stated, Germany would be able to guarantee their protection without having the Monroe Doctrine thrown in her face. She will tell the United States: "This is not a colony we have erected, it is a State, independent and sovereign like your Republic of Panama; the citizens of this State have been our subjects; it is our intention to protect them against interference from Brazil."¹⁷⁶ Other newspapers seeing a precedent set for Germany in South America included the *New Haven Register*,¹⁷⁷ *Topeka Daily Capital*,¹⁷⁸ and *New Orleans Daily Picayune*,¹⁷⁹ with the *Nashville Banner* calling the precedent created dangerous: "After our action in abetting the Panama secession how could we consistently oppose German aid to a rebellion in Brazil?"¹⁸⁰

CONSPIRACY AND ABETTING

There was disagreement among the critical newspapers as to whether the Roosevelt Administration conspired, abetted, or simply encouraged the Revolution.

The *Raleigh News and Observer* charged that: "Panama canal schemers having forty million dollars at stake, were intrusted with that work, but all the world knows that the revolution in Panama was hatched up in Washington under the direction of men near to the administration, and would never have been done but for assurance that the government at Washington would recognize the infant republic."¹⁸¹ The *Atlanta Journal*, noting that it had no disposition nor grounds for a defense of the President "for the manner in which he acted as midwife" to Panama, asserted that everything published "has indicated that Mr. Roosevelt was the eager leader of a conspiracy against the integrity of a weaker and a friendly people."¹⁸²

The *Wheeling Register* believed that the United States was privy to a conspiracy, "that the arrangement for the formation of the republic of Panama was undoubtedly hatched at Washington, with the full knowledge and consent of the administration."¹⁸³ The *New Orleans Daily Picayune*

claimed that the U. S. Government had conspired with the people of Panama,¹⁸⁴ while the *Charleston News and Courier* referred to "the plot of President and his Cabinet."¹⁸⁵

According to the Wilmington, Delaware, *Every Evening*: "The Panama incident assumes more and more the appearance of a brutal intrigue, encouraged secretly at Washington, if not actually conceived there."¹⁸⁶ The Springfield, *Illinois State Register* referred to "this Rough Rider president encouraging and conniving with a few Panama schemers to wrest a state from the galaxy of the United States of Colombia. . . ."¹⁸⁷ And the New York *Evening Post* declared that the orders sent to the Navy on November 2 to prevent the landing of any troops within 50 miles of Panama (City), "could not be a plainer guarantee to the rebels of immunity from attack by Colombian troops."¹⁸⁸

In the opinion of the Louisville *Courier-Journal* the Roosevelt Administration "was in direct communication with the Agents of the French Company working up the so-called Revolution. . . ."¹⁸⁹ And the Colombia *State* charged that the "development of the situation at Panama day by day reveals further evidences of a conspiracy in which the government of the United States is a shameless accomplice after, if not before, the fact."¹⁹⁰

Putting the matter very succinctly the Houston *Post* declared: "If the government at Washington was not at the bottom of the revolutionary movement in Panama, it had on its diving suit, was under the water and witnessed the laying of the mine."¹⁹¹

Other papers, whether or not they doubted that any "clear evidence" could be produced that the United States had instigated the Revolution,¹⁹² accused the Roosevelt Administration of fomenting, aiding or abetting, or encouraging the Revolution.¹⁹³

The Norfolk *Virginian-Pilot* charged that "Panama received the moral support of the Washington government in planning secession and has received its military support since. To attempt to justify that sort of thing on the ground that it is 'business' is to justify highway robbery, for that also is 'business' of the strictest sort."¹⁹⁴ The Chatanooga *Daily Times* asserted that the people of the United States had been "placed in the position of pettifogging intriguers, and whether they deserve it or not, will be regarded by the civilized world as a state organization for loot and selfish aggrandizement."¹⁹⁵

The Portland *Daily Journal* believed that the U. S. Government was so far involved in the Panama events that "it has become a sort of test of patriotism to sustain it. But one of these days when the real inside history of the whole affair is written, the genuine facts and circumstances will be less believable than any book of fiction that ever has been penned."¹⁹⁶ And

the Springfield *Daily Republican* proclaimed: "Away with humbug, cant and hypocrisy. We are witnessing what is really a seizure of the isthmus by the United States government through military force, masked in part by the fake republic set up Tuesday last at Panama city."¹⁹⁷

As put by the Milwaukee *Journal*, the people of the United States "will swallow one coincidence, or perhaps a pair of them, but when they face a chapter that is all coincidences you can't blame them for being skeptical."¹⁹⁸

COLOMBIA

The right of the Colombian Senate to reject the Hay-Herrán Treaty was defended by the New York *Times*, which pointed out that this was the same right used by the U. S. Senate in rejecting the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.¹⁹⁹ The Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union* charged that for the United States to use this rejection as a reason to dismember or assist in dismemberment of Colombia, "will be as the lion would eat the lamb--because it is able to do so."²⁰⁰ Noting that Colombia had a right to refuse the ten million dollars offered and ask for more, the Baltimore *Sun* thought that the weakness of Colombia was an element in the affair: "Superior force, it appears, is the only title Washington respects."²⁰¹ And the New York *American* stated: "If Colombia has turned blackmailer, that does not justify the United States turning pirate."²⁰²

The Philadelphia *Record* believed that the refusal of Colombia to ratify the Canal concession was not final or irrevocable.²⁰³ And the Washington *Post* pointed out that the Canal was a matter of great importance for Colombia, so it was not an international outrage that she could not immediately come to terms: "But this great republic had no tolerance for delay. . . ."²⁰⁴

Referring to a Colombia protest by President Marroquin directly to the U. S. Senate, received November 16, 1903, the Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette* stated: "Possibly the Colombian executive, seeing that the president of our country is working hand in glove with the Panama rebels, and that our secretary of state is the accomplice of our president, felt that if his country was to get consideration and justice it could get such things only from the senate and people of the United States."²⁰⁵ The Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat* saw the grounds for this protest as tenable.²⁰⁶

LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE

The Philadelphia *Record* felt that the United States could better afford to forego the Canal than have Latin America fear its strength.²⁰⁷ The

Raleigh *News and Observer* saw the effect upon Latin America as the worst part of the whole affair: "They regard our setting up of the republic as a mere pretext to grab the country, and they are right about it. We will get out of Panama about as early as England will get out of Egypt."²⁰⁸ The New Haven *Evening Register* also showed concern for the Latin American implications of the Panama policy, asking if South Americans would "see in that action a disinterested affection for their welfare?"²⁰⁹ Fearing that "closer relations" with South America had been damaged, the Milwaukee *Journal* wondered: "Can we keep our faces straight long enough to propose another Pan-American congress?"²¹⁰

Damage to trade with South America was seen as a consequence of the "ruthless" treatment of Colombia by the New York *Times*: "Some of our merchants complain already that their trade has been killed by what the President has done."²¹¹ Noting the expectation of trade with South America after a Canal was constructed, the Baltimore *Sun* stated: "It does seem to be rather absurd to seek trade by slapping patrons in the face and deriding sentiments which they hold dear."²¹² The Springfield *Daily Republican* pointed out that due to fear of aggression by the United States trade opportunities with South America were never poorer. The President had gone far toward annulling one of the main objects of a Canal.²¹³ And the Manchester, New Hampshire, *Union*, regretting that U. S. dignity had been lowered in the estimation of Latin America, thought good-will and commercial benefits had been sacrificed for the sake of more territory. Latin America would see the action taken against Colombia as part of a policy of United States expansion by conquest.²¹⁴

The New York *Evening Post* believed that European governments could not be expected to object to the Panama policy of the United States: "Europe has long wanted the United States to take direct charge of the unruly peoples of Central and South America."²¹⁵ The New Orleans *Daily Picayune* asserted that the "European countries welcome the United States into the grand combination of land grabbers, and dance with glee at the fact."²¹⁶ And the Augusta *Chronicle* was not surprised at European recognition of Panama: "These European countries have long been in the grab game."²¹⁷

HASTY SIGNING

The Pittsburg *Dispatch* called the hasty signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama "the most extreme example of the railroad speed which has characterized all our transactions with the infant republic."²¹⁸ It continued: "Before Panama has a constitution, a representative body or an election the treaty is made, signed and it is heard

in addition that the commissioners are 'authorized'--by whom not stated--to ratify the treaty in the national capital of this country. Should subsequent question be raised in Panama as to the constitutionality of such proceedings it is presumed that our Government will supply the constitutionality along with the other things."²¹⁹

The Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat* felt that the hasty signing of the Panama Canal Treaty would "only confirm the belief that the whole scheme was hatched in the United States and the signing of the treaty was a part of the agreement."²²⁰ And the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* exclaimed: "Outside of the realm of opera bouffe we shall search in vain for a precedent for these breathless proceedings."²²¹

Noting that the defects of irregularity in the negotiation and signing of the Treaty were curable once a constitutive authority was chosen in Panama to ratify the document, the New York *Times* saw implications for expenditures and defense as a result of the Treaty: ". . . we have entered merrily and with a degree of haste quite too great to permit of mature reflection upon an undertaking which requires us to assume certain large obligations."²²²

SECESSION

In the opinion of the Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat* it was inconsistent for the United States to help Panama secede when it had prevented its own people from doing the same thing.²²³ The Augusta *Chronicle* noted that "Uncle Samuel" is suppose to have an aversion to "rebels and traitors and secessionists." Yet this extraordinary and versatile uncle was now putting "rebels, traitors and secessionists" on the back of Colombia: "It is true that our uncle has a large prospective stake in the railway and canal, in that region, but that should not make him what is called a 'monstrous paradox.'"²²⁴ "Born of secession, rebellion and treason, a new 'Republic' has been brought forth with Uncle Sam as the attending physician."²²⁵

The Charleston *News and Courier* exclaimed that whereas the U. S. Government put down rebellion in the United States it is "not only approving and encouraging secession in a sister Republic, but, as all the world believes, instigating a State of that Republic to secede therefrom and establish a government of its own!"²²⁶ The South was fully justified in its rebellion by the Declaration of Independence and there was no conspiracy with a foreign government: "In contrast, behold the citizens of Panama, conspiring with the agents of the Panama Canal Company and the United States consuls for pledges of support in money, ships and men, before daring to raise the standard of their State, or rather, province, for the isthmus had been shorn of all its autonomy years ago."²²⁷

According to the *Colombia State* the scabs had fallen from the Government's eyes, like with Saul of Tarsus, and it now saw secession as right. But Panama did not even have the loophole South Carolina tried to use.²²⁸ And the *Nashville Banner* asked its readers to compare the secession of Panama brought about by a half dozen men powerless to protect themselves, with South Carolina's secession.²²⁹ It claimed: "The recognition of the right of secession in the Panama instance by the United States Government is a logical vindication of the principle contended for forty years ago by the seceding States of the Union."²³⁰

The *Richmond Times-Dispatch* compared Panama's desire to secede for "business reasons" with the South's desire to secede, concluding that things had changed since those days: "President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State and the members of his Cabinet evidently think that secession in Panama is a very beautiful thing and full of righteousness. 'O, noble secessionists,' they say, 'peace be unto you. Have a canal with us.'"²³¹ But: "Panama played smart and seceded--and secession is always right--when it succeeds."²³² And the *Little Rock, Arkansas Gazette* explained:

If Panama succeeded, the Confederacy had succeeded when Jefferson Davis was inaugurated president. If Panama expelled Colombian troops, the Confederacy did the same with United States troops, and took possession of the forts and arsenals. The Confederacy extinguished every atom of United States authority in the South. Besides, the United States are today using their navy to prevent Colombia from suppressing the Panama rebellion. Suppose in 1861 Great Britain had used her fleets to prevent the United States from blockading or attacking Southern seaports.²³³

Joining these and other Southern papers²³⁴ in noting the contrast between the U. S. Government's reaction to the secession of the Confederacy and the secession of Panama, were the *Indianapolis Sentinel*,²³⁵ *Chicago Chronicle*,²³⁶ *Springfield, Illinois State Register*,²³⁷ and *Tucson Citizen*,²³⁸ with the *Pittsburg Post* recalling that when the South seceded a protest was sent out from Washington to the great powers of Europe stating emphatically that the Confederacy had not shown strength sufficient to warrant recognition,²³⁹ and the *Wilmington, Delaware, Every Evening* comparing the Panama situation with the relation between Britain and the Confederate States, asserting that "a reasoning by analogy ought to convince every fair-minded citizen of this country that the policy being pursued by the Roosevelt administration is radically wrong."²⁴⁰

REJECTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE FRUITS: MEANS, ROUTES, AND BENEFITS

Opinion among the critical newspapers was divided between those desiring opposition to the Panama Canal due to the means of attainment, and those willing to accept the fruits of a wrong policy. For some papers the choice of Canal routes played a part in this decision. Others were influenced by expected Canal benefits to their region.

The Tucson *Citizen* praised Democratic Senators for opposing ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. It was the duty of Democrats to take the same position in regard to Panama as they did in opposing imperialism in the Philippines.²⁴¹ The Colombia *State* challenged the Democratic Senators to defeat the Panama Canal Treaty on the grounds of legal and moral principle.²⁴² Recalling that it had earlier supported a Nicaragua route, but then had backed the Panama route after that was chosen--without condemning the Nicaragua alternative, the *State* declared that it was nonsense to say a Canal would be lost altogether unless Theodore Roosevelt was supported.²⁴³

Stating that Democratic Senators were unanimous in condemning the Administration's course, yet several of them proposed to vote for the Canal Treaty with Panama, the Springfield *Daily Republican* noted: "The goods are tainted, they say; but you know we need them in our business." It concluded: "The party that mothered the Ostend manifesto naturally has some representatives to-day who do not object too seriously to receiving stolen goods."²⁴⁴ Earlier the *Daily Republican* drew attention to the fact that Congress had, in its most recent legislation, stamped the Nicaragua route as an alternative worthy of approval, even if less desirable in some respects than the Panama route,²⁴⁵ and it continued to denounce the violation of the Spooner Law.²⁴⁶

The Pittsburg *Post* hoped that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty would not be ratified by the U. S. Senate, thus saving the nation from being "enrolled among the governments who have stolen property in the pursuit of mad ambition or sordid greed."²⁴⁷ "Better no canal for a century than a canal built under such despicable abandonment of all that is proudly American."²⁴⁸

The New York *Times* called for the defeat of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty: "The country does, indeed, want the canal, but it does not want a canal built in wrong and dishonor. The short way, the right way, to check the President in his headlong and dangerous course is to reject the treaty."²⁴⁹ It believed that the United States should abandon the Panama route completely and proceed to Nicaragua under the Spooner Law:²⁵⁰ "The American people prefer the Nicaragua route, they believe it to be superior, they want the canal constructed across the Isthmus at that point."²⁵¹

Praising the opposition of Democratic Senators to the Panama Canal Treaty as righteous and democratic, even though unpopular, the *Omaha Morning World-Herald* compared their stand with opposition to imperialism in the Philippines.²⁵² It believed "now, as always" that the Nicaragua route was better than its rival.²⁵³

The New York *American* stated that it had always been foremost in urging an Isthmian Canal, but believed "we should rather forego forever the advantage of an interocean waterway than gain one by such means as this."²⁵⁴ It hoped that "the majority in Congress will place loyalty to principle above loyalty to the Administration, and give us back our self-respect."²⁵⁵ The "theft of Panama" was as needless as it was criminal, as the Canal preferred by the American people could be had without delay by negotiating a treaty with Nicaragua and Costa Rica.²⁵⁶ The San Francisco *Examiner*, owned by William Randolph Hearst like the New York *American* and containing the same editorial attacks upon the Administration's Panama policy, called upon Congress, particularly the Democrats, to compel the President to obey the law and dig a Nicaragua canal.²⁵⁷

The *Pittsburg Dispatch*, which had favored a Panama Canal even before the Administration took it up, felt that neither the Canal's importance nor Colombian greed could overrule good faith to the treaty compact of 1846.²⁵⁸ Calling a Canal a desirable project, the *Boston Post* nevertheless concluded: "But does this desirable end justify dishonorable means? We do not think the American people will accept such a plea."²⁵⁹ The New Haven *Evening Register* expressed its opinion that: "We want the canal but we need absolutely clean hands more."²⁶⁰ Similarly the *Salt Lake Herald* noted: "This country wants the interoceanic canal badly, of that there can be no question; but the people do not want it badly enough to be guilty of underhanded dealings in securing it. It begins to look as if nobody can touch that Panama ditch without being defiled."²⁶¹ And the *Raleigh News and Observer* drew attention to the fact that the United States could have turned to Nicaragua or paid Colombia more instead of joining the "land-grabbing nations.": "It was not necessary to violate our good faith with Colombia and recede from honorable national policy to build the canal."²⁶²

The Indianapolis *Sentinel* had all along been in favor of the Panama route, yet explained: "We want the canal, but more than that we want to preserve our national honor."²⁶³ It stated that an amicable settlement with Colombia should be reached in order to prevent hostilities.²⁶⁴ And according to the *Philadelphia Record* the Canal, which several Southern Democrats were afraid of losing, would not be endangered or even perceptibly delayed by an honorable course. Many Democratic Senators

wanted the Nicaragua route, and Colombia would have to come to terms when it realized the danger of losing Panama.²⁶⁵

The Memphis *Commercial Appeal* announced that "it is our plain duty to carry out the terms of the Spooner act and build the Nicaragua canal."²⁶⁶ And the Denver *Rocky Mountain News* pointed out the Nicaragua alternative and the elapse of "reasonable time" for turning to it, so such a "coup d'état" as in Panama was not necessary for the construction of a Canal.²⁶⁷

On the other hand there were several newspapers, particularly in the South, which, despite their denunciation of the means of attainment of the Panama Canal, and even despite their possible preference for the Nicaragua route, made the decision to accept the results of a wrong policy.

In the words of the Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat*:

No matter what we may say of the methods employed by the administration to secure the isthmian treaty, we must acknowledge that the act will stand. We have secured a better treaty than we could have had otherwise, and would be foolish indeed not to go forward with the construction of the canal. There is no doubt that the administration secretly encouraged the secession of Panama, otherwise that republic could not have attained its present proportions. In resorting to such tactics the administration subjects itself to the severest censure, but since we have the treaty, and it is not likely that the work of the administration can be undone, the only sensible thing is to go ahead with the construction of the canal. Such disgruntled factors as Senator Morgan should be suppressed.²⁶⁸

The Houston *Post* also felt that the Panama Canal had to be accepted: "The *Post* regrets that Panama instead of Nicaragua is to be the route of the great American waterway, and it would have infinitely preferred a cleaner transaction than the abetting of a secession movement. But the thing is done, there is no way of undoing it, and the least said about it the better."²⁶⁹

As expressed by the Louisville *Courier-Journal*, which favored a Nicaragua route but was now willing to accept the Panama Canal in order to get a Canal period,²⁷⁰ the only choice, due to the *fait accompli* offered by the President's quick action, was to sustain a wrong way of doing a right thing. But the responsibility for the wrong action would be placed on the Administration. On this line a successful appeal could be made to the people.²⁷¹ Yet two things were necessary to remove any cloud from the Panama Canal title: a surrender of the rights of the New Panama Canal Company, and the assent of Colombia.²⁷²

Despite its criticism the Augusta *Chronicle* felt that the Democrats should put no obstacle in the way of the Canal so important to the

development of Southern ports and for turning the tide of commerce towards the South. The Democrats had long demanded a Nicaragua canal, but the "change to the Panama canal was a mere detail, a question of policy in the selection of the best route."²⁷³

In the opinion of the Nashville *Banner* it was not necessary to abet the uprising in Panama in order to gain a Panama Canal, as the Colombian Congress, before its adjournment, had commissioned President Marroquin to enter into further negotiations. So even if the American people wanted a Panama instead of a Nicaragua route, they were "not responsible for the stigma that may be put upon the national honor by the seemingly dishonest coup. . . ." "The preference for the Panama route should not have led to an unseemly breach of faith with a sister republic. and that is what is charged against the President."²⁷⁴ Yet the *Banner* did not want any more wrangling over which Canal route to accept. The South and the whole country want a Canal, and "as the Panama route appears the most available, they want the Panama Canal."²⁷⁵ It summarized its position by saying: "The end accomplished in securing the control of the isthmus for the United States is unquestionably a good one. The means employed in reaching it are all that is amenable to criticism."²⁷⁶

The Savannah *Press* announced that denunciation of the means used to gain the Canal "does not mean opposition to the canal. It means opposition to the doubtful diplomacy which has separated the state of Panama from its parent government. It means protest against a policy of policing a foreign shore with our war ships to prevent the protection of its integrity by a friendly neighbor."²⁷⁷ The Wilmington, North Carolina, *Morning Star*, despite its criticism, noted that a Canal would open great possibilities for the South's development, and maybe even help wipe out the supremacy of the North and East by shifting the balance of power Southward and Westward.²⁷⁸

While the Atlanta *Journal* regretted the way in which the Canal had been obtained, it also wanted a Canal, from which the South would benefit most;²⁷⁹ and the Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union* felt that to now insist that Colombia sign the Hay-Herrán Treaty to avoid suspicion, as suggested by the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, would be no less suspicious than to sign a Treaty with the revolutionists.²⁸⁰

Believing that a Canal would greatly benefit the South, the Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette* stated that Democrats should confine their attacks to the Administration's errors rather than oppose the Panama route.²⁸¹ As it had stated earlier: "All the scandal that could be uncovered in Washington with respect to the administration's actions in aiding the isthmian rebellion would not make Nicaragua the better place to build the canal when skilled and competent men have decided in favor of the other route."²⁸²

Southern anguish was shown by the *Birmingham Age-Herald*, which, after editorials stating that the United States was required by the Spooner Law to turn to the Nicaragua route,²⁸³ was willing to accept a Panama route even if it meant recognition of Panama: "Facts are facts, and conspiracies are conspiracies, and the republic of Panama, the fruit of a vile conspiracy, is nevertheless a fact, and the sooner all accept it as such the sooner a canal will be dug."²⁸⁴ The South prefers a Nicaragua route, "but the schemers at home and abroad have plotted otherwise, and there is really no line of policy open to us except an acceptance of the Panama route. . . ."²⁸⁵

The *Chatanooga Daily Times*, after stating that the people did not want the desired Canal at the sacrifice of their self-respect, especially when a better route and one much more to their advantage might be secured,²⁸⁶ and that if the Panama route was chosen it would be through recognition of rebellion and secession and upon the policy of spoliation and loot,²⁸⁷ then thought the people of the United States would accept the Canal despite the means used to get it: "The people want an isthmian canal by *fair* and honorable means--but we are decidedly of the opinion that they *want* a canal. It may be unfortunate that this is so: that people are not given to making nice distinctions as to ways and means of accomplishing great designs from the days of the Pilgrim fathers all through the history of the American Indian, but it is, and Mr. Roosevelt is not going to be held to a too rigid account if the Panama canal is secured even at the cost of spoliation of a friendly state."²⁸⁸ As put by the *New Orleans Daily Picayune*: "Of course, the treaty will be ratified. If we are going to stealing outright, let us get the full benefit of the theft, since there is only conscience to punish us for the act."²⁸⁹

Some papers outside the South were critical of the means but willing to accept the results of the Panama policy. The *Milwaukee Journal* felt that refusal to ratify the Canal Treaty would just delay the great Canal project, and not restore Panama to Colombia.²⁹⁰ The *Washington Post*, stating that Panama is and ought to be free, noted that the "result of the outburst will be profitable not only to Panama, but to the whole of Christendom."²⁹¹ And the *New York Staats Zeitung* believed that the politically correct course of the Democrats should be "to censure the President sharply for his hasty, unhandsome action, but eventually to support a canal treaty with Panama."²⁹²

The Railroads

Several papers saw the transcontinental Railroads as long-time opponents of any trans-Isthmian Canal, finally encouraging the switch

from the Nicaragua to the Panama route in 1902 as the best way to defeat the Canal for a long time to come.²⁹³ But after Nicaragua supporters surprisingly backed the Panama route as better than no Canal at all,²⁹⁴ the Railroads found it necessary to influence Colombia to reject the Hay-Herrán Treaty.²⁹⁵

The New York *American* saw President Roosevelt's delay in turning to Nicaragua following the Panama Revolution as encouraging the Railroads to continue their campaign against a Canal in Washington;²⁹⁶ and the Tucson *Citizen* called for those not under the influence of the transcontinental Railroads, and who really hoped for a speedy Canal to aid Senator Morgan's fight for a Nicaragua canal.²⁹⁷ The Colombia *State*, also supporting the Nicaragua route, felt that the greatest opposition to a Canal came from the Senators and Representatives of several Far Western and Middle Western states where Railroads were almost omnipotent in politics.²⁹⁸

On the other hand the Louisville *Courier-Journal* believed that to defeat the Panama Canal now would just play into the hands of the transcontinental Railway ring who were against any Canal at all,²⁹⁹ and the Chatanooga *Daily Times* pointed out that there was support for the Canal because it would force a reduction in the train freight rates from the South to the Great West, so it could not begin too soon now that it was to be started.³⁰⁰

PERSONAL ATTACKS, POLITICS, and CAMPAIGN ISSUE

President Roosevelt was charged with throwing considerations of honor to the winds in a moment of pettish irritation and impatience,³⁰¹ carrying out an impulsive act by an impulsive President which was a cause for shame and regret,³⁰² seizing the territory of Colombia and oppressing a weak nation,³⁰³ being a dangerous President who had dragged the United States back to the barbaric principle of brute force making right against a weak nation,³⁰⁴ violating principles of equity as between friendly nations and of good faith with his own people,³⁰⁵ and placing the United States in a contemptible light.³⁰⁶

The Omaha *Morning World-Herald* stated that: "The student of history will have little difficulty in reaching a conclusion with respect to Mr. Roosevelt's course in Panama; it is not law, it is not morals, it is not statesmanship. Perhaps, however, it is business--and strenuousity."³⁰⁷ The New Haven *Evening Register* noted: "the only defense we have seen of the President's extraordinary course is, first, that we need the canal 'in our business,' and second, that having taken this arbitrary and unprecedented course it is the duty of every patriotic American to support the

President."³⁰⁸

While the *New York Times* called President Roosevelt's course upon the Isthmus irregular, lawless and unjust;³⁰⁹ the Springfield, *Illinois State Register* called it dishonest, unnecessary, contrary to the ethics of U. S. government, and unjust to Colombia.³¹⁰ And the *New York Evening Post* asserted that the President was winning the approval of "every American who believes in bullying, or loves a row, or thinks that his country is never great unless cheating somebody. . . ."³¹¹

According to the *Charleston News and Courier* the President and his Cabinet wanted to create a situation by which Congress would be virtually compelled to back up their aggressive action.³¹²

Some critical papers felt that there was no political issue for the Democrats in the Panama affair. The *Milwaukee Journal* believed that the practical gains-political and commercial-would overcome any attempts based on right and justice to make political capital out of the President's recognition of Panama: "It has been demonstrated again and again that money is thicker than water."³¹³ While condemning the President on moral grounds, the *Atlanta Journal* saw no party issue in the Panama deal, and it urged the Democratic leaders to help dig the Canal rather than obstruct it.³¹⁴ But it called President Roosevelt "dangerous," "an unsafe pilot for the national vessel," and a leader who had exhibited jingoistic tendencies throughout the Isthmian affair and his whole administration.³¹⁵ It bemoaned: "We are hooked to a chain of lubricated lightning and we wish it distinctly understood that we are not responsible for any damage it does; for we ourselves can't always tell where it is going to strike."³¹⁶

In the opinion of the *New Haven Evening Register* no politics were involved in the criticism: "The press, on the whole is critical but along lines moral and legal."³¹⁷

On the other hand the Indianapolis *Sentinel* thought that President Roosevelt had overreached himself in the Panama Canal affair, giving his political adversaries the opportunity for which they had hoped.³¹⁸ The Springfield, *Illinois State Register* charged that "President Roosevelt is not a safe man to have at the head of our government. With him 'Might makes Right.'"³¹⁹ The Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette* explained that "instead of a conservative and just man like Grover Cleveland we have in the White House today a person impulsive, hot-headed and immature, a man whose unwarranted meddling in the internal affairs of a friendly power-for such his action with reference to Colombia and Panama seems to be-may cause the United States to rue the day when it was given to Theodore Roosevelt to involve this government where and how he might choose."³²⁰

Calling the President a "discredited leader," the *Omaha Morning*

World-Herald wondered if Panama was not his effort to save himself. It was an adroit political move just when Roosevelt was in need of repair.³²¹

Several papers saw a campaign issue in the Panama events. The Philadelphia *Record* challenged the Democrats to unite to condemn the President's actions and let the country know that Theodore Roosevelt was unsafe; it concluded that the Democratic party could win the Presidential election (of 1904) on this issue, if its leaders would only lead it.³²² The New York *Times* stated that if the rejection of the Panama Canal Treaty would suit the Republicans as a campaign issue let them make the most of it: "They expect to make Mr. ROOSEVELT their candidate. If his isthmian policy is presented to the people in its true light, if their moral sense is awakened by the expositions and appeals of the campaign, their votes will sweep Mr. ROOSEVELT from the great office whose powers he has abused. It is not an issue of which Democrats need be afraid."³²³

The Seattle *Daily Times* noted that even Republicans were worried over the President's warlike attitude in Panama,³²⁴ and concluded: "The reception which has been accorded President Roosevelt's 'Caesarian policy' in Panama by the more conservative elements of the American population has rather alarmed the devoted adherents of the administration, and has intensified the opposition to Roosevelt's nomination next year."³²⁵ And the Chicago *Chronicle* asserted that "there is every reason why no man so reckless and so void of a proper sense of international obligations as Mr. Roosevelt has shown himself in this highhanded business should be in an office where he is capable of doing infinite harm." "If he is not repudiated by his party, both he and his party should be separated from the control of national affairs."³²⁶

In the opinion of the Wilmington, North Carolina, *Morning Star*, the Republicans had given the Democrats a campaign issue, although "not of the question of the canal itself--but of the administration tactics on the isthmus."³²⁷

However, the Colombia *State* noted that Republicans were counting on Democratic fear of defeat when the Republicans accused them of opposing a Canal: "But to oppose the steal does not mean defeat." The record shows that the Democrats have supported a Canal in the past and now they "still favor a canal but desire to obtain it honorably."³²⁸ In fact, the Democrats should use the Canal issue to defeat Theodore Roosevelt: "Roosevelt, as fast as possible, is destroying our national ideals. For that reason alone his defeat is necessary for the republic's preservation."³²⁹ "The man who is capable of blackening the country's honor for the sake of his own political advantage, who can juggle with the rights of nations, who will use the armed forces at his command to ensure a coup to forward his personal ambitions--such a man is a dangerous creature; in office, a menace to

republican institutions."³³⁰

Likewise the Memphis *Commercial Appeal* announced: "This whole discreditable episode emphasizes the necessity of relieving the country of such an incubus as Roosevelt. . . ." ³³¹ It pointed out that war unites people and re-elects the party in power, and accused the President of trying to involve the country in a war in order to promote his own political fortunes. ³³² It explained that the Democrats would be asked to hold their peace so the Canal would not be jeopardized, but the time had come for the Democrats to fight. This was their "Golden Chance.": "The Roosevelt administration has now touched the high water mark of criminal folly. The honor of the republic is at stake. The traditions of democracy are trampled under foot, and the unscrupulous gentleman who occupies the White House seems bent upon a course that would be discreditable to the czar of Russia or the sultan of Turkey. The Democratic party should resist to the death his progromme of blister and spoliation."³³³

The Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union* believed that the Democrats should make the Panama affair a party issue and they could win on it:

The President avows a policy like that of England and Germany--he would stamp hypocrisy on all our past; he would be as the Kings and Emperors are.

Make this the issue and the nominee of the Democracy is declared--our trump card leaps from the deck. The party that "conspired" in Hawaii repeats the performance on this hemisphere, and the issue becomes paramount. . . .³³⁴

GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

The critical newspapers were geographically located in all regions of the United States, with the heaviest concentration in the South: South 26, Atlantic 12, Midwest 9, West 7, New England 4. Total 58.

Politically, Democratic and Independent newspapers led the attack: Democrat 25, Independent Democrat 13, Independent 12, Independent Republican 4, Republican 1, Others 3. Total 58. Or: Democrat and Independent Democrat 38, Republican and Independent Republican 5, Independent 12, Others 3. Total 58.

Table 1: Comparison of the geographical distribution of the attacking newspapers based on political distribution:

	Dem + Ind Dem	Rep + Ind Rep	Indep	Others	Total
West	2	1	4	0	7
Midwest	6	1	2	0	9
New England	3	0	1	0	4
Atlantic	5	3	3	1	12
South	22	0	2	2	26
Total	38	5	12	3	58

Some important Democratic and Independent newspapers were missing from the attack, and will be found in the following chapter on the defending press. The same holds true for some of the leading anti-imperialist newspapers. Yet, many important anti-imperialist and anti-expansionist papers continued their tradition in regard to the Panama issue. These include the Springfield *Daily Republican*, New York *Evening Post*, Boston *Post*, Pittsburg *Dispatch*, Pittsburg *Post*, Baltimore *Sun*, Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, Philadelphia *Record*, Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, Charleston *News and Courier*, New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, Chicago *Chronicle*, Indianapolis *Sentinel*, and Atlanta *Journal*.³³⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Newspapers were influenced to criticize the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration due to moral, anti-imperialist, legal, Canal route, and political considerations. Regional and economic considerations largely explain the decision of many Southern papers to content themselves with denouncing the means used to gain the Panama Canal while accepting the results in the form of the Canal seen as so beneficial to the region. Even Southern preference for the Nicaragua route was overcome in the desire to get a Canal period. Important exceptions to this Southern policy were the Colombia *State* and the Memphis *Commercial Appeal*.

CHAPTER IV: THE PRESS AND THE PANAMA ISSUE: THE DEFENDERS

THE ATLANTIC STATES

The following newspapers in the Atlantic states defended the Administration's Panama policy: Baltimore *American* (Ind.);¹ New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin* (Fin.);² New York *Commercial Advertiser* (Rep.);³ Brooklyn *Daily Eagle* (Ind. Dem.);⁴ New York *Sun* (Rep.);⁵ New York *Press* (Rep.);⁶ New York *Daily Tribune* (Rep.);⁷ New York *Herald* (Ind.);⁸ New York *Commercial* (Fin.);⁹ New York *Wall Street Journal* (Fin.);¹⁰ Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, *Patriot* (Ind.);¹¹ Albany, New York, *Evening Journal*;¹² Newark, New Jersey, *Daily Advertiser*;¹³ Newark, New Jersey, *Evening News* (Ind.);¹⁴ Philadelphia *North American* (Ind. Rep.);¹⁵ Philadelphia *Inquirer* (Rep.);¹⁶ Philadelphia *Press* (Rep.);¹⁷ Washington *Evening Star* (Ind. Rep.);¹⁸ Washington *Times* (Dem.);¹⁹ New York *World* (Ind. Dem.);²⁰ Buffalo *News* (Ind.);²¹ Buffalo *Express* (Ind. Rep.).²²

NEW ENGLAND

The following defended the Roosevelt Administration in New England: Boston *Evening Transcript* (Ind. Rep.);²³ Boston *Daily Advertiser* (Rep.);²⁴ Boston *Daily Globe* (Dem.);²⁵ Boston *Herald* (Ind. Dem.);²⁶ Boston *Journal* (Rep.);²⁷ Concord, New Hampshire, *Evening Monitor* (Ind.);²⁸ Hartford, Connecticut, *Daily Courant* (Rep.);²⁹ Bangor, Maine, *Daily News* (Ind.);³⁰ Burlington, Vermont, *Daily Free Press* (Rep.);³¹ Providence, Rhode Island, *Evening Bulletin* (Ind.);³² Providence, Rhode Island, *Daily Journal* (Rep.);³³ Hartford, Connecticut, *Times* (Ind. Dem.).³⁴

THE WEST

The following defended the Administration in the West: Salt Lake *Tribune* (Ind. Rep.);³⁵ Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News* (Ind.);³⁶ Boise, *Idaho Daily Statesman* (Rep.);³⁷ Bismarck, North Dakota, *Daily Tribune* (Ind.);³⁸ Grand Forks, North Dakota, *Daily Herald* (Ind. Rep.);³⁹ Helena, *Montana Record* (Ind.);⁴⁰ Portland *New Age* (Black);⁴¹ Portland *Morning Oregonian* (Ind. Rep.);⁴² Albuquerque, New Mexico, *Daily Citizen*;⁴³ Phoenix, *Arizona Republican* (Ind.);⁴⁴ Tacoma, Washington, *Daily Ledger* (Rep.);⁴⁵ Sioux Falls, South Dakota, *Daily Argus-Leader* (Rep.);⁴⁶ Los Angeles *Daily Times* (Rep.);⁴⁷ Seattle *Post-Intelligencer* (Rep.);⁴⁸ San Francisco *Chronicle* (Ind.);⁴⁹ San Francisco *Call* (Rep.);⁵⁰ Colorado Springs *Gazette* (Rep.);⁵¹

MIDWEST STATES

The following Midwest newspapers defended the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration: Des Moines, Iowa, *Register and Leader* (Rep.);⁵² Chicago *Record-Herald* (Ind. Rep.);⁵³ Chicago *Daily Tribune* (Rep.);⁵⁴ Detroit *Free Press* (Ind. Dem.);⁵⁵ Minneapolis *Tribune* (Rep.);⁵⁶ Minneapolis *Journal* (Rep.);⁵⁷ Indianapolis *Journal* (Rep.);⁵⁸ Detroit *Evening News* (Ind.);⁵⁹ Kansas City, Missouri, *Star* (Ind.);⁶⁰ St. Louis *Republic* (Dem.);⁶¹ St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* (Rep.);⁶² Cleveland *Plain Dealer* (Ind. Dem.);⁶³ Topeka, *Kansas State Journal* (Ind. Rep.);⁶⁴ Sioux City, Iowa, *Journal* (Rep.);⁶⁵ Duluth, Minnesota, *News Tribune* (Ind.);⁶⁶ Grand Rapids, Michigan, *Herald*;⁶⁷ Columbus, *Ohio State Journal* (Rep.);⁶⁸ Cincinnati *Commercial Tribune* (Rep.);⁶⁹ Cincinnati *Enquirer* (Dem.);⁷⁰ Madison, *Wisconsin State Journal* (Ind.);⁷¹ Lincoln, *Nebraska State Journal* (Rep.);⁷² Springfield, *Illinois State Journal* (Ind. Rep.);⁷³ Milwaukee *Sentinel* (Rep.);⁷⁴ Chicago *Daily News* (Ind.).⁷⁵

THE SOUTH

The following newspapers in the South defended the action taken by the Roosevelt Administration: *Nashville American* (Dem.);⁷⁶ *Mobile, Alabama, Register* (Dem.);⁷⁷ *Atlanta Constitution* (Dem.);⁷⁸ *New Orleans Times-Democrat* (Dem.).⁷⁹

INTERNATIONAL EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE INTERESTS OF CIVILIZATION⁸⁰

International Eminent Domain

The *Albany Evening Journal* expressed the thought of several papers when it declared that: "If international law does not confer the power upon nations to exercise, in certain circumstances, something like the right of eminent domain in cases such as the matter of the isthmian canal, which involves the good of nations, then there is a defect in international law."⁸¹

The *Detroit Evening News* declared:

There is unfortunately no law covering the question of "international eminent domain," but the condition is exactly parallel to that in which some great public improvement. . . is made impossible by the selfishness or greed of an individual or a coterie of individuals. The equity of the rule of eminent domain is recognized everywhere. The citizen must make sacrifices in the interests of the community of the nation. There is no reason why the selfishness of a petty nation should be allowed to interfere with the prosecution of a work which is for the benefit of the commerce of the world.⁸²

An example of eminent domain on the national level was provided by the *Grand Forks Daily Herald*: "We run a railroad through a man's farm, not only without his consent, but against his wishes." "The principle is world wide. For this reason it is absurd that the interests of a continent, and to a large extent of the whole world should suffer because one country refuses to permit itself to be benefitted in common with the rest of the world by the construction of a canal across its territory."⁸³

The *Portland Morning Oregonian* put it this way: "We prefer to regard the Republic of Panama and the part played by the United States in its recognition as one of the practical, wise and just undertakings by which civilization moves on its way. These steps are usually fraught with embarrassments, but they are necessary. The assertion of civilization's eminent domain often involves discomforts and apparent injustice to the adverse claimants who stand stubbornly in the path of progress."⁸⁴

The *Providence Evening Bulletin* put it even more bluntly: "No nation hesitates to chastise, to sequester, if necessary to kill, any individual who violates the laws which the community has formulated for its own

protection and for the greatest good of the greatest number. The nations of the earth are becoming more and more members of one great cosmopolitan community." "Individual nations have gone further still in the establishment of the principle of the right of great powers to coerce weak ones in the interests of civilization, of good government and of peace."⁸⁵

The Boston *Daily Advertiser* asserted: "The right of the United States in this matter of a canal is by a sort of 'eminent domain,' not based on international law but on national necessity, as the president looks at it." "What has been done on one hand in encouraging the people of Panama to start their revolution while keeping the Bogota government from interfering, was 'high handed,' if anybody wanted to call it so. It was a clear case of a big government doing as it pleased regardless of international law or the 'comity of nations,' or any other settled principle of international practice. But it was done only because Pres. Roosevelt considered it necessary."⁸⁶

The St. Louis *Republic* admitted that the right of eminent domain was the only justification for the action of the United States. A sharp change in foreign policy had occurred with precedents broken by the prompt recognition of Panama, the involvement in a South American broil, and the immediate establishment of a protectorate.⁸⁷ But the canal was of great value: "That we should be delayed, obstructed, interfered with by an unformed state like Colombia is, upon the face of it, ridiculous. Whether, however, our present course is justified, whether it is right to put the job through at the cannon's mouth, that is a question which can only be determined in the light of developments, or when all the facts can be studied in perspective. Just now, it seems that a 'gun play' is both needful and proper."⁸⁸ Some logic underlies the radical action of the United States "based on the general principle that an inconsequential and corrupt state like Colombia has no vested rights which may act as a bar to the world's progress, to the furtherance of an enterprise so tremendous as the canal project."⁸⁹

The San Francisco *Chronicle* announced that: "Since there is no international law of that kind [eminent domain], we must of necessity revert to what, anterior to civilization, was universal law--the will of the strongest." "It may be assumed as a settled fact that the Panama canal will be built by the United States through territory whose sovereign is nominally the Republic of Panama but really the Republic of the United States of America, and that it will be done with the approbation of the people of this country and the civilized world on the same ground upon which we justify wresting this continent from the possession of a nomad race which did not and could not make use of it." "The world must move. It is an age of power. The weak will be protected, but they will not be

permitted to obstruct, whether upon the continent of America, the isthmus of Panama, the isles of the Pacific, the plains of Manchuria, or the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus. It is manifest destiny."⁹⁰

The Interests of Civilization

The *Tacoma Daily Ledger* declared that: "Colombia stood in the path of progress, and declined to budge. It had to be swept aside. The interests of civilization are too important to be stayed in their expansion by the greed of any little power."⁹¹

According to the *New York Commercial*, Colombia's "attitude was distinctly an obstruction in the path of civilization, a menace to peace in that part of the world, a blow at commercial progress, and against humanity."⁹² A weaker Administration would have felt that the "world and civilization" could afford to wait.⁹³

The *Des Moines Register and Leader* felt that: "As long as the interests of Colombia alone were concerned, the United States clearly had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the South American republic, but when the Panama canal became involved the world's interests were concerned. . . ."⁹⁴

The *Chicago Tribune* announced that: "The Colombians have put themselves across the path of the world's trade, and they have been hustled out of the way."⁹⁵ And the *Detroit Free Press* felt that: "The only point at issue was whether the United should assist in checking the advancement of civilization by permitting Colombia to crush an insurrection that meant the construction of an isthmian canal."⁹⁶

The belief of the *Nebraska State Journal* was that the importance of the interoceanic Canal to civilization was indicated by the general approval of the Panama secession by all commercial people. "Colombia is the dog in the manger and it is perfectly legitimate to clear her out, root and branch, from the isthmus by a popular uprising."⁹⁷

The *New York Herald* stated that with the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines and the promising commercial future of the United States "the control in the interest of commerce and traffic of the whole civilized world, of the means of undisturbed traffic across the Isthmus of Panama has become of transcendent import to the United States."⁹⁸

The *Duluth News Tribune* felt that the incessant bickerings and disturbances on the Isthmus must end for the sake of the commerce of the whole civilized world.⁹⁹ "The canal must be built. The commercial interests of this country and of the world, and highest military strategy demand it."¹⁰⁰

Similar expressions to the above were evoked by the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*,¹⁰¹ *Cleveland Plain Dealer*,¹⁰² *New York Sun*,¹⁰³ *Kansas City Star*,¹⁰⁴

and the San Francisco *Call*.¹⁰⁵

EXPANSIONISM

The St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* had long been advocating the guardianship of the United States over the entire Western Hemisphere.¹⁰⁶ Panama was seen as the first step: "The establishment of the republic of Panama marks also the beginning of the establishment of United States' guardianship over the whole hemisphere." The Canal territory will be ours "absolutely and permanently" and "we will control the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico; all the islands thereof will drift toward us peaceably, by the law of political gravitation, and United States suzerainty over the Western Hemisphere will be fixed forever."¹⁰⁷ Of course, Panama itself would come under U. S. control.¹⁰⁸ The protectorate over Panama would be a warning to Europe that the United States was the guardian of the Hemisphere.¹⁰⁹

The *Arizona Republican* declared that: "It now seems certain that the era of expansion into which this country was led by the Spanish war will be marked by the acquisition of Panama, and. . .it is difficult to imagine that there will be any division as to the wisdom of annexing Panama--at the proper time."¹¹⁰

The Providence *Evening Bulletin* announced that "the world will be a better place to live in if and when the United States takes over the control of the island of Hayti, and of Central America, and of Colombia, and of Venezuela. . . ." A start had already been made in showing South America that they violate the customs of fair dealing at their own peril. It will be an excellent thing when the South American oligarchies come to fear and hate the United States so they will not dare swerve from the strict path of international duty, "or, moved by hate, they provoke us at last to rouse ourselves and stamp out their miserable existence"¹¹¹

In an article on Panama and the Open Door, the New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin* stated:"That the gateway to Asia, which is to be furnished by uniting the two oceans, should be under the immediate control and protection of the United States, has been accepted as equally necessary and desirable by the other great commercial nations." "The unexampled vigor and promptitude with which the new conditions in Panama have been dealt with, and the difficulties interposed by Colombia to the construction of the canal consequently swept away, are equally a testimony to the presumed value to this country of the defense of its commercial opportunities in Eastern Asia."¹¹² "If the extension of the influence of the United States has been anywhere pursued in obedience to the call of 'manifest destiny,' it has been on and around the Pacific Ocean. If there be one point more than any other where a check to our influence would dwarf the role which this republic is fitted to play on the stage of

history, it would be here."¹¹³

The Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News* believed that "the critics forget that this country is destined to grow and to exercise an influence for good, directly or indirectly, upon all the world. Its career can no more be stopped than can the sun be stayed in its course through the heavens, as long as the people are true to the mission committed to the founders of the Republic." Critics will exist at all times. "But the Almighty has led the nation onward by night and by day, as He did anciently the chosen people, as long as they were true to Him."¹¹⁴ "Those who appreciate the blessings American principles of government confer upon all that come under its influence, cannot but rejoice that another section of the western hemisphere has come into closer contact with the great representatives of these principles."¹¹⁵

The Detroit *Evening News* felt that only hypocrites would pretend that the interests of civilization were the first consideration of the United States. "What we want is the canal, and to have the canal we must have the territory which encloses it."¹¹⁶ "Panama should be made a part of this country, and will be ultimately without any doubt."¹¹⁷ The Panama affair is tame compared to what other nations have done, and we have done bolder things before--we forced Great Britain to evacuate the Mississippi Valley and Andrew Jackson was far more rash in Florida than Commander Hubbard in Panama.¹¹⁸ "It is doubtful if a coup of similar importance was ever accomplished by any great government with so little waste of energy, so neatly and so completely."¹¹⁹ "A government representing the will of 80,000,000 people cannot always hesitate between a question of morals and a question of opportunity and necessity. The only folly thus far apparent is the attempt to justify the present attitude by reference to the treaty of 1846 which, bend and twist as they may, the casuists can hardly apply to the case."¹²⁰

In the opinion of the Philadelphia *Press* the United States plays the part in the Western Hemisphere of the concert of Europe in European affairs.¹²¹ "The United States is the primate of this continent and in the common interest it exercises the right of primacy." "We are trustee for the world of isthmian traffic. That responsibility compels us to interpose in the present issue between Colombia and Panama."¹²²

The Cincinnati *Commercial Tribune* stated that: "The vigorous policy of the administration in foreign affairs commends itself to every citizen who favors progress in national matters or in the spread of modern civilization."¹²³ The Nashville *American* desired "to see the United States in absolute control not only of the Panama Canal, but of the isthmus and territory of Panama."¹²⁴ In the words of the Minneapolis *Journal*: "Craven, indeed, would this nation be if it should allow its growth, development and prosperity to be strangled by the fact that a travesty of a nation held the

isthmus of Panama."¹²⁵ The *Wall Street Journal* announced that: "The events in Panama mark another advance movement of the United States and bring us still further into the front rank of nations. It is another assertion of the broadening policy of this country."¹²⁶ The opening doors of the Orient require an open waterway.¹²⁷

The *Hartford Times* summarized the situation when it said: "Whatever may be said or thought of the course of the Roosevelt administration in encouraging and aiding the secession of Panama from Colombia, common sense requires men of all parties in this country to recognize the fact that the Panama route is the only practical isthmian canal route, and that it is not simply desirable, but inevitable, that the isthmus of Panama shall pass under the suzerainty, if not the sovereignty, of the United States."¹²⁸

PROTECTORATE OVER PANAMA

The *Boston Evening Transcript*,¹²⁹ *Philadelphia Inquirer*,¹³⁰ *Grand Forks Daily Herald*,¹³¹ and *Albuquerque Daily Citizen*¹³² believed that the United States should establish a protectorate over Panama. The *Indianapolis Journal* declared that the United States would be entering into its first permanent protectorate--Hawaii and Cuba were only temporary protectorates.¹³³

The *Grand Forks Daily Herald* thought that Panama was not strong enough to stand alone, but all the other South American governments were in the same boat. "Not one of them would last were it not for the fact that there is a Monroe doctrine and a nation with ships and guns ready to enforce it."¹³⁴

THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION

Diverse reasons were given to defend the right of revolution.

The *Des Moines Register and Leader* thought that "revolutions must be judged in the end not by technical rules, but by their relations to the mighty progressive movements in human affairs which they either are in harmony with or tend to retard. Measured by this standard what revolution in history was ever more justified than that of Panama?"¹³⁵

According to the *Buffalo Express*, "even if the United States fomented the revolution, it acted in the interests of the governed, and that is of more importance than the interests of the governing power, whether it be a corrupt group of politicians in Bogota or a monarch in Europe."¹³⁶

In the opinion of the *Hartford Daily Courant* it was not only natural but praiseworthy that the people of Panama should revolt after being thrown into the ditch, "and it is neither less natural nor less praiseworthy because the grave step that they have taken also coincides with the interests of the United States."¹³⁷

The New Orleans *Times-Democrat* asked if the United States, born in revolution, could take the position that revolution was always wrong?¹³⁸ And Panama had more cause for its action than the United States had under George III.¹³⁹ This same idea was expressed by the Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News*.¹⁴⁰

The Bangor *Daily News* believed that it was right for Panama to deliver itself from a yoke under which it had been suffering for years, and the "United States in determining to aid in bringing permanent peace to the great highway between the oceans has acted as a strong nation situated as it is ought to have acted."¹⁴¹

The Portland *Morning Oregonian* put the matter succinctly: "We want the canal and Panama wants the canal. Colombia doesn't care about the canal, but wants money, and tries to extort it. This is the whole story. In The circumstances it hardly becomes us to deny the sacred right of revolution in Panama. . . ."¹⁴²

The Atlanta *Constitution* believed that the "right of revolution, in the American code, is an inalienable right of misgoverned humanity."¹⁴³ And the *Nebraska State Journal* attacked the mugwumps for demanding consent of the governed in the Philippines but not in Panama.¹⁴⁴

The St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* declared that the South would have been recognized had it succeeded.¹⁴⁵ The Baltimore *American* stated that the right to revolt was incontestable if a state had reasons--which Panama had.¹⁴⁶ And the *Wall Street Journal* saw these justifiable reasons as Panama's geographical separation from the rest of Colombia and the years of complaints Panama had against the Bogotá government.¹⁴⁷

The Hartford *Times* felt Panama had a right to revolt since Colombia had blocked the Canal.¹⁴⁸ The Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News* declared that self-preservation is the first law of nature.¹⁴⁹ The Tacoma *Daily Ledger* thought it was the best elements of Panama who had led the revolt and their cause was good.¹⁵⁰ And the Philadelphia *North American* saw the hand of Providence, which favored the United States, behind the occurrence of the revolution at just the time it was needed.¹⁵¹

SECESSION

The defending papers differed in opinion as to whether or not the acceptance of Panama's secession justified the secession of the South in 1861.

The Philadelphia *Press* saw no parallel between Panama's secession and the South's secession because: Panama was successful while the South was unsuccessful; the United States had duties on the Isthmus and its whole diplomatic history for fifty years had been for a Canal; and Panama was

not declaring its independence to make slavery but to get its freedom from a gang of "freebooters."¹⁵²

The Des Moines *Register and Leader* saw the difference in the fact that the civilized world had accepted the secession of Panama but not the secession of South Carolina earlier.¹⁵³ According to the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, President Lincoln was not going to attack slavery in the South, and could not have done so because his party lacked a majority in Congress. So the South's secession was not justified, while Panama had good reasons to secede.¹⁵⁴

Colombia was not a nation in any sense in the view of the Providence *Daily Journal*, and lost its claim to Panama when it no longer could effectively assert its power.¹⁵⁵ Neither did the Detroit *Free Press* see any parallel between the case of Panama and the Confederacy.¹⁵⁶

On the other hand, the Atlanta *Constitution* saw in the Panama situation a confirmation of the South's doctrine of secession,¹⁵⁷ and the New Orleans *Times-Democrat* called it a secession after southern style.¹⁵⁸ The San Francisco *Chronicle*¹⁵⁹ and Grand Forks *Daily Herald*¹⁶⁰ agreed that the South would have been recognized if it had been able to maintain its separate existence.

PEACE

The Roosevelt Administration was praised for being an agent of peace in the world.

The Chicago *Daily Tribune* asserted that: "Members of peace societies should be grateful to the government for what it has done and should urge Colombia to accept the situation and keep quiet."¹⁶¹ The Detroit *Free Press* claimed that Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt had "established the Pax Americana on the isthmus and insured the Panama canal to the commerce of the world."¹⁶²

The Grand Forks *Daily Herald* put it a different way: "Similar accusations are heard when a big boy interferes in a fight between two little ones and prevents them from tearing out each other's eyes."¹⁶³

The Providence *Daily Journal* felt that the only alternative to what the United States did was to form a ring around Colombia and the insurgents and let them cut each other's throats. This is what the Anti-Imperialists want, it claimed.¹⁶⁴

Further statements about the United States being an agent of peace were expressed by the St. Louis *Republic*,¹⁶⁵ Philadelphia *Press*,¹⁶⁶ Chicago *Daily News*,¹⁶⁷ and Minneapolis *Tribune*.¹⁶⁸

THE TREATY OF 1846

The Treaty of 1846 was used to defend the action of the Roosevelt

Administration on the Isthmus of Panama.

Most defending papers agreed that the Treaty only guaranteed Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus against foreign assault, and that the United States had not guaranteed to help restore Panama by force to Colombia in case of a domestic revolution.¹⁶⁹ However the *Minneapolis Journal* pointed out that the Treaty of 1846 did not give the United States the right to prevent civil wars on the Isthmus.¹⁷⁰

What about Colombia's right to suppress a revolution in its own country, especially if it was not the duty of the United States to do this? The *Baltimore American* claimed that since Panama succeeded to the Treaty of 1846, the guarantee of United States protection "was as applicable to Panama as Colombia."¹⁷¹ Or as the *New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin* put it, the obligation to preserve sovereignty on the Isthmus "ran with the land."¹⁷² Other papers referring to the Treaty "running with the land" in regard to protecting transit, etc., include the *Philadelphia Press*,¹⁷³ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*,¹⁷⁴ *Grand Rapids Herald*,¹⁷⁵ *New York Daily Tribune*,¹⁷⁶ and *Hartford Daily Courant*.¹⁷⁷ The *Portland Morning Oregonian* bluntly stated that Colombia had the right to suppress the revolution but she can not.¹⁷⁸ According to the *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, Colombia had permission to swim but was not allowed to go near the water.¹⁷⁹ The *Idaho Daily Statesman* said: "A sort of barbed wire fence has been built around the new government by the conditions of the case, and the soldiers of Colombia would find it very difficult to get through."¹⁸⁰

The most used reason given to defend the use made of the Treaty of 1846 was that it required the United States to protect transit across the Isthmus. This was interpreted as meaning that the United States could allow no fighting and had to keep the peace--at least in the area of the Panama Railroad and its terminals. The *New York Daily Tribune* claimed that this was a paramount obligation, even if it interfered with Colombia's attempts to defend its sovereignty: "The time for Colombia to protect her sovereignty in a region where we were bound to keep the peace was when she had it."¹⁸¹ In the words of the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* the Treaty of 1846 guaranteed Colombian sovereignty over the Isthmus "with the plainly apparent reservation that the exercise of that sovereignty shall not be at any time detrimental to the great project of isthmian canalization."¹⁸² A large number of papers referred to the obligation to protect the transit and railroad on the Isthmus.¹⁸³ The *Baltimore American* asserted that President Roosevelt would have been subject to impeachment if he had not kept his oath of office by obeying the Treaty of 1846.¹⁸⁴

THE SPOONER LAW

The Spooner Law had instructed President Roosevelt to negotiate a Canal treaty with Nicaragua if arrangements for a Canal could not be made with Colombia within "reasonable time." The Chicago *Daily Tribune* stated that the interpretation of "reasonable time" should be left to the President and he was the most competent to decide.¹⁸⁵ Also, the meat of the Spooner Law was a Panama Canal rather than a canal at Nicaragua.¹⁸⁶ The Burlington *Daily Free Press* believed that the "reasonable time" was not up until President Roosevelt had exhausted all possibilities for a Panama Canal since this was the best route.¹⁸⁷ The Los Angeles *Daily Times* stated that there had been no time for the President to turn to Nicaragua between the adjournment of the Colombian Senate and the Panama Revolution.¹⁸⁸ The Providence *Daily Journal*,¹⁸⁹ Milwaukee *Sentinel*,¹⁹⁰ New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*,¹⁹¹ and Sioux City *Journal*¹⁹² also defended the President on this point.

The critics had also charged that the President had no authority to make a Canal Treaty with Panama since the Spooner Law specifically named Colombia as the negotiation partner. But the New York *Herald* disagreed. It quoted Secretary Hay's statement that the Treaty of 1846 "is a covenant, as lawyers say, that runs with the land." Thus since the Treaty of 1846 was now a treaty between the United States and Panama, the Spooner Law was also valid whether it named Colombia or Panama.¹⁹³ The St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* asserted that Panama takes the place of Colombia so the Spooner Law is still valid.¹⁹⁴ And the New York *Commercial* thought that all the treaty obligations of the United States passed to Panama from Colombia so the way was clear for a Canal Treaty with Panama.¹⁹⁵

According to the Mobile *Register*, in passing the Spooner Law, Congress "was seeking primarily, not a treaty with Colombia, but a certain canal route, namely the Panama route."¹⁹⁶ The Grand Forks *Daily Herald* said: "The Spooner act contemplated the completion of an arrangement, if possible, with the people in charge of the administration of the isthmus. Those people today are the people of Panama."¹⁹⁷ And the Baltimore *American* thought that by inference the United States could negotiate a treaty with Panama under the Spooner Law, because it aimed at a Canal, not the identity of the country.¹⁹⁸

CONVERTED FROM NICARAGUA TO PANAMA

Some papers were converted from a Nicaragua to a Panama Canal after the events on the Isthmus. The New York *Herald* had stated on November 5 that the Spooner Law required the President to turn to Nicaragua as he had failed to come to terms with Colombia within "reasonable time."¹⁹⁹ But

then it said on November 24 that the purpose of the Spooner Law was the Canal, which can only be obtained from Panama.²⁰⁰

The Washington *Evening Star* announced: "The canal then at Panama is at last in sight; and *The Star*, originally for Nicaragua, and still regretting that that route was not chosen, accepts the result."²⁰¹

The Portland *Morning Oregonian* had always wanted a Nicaragua route, but held now for a Panama Canal.²⁰² And the Atlanta *Constitution* explained that it had recently stood for abandoning Colombia and turning to Nicaragua, but now it stood behind a Panama Canal.²⁰³

ATTACKS ON THE NICARAGUA IRRECONCILABLES

The New York *Press* charged that: "None but the transcontinental railroads, the Colombian blackmailers and the Nicaragua irreconcilables like Senator Morgan, we take it, is going to deplore a development of events in the United States of Colombia leading to the building of the Panama Canal."²⁰⁴

Senator Morgan (Dem., Alabama) was especially attacked for standing for Nicaragua or nothing,²⁰⁵ for being grafted to one route.²⁰⁶

Similar regret was expressed by the Nashville *American*,²⁰⁷ Cincinnati *Commercial Tribune*,²⁰⁸ Philadelphia *Inquirer*,²⁰⁹ Milwaukee *Sentinel*,²¹⁰ Colorado Springs *Gazette*,²¹¹ Detroit *Free Press*,²¹² and Cleveland *Plain Dealer*.²¹³

THE RAILROADS

Again the transcontinental Railroads were especially singled out as attempting to block any Canal at all. The Sioux Falls *Daily Argus-Leader* explained that a Canal would divert traffic from their high-rate railroads.²¹⁴

The Burlington *Daily Free Press* charged that the critics were either newspaper syndicate heads who have presidential aspirations (obviously a reference to William Randolph Hearst), Nicaragua supporters, or large Railroad interests: "Teller of Colorado [Democratic Senator] a particularly vociferous opponent of the Panama policy of the administration, represents a State with no seacoast and is himself interested in railroads."²¹⁵ The Brooklyn *Daily Eagle* explained that Senator Teller was trying to block the Panama Canal to revive the Nicaragua route, however his state has no outlet to the sea for ocean commerce: "It is a railroad ridden state."²¹⁶

The Idaho *Daily Statesman* thought that the Railroad lobby was now at the end of its rope. The Railroad interests had overreached themselves when they went to Bogotá to prevent the ratification of the Hay-Herrán Treaty.²¹⁷

References to the anti-Canal stand of the Railroads came from all parts of the country, including the *Boston Evening Transcript*,²¹⁸ *Detroit Free Press*,²¹⁹ *New York Press*,²²⁰ *New York Herald*,²²¹ *Portland Morning Oregonian*,²²² *New Orleans Times-Democrat*,²²³ *Topeka, Kansas State Journal*,²²⁴ *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*,²²⁵ *Newark Daily Advertiser*,²²⁶ and *Illinois State Journal*.²²⁷

The Railway World defended against these charges as having no substantial basis in fact, being the product of "very fertile imaginations." "Any one familiar with railway history and operation in this country knows that such a canal will be of ultimate and inestimable value to the railway systems of the country." The Panama Canal will increase the short-haul business of the Railways, the real backbone of the Railroads, because the great bulk of goods passing through the Canal will have to travel to and from the interior of the United States to the seabords by Railway. Besides this the Canal will develop new resources, lead to growth in population, and increase general prosperity.²²⁸

RECOGNITION OF PANAMA

Several reasons were given to justify the recognition of Panama by the United States: (a) The *Indianapolis Journal* declared that: "The Colombian government having been overthrown and the Colombian authorities having withdrawn, the new provisional government of Panama is the only authority left there to deal with, and is the de facto government."²²⁹ The *San Francisco Chronicle* emphasized that the new republic "is there. It is independent. It has an organized government which controls the entire territory of the new republic, and there is no armed enemy within its bounds."²³⁰ The *Mobile Register* stated that: "At the present moment Panama appears. . .to be entirely free to act independently of Colombia. It is this fact that the president of the United States has recognized."²³¹ The *Salt Lake Tribune* felt that Panama was the only authority left on the Isthmus, and the United States had to deal with someone due to its treaty obligations.²³² And the *Grand Forks Daily Herald* put it this way: "The authority of the Colombian government has melted into thin air."²³³ Similar ideas to the above were expressed by many papers.²³⁴

(b) Some papers stressed that there was a precedent in United States history and international law for recognizing a nation when it was actually established in fact.²³⁵ Others declared that the Panama case had no precedent but none was needed as the situation was unprecedented.²³⁶ Thus President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay were warranted in creating their own precedent.²³⁷

(c) Other reasons given for justifying recognition of Panama included: European approval was evidence that Roosevelt and Hay were right;²³⁸ the President had executive power to recognize governments through his treaty-making powers and his power to accept ambassadors;²³⁹ and recognition was necessary to fulfill the treaty obligations of the United States and protect the interests owned by citizens of the United States.²⁴⁰

The Los Angeles *Daily Times* felt that: "In recognizing the de facto government of Panama, the government has taken the only course consistent with its attitude, its obligations, and its manifest duty in the premises."²⁴¹ The Minneapolis *Tribune* saw an additional reason for recognition in that the revolution was created in the usual fashion for South American revolutions--in New York.²⁴² And other papers stressed that the way was now opened for a Canal.²⁴³

According to the Atlanta *Constitution*: "Answering their appeal to our government as the guarantor of republican government on the western hemisphere, President Roosevelt gave them recognition. What else and whom else could he recognize?"²⁴⁴

IN PRAISE OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The action of Theodore Roosevelt in the Panama events was praised as courageous and necessary. In the viewpoint of the Kansas City *Star* it was "courageous, just and progressive."²⁴⁵ The Baltimore *American* commended President Roosevelt for acting "like a statesman and an American in this matter."²⁴⁶ According to the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* "President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay have acted with their customary courage and intelligence."²⁴⁷ The Washington *Evening Star* noted that President McKinley had been declared too slow, and President Roosevelt too swift.²⁴⁸

The Milwaukee *Sentinel* stated that: "President Roosevelt is the soul of candor and honesty, and is personally incapable of the underhand and paltry work in question...."²⁴⁹

Theodore Roosevelt could not be expected to treat Colombia the same as Great Britain or Germany, declared the Hartford *Times*: "There is also such a difference between a hen and a hawk that most persons treat them quite differently."²⁵⁰

And the Philadelphia *Press* believed that President Roosevelt had not fomented or encouraged the revolution: "He was in no way responsible for it."²⁵¹

NO CONSPIRACY

Many papers agreed that the course of the United States on the Isthmus

was entirely just, strictly correct, and that it had not conspired to foment a revolution.²⁵² Revolts were common in Colombia.²⁵³ And this particular revolt was an "open secret." It was the duty of the U. S. consular service to know what was about to occur.²⁵⁴ The "attitude of the Washington authorities has been strictly correct, both in a diplomatic and a moral sense."²⁵⁵

In fact, the revolt on the Isthmus was inevitable.²⁵⁶ In the words of the Milwaukee *Sentinel*: "As to our present opportunity in Panama, the plum appears to have ripened and dropped into our laps without giving us the trouble of shaking the tree."²⁵⁷

The New York *Commercial Advertiser* saw the whole country on a broad grin over the comic-opera conspiracy theories, and quoted Congressman Adamson of Mississippi as saying the day before at the White House: "Mr. President, I am glad you did not start the rabbit to running, but as long as the rabbit was going to run any how, it's a good thing we did not have a bow-legged man in the White House who couldn't catch it."²⁵⁸

COLOMBIA DESERVED IT

The results of Panama's independence were seen as poetic justice for Colombia as the latter had stood in the way of a Canal.²⁵⁹ Because Colombia had tried to get an increase in the amount to be paid for the Canal her rulers were called "blackmailers,"²⁶⁰ "extortioners,"²⁶¹ "financial highwaymen,"²⁶² "grafters,"²⁶³ and "hold-up men."²⁶⁴ And Colombia was accused of treating Panama badly for years.²⁶⁵

As the *Wisconsin State Journal* put it: "We can't afford to wait in these big-world interests and Colombia ought to have seen the folly of dillydallying after the way the Spanish war was conducted."²⁶⁶ Or the *Portland Morning Oregonian*: "The interests of mankind require the construction of a canal across the isthmus of America. To accomplish it our country had been dealing with Colombia--a vile, rotten so-called republic, ruled by a corrupt oligarchy."²⁶⁷ Or the *Grand Forks Daily Herald*: "As a nation it [Colombia] is on a par with several of the other Central American [sic] nations, and the world would be no worse off if none of them existed."²⁶⁸ Or the *Baltimore American*: ". . . Colombia, the international canine in the fodder rack, is yelping because she interposed herself between the world and some of the mileposts of its progress and got herself run over."²⁶⁹ Or the *Chicago Daily Tribune*: "Like the dog in the fable, which sought to seize the shadow and dropped the bone, it [Colombia] is without sympathizers."²⁷⁰

The Philadelphia *Press* was almost a lone voice among the defending newspapers when it suggested compensation should be given to Colombia

for the loss of Panama.²⁷¹

WARNING TO THE DEMOCRATS

The Democrats were warned not to make a party issue of the Panama affair, or else be ready to suffer the consequences at the hands of the people.²⁷²

Even though they had been searching for a campaign issue for a year, and at last thought they had found one, the Democrats would only be running "their erratic course like the discredited battle cry of 16 to 1."²⁷³

In fact, the Detroit *Evening News* projected that the Panama affair would favor the Republicans instead of the Democrats in the 1904 presidential election: "In the Panama affair he [Roosevelt] has made an appeal to his countrymen which can hardly fail to bring the great bulk of them to his support next year. However the revolution came about, whether with or without encouragement from Washington, there can be no doubt that nine-tenths of the people heartily approve what has been done." The nation is unanimous in wanting a Canal.²⁷⁴ The Atlanta *Constitution* also thought Democratic obstructionism would favor the Republicans in 1904,²⁷⁵ and the Burlington *Daily Free Press* saw the Democrats "placing themselves and their party in the path of the progress not only of this country but of the world itself."²⁷⁶

The Brooklyn *Daily Eagle* declared that: "It is bad politics for any organization to offend the national pride or to oppose the national progress."²⁷⁷ The Cincinnati *Commercial Tribune* advised the Democrats to recognize the facts and the "workings of Manifest Destiny."²⁷⁸ And the Idaho *Daily Statesman* warned the Democrats they would be facing a people intensely practical--a people baffled on a Canal for years.²⁷⁹

The Atlanta *Constitution* warned that "the American people do not want any petty, partisan politics mixed up in the negotiations. It is the most gigantic business proposition that has occupied human thought since Balboa crossed the Isthmus and discovered the Pacific Ocean in 1513." "The day of duty and destiny has arrived. . . ."²⁸⁰ Besides, "voting in favor of a canal treaty with Panama does not involve any democrat in a conclusive approval of the acts of President Roosevelt that may later appear to have been wrong."²⁸¹ The Democrats should vote for the Canal Treaty.²⁸²

The New Orleans *Times-Democrat* noted that the Democrats found it impossible to unite on the Panama issue: "This was inevitable as soon as the Senators had heard from their constituents and from the Democratic press. The Southern people want a canal. . . ."²⁸³ Even a majority of those Southern papers that disapprove of the President's course, the *Times-*

Democrat declared, advise strongly against the Democrats making Panama a party issue--with the exception of the Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union*.²⁸⁴

ANTI—IMPERIALIST PAPERS THAT DEFENDED ON PANAMA

Several papers that opposed the Philippine policy of the United States, and other foreign measures seen as imperialistic, defended the action taken on the Isthmus of Panama.

The Boston *Evening Transcript* was one of the leading spokesmen for the anti-imperialist movement on the Philippine issue.²⁸⁵ Both the Detroit *Free Press* and Detroit *Evening News* were critical of the Philippine policy.²⁸⁶ And the Buffalo *Express* and Philadelphia *North American* were anti-imperialist newspapers.²⁸⁷

The Boston *Herald*, Brooklyn *Daily Eagle*, Providence *Daily Journal*, Des Moines *Register and Leader*, and New Orleans *Times-Democrat* had all been critical of expansionism.²⁸⁸ The same holds true for the New York *World*,²⁸⁹ and Cincinnati *Enquirer*.²⁹⁰

THE NEW YORK WORLD AND BOSTON HERALD

At first the New York *World* attacked the Administration's Panama policy, only to turn about face and defend it.

On November 8, 1903 the *World* declared:

The new reading of President Monroe's famous message, which may or may not pass into history as "The Roosevelt Doctrine," seems to be, as revealed by the Panama incident:

1. No great power except the United States shall bully a little South American nation.
2. No European power shall interfere with such bullying when the United States finds it convenient to resort to it.²⁹¹

What will Congress and the American people say "of a palpably 'arranged' revolution? Of an immediate recognition of a rebel state such as for years we forbade Europe to accord to our Confederacy? Of the President's interference to prevent Colombia from waging war as we did to preserve our union of States inviolate?"²⁹²

Yet on November 19, 1903, the *World* announced that the Administration had fulfilled its treaty obligations; the recognition of Panama was justified; and "President Roosevelt is entitled to view with satisfaction both the approval of his country and the bright prospect of a speedy removal of the last obstacle to the construction of the canal." "The Democratic Senators who have refused to join in the concerted opposition

to the Administration in this matter have acted wisely."²⁹³

The *World* noted that Theodore Roosevelt had been accused of fomenting the revolution: "But is not this a little like accusing some one of planting mosquitoes in the Jersey meadows, or encouraging lynch laws in Texas, or cultivating 'graft' under the auspices of Tammany Hall?" "Can any reader of the newspapers recall a time when there was not a revolution down there?"²⁹⁴

The *World* did denounce the payment of ten million dollars to Panama: "If it is charity, it is unwarranted. If it is conscience money, it is misapplied."²⁹⁵

The Boston *Herald* concluded that for the sake of the Canal the United States gave a new interpretation to the Treaty of 1846. In preventing Colombian troops from landing on the Isthmus under a policy of preventing fighting on the Isthmus, the United States made a radical departure from a policy of non-interference in Latin-American affairs. Yet the *Herald* said: "Methods to advance national interests which would be worthy of the severest condemnation if practised against a reputable government receive at least a degree of justification when adopted in treating with a disreputable government."²⁹⁶

The *Herald* repeated that the new construction given to the Treaty of 1846 was "an invasion of sovereign rights" made for the sake of the Canal. Yet it added: Knowing the character of the people dealing with us, we are willing to assume that "we took the only satisfactory course open to us. But Senator Cullom is simply playing the part of a hypocrite in endeavoring to maintain that the course taken is one which is not on our part the almost unqualified assertion of superior force."²⁹⁷

"If the subject could be referred for final adjudication to the tribunal of The Hague, letting the work of canal construction begin and go on, it might then be determined whether Panama should be independent or be a part of Colombia, whether the money paid should be held by Panama or turned over to Colombia. . . ."²⁹⁸ The one serious effect of the Panama policy is its effect on Latin America.²⁹⁹

In its early editorials on the subject of the Panama Revolution the *Herald* had stated that both Hay's view that the Treaty of 1846 "goes with the land" and his assertion that the Treaty dealt only with foreign aggression were borne out by history. And it had decided that Panama had a right to secede because the Colombian Constitution of 1886, currently in effect, had been forced upon Panama against her will, so that she had never voluntarily given up the right of secession originally held.³⁰⁰

The *Herald* had also asserted: "We did not initiate the revolution, but we evidently knew that it was to occur, and the native leaders to the movement must have had a tolerably clear idea of what was to be the

restrictive policy that we have within the last few days put into force." The State Department probably felt justified in this policy, "the sincerity of which may be a little obscure," because of Colombia's desperate game of diplomatic "bluff."³⁰¹

THE SOUTH AND THE CANAL

The Atlanta *Constitution* believed that the compelling reason for the creation of Panama was to secure a Canal: "The people of the south want it and want it as quickly as it can be built. A hundred industries and prosperities of the south wait upon its completion."³⁰²

In an editorial entitled, "The Canal a Paramount Southern Question," the *Constitution* charged that the transcontinental Railroads were discriminating in rates between the Southeast and the Pacific Coast. As soon as the Railroads felt the chance of a Canal was gone, they had abandoned their southeastern trans-Mississippi rates, sacrificing Southern industries to the North and East. "The south cannot stand for this sort of cut-throat competition. Her only salvation is in the building of the isthmian canal."³⁰³

The *Constitution* believed that Georgia would be benefitted more by the Canal than the states between Chicago and the Rockies and north of the Kansas-Nebraska line, which were dominated by railway mergers making profits for Pacific ports.³⁰⁴

It concluded: "From the Ohio, Missouri and Platte rivers to the South Atlantic and gulf coasts the canal is now of paramount importance. The transcontinental railways combine are even now coercing the southern people by unbearable freight discriminations and are putting the strangling cord of thugs to the necks of our growing industries, most of which are being operated with the ultimate end of supplying South Pacific and Oriental markets."³⁰⁵

THE PACIFIC COAST AND THE CANAL

The Tacoma *Daily Ledger* felt that the people who contend the Canal will injure the Pacific Coast had no way of proving their case: "Certainly the Puget Sound country will not be disturbed." All our products will go by ship to the Pacific and Orient, and the bulk of traffic will increase. And the products of the Midwest will seek deep water here.³⁰⁶

GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION

Of the 79 newspapers above found to be defending the Administration's Panama policy, 24 were from the Midwest, 22 from the Atlantic,

17 from the West, 12 from New England, and 4 from the South.

In comparing the 58 newspapers found to attack the Panama policy with the 79 defending, on a geographical basis, we find that in each region of the United States except the South between 1/3 and 1/4 of the papers attacked the Administration. In the South 87% attacked the Panama policy. The total percentages for the whole country are 42% attacking and 58% defending.

Table 2: Comparison of attacking and defending newspapers based on geographical division.

	Attacking	Defending	Total
Midwest	9	24	33
Atlantic	12	22	34
West	7	17	24
New England	4	12	16
South	26	4	30
Total	58	79	137

Table 3: Percentage comparison of attacking and defending papers based on geographical division.

	Attacking	Defending	Total
Midwest	27%	73%	100%
Atlantic	35%	65%	100%
West	29%	71%	100%
New England	25%	75%	100%
South	87%	13%	100%
Total	42%	58%	100%

POLITICAL DIVISION

The political division of the defending newspapers was found to be: Republican 29, Independent Republican 10, Independent 18, Democrat 8, Independent Democrat 6, Others (including Financial and Black) 8. Total 79. Or: Republican and Independent Republican 39, Democrat and Independent Democrat 14, Independent 18, Others 8. Total 79.³⁰⁷

Table 4: Comparison of the geographical division of the defending papers based on political division.

	Dem + Ind Dem	Rep + Ind Rep	Indep	Others	Total
West	0	10	5	2	17
Midwest	4	14	5	1	24
New England	3	6	3	0	12
Atlantic	3	9	5	5	22
South	4	0	0	0	4
Total	14	39	18	8	79

A comparison of the attacking and defending papers based on political division shows that the Democrat and Independent Democrat press was more divided on the Panama issue than the Republican and Independent Republican press: while 73% of the Democrat and Independent Democrat press attacked, 89% of the Republican and Independent Republican press defended.

Table 5: Comparison of the attacking and defending papers based on political division.

	Attacking	Defending	Total
Rep + Ind Rep	5	39	44
Dem + Ind Dem	38	14	52
Indep	12	18	30
Others	3	8	11
Total	58	79	137

Table 6: Percentage comparison of the attacking and defending papers based on political division.

	Attacking	Defending	Total
Rep + Ind Rep	11%	89%	100%
Dem + Ind Dem	73%	27%	100%
Indep	40%	60%	100%
Others	27%	73%	100%
Total	42%	58%	100%

CHAPTER V: THE SENATE DEBATE: THE DEMOCRATS¹

How did the Democratic Senators vote on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, and why did they take the position chosen?

The Democratic Steering Committee met in caucus under the leadership of Senator Gorman to form strategy for the upcoming debate on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, but it was already clear at the fourth meeting held November 16, 1903, that the Democratic minority in the Senate was divided on the Panama issue. Holding 33 of the 90 Senate seats a united Democratic party could block the Treaty with Panama, but disagreement arose between Senators wanting to censure the Roosevelt Administration while accepting the Canal Treaty and Senators urging that the Democrats vote as a unit against the Treaty. At the November 16 caucus meeting Senator Carmack proposed a resolution, backed by Senators Gorman, Teller, and Dubois, to repeal the Spooner Law unless President Roosevelt turned to negotiations with Nicaragua. Senator Bacon countered with a proposal limiting Democratic action to severe censure of the Administration for its hasty recognition of Panama and failure to obey the Spooner Law. No agreement was reached.²

At a series of Democratic conferences December 13, 14, and 15, 1903, Senator Blackburn of Kentucky introduced a resolution which passed requiring unquestioned obedience to future caucus decrees approved by a two-thirds vote. This unusual political step threatened the Panama Treaty, although four exceptions to the Blackburn resolution were agreed upon. Senators were not bound to any caucus decision if it caused them to break a previous campaign pledge, went against instructions received from state legislatures, was clearly unconstitutional, or if they had conscientious scruples against the measure. A motion to exempt the Panama Treaty from the Blackburn resolution was voted down, with Senator Gorman calling the Treaty the "one great measure we must defeat, or rather, postpone, until Dec. 1904."³

At a New Years Eve conference of Democratic leaders it was decided to discuss the Panama Treaty so fully as to expose all its defects, while attempts would be made to unite "the most" of their people. But by January 30, 1904, Senator Gorman was ready to admit defeat in the efforts to unite the Democratic Senators. Caucus agreement was limited to calling for official information on the Panama Revolution.⁴

Meanwhile the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had instructed Senator Cullom (Rep., Illinois) to report the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, January 18, 1904, with some minor amendments. These were related to increased U. S. control over sanitation, the limits of the municipal zones of Colón and Panama, and U. S. control of the harbors for purposes of

improvement.⁵ But Senator Cullom asked the Senate to reject the amendments, partly because they were not important enough to justify resubmitting the Treaty to Panama and partly due to the "earnest insistence" of the State Department.⁶

After months of debate, including the rejection of some Democratic amendments (see below), the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty went to vote without any changes.⁷

The following Democratic Senators criticized the Roosevelt Administration's Panama policy in the Senate: Augustus Octavius Bacon (Georgia),⁸ Arthur Pue Gorman (Maryland),⁹ Edward Ward Carmack (Tennessee),¹⁰ Benjamin Ryan Tillman (South Carolina),¹¹ Hernando De Soto Money (Mississippi),¹² Henry Moore Teller (Colorado),¹³ Thomas MacDonald Patterson (Colorado),¹⁴ James Henderson Berry (Arkansas),¹⁵ Charles A. Culberson (Texas),¹⁶ Francis Griffith Newlands (Nevada),¹⁷ John Warwick Daniel (Virginia),¹⁸ Stephen Russell Mallory (Florida),¹⁹ John Tyler Morgan (Alabama),²⁰ Edmund Winston Pettus (Alabama),²¹ Anselm Joseph McLaurin (Mississippi),²² Furnifold McLendel Simmons (North Carolina),²³ Lee Slater Overman (North Carolina),²⁴ William Joel Stone (Missouri).²⁵

CANAL DESIRE, LACK OF MORALS, and IMPERIALISM

According to Senator Stone, after recognition of Panama "came the crowning act, the objective act, to which all precedent acts were but preliminary--the making of a canal treaty with Panama."²⁶ Senator Morgan put it this way: "We will go down in history as the violators of our treaty with Colombia for the purpose of obtaining canal concessions at Panama, on our own terms, that we could not otherwise obtain, and children yet unborn will change the title of the Grand Republic to some reproachful name that we will furnish them occasion to saddle on us."²⁷ Senator Teller asked rhetorically: "Will somebody tell me whether the desire to build the canal, if there had been no other place on the face of the earth where we could build one, was enough to justify intervention, without further consideration and further treatment, or effort to treat, with Colombia?"²⁸ And noting that the United States had made a long stride toward a Canal by its precipitate recognition of Panama, Senator Mallory concluded that "it would seem to a disinterested and impartial judgment that the United States had abandoned her time-honored traditions and had recklessly subordinated the preservation of her high repute among the nations of the south to the sordid purpose of material profit."²⁹

Senator Teller pointed out that: "National morality is as essential as individual morality; . . . a nation can no more transcend the great laws of God and man with impunity than can individuals."³⁰ For 125 years, he

claimed, the United States had stood as a beacon light, operating its government, as once said by Secretary of State Hay, upon the Monroe doctrine and the Golden Rule: "How much of the Golden Rule, how much of the Monroe doctrine is there in this intervention? And then I hear the answer to it all is: 'Oh! we want a canal.'" ³¹

In explaining the attitude of the United States toward Colombia, Senator Morgan stated: "Being the result of inducements of a strongly tempting character, it is a selfish and covetous aggression." ³² And Senator Pettus emphasized that "the honor of the nation is worth more than the property of the nation." ³³ He further declared: "Now, have we gotten to be so great, has all this power been intrusted to us by our Master that we should abuse it like a bully? I fear we are doing it. I fear we have got too large to be just, and the people of the country fear it. Whenever this nation gets too large to be just, it will be too large to be respected by its own citizens." ³⁴

Senator Patterson declared that civilization means respect for the law, not coveting another country's territory, and among other things he accused President Roosevelt of abandoning national morality. ³⁵ And Senator Overman felt that moral principle had been violated by a policy of might. ³⁶

Deploing many of the incidents antecedent and relating to the Panama Canal Treaty, Senator Money compared them to the bad precedents of Samoa, Hawaii, and the Philippines. ³⁷ Senator Carmack believed that the action taken by President Roosevelt against Colombia was "but the beginning of a systematic policy of aggression toward the Central and South American states. It is not meant for Colombia alone; it is the beginning of a policy of persistent and constant interference and intermeddling with the internal affairs of those countries." ³⁸ As put by Senator Patterson: "The President. . .has carried the big stick and Colombia has felt its weight." ³⁹ And Senator Tillman wanted to know, if it was the business of the United States to become a guardian for all populations to the South, "why single out the only one that has a canal and then try to make out that we are honorably getting in the position we are now in?" ⁴⁰

TREATY OF 1846

It was charged that for the first time the United States had used the Treaty of 1846 to aid the insurgents who were guilty of disorder, rather than aiding the sovereignty responsible for order. ⁴¹ The United States had no right under the Treaty to prevent Colombia from carrying out military

operations along the line of transit, for this area was also under Colombian sovereignty; the only right it held was to tell Colombia that her military operations must not actually interrupt transit. President Roosevelt exceeded his Treaty rights when he ordered Colombian troop landings to be prevented; the excuse could not be used that the troops landed anyway as no doubt Colombia was intimidated and deterred by these orders from taking measures she otherwise would have carried out.⁴²

Under the Treaty of 1846 the United States had guaranteed to Colombia the neutrality of the Isthmus so that free transit would not be interrupted, but Colombia also had guaranteed this transit to the United States. Senator Teller argued that Colombia herself had the responsibility for protecting transit in times of domestic conflict. This was shown by statements made by earlier Secretaries Seward, Fish, and Bayard, as well as by former President Cleveland, with Secretary Bayard stating:

On several occasions the Government of the United States, at the instance, and always with the assent, of Colombia, has, in times of civil tumult, sent its armed forces to the Isthmus of Panama to preserve American citizens and property along the transit from injuries which the Government of Colombia might at the time be unable to prevent. But, in taking such steps, this Government has always recognized the sovereignty and obligation of Colombia in the premises, and has never acknowledged, but, on the contrary, has expressly disclaimed, the duty of protecting the transit against domestic disturbance.⁴³

Teller charged that President Roosevelt was using the Treaty of 1846 "to create a false impression in the country as to what the treaty really contains."⁴⁴

Senator Carmack noted that in a Treaty signed in 1857 the United States forced Colombia to acknowledge "its liability arising out of its privilege and obligation to preserve peace and order along the transit route," for damages to American property suffered in the Panama riot of April 15, 1856.⁴⁵ And on November 6, 1903, the United States looked to Panama, as Colombia's successor, to defend Isthmian transit under the Treaty of 1846. So, Carmack concluded: "If Panama had that right under the treaty of 1846, Colombia had that right under the treaty of 1846."⁴⁶ Besides, he declared, the U. S. war ships were not sent to the Isthmus to protect the transit, but to exclude Colombia from her own territory: "Never before was the claim made that we had the right under the treaty of 1846 to support an insurrection against the authority of Colombia."⁴⁷

Senator Mallory explained that "we had the right when requested by her to give our aid to Colombia in suppressing disorder or insurrection on the Isthmus, whereby free and open transit was likely to be interrupted, but we were under no obligation to do so, and that right is very different from the

right to prevent Colombia from taking proper steps to suppress an insurrection against her authority.”⁴⁸ And Senator Daniel pointed out that although it was the duty of the United States to see that Colombia protected and observed the open transit of the Isthmus, this was not menaced by either Panama or Colombia. Instead “the troops of Colombia going to Colon were moving right in the line and in furtherance of the duties which our State Department has said we will insist that they shall discharge in protecting that line from attacks of insurgents.”⁴⁹

Senator Tillman pointedly asked, “Where is there any authority, by treaty or otherwise, constitutional or lawful, to forbid Colombia to land troops within 50 miles of Panama?”⁵⁰ It was these orders, sent November 2, 1903, that were preventing Colombia from regaining her sovereignty over the Isthmus in the opinion of Senator Overman. He charged that Colombia “is prevented from asserting her sovereignty over the Isthmus of Panama, was prevented from suppressing a rebellion, prevented from regaining her lost territory by this great and powerful country with whom she had entered into such friendly relation and solemn compact.”⁵¹ As far as the refusal to transport Colombian troops along the Panama Railroad was concerned, Senator Teller quoted the message of Commander McLean of the *Ranger* at Panama, September 20, 1902, during an earlier conflict, to show that Colombian troops were transported during civil war, with their arms being carried in a separate train.⁵² And Senator Newlands emphasized in a resolution that the prohibition to use the Railroad violated the express terms of the Treaty of 1846.⁵³

Under the Treaty of 1846 the United States had also guaranteed the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus. While Senator Overman believed that this guarantee of sovereignty included against secession and dismemberment, because sovereignty against foreign invasion was already guaranteed Colombia in the Monroe Doctrine and the neutrality clause of the Treaty of 1846,⁵⁴ Senator Patterson changed his mind and concluded that the United States had only guaranteed the Isthmus against foreign invasion, not domestic insurrection. However, he added, “when a nation guarantees the neutrality and the property of another nation in a part of its possessions as against foreign powers, it has effectually tied its own hands from conspiring with domestic traitors to destroy that sovereignty.”⁵⁵ It was Colombia’s responsibility to suppress rebellion, yet: “Colombia was prevented by the United States from taking the first step that was necessary to put down the so-called insurrection.”⁵⁶

It was also pointed out that the Treaty of 1846 provided for arbitration in case of any controversy arising between the United States and Colombia instead of going to war.⁵⁷

Furthermore, Senator Teller denied President Roosevelt’s assertion that

the Treaty of 1846 "vested in the United States a substantial property right carved out of the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada then had and possessed over the said [Isthmian] territory." He explained: "Every act of ours since 1846 has shown that that is not a correct statement. Not only have we negotiated with Colombia for rights which we would not have negotiated for if we had already had them in a treaty, but we have negotiated with Nicaragua, and we have passed through this Senate three times bills for the building of a canal, not over the Panama route, but over the Nicaragua route."⁵⁸ Senator Newlands asserted that President Roosevelt admits there was not a word in the Treaty of 1846 regarding a concession for building a future Canal--although the President claimed the spirit of the Treaty required Colombia to sanction the construction of a Canal.⁵⁹ And Senator Patterson emphasized that the fact that it was a Treaty of peace, amity and commerce, revokable upon year's notice after twenty years had passed, showed it did not carve out some part of Colombian sovereignty and give it to the United States. The obligations which the United States had assumed under Article 35 were only added in exchange for the great commercial privileges conferred to it by the Treaty.⁶⁰

Drawing attention to the fact that only Colombia could carry out these commercial sections of the Treaty of 1846 (sections 4, 5, and 6) in all ports and territory of Colombia, Senator Carmack denied that Panama had any rights under this Treaty because of a "covenant running with the land."⁶¹

INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERVENTION, and RECOGNITION

Senator Teller criticized the breaking of international law through intervention in Colombia and premature recognition of Panama, and tied these two aspects together when he explained: "I know it is not an act of war to recognize a government, even although it is unduly and improperly done; but if it is done with an act of intervention in favor of the rebels or the insurrectionists it is by all the authorities in this country and everywhere else an act of war."⁶² Noting that one of the great principles of international law is that "there is an obligation upon every nation in the world to maintain absolute neutrality between the old government and the attempted new one," he charged that "the President of the United States intervened and recognized this Republic in a way in violation of law."⁶³

Teller quoted from several legal authorities to show that the United States was guilty of intervention, both when it obstructed the parent state (Colombia) from taking entitled steps to put down insurrection,⁶⁴ and when it treated Panama as independent before Panama even had a political organization qualifying it to be recognized as a belligerent or Colombia

had a chance to react.⁶⁵ And he declared: "When we said to Colombia, 'You must not attempt to reestablish your authority over the seceding State of Panama,' it was as much a declaration of war as if Congress had declared it, so far as the laws of the nations are concerned."⁶⁶

Senator Carmack expressed similar views, stating that "recognition, where the intention and effect is to give moral support to an insurrection, is itself an unfriendly act and a species intervention. In this case there was not only constructive, but actual, intervention."⁶⁷ The rule of international law "is that the independence of a new state must exist as an undoubted fact before it can be recognized as a fact. When the new state shall have firmly established its independence, after it has successfully repelled every effort to subjugate it, after all efforts have been practically abandoned or become manifestly hopeless, then, and not until then, can other nations deal with it as a sovereign and independent power."⁶⁸ "But the President did not stop with the act of recognition. He actually intervened. He sent war ships of the United States there to drive the troops of Colombia from her own territory, to keep them from suppressing an insurrection against her own authority."⁶⁹

Citing precedents against the premature recognition of Panama, Senator Pettus quoted from a Message by former President Jackson of December 31, 1836:

The acknowledgment of a new State as independent and entitled to a place in the family of nations is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility, but more especially so when such State has forcibly separated itself from another of which it had formed an integral part and which still claims dominion over it. A premature recognition under these circumstances, if not looked upon as justifiable cause of war, is always liable to be regarded as a proof of an unfriendly spirit to one of the contending parties.⁷⁰

Senator Overman admitted that other nations had recognized Panama, but in his judgment "no country. . . would have taken this step without the example and the consent of the United States."⁷¹ There was no precedent for the exception to the general rule of recognition that the President claimed in this case: "We recognize a republic without a constitution, without laws, without a navy, without an army, without anything but a junta composed of three men--a newborn republic set up and recognized in the space of three days."⁷²

Senator Daniel concluded that the Panama Government "is as naked as a government as was the first man in the Garden of Eden."⁷³ He explained that it was the "municipality, common council, and citizens of Panama and not the people of the State of Panama who organized this

revolution and went into it.”⁷⁴ Referring to Arango, Arias, and Boyd he asked: “Are these three men ‘a republican form of government?’”⁷⁵

In the words of Senator Gorman: “We recognize a Government of only three or five men, selected by nobody, but made secure by our naval officers and our agents who were looking after the canal.”⁷⁶ According to Senator Stone the recognition of Panama was in unseemly haste, especially when the United States had such special interests at stake.⁷⁷ And Senator Newlands charged that President Roosevelt had violated international law by his premature recognition of Panama.⁷⁸

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND LAW

Senator Gorman declared that by virtually seizing a part of the territory of Colombia the President had taken “action amounting to a declaration of war, which the Constitution says Congress alone has the power to declare. . . .”⁷⁹ Also noting that the U. S. Constitution gives Congress the exclusive right to declare war, Senator Carmack stated: “I charge that the President violated the Constitution in that he committed acts of war against the friendly Republic of Colombia.”⁸⁰ When one nation resists the exercise of sovereignty by another, he pointed out, it is an act of war.⁸¹ Carmack quoted from Senate Document 51, received by Congress on December 19, 1903, having been sent by President Roosevelt in response to resolutions seeking information, to show that on November 11, 1903 Colombian troops were forbidden to land anywhere on the Isthmus of Panama.⁸²

Likewise accusing the President of violating the Constitution, Senator Newlands contended “that the entire action of the President constituted a declaration of war, and his acts were acts of war. War was not only declared, it existed.”⁸³ “It was a successful war, which accomplished the segregation of Colombia’s territory, raped from her the territory that belonged to her, and transferred it to a new sovereignty.”⁸⁴ Among other things, Newlands drew attention to the fact that the concessions Colombia had given to the Panama Railroad Company and later to the French Panama Canal Company guaranteed the right of Colombia to transport troops and ammunition on the Panama Railroad. After quoting these guarantees, Newlands stated: “So the Government of the United States, by its action at Colon, actually forbade the concessionaires of Colombia, these people whose only right to be there existed by virtue of Colombia’s grant, to carry out the very terms of their grants requiring them to give the Government the transportation that was necessary for the moving of troops essential to the preservation of public order .”⁸⁵

Senator Pettus charged that President Roosevelt "is making war on the Republic of Colombia without any authority from Congress, both by the Navy and the Army, and for the purpose of securing that 10 miles of land through that country."⁸⁶

Constitutional arguments were also used in the question of the recognition of Panama, with Senator Bacon drawing a distinction between the executive function of recognizing the particular government established and the legislative function of recognizing the fact of independence;⁸⁷ while Senator Mallory stated that the President had the power to recognize new governments under his power to receive ministers, but he had the "duty of ascertaining beyond any question whether his act of recognition could be justly construed as an act of hostility by any nation that had reason to object to such recognition. . . ." If so, he should defer recognition, at least until he could consult with Congress, which has the power of declaring war.⁸⁸

Senator Morgan pointed out that the Hay-Herrán Treaty had set a time limit of September 22, 1903 for the exchange of ratifications of this document; so the President had no power to negotiate further with Colombia for a Canal after that date, he declared: "The Spooner law required him to open negotiations with Nicaragua and Costa Rica for that purpose. It had no reference to any *cæsarean* operation by which a republic of Panama might be taken alive from the womb of Colombia and be empowered by our President to seize the territory of Colombia and to assume ownership and sovereignty there under mythical covenants that some diplomatists, 'wise above what is written,' have invented and have declared that they 'run with the land.' "⁸⁹ Senators Carmack and Patterson also insisted that the Spooner Law be obeyed.⁹⁰

INTERESTS OF CIVILIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL EMINENT DOMAIN

Senator Teller noted that President Roosevelt, in his Message to Congress of January 4, 1904, had based his defense on (1) treaty rights, (2) national interests and safety, and (3) the interests of collective civilization.⁹¹ In taking up the third point, Teller declared that instead of making new international law regarding the interests of collective civilization to gratify its own special interests, the United States should be standing for justice and right and taking an interest in the maintenance of smaller nations.⁹² He continued: "Why that doctrine would justify the power of Russia to sweep down across Asia and compel 400,000,000 Chinamen to bow to her behest."⁹³ "Oh. . .that we should have lived to

this hour to see the attempt to commit the American people to such a doctrine as this! But. . . it is not an American doctrine. It is the doctrine of the autocrat, the doctrine of power, and the doctrine that might makes right."⁹⁴ A Canal must be given to the world with "clean hands": "I am more anxious. . . that the Government of the United States go before the world as an honest, law-abiding, justice-loving nation than I am that it should glory in the greatest work of human hands. It will not do to say it is in the interest of civilization, and thus acquit ourselves of a violation of international law. You have no right to take Colombia's land in the interest of civilization. That. . . is the robber's claim."⁹⁵ Furthermore, "it has been the cry of every tyrant who ever lived that his tyranny was for the good of mankind."⁹⁶

Senator Patterson charged that: "The President, when he advanced the claim, to justify despoiling Colombia of its most prized department, that the United States was 'the mandatory of collective civilization,' to do the job must have abandoned the field of treaty obligations, of international law and national morality to soar where imagination supplants reason and fiction is divorced from fact."⁹⁷ And Senator Simmons declared that the President's assertion that the recognition of Panama must be exempted from the normal rules, due to a mandate the United States held from collective civilization, was "a plea in confession and avoidance. . . ."⁹⁸

According to Senator Stone the right of international eminent domain was "the exact doctrine under which powerful nations, without conscience, have plundered weak ones in all the ages. It is the doctrine of the divine right of force."⁹⁹ Senator McLaurin brought out that "if this Government has a right to assert the doctrine of international eminent domain, then it would be similar to the doctrine of national eminent domain; and if so, it would be the duty of this Government, in asserting that right, to pay the real owner of the soil an amount that the property taken was reasonably worth."¹⁰⁰ And Senator Teller denied that there was any international law of eminent domain.¹⁰¹

AIDING AND ABETTING

While Senator Simmons did not believe that President Roosevelt consciously and intentionally, directly or indirectly, was involved with the conspirators,¹⁰² and Senator Mallory thought President Roosevelt's denial on January 4, 1904 that any U. S. official had incited the revolt disposed of the charge conclusively,¹⁰³ Senator Stone profoundly regretted that he could find nothing in the grounds put forward to justify the President's course which was satisfactory to his mind: "If the Administration is really innocent of wrongdoing, the facts are woefully unkind to the

Administration. The things proved, to say nothing of those asserted, put the Government on the defensive. They tend strongly to show that we were in some way, some discreditable way, a party to the Panama insurrection."¹⁰⁴ He was not charging complicity, but among the grounds for suspicion were the fact that the President "stands before us as admitting his entire willingness to have fomented rebellion in Panama, to have dismembered the Republic of Colombia, and to have supported the lawless act by the power of our arms, and yet he denounces any suspicion of complicity by this Government in what was actually done as being as 'destitute of foundation as propriety.' "¹⁰⁵

Referring to the information contained in President Roosevelt's Message to Congress, January 4, 1904, Senator Patterson stated about the President:

He had conceived the probability of the secession of Panama under his own guidance. He does not pretend that he did not express his opinions and desires freely; and that being the case, it does no violence to the President to suggest that his views and purposes were known, considered, and believed in by those who comprised the Panama revolutionary junta. Thus we find that long before the revolution occurred--if we can dignify it by that name--the President was contemplating preparations for it.¹⁰⁶

Noting that the President quoted from the orders sent to the Navy, just before the Panama Revolution, to prevent the landing of Colombian troops, Patterson continued:

So . . . it must be perfectly clear, first, that the President knew of the uprising that was threatened; that the President had determined to prevent interference by Colombia with the uprising; that the President had made up his mind to defeat every effort of Colombia to overcome the rebellion of its subjects, not requiring of Panama to demonstrate its ability to maintain its independence against Colombia. Pure, cold-blooded, deliberate participation with the rebels, though the President avers it was without previous arrangement, but undeniably the secessionists knew his mind. He tells us that his mind was made up.¹⁰⁷

And the purpose was to gain a Canal, Patterson pointed out.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, by the chicanery of Panama Railroad officials, the Colombian generals who had landed at Colón were decoyed into going without their forces into the very arms of the conspirators; and Naval officials, obeying orders from Washington, denied transportation to the main body of Colombian troops.¹⁰⁹

Senator Carmack also made direct accusations against President Roosevelt: "The President has denied with some heat that he had any

complicity in this business. He does not conceal the fact that he desired this insurrection. He does not conceal the fact that he intended to aid it if it occurred, and he can not conceal the fact that he did aid it."¹¹⁰ "To all intents and purposes there was but one man in that insurrection, and that man was the President of the United States."¹¹¹ The revolutionists rose as one man, "but the one man was in the White House."¹¹² Carmack quoted correspondent Merrill A. Teague, who had interviewed the conspirators, to show that they would not have made the first move but for their belief that advanced assurance had been given by the Government at Washington.¹¹³ This was the important question in Carmack's mind: "The President said he did not encourage the insurrection. What more did he need do to encourage the insurrection than to let Bunau-Varilla and a few other choice spirits know that if they did get up any sort of an insurrectionary movement it would have behind it the military power of the United States and that the conspirators would get \$ 10,000,000 of good American money to pay them for doing it?"¹¹⁴

Senator Morgan asserted: "In every stage of the proceeding the New Panama Canal Company led, if it did not dictate, the policy of the President, and Bunau-Varilla and Cromwell were in at the death."¹¹⁵ And he satirically asked: "Why did not the President, while preparing for a coup d'état, . . . create the Republic of the New Panama Canal Company and lead it into the family of nations as the latest born, uncrowned goddess of liberty?"¹¹⁶

While Senator Berry thought the President had no doubt stated the truth when he said he had not encouraged the Revolution, he believed "that the parties here who were working in the interests of the revolution had assurances from the State Department here that the naval forces would be used precisely as they were used. That I do not think any man can approve."¹¹⁷ Senator Culberson, active outside as well as inside the Senate, stated his viewpoint clearly in a speech at the Iroquois Democratic Club of Chicago:

This incident throughout was marked not alone by repeated injustice, but by reproach and dishonor. The declaration of the administration that it did not officially and publicly instigate the revolt, for that is the whole force of the denial, is fully accepted, and yet its conduct was tantamount to instigation and encouragement, and had that effect. What it failed to do officially and publicly was DONE PERSONALLY AND SECRETLY.¹¹⁸

COLOMBIA

Senator Patterson defended Colombia as a country over eighty years old,

older than the United States was when its war of rebellion occurred, which had since 1846 "religiously observed" its pledge to keep isthmian transit open so far as it could. It was those who sought to overthrow the Government who were disturbing the peace.¹¹⁹ Colombia, he stated, had wanted to amend the Hay-Herrán Treaty, but did not do so because of the repeated warnings by U. S. diplomatic representatives, and because they wanted to leave the ground entirely open when a new treaty should be negotiated. Administration threats to sever friendly relations with Colombia if the Hay-Herrán Treaty was not ratified could only ensure its rejection: "That the treaty was not ratified may be largely traced to the inconsiderate and insulting attitude of Secretary Hay to the Colombian Congress."¹²⁰ And Patterson pointed out that the Colombian constitution of 1886, suspended for a time, had been restored before 1903, for the Colombian Congress that met to consider the Hay-Herrán Treaty was elected under that constitution.¹²¹

Both Senators Pettus and Stone defended Colombia's right to reject the Hay-Herrán Treaty,¹²² and Stone called the insurrection itself "venal and selfish. It was not a struggle for liberty, but for greed."¹²³ Senator McLaurin pointed out that less than a year before the Roosevelt Administration had been willing to fasten the hold of Colombia over Panama in the Hay-Herrán Treaty.¹²⁴

Senator Mallory agreed that Colombia had the power to reject the Hay-Herrán Treaty, but its grounds must be fair and reasonable; he accused Colombia of acting with insincerity.¹²⁵ And Senator Simmons felt that Panama was justified in revolting due to oppression and tyranny by Colombia; yet he thought some way should be found to compensate Colombia: "I think she has suffered wrong at our hands. . . ."¹²⁶ "Nearly every Senator upon this side of the Chamber, if not every one, whether he intends to vote for the [Hay-Bunau-Varilla] treaty or against it, believes that wrong has been done to Colombia and that reparation should be made for that wrong, and they intend to insist that reparation shall be made."¹²⁷

Senator Bacon argued both for compensation to Colombia,¹²⁸ and for arbitration between Colombia and the United States on the grounds that disagreement over the interpretation of a treaty (the Treaty of 1846) was a proper subject for arbitration.¹²⁹

PERSONAL ATTACKS AND POLITICS

Charging that a part of the territory of Colombia had been "virtually seized, by military power," Senator Gorman accused President Roosevelt of usurpation: "No head of an autocratic government ever was guilty of a

more audacious act. Newspaper critics draw a parallel between our President and Napoleon."¹³⁰

In a tirade against Roosevelt, Senator Carmack accused the President of a "morbid craving for war and for the excitement of action which is the dominant trait of his character."¹³¹ "Into what dangers and difficulties. . . may we not be led by this headlong President of ours? His honesty is no protection, because an honest man, filled with foolish zeal, with the blood in his head, and thinking with his blood instead of his brain, is about as dangerous a man as you can have in the country."¹³² "It has been said that the President would not have dared to commit such an outrage upon a stronger nation. I do not agree with this opinion. I set no such limits to the strenuousness of this Administration. I believe that the President would really have felt a sterner joy if Colombia had been a foeman more worthy of his steel."¹³³

Earlier attacks upon imperialist policies by Senator Tillman¹³⁴ were intensified when President Roosevelt became responsible for them, due to his personal animosity toward Theodore Roosevelt.¹³⁵ During the Panama debate in the Senate, Tillman called President Roosevelt "the only sponsor, the only godfather and protector of this Panama Republic, with which he has entered into a treaty, which he asks us to ratify."¹³⁶ He questioned "where the President gets any right to use the Army and Navy of the United States to protect a republic which he himself has created."¹³⁷ Addressing the other side, he exclaimed: "We can not convict you on the evidence so far presented of having stolen the Isthmus. The circumstances and admissions of the President show it to all honest men. I had better not be too sweeping. I will say that all honest men who are not partisans must acknowledge that our Government has stolen it."¹³⁸ Without endorsing the idea, as he explained, Tillman stated he would have preferred that the United States had pursued the policy of the bold highwayman rather than that of the sneak thief. To say to Colombia in the interests of commerce and civilization, "Get out of the road and let us build the canal," would have been honorable and decent; but to obtain "a pretended claim there by the methods of a sneak thief and then defend it by the attitude of a bully is a disgraceful episode in American diplomacy."¹³⁹

Senator Morgan exclaimed that "the President of the United States, by a strange fiction of alleged international law, had created the Republic of Panama in a night, like Jonah's gourd, and had created its minister plenipotentiary by the breath of his nostrils. . . ."¹⁴⁰ "He had an ambition to serve that put every power and every device into strenuous action. It was that the honor of creating an isthmian canal should belong to his Administration."¹⁴¹

Senator Overman stated that he had the profoundest respect for the

President, but "I do not subscribe to the doctrine, 'The king can do no wrong:' 'the President, always right; right or wrong, the President.' "¹⁴² And Senator Newlands called for "a prompt disavowal by the Congress of the United States of the acts of the President as unauthorized, as unwarranted, either by our treaties, by international law, or by the Constitution of the United States."¹⁴³

The failure of Senator Gorman, party political leader in the Senate,¹⁴⁴ to unite the Senate Democrats against the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, led to a loss of personal prestige, destroying his chances to become the Democratic presidential candidate in the 1904 elections.¹⁴⁵ Besides his behind-the-scenes maneuverings,¹⁴⁶ Gorman declared in the Senate while pleading the right to all information on the Panama events: "Can it be in the mind of any man that a desperate political chance, growing out of the depressed conditions, makes it necessary for political success that the flag and the armies of the country may be exhibited in some foreign land to strengthen the party and secure party power? If such a thought has entered the mind of any man, here is the body to stay it."¹⁴⁷ He charged that "in this case there has occurred the most flagrant action by the Executive Department that has ever taken place in the Government, and, in my judgment, outside of the question of a canal at Nicaragua or at Panama, it ought to be resented by the Senate without regard to party."¹⁴⁷

Senator Carmack denied that his course was inspired by partisan prejudice or antagonism to the Administration, rather "my antagonism to this Administration had its origin and owes its continuance to just such acts as I have condemned in this business. I have been consistent in my opposition to everything that savors of imperialism or tyranny, and my views have never been colored by my feelings toward the Administration in power."¹⁴⁹ And Senator Overman declared that it was a question which rises far above politics and partisanship.¹⁵⁰

RESOLUTIONS, AMENDMENTS, and A BILL

Senator Bacon introduced a resolution on January 12, 1904, calling for a treaty with Colombia "that full and complete compensation may be made by the United States to the Republic of Colombia for the loss of her sovereignty and property rights in Panama so far as the same may be shown to be due to any act of the United States through the land or naval forces of the same. . . ." Furthermore, if Colombia and the United States failed to come to an agreement on the question of United States responsibility or the amount of compensation, the matter should be referred to arbitration at The Hague or some other tribunal agreed upon.¹⁵¹

Bacon explained that his compensation resolution (Sen. Res. 82) did not originate in Democratic caucus, but was solely at his own initiative.¹⁵² He suggested that it would allow Senators opposed to what they conceived as illegal acts to vote for the Panama Treaty when they could not do so otherwise.¹⁵³ However, by his resolution, he unwittingly helped to sabotage Democratic strategy, which was to discuss the Treaty so fully that all of President Roosevelt's conniving would be exposed; then when public opinion was turned against the President, the Democrats could block the Treaty without appearing to be obstructionists.¹⁵⁴

The much debated Bacon resolution¹⁵⁵ was modified by its author on February 8, 1904, in order to meet Republican criticism, by removal of references to alleged responsibility of U. S. forces for the success of the Panama Revolution. And the section on arbitration was completely removed, as this question could wait until it was seen whether or not an agreement could be reached with Colombia. However, Bacon stressed that the original resolution was satisfactory to himself.¹⁵⁶ The Bacon resolution remained unacted upon at the time of the vote on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.

Senator Bacon also introduced, in executive session of the Senate, an amendment to Article I of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty stating that the United States "acting both for the United States and for the Republic of Panama, and in their names, shall be empowered to treat with the Republic of Colombia and agree in their behalf upon a sum of money to be paid to and received by the Republic of Colombia in full compensation for the surrender and quitclaim of any and all right of sovereignty alleged and claimed by the Republic of Colombia in, to, and over the territory embraced in the Republic of Panama. . . ." This compensation to Colombia, to be guaranteed by the United States, would also be on account of any and all concessions granted by Colombia to the New Panama Canal Company and Panama Railroad Company and on account of any and all claims and alleged rights in or to the property of these companies, and for "any and all alleged claims of the Republic of Colombia against [either the United States or] the Republic of Panama on account of the recent revolution in Panama and the secession of Panama from the Republic of Colombia, or any alleged matter or thing connected therewith." The words in bracket were struck out on a motion by Senator Cockrell.¹⁵⁷

Bacon's compensation policy was defeated when his amendment to Article I of the Panama Canal Treaty was voted down 49 to 24 (52 to 27 including pairs) on February 23, 1904.¹⁵⁸

Senator Morgan offered several amendments to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty in executive session: (1) His first amendment was to strike out Article I guaranteeing Panama's independence and replace it with the

words: "The United States of America recognizes the independence of the Republic of Panama and will protect it against foreign and domestic enemies, guaranteeing to it a republican form of government and security against domestic revolution and violence, for which purposes all needful powers are, by this convention, conferred upon the Government of the United States."¹⁵⁹ (2) The second amendment was to strike out the last clause of Article 22, whereby the title to the Canal was dependent upon consummation of the purchase from the New Panama Canal Company. In lieu of this clause Morgan inserted that the United States would enforce the New Panama Canal Company's rights and obligations to which it was entitled under the laws of Colombia and contracts with Colombia, as if they were made with the United States. But the United States would not be liable to any government, person, or company for the manner in which it dealt with or disposed of these rights.¹⁶⁰

(3) Morgan's third amendment was to add to Article III, whereby Panama granted to the United States all authority in the Canal Zone as if it were sovereign, the following: "And whenever the legislatures of the high contracting parties shall, respectively, so provide by law, the provisions of this article shall apply to and include all the territory of the Republic of Panama...or to so much thereof as shall be so annexed to the United States in the manner herein provided."¹⁶¹ (4) The fourth amendment added to Article 26 the following words in italics: ratified by the "*legislatures of the*" respective Governments.¹⁶² All four amendments were voted down.¹⁶³

Senator Morgan also introduced a resolution in executive session inquiring into the alleged powers of Bunau-Varilla to negotiate and conclude the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.¹⁶⁴

In open Senate session Senator Morgan introduced one bill and many resolutions. The Morgan Bill (S. 3657) called for annexation of Panama to the United States; appropriation of 15 million dollars to be paid to Colombia when Congress had ratified any agreement the President should make with Colombia in respect to the secession of Panama; appropriation of 40 million dollars for, and an authorization for the President to acquire, the rights and concessions of the New Panama Canal Company-subject to Congressional approval, and Congress was to receive all the facts on the rights of the New Panama Canal Company to sell; and the 10 million dollars appropriated in the Spooner Law should apply to a canal at Panama-but nothing in this act should affect the rights under the Spooner Law in respect to the Nicaragua route.¹⁶⁵ The latter two points reflected Morgan's view that ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty would end all appropriations for a Panama Canal under the Spooner Law; and he stated he was trying to relieve the country and Congress of its

embarrassment.¹⁶⁶ He proposed to stop those who would be demanding their money as soon as the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was ratified, and to investigate their rights as things proceeded.¹⁶⁷

In explaining the part of his Bill calling for the annexation of Panama, Morgan stated that Article III of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was actually an annexation of the Canal Zone; the only question was whether the Zone should be increased for public necessity and safety. "If we need the richest part of Panama and are willing to cut the Republic in twain to get it, why should we not take the entire Department and govern it under the benignant laws of the United States? If this is a violation of principle or sound policy, the acquisition of 500 square miles is only smaller in degree."¹⁶⁸ This Bill, he stated, as its purpose is, "lays down the basis upon which the Panama Canal will be built if Mr. Roosevelt has the power still and the will to violate the Spooner act. . . . It is left to his conscience. . . ."¹⁶⁹

Morgan introduced a resolution calling for an inquiry by the Committee on Pacific Railroads into the assertions, by public journals exercising leading influence in the great political parties, that the transcontinental Railroads "acting in concert or combination, or with a common purpose, or singly, have opposed, unlawfully, the public policy and laws of the United States in respect of the ratification by Colombia of the treaty known as the Hay-Herran treaty, and that such railroad companies in like manner are obstructing the full and complete execution of the duty and policy of the United States as declared in the act of Congress approved June 28, 1902. . . ."¹⁷⁰

Further Morgan resolutions stated that it was the right of Congress to pass upon any contemplated purchase from the New Panama Canal Company;¹⁷¹ called upon the Attorney-General to inform the Senate about any plans to purchase from the New Panama Canal Company, with the terms including the sum, and any participation by France in such a purchase or sale;¹⁷² resolved that the U. S. guarantee of Panama's independence was in effect a declaration of war against Colombia without Congressional assent and against the law of neutrality enacted by the U. S. Congress;¹⁷³ stated that obedience to the Spooner Law and the McKinley protocols required the President to proceed with further Canal negotiations with Nicaragua and Costa Rica;¹⁷⁴ directed the Secretary of State to send the Senate a copy of the dispatch or letter of January 22, 1904 relating to withdrawal or abandonment of all amendments to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, sent by Minister Buchanan at Panama to Secretary Hay;¹⁷⁵ called upon the Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine to inquire into hygienic conditions between Colón and the city of Panama and in those cities;¹⁷⁶ and requested the President to provide information on the present organization of government in Panama, and its

constitution.¹⁷⁷ The latter resolution was passed the same day, with the President transmitting the information requested the day after the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was voted upon.¹⁷⁸

In response to an appeal from Senator Spooner for a resolution allowing a practical line of action on his proposition of disavowal of the acts of the President,¹⁷⁹ Senator Newlands introduced a very long resolution listing his charges against President Roosevelt.¹⁸⁰ In the last section of the resolution he summarized these charges:

Resolved, That the instructions of the United States to its naval forces aforesaid not to permit the landing of the Colombian troops on the Isthmus, and the intervention of the armed forces of the United States to prevent such landing and the use of the Panama Railroad, and the display of power and force which overawed Colombia and prevented her from defending her sovereignty over the Isthmus, and thus secured the secession of Panama and the dismemberment of Colombia and the creation of a new sovereignty in Colombia's territory, sustained and supported only by the armed forces of the United States, constituted a declaration and prosecution of a successful war upon the part of the United States against Colombia.

2. That such action constituted a breach of the treaty of 1846 in this, that it denied Colombia's sovereignty over the Isthmus of Panama, expressly acknowledged by the treaty of 1846.

3. That it also violated the provision of the treaty of 1846, which declared that neither of the two contracting parties should ordain or authorize any act of reprisal nor declare war against the other on complaint of injuries or damages until the party considering itself offended should have laid before the other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same should have been denied in violation of the laws and of international right.

4. That the recognition by the President of the United States of a state thus attempting to secede, which was without a government or an army or the ability to sustain itself or to maintain international obligations, and whose existence was supported and sustained alone by the armed forces of the United States, constituted a breach of international law.

5. That the armed intervention of the United States, as aforesaid, was making war against Colombia upon the part of the President of the United States without the sanction of the Congress of the United States, and was in violation of the provision of the Constitution which gives to Congress alone the power to declare war.¹⁸¹

Newlands ended his resolution by proposing a solution to the problem:

Resolved. That the President of the United States is respectfully requested to negotiate a new treaty with the United States of Colombia providing for the cession by Colombia of all rights of every kind and description whatsoever which Colombia may claim to have in connection with the Isthmus of Panama or the treaty of 1846, including all her rights in the concessions for the construction of the Panama Railroad and Panama Canal across said Isthmus, and absolutely substituting by said treaty the United States of America for the United States of Colombia in all respects whatsoever, as far as said Isthmus of Panama is concerned.

Resolved, That said treaty should follow as closely as is feasible the lines of treaties whereby the United States acquired by purchase Louisiana from France, Florida from Spain, and Alaska from Russia.

Resolved, That if it is found impracticable to agree upon the amount of compensation for said cession, said amount shall be referred for determination to arbitration. . . ; but in case such arbitration is found necessary said treaty shall contain a provision allowing said cession to take full effect upon the exchange of ratifications thereof, without waiting for the result of said arbitration, in order that work upon said canal may be at once commenced.¹⁸²

Newlands stated that his purpose was to expedite the Canal, not delay it, and he explained that the method contained in his resolution for settling existing complications expressed his own "individual views, without consultation with my associates. . . ." ¹⁸³ The Newlands resolution (No. 102) ¹⁸⁴ was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 28, 1904. ¹⁸⁵

Senator Stone introduced a resolution on January 13, 1904 directing the Committee on Foreign Relations to inquire into the Panama Revolution, particularly as to any participation in the Revolution by the U. S. Government or by any civil or military official of the United States. ¹⁸⁶ On January 26, 1904, he laid before the Senate a substitute or a modification of the above resolution. It called on the same Committee to ascertain whether Bunau-Varilla and other persons residing in the United States aided or promoted an insurrection in Panama; whether they gave assurances to citizens of Panama that the U. S. Navy would assist the insurrection; and "whether any official of any Department of the Government did disclose or make known to said Bunau-Varilla, or to any other persons, the action which the Government of the United States. . . proposed to take in the event of an insurrection." ¹⁸⁷

A resolution of inquiry by Senator Gorman on January 5, 1904 requested information from the President regarding past interventions by U. S. military forces in Colombia under the Treaty of 1846, either at Colombia's request or without such request, and either in aid of or to suppress revolt,

rebellion, or disturbance. Section five of the resolution stated: "And also to inform the Senate which words, if any, in the treaty of 1846 authorized the United States, in the opinion of the President, to enter by military force and uninvited into the territorial jurisdiction of New Granada or Colombia in order to prevent the interruption or embarrassment of free traffic across the Isthmus."¹⁸⁸

After Gorman replaced "intervened" with "employed military force," etc., and after he deleted the whole of section five,¹⁸⁹ and later accepted Senator Foraker's modification to section four which replaced the terms "in aid of" and "to suppress" with "on account of" any revolt or rebellion or disturbance,¹⁹⁰ the modified resolution passed on January 22, 1904.¹⁹¹ Section four, now the last one, read as modified: "And also that he will inform the Senate of the dates when and circumstances under which the United States has employed military force in the internal affairs of New Granada or Colombia on account of any revolt or rebellion or disturbance of peace therein."¹⁹²

President Roosevelt responded to the Gorman resolution, submitting to the Senate reports from the State and Navy Departments, with accompanying papers, on February 3, 1904.¹⁹³

Senator Culberson introduced a resolution (No. 104) into the Senate on January 25, 1904, which was agreed to four days later after amendments.¹⁹⁴ In its final form it resolved:

That the President be requested to inform the Senate whether all the correspondence and notes between the Department of State and the legation of the United States at Bogota, and between either of these and the Government of Colombia in relation to the construction of an isthmian canal, since June 28, 1902, and all the correspondence and notes between any Department of the Government of the United States and any of its officials or representatives or the Government of Panama, concerning the separation of Panama from Colombia, have been sent to the Senate, and, if not, that he be requested to send the remaining correspondence and notes to the Senate in executive session, if not, in his judgment, incompatible with the public interest.¹⁹⁵

Culberson argued that the Senate, with the responsibility of giving advice and consent to treaties negotiated by the President, was entitled to all the information the President had in his possession. He pointed out that he was not asking for the information to be sent to the Senate in open session, but in executive session with all the secrecy that involved.¹⁹⁶

In response to Culberson's resolution, President Roosevelt transmitted to the Senate in executive session on February 4, 1904, "all such correspondence in the Department of State as has not already been communicated to the Senate and printed in Senate documents numbered

51, 53, and 95." Plus he transmitted all such information not previously sent from the Navy Department, the only other executive department involved. He added: "I have reason to believe and do believe that no paper which could be deemed to fall within the purview of the resolution has been omitted."¹⁹⁷

Culberson also introduced a resolution (No. 49) on December 11, 1903, directing the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate to consider and report on "whether the inhabitants and residents of the Department of Panama may lawfully form a distinct, separate, and independent government in that territory, and particularly whether there is any governmental authority other than Colombia empowered to grant in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of land and waters in the territory of Panama, with full and complete sovereignty over the same."¹⁹⁸ Stating that the purpose of his resolution had largely been accomplished by its introduction and publication, and that it was evident that the majority in the Senate would not permit such an inquiry into whether "the United States can forcibly appropriate territory which, by the treaty of 1846, it guaranteed in Colombia, at least against all foreign nations, including the United States," he withdrew the resolution on February 22, 1904.¹⁹⁹ He pointed out though that the great controversy of 1861 resolved around the contention of the South that its reservation of State rights inherently justified secession, but: "No such claim is possible under the constitution of Colombia, for by its very terms all sovereignty is lodged wholly and exclusively in the centralized nation."²⁰⁰

And a resolution by Senator Daniel on January 12, 1904 called for all correspondence not heretofore transmitted between the Secretary of State and Colombia concerning the relations of the two countries since the Panama Revolution.²⁰¹

THE DEMOCRATIC VOTE ON THE HAY—BUNAU—VARILLA TREATY

The Democratic vote on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was evenly divided, with 14 voting in the affirmative and 14 voting in the negative (16 for and 17 against counting pairs).²⁰²

Of the above Senators who criticized the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration, five voted *for* the Treaty and one was paired for it: Bacon (Georgia), Berry (Arkansas), Mallory (Florida), Money (Mississippi), Simmons (North Carolina), and Stone (Missouri-paired). The remaining twelve either voted *against* the Treaty or were paired against it: Carmack (Tennessee), Culberson (Texas), Daniel (Virginia), Gorman (Maryland),

Morgan (Alabama), Newlands (Nevada), Patterson (Colorado), Teller (Colorado), Pettus (Alabama), Tillman (South Carolina), Overman (North Carolina--paired), and McLaurin (Mississippi--paired).²⁰³

Democrats not making Senate speeches but either voting *for* the Treaty or paired for it were: Francis Marion Cockrell (Missouri), Murphy James Foster (Louisiana), Asbury Churchill Latimer (South Carolina), James Bennett McCreary (Kentucky), James Piper Taliaferro (Florida), Samuel Douglas McEnery (Louisiana), Paris Gibson (Montana), and William A. Clark (Montana--paired). Democrats not making Senate speeches but either voting *against* the Treaty or paired against it were: Joseph Weldon Bailey (Texas), William Brimage Bate (Tennessee), Joseph Clay Stiles Blackburn (Kentucky), Fred Thomas Dubois (Idaho), and Thomas Staples Martin (Virginia--paired).²⁰⁴

Two Democratic Senators defended the Roosevelt Administration in Senate speeches, both voting *for* the Treaty: Alexander Stephens Clay (Georgia), and James P. Clarke (Arkansas).²⁰⁵

Geographically, the Democratic Senators from Colorado (two), Nevada (one), and Idaho (one) voted against the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, while the Democratic Senators from Montana (two) supported it.

Both Democratic Senators from Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, and Virginia were against the Treaty, while both from Georgia, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Florida voted for it. The Democratic Senators from North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Kentucky were divided as to their stand.

The two Democratic Senators from Missouri were for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.

And the Democratic Senator from Maryland voted against the Treaty.

However, the vote on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty does not give a complete picture of the opposition to the Roosevelt Administration's Panama policy. The vote on the Bacon Amendment (which proposed compensation to Colombia) adds to our knowledge of this sentiment: 27 out of the 33 Democratic Senators approved of the Bacon Amendment, 2 voted against it, and of the 4 who did not vote 3 were strongly critical of the Panama events.²⁰⁶

Governor Hogg of Texas illustrated the actual choice made by many of the Democratic Senators as to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty when he told the story of a dog catching a rabbit in violation of its previous teaching and rules laid down for its conduct: "You might whip the dog, says Gov. Hogg, but would you throw away the rabbit?"²⁰⁷

With the desire for an Isthmian Canal, and the very favorable terms of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, perhaps the wonder is that there was such vocal and bitter opposition. President Roosevelt, at least, was surprised:

"...I was not at all prepared for opposition of the South toward a measure which, though I believe it to be beneficial to all the country, is of course most beneficial to the South and the Pacific slope."²⁰⁸

Critical and Against the Treaty

Several petitions were sent to Senator *Carmack* from commercial bodies in Tennessee asking him to vote for the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, but he refused to vote against his own conscience.²⁰⁹ He noted that he had been consistent in opposition to everything that "savors of imperialism and tyranny. . . ."²¹⁰ In explaining the reason for his stand he stated: "I stand here for the canal; but I stand here for the law. I can not vote for the ratification of the Panama treaty. I have no criticism to make upon those who, while they condemn the action of the President, feel that it is their duty under the circumstances to support the treaty. I say with my view of this question I can not do it." He continued:

I can not support this treaty because I can not support and indorse the lawless acts of which it is the fruit; and if the Senate is ready, not only to excuse, but to applaud the President for violating the laws which we ourselves have made, then the ratification of this treaty ought to be followed by a resolution that the President shall take care that the Republic suffers no harm, and then we should end an existence that is as useless as that of the Roman senate in the days of the Cæsars and go to our homes and try to earn our living in an honest way.²¹¹

In addition, being an earnest advocate of a trans-Isthmian Canal long before entering the Senate,²¹² he felt the Canal was not tied to the Treaty--the Spooner Law requiring the President to turn to Nicaragua was still on the books.²¹³ It was wrong to claim that what had been done could not be undone; and what had been done only secured a particular route favored by the Republicans and the President, and most favored by the continental Railroads.²¹⁴ Slightly favoring a Nicaragua route, he had voted "cheerfully" for a Panama route when that was chosen; but he now insisted that the Spooner Law be obeyed as he had expected. He asserted that his action was not due to any particular preference for the Nicaragua route, but because the law required it.²¹⁵

Senator *Tillman* of South Carolina, one of the vice-presidents of the original Anti-Imperialist League, and who played an active anti-imperialist role regarding the Philippine issue,²¹⁶ condemned those who would vote for ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty despite the means of attainment, pointing out that "it is a good law that the receiver of stolen goods is as guilty as the man who steals them."²¹⁷

Mississippi Senator *McLaurin*, who felt that the very first Article of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, by which the United States guaranteed the independence of Panama, was a declaration of war against Colombia if she felt able to assert her authority,²¹⁸ withstood pressure from the legislature of his state calling him to vote for the Treaty. The vote in the Mississippi Senate on a resolution to request the federal Senators of that state to vote for ratification passed 31 to 1 on January 6, 1904.²¹⁹

Senator *Overman* of North Carolina, always a strong advocate of a Canal and knowing that a very large number of his people desired the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty ratified, would have preferred to vote for it. But he could not get his conscience to support the Treaty. The insurmountable barrier was the violated Treaty of 1846.²²⁰ In his mind there was something more important than the question of the Canal, which would have been dug at Panama or Nicaragua irregardless of the actions taken toward Colombia:

The strongest advocates of the canal, Senators who for years have fought and labored for a canal, who have made it almost their life work, have spoken for it, have pleaded for it, have molded public sentiment for it, are now most strongly opposed to this treaty. With me, as it is with every Senator here, it is a question which rises far above politics and partisanship, far above dollars and cents, far above local and sectional considerations or popular clamor--it is a question of principle. Believing, as I do, that to ratify this treaty is to violate a solemn contract, to violate a well-known principle of international law, to violate that great moral principle "Might does not make right;" and believing, Mr. President, that I am best serving my country in so doing, I shall vote against the treaty.²²¹

It was an accomplished fact, but in his judgment accomplished in the wrong, and he could not condone it.²²²

Senator *Morgan* of Alabama, noted for his expansionist policies in the 1890s,²²³ had been the foremost advocate of a Nicaragua canal for about twenty years.²²⁴ He introduced Canal bills in 1892, 1894, 1896, and 1898, and was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals until his removal by the Republicans shortly after the Panama Revolution.²²⁵ He accused President Roosevelt of brushing aside as chaff the conclusions of scientific men during the past two centuries, crushing all who dared question his wisdom.²²⁶

Morgan did not listen to the advice of Bunau-Varilla given after the Revolution: "I beg you not to throw away the title which the thankfulness of humanity owes to you that of the father of the Isthmian Canal. . . ."²²⁷ Nevertheless, the name of John Tyler Morgan has come down to us inseparably connected with the Canal.²²⁸

Morgan was against ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty on

several specific grounds. He claimed that Article I of the Treaty was a declaration of war against Colombia.²²⁹ Furthermore he denied the legitimacy of the Treaty in the first place. It was made with a de facto government that had no power to sell or convey territory within its operations; Colombia's de jure government over the Isthmus was not destroyed by the de facto recognition of Panama. It was made with foreign persons not organized as a nation: "But we are treating. . .with a party that is under duress from fear of Colombia, and from incapacity to deny us anything we choose to demand as the price of our protection against Colombia. This treaty power is the first of its sort that ever appeared in the annals of history."²³⁰

In Morgan's opinion ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty would sweep away all appropriations for a Canal under the Spooner Law, which did not authorize negotiations with Panama. But if the Treaty was not ratified, the Republicans would be forced to turn to the Nicaragua route.²³¹

Referring to the McKinley protocols with Nicaragua and Costa Rica, December 1, 1900, which promised negotiations for a Canal when the President was authorized to acquire control of the necessary territory, Morgan asserted that pledges of honor to these countries would be broken by the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.²³²

Morgan's most prolific attack was against the obligation in Article 22 of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty to pay the New Panama Canal Company \$ 40,000,000 for its "fraudulent and unjust" claims:²³³ "In this treaty they have so provided, in Article XXII, that we can not get an absolute title to the canal zone from Panama until we have purchased and paid for their canal property and concessions at a price that is satisfactory to them, and France has bound Panama to respect and enforce their demands as the condition of their recognition of its independence."²³⁴

Senator *Culberson* of Texas, who had attacked the Philippine policy of the Republican Administration as a member of the Senate Committee on the Philippines--1902,²³⁵ believed that "a vote to ratify the treaty is a vote to approve the most disgraceful diplomatic episode in all the annals of America."²³⁶ Instead of complying with the Spooner Law as to Nicaragua, the President "waited from August until November for a revolt in Panama or action by this Government, looking to actual seizure of the canal strip by us without authority."²³⁷

Virginia Senator *Daniel*, who had spoken against the annexation of the Philippines,²³⁸ denied that the defeat of the Panama Canal Treaty would imperil or thwart the desired Canal. Few care whether the Canal will be constructed through Panama or Nicaragua, he stated; the Spooner Law made it well assured.²³⁹

Among the Southerners not giving speeches on the Panama issue in the

Senate, but voting against the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, Senator *Bate* of Tennessee was an Anti-Imperialist,²⁴⁰ and likewise Senator *Bailey* of Texas was opposed to imperialism.²⁴¹

Senator *Teller* of Colorado was an expansionist before 1898, and although his Teller Amendment in April, 1898 prevented future annexation of Cuba,²⁴² he voted for ratification of the Treaty with Spain, February 6, 1899, by which the United States gained control of the Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico and Guam.²⁴³ However, he cast his vote against the 1901 Platt Amendment providing for a "protectorate" over Cuba.²⁴⁴

Teller, fascinated by engineering projects and having gained practical experience in the building of the Colorado Central Railroad, read everything he could find on the subject of an interoceanic Canal. From his study he concluded that the Canal must be government-built and under complete U. S. control, at sea-level (without locks), and large enough for the ships of the future. So he voted against all the "one-horse canals" proposed in the 1880s and 1890s.²⁴⁵ If it was to be a lock Canal he preferred the Nicaragua route, but as Panama offered the only hope for a sea-level Canal he voted for the Spooner Law. However, he did not believe in the ultimate success of the Panama Canal as planned, and hoped that after its failure it could be cut down to the sea-level. He felt that the advantages of the Canal had been greatly overrated, whether lock or sea-level.²⁴⁶

He summarized his position on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty:

I am going to vote against this treaty. I am not going to vote against it because I am opposed to a ship canal, although I am, and everybody here has known for twenty years that I was. I am not going to vote against it because I think Nicaragua would be a better route; but I am going to vote against it because it was inaugurated by a body that is not entitled by the universal recognition of mankind heretofore to be intrusted with the power to make a treaty with us concerning that land."²⁴⁸

Teller wished to enter his protest against the precedents set in the Panama events, denying that he should keep his mouth shut on the grounds that the evil could not be undone. Nothing so dangerous and threatening in the diplomatic affairs of the United States had ever been done, and "every evil precedent, every violation of international law, every violation of constitutional law, will be followed by a greater violation of the law and the Constitution, and the first violation will be quoted as a precedent."²⁴⁸

Fellow Colorado Senator *Patterson*, an opponent of the Philippine policy,²⁴⁹ charged that the zone for the Panama Canal "was stolen in a most bare-faced manner from Colombia." Therefore the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty should not be ratified.²⁵⁰

Calling himself an "earnest advocate" of an Isthmian Canal, preferring the Nicaragua route but voting for the Spooner Law with the expectation that if the treaty with Colombia failed the President would obey the law and turn to Nicaragua, Patterson exclaimed: "Now, who could have anticipated that when this Congress met, Nicaragua would be wholly abandoned, Colombia would be flouted, that Panama would be revolutionized into an independent Government, and that the United States, in violation of its treaty obligations and of the admitted rules of international law, would have first abetted the secession and then negotiated a treaty with that mushroom Republic?"²⁵¹

Patterson asserted that the "real friends of the canal are those who oppose the treaty." Then the United States could turn to the more advantageous Nicaragua route and block the designs of the transcontinental Railroads. In his opinion "those who have opposed an isthmian canal are all in favor of the Panama route. They recognize that the edict of the American people is that a canal shall be built. They must bow to it, and bowing to it they stand by the route that will require much the longer time to construct, whose successful construction is, according to the report of the Isthmian Canal Commission yet veiled in doubt, and that eliminates from competition with them the sailing vessels of the United States and of the entire commercial world."²⁵² Equatorial calms on the Pacific side practically year-round made a Panama Canal unavailable for sailing ships, he stated. And "the truth remains that it is the cheap transportation of the sailing vessel that the great transcontinental lines fear more than the much more costly transportation by steam."²⁵³

So, Patterson announced, "as a Senator. . . earnestly and anxiously desiring the construction and the speedy opening of an isthmian canal which will bring into competition with the great transcontinental railways not only the steam vessels but the great sailing fleets of the world, standing for a canal that will realize the wishes and desires of the American people in a much shorter period than is possible under the Panama scheme, I shall vote against the ratification of the Panama treaty, feeling that in doing so I am best serving my country and its people."²⁵⁴

Senator *Gorman* of Maryland, who led out in the unsuccessful attempt to unite the Democrats against the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty,²⁵⁵ was an opponent of imperialism as well as a party political leader in the Senate.²⁵⁶

Critical but For the Treaty

Senator *Bacon* of Georgia, an opponent of imperialism in the past in the Senate.²⁵⁷ and also critical of the events leading to the signing of the

Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, stated his opinion that it was the duty of a Senator to be guided by the wishes of the people of his state, irregardless of his own personal views, when their wish was clearly indicated. He was convinced, after a careful inquiry, that the people of Georgia, although wanting a peaceful settlement of Colombia's claims, also wanted him to vote for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.²⁵⁸ Among the evidence available to him was a petition from the mayor and council of Atlanta, urging the two Senators from Georgia "to vote for the ratification of said treaty when it comes to a vote in the United States Senate." The Canal, the petition said, "will be of great benefit to the city of Atlanta, the State of Georgia, and the entire South."²⁵⁹

So, explained Bacon, "in compliance with that wish [of the people of Georgia] and in pursuance of the duty which I conceive devolves upon me under such circumstances, I shall do so."²⁶⁰ However, he was quick to add that: "I do not understand by any means that they approve of the recent occurrences on the isthmus of Panama, so far as they involve any of the alleged actions of the United States in aiding the accomplishment of the revolution. I believe quite the contrary."²⁶¹

Bacon summarized his position by explaining that he was presenting the stand of those who, "while they favor the ratification of the treaty do not approve of illegal actions by the United States in connection with the revolution upon the Isthmus of Panama. If the people of Georgia thought that the ratification of the treaty involved an approval of the alleged illegal actions of the United States in connection with the revolution, as earnestly as they wish the building of the canal they would be opposed to the ratification of the treaty."²⁶²

Senator *Money* of Mississippi, a champion of the Nicaragua route as the best choice, and deploring many of the incidents antecedent and relating to the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty as comparable to past imperialistic precedents,²⁶³ nevertheless thought that the Treaty was more liberal to the United States than any Senator could ever have dreamed: "In fact, it sounds very much as though we wrote it ourselves...."²⁶⁴ So he announced: "As a government capable of negotiating a treaty has seen fit to make this one with us, and as we could not under any circumstances ever get a better one, then I am for taking this."²⁶⁵ Despite preferring Nicaragua, "I shall support this treaty as something expected of the Senate by the people of the United States."²⁶⁶

Furthermore, Money explained, "There is another reason...why I shall support the treaty. The legislature of my State, that has lately honored me with a reelection, passed a resolution requesting me and my colleague to vote for this measure."²⁶⁷ "I believe in the doctrine of instruction."²⁶⁸ Not seeing the choice as a matter of conscience, Money even expressed "regret

that there is not to be a unanimous vote on this side...."²⁶⁹

In announcing his decision to vote for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty Senator *Mallory* of Florida explained: "I fail to see any sufficient reason why a member of this body who disapproves and condemns the President's action as I do--emphatically and unqualifiedly--should, for that reason alone, feel it his duty to antagonize the treaty."²⁷⁰ He added: "It would have been easier and, perhaps, more politic in me, viewing the important questions involved as I do, to have remained silent and to have cast my vote in the way in which I believe a great majority of the people whom I, in part, represent on this floor would have me to vote."²⁷¹

Mallory did not believe that the Spooner Law had been broken. In his opinion the spirit of the Law was a Canal, so it was immaterial whether it was gained from Colombia or Panama; and Colombia had continued to discuss a series of its own counterproposals instead of dropping the matter after rejecting the Hay-Herrán Treaty August 12, 1903, so there had still been hope in that direction without turning to Nicaragua.²⁷² The great majority of the people of the United States, he believed, wanted the Canal for commercial, communication, and strategic reasons.²⁷³

Despite his criticism of the actions of the President on the Isthmus and his advocacy of the Nicaragua route, Senator *Berry* of Arkansas gave four reasons why he was going to cast his vote for the Panama Canal Treaty. Firstly, the defeat of the Treaty would not restore the conditions which existed in Colombia prior to the Revolution. Secondly, its defeat would not compel the President to obey his plain duty to construct the Canal at Nicaragua. Thirdly, a vote for the Treaty could not rightfully be construed as an indorsement of the action of the President. And fourthly:

But perhaps after all...the most persuasive reason for me to vote for the treaty is that which I think controls most Senators here, though it is sometimes considered a weakness to admit it, and that is I believe four-fifths of the people of the State from which I come want me to vote for it. I think they want the canal. I think that while they do not approve of what was done, they think it is done and past and that it can not be remedied by a defeat of the treaty. They believe that the defeat of this treaty will not secure a canal at Nicaragua. They believe that if it is defeated it will simply delay for some years the construction of any canal, a subject in which they have such an intense interest.²⁷⁴

He pointed out that the people of the South believed the Canal would tend to largely increase the price of cotton, reduce very largely the freight rates charged to transport the cotton to the eastern part of the country, and build up the ports of the South. It was not like the Paris treaty or the Philippines act. "As I said, the people of the South want it, and whatever the people of the South want, I want."²⁷⁵ In addition: "This treaty with

Panama is more favorable to the United States."²⁷⁶

Senator *Simmons* of North Carolina announced that "those of us who expect to vote for the treaty do not intend by that act to condone the sins of the Administration; and...they would vote with practical unanimity against it and it would be defeated if they thought, as the ex-Secretary of War declares he thinks, that by voting for this treaty they would condone, indorse, or acquiesce in the wrongful action of the Administration toward Colombia."²⁷⁷

In defending his decision Simmons asserted that the Panama Revolution and the recognition of Panama had to be kept distinct from the Treaty;²⁷⁸ that to defeat the Treaty would not change Panama's status as an independent nation--there was no proposition before Congress to overturn the binding executive recognition.²⁷⁹ "If what has been done in Panama can be undone at all by this Government it can only be undone by doing a greater wrong to Panama than has already been done to Colombia."²⁸⁰ He could act upon the admitted fact that Panama was an independent nation without approving of the means by which that independence was achieved.²⁸¹

Simmons believed there had been a real change of opinion behind the switch from the Nicaragua to the Panama route in the Spooner Law, which had decidedly chosen Panama as the best route; that the reasonable time for an agreement with Colombia had not lapsed;²⁸² and that the purpose of the Spooner Law was a Panama Canal, whether from Colombia or Panama--Colombia just happened to be in control of the territory at the time it was passed. The only effect of sticking to the letter of the law and defeating the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty would be to force a Canal at Nicaragua; since Colombia no longer owned the Isthmus no treaty could be made with her.²⁸³ He also pointed out that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was much more favorable to the United States than the Hay-Herrán Treaty had been.²⁸⁴

Furthermore, Simmons explained, the people of his state, feeling deeply about securing a Canal, and as speedily as possible, did not think the defeat of the present Treaty would make the preferred Nicaragua canal at all certain; they saw only vexatious delays: "They wish me to vote for this treaty if I can do so without violating my conscience."²⁸⁵

Stating that the Nicaragua route was infinitely superior to the Panama route, Senator *Stone* of Missouri claimed that "a magic and potent hand was thrust forth from a shadow somewhere and wrought a sudden change" in the decision of the Isthmian Canal Commission. Since then the Administration had but one purpose, a Panama Canal or no Canal at all.²⁸⁶ Yet, despite his Nicaragua preference, and despite his strong criticism of the events surrounding the Panama Revolution, in which he

rejected what he called the "flimsy pretenses" upon which U. S. action was justified,²⁸⁷ Stone indicated that, in obedience to the wishes of the people of his state, he would support the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.²⁸⁸

The two Senators from Louisiana, *Foster* and *McEnery*, did not make speeches on the Panama issue, but voted for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty which they had been instructed to do by the Louisiana legislature.²⁸⁹

Defended and For the Treaty

Senator *Clarke* of Arkansas pointed out that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty exceeded in its liberality any treaty heretofore, and also that a Canal was an absolute necessity--something which his section of the country understood.²⁹⁰ He wanted a sea-level Canal rather than a lock Canal, and felt that this could only be a reality at Panama; thus the President was justified in waiting so long without turning to the Nicaragua route. A sea-level Canal would allow the very largest ships to trade with the Far East. He also stressed the advantages of a Canal to U. S. defense, which would be maintained more effectively and economically by a two-ocean Navy.²⁹¹ The Panama Revolution was absolutely essential for the preservation of the Canal and Railroad property of the New Panama Canal Company; the forty million dollars and the Railroad property would be wiped out of existence by a move to Nicaragua.²⁹²

In Clarke's mind doctrines of international law "must be applied and understood rationally, leaving room for legitimate exercise of the aggressive spirit of progress, which is the mission of the American people..."²⁹³ "Nor," he continued, "must we overlook the fact that many of the most important events in the world's history have been marred by intrigue and written in blood, but where the betterment of mankind has in the end justified them."²⁹⁴ And "the loser, in the inevitable march to a manifest destiny, has his grievance sanctified in the assurance that the convulsion by which he was undone did not in all things come to pass 'according to law.'"²⁹⁵ Not that he was advocating a departure from principles of right, he explained. When understood in the spirit of progress characteristic of the time, no action will be encountered in the Panama affair which can not be condoned.²⁹⁶

Clarke announced that President Roosevelt "did not, in my opinion, so far transgress the boundaries of the power and discretion vested in him as to warrant me in repudiating his act by voting to reject the treaty."²⁹⁷ Clarke added that "the wonder is not that he did so much to give free rein to the inherent spirit of revolution always rampant in Panama, but it rather excites wonder that he did so little in that direction."²⁹⁸ The Senator believed that no aid had been given to the revolutionists prior to their declaration of independence, and any haste in extending recognition was a

matter of detail within the President's discretion.²⁹⁹

Clarke asserted that many of the attributes of Colombia's sovereignty had been "carved out" by the Treaty of 1846: "To the extent that Colombia lost it we gained it, and it accounted to a definite interest in the Isthmus."³⁰⁰ But the greatest part of his speech was an attack upon Colombia for rejecting the Hay-Herrán Treaty. He had no praise for the character of Colombia's rulers, accusing them of dishonesty,³⁰¹ making a mockery of U. S. efforts by a course of duplicity,³⁰² and of keeping a "Punic faith" with the United States.³⁰³ After the manner in which the Hay-Herrán Treaty was rejected, he claimed, "we owed to the Colombians nothing and could afford to laugh when their calamity came. Our only duty in the premises was to ourselves, and that was to respect the cardinal principles of right and justice...."³⁰⁴

Senator *Clay* of Georgia admitted that Panama had been recognized with undue haste to take advantage of the Revolution in order to advance commercial interests, and that acknowledgment of independence of insurgents was an international wrong so long as the sovereign nation had a reasonable hope of maintaining its authority, but he claimed that "our Government was not bound by the general rules of international law in recognizing the independence of Panama."³⁰⁵ Three special circumstances made this true: (1) the Treaty of 1846; (2) Colombia's conduct in rejecting the Hay-Herrán Treaty; and (3) the importance of an Isthmian Canal to United States and world commerce.³⁰⁶

Under the Treaty of 1846, *Clay* explained, the United States could interfere in the domestic quarrels of Colombia to protect American lives and property, and to keep the transit open across the Isthmus when Colombia was unable to keep its pledge to do so.³⁰⁷ However, he stated that "I shall cast my vote in favor of the ratification of the treaty upon other grounds much more satisfactory to me than I could possibly reach on this theory of the issue. On this theory of the case, separated from other points in the controversy, I hardly think I could vote for the treaty."³⁰⁸

Colombia's attempts to "extort" money from the United States, he asserted, "might be a reason why we should take advantage of a situation arising unexpectedly and acknowledge the independence of a people who would own the territory we so much desired and necessary to be used for the commerce of the world."³⁰⁹

And *Clay* felt "there was nothing of greater importance than the construction of an interoceanic canal." Besides allowing direct Pacific Coast trade with European markets and providing world markets for the South's cotton, the Canal would transfer the existing advantages London had as the commercial center of the world to the United States.³¹⁰

These arguments, he noted, would not justify taking the territory of

Colombia by force, "but they are powerful reasons why our Government should have acted promptly in recognizing the independence of Panama, in order to secure from her the necessary territory for canal purposes."³¹¹

Accepting the hasty recognition, Clay dismissed other reasons to block the Treaty with Panama: "My opposition heretofore had been based upon the fact that the circumstances associated my own country with the revolution, aiding, encouraging, and sustaining it; going further to sustain it than the terms of our treaty would authorize. Such conduct would be dishonorable and morally wrong. That branch of the argument, however, I have dismissed."³¹²

Other reasons Clay gave for his decision to back the Treaty with Panama included the satisfactory terms of the Treaty, his belief that its failure would indefinitely delay the Canal, his feeling that Panama could not be restored to Colombia, and, as he put it: "I vote for the treaty because on this issue I find in favor of the integrity of my own country, and in favor of the honesty of an American President."³¹³ Furthermore: "Candor compels me to say that I have been actuated to some extent in reaching the conclusion to vote in favor of this treaty by reason of public sentiment in my own State, and by the further reason of the great commercial benefits that will certainly follow to the South by reason of the construction of the canal."³¹⁴ Clay presented to the Senate on January 27, 1904 a petition from the mayor and general council of Atlanta which urged that he and Bacon vote for ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty.³¹⁵

However, Clay appreciated the grounds upon which opposition to the Treaty was based, and he denied that this opposition could be construed as opposition to an Isthmian Canal-with one or two exceptions.³¹⁶ In addition, he spoke in favor of compensation to Colombia, stating that "if any injustice had been done Colombia on our part every reparation within our power should promptly be made."³¹⁷

CONCLUSIONS

Largely, but not entirely, unanimous in condemning the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration, the Democratic Senators were more divided as whether or not to accept the results of this policy by voting for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.

The position chosen by the individual Senator depended upon his reaction to public and official pressure coming from the home state, his desire for a Canal or a particular Canal route, regional and economic considerations, his attitude toward imperialism, political considerations, his personal views toward President Roosevelt, his response to legal arguments, and the moral issue of whether or not it was right to accept the fruits of something wrongly done.

CHAPTER VI: THE SENATE DEBATE: THE REPUBLICANS

The immediate Republican strategy following the Panama Revolution was to forestall criticism by showing that they were not afraid of an inquiry into the matter. Realizing that many Democrats were preparing resolutions of inquiry, Congressman Robert R. Hitt, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a resolution into the House of Representatives on November 9, 1903. It requested the President to communicate to the House all correspondence and other official documents relating to the Panama Revolution. The consent of Secretary of State Hay to the introduction of the resolution had been obtained beforehand.¹ The resolution was agreed to,² and President Roosevelt responded to it by transmitting copies of the papers called for on November 16 and 27, 1903.³

A similar resolution was introduced into the Senate by Shelby Moore Cullom, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on November 11, 1903.⁴ The President transmitted papers to the Senate (and House) on December 19, 1903.⁵

Following the transmission of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty to the Senate by President Roosevelt on December 7, 1903,⁶ the President invited the leading Republican Senators to come to the White House for a consultation concerning it. Roosevelt's biographer, Joseph Bucklin Bishop, describes the meeting: "When the Senators came they were found, almost to a man, to be in a hostile frame of mind, but after several hours of earnest discussion, they one by one came to the view of the President and Secretary and promised to support the treaty."⁷ Further evidence of discontent among Republican Senators is found in a letter President Roosevelt wrote earlier, in which he said that "in this Panama business the *Evening Post* and the entire fool mugwump crowd have fairly suffered from hysterics; and a goodly number of the Senators even of my own party have shown about as much backbone as so many angle worms. However, I have kept things moving just right so far."⁸

Republican strategy backing the President was directed by Senators Spooner, Lodge, Cullom and Foraker,⁹ with Hanna and Depew also working to hold the Republican forces in line.¹⁰ Senator Cullom wrote a few years later: "Many people have charged that the Roosevelt Administration actually incited the revolution. Whether this is true or not, I do not know. I contended at the time, and still believe, that it is not true. I hope it is not...."¹¹

The greatest Republican opposition in the Senate might have been expected from Senators Eugene Hale (Maine) and George Frisbie Hoar (Massachusetts), who were the only Republicans to vote against the Treaty with Spain, February 6, 1899, by which the United States acquired the Philippines and Puerto Rico, etc.¹²

Senator Hale was in favor of a liberal compensation to Colombia, without referring the matter to The Hague tribunal, but only for the loss of Colombia's territory and prestige--not for anything the United States had done: "While I regret the condition, I think that everything which has been done had to be done. I think we should ratify the treaty."¹³ He thought that the passage of a compensation resolution might even pave the way for Senators to vote for the Panama Canal Treaty, who could not do so otherwise.¹⁴ Hale himself introduced such a resolution on January 13, 1904, requesting the President to tender his best offices toward the adjustment of Colombia's claims against Panama.¹⁵ Hale ended up voting for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and against the Bacon Amendment.¹⁶

However Senator Hoar, regarded as the leading Republican Anti-Imperialist in the Senate, went much further than Senator Hale. Hoar's main problem as an Anti-Imperialist continued to be his efforts to defend principle and the Republican party equally.¹⁷ But President Roosevelt was expecting his opposition.¹⁸ The President met with Senator Hoar to disabuse his mind of critical impressions on Panama, by getting him to read a prepared Presidential Message on the subject. Senator Cullom, an observer at the meeting between the two, writes: "Senator Hoar seemed adverse to reading it, but finally sat down, and without seeming to pay any particular attention to what he was perusing, he remained for a minute or two, then arose and said: 'I hope I may never live to see the day when the interests of my country are placed above its honor.'"¹⁹

Senator Hoar introduced a resolution on December 9, 1903 requesting information from the President as to whether Panama was independent at the time of the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, whether it had given authority to the persons who had signed the Treaty on its behalf and whether these officials had any personal or private interest in or relation to the construction of the Panama Canal, "and whether Colombia was prevented by the action of the United States or by any officer or force under the jurisdiction of the same from attempting to assert its authority or to prevent such secession, and what instructions, if any, had been given by the Government of the United States to such officers, whether civil, military, or naval, and whether if any action had been taken by such officers without special authority what action was so taken, and whether such action has been approved or disapproved by the Government of the United States...."²⁰

Hoar spoke on his resolution December 17, 1903, stating his eagerness to support the Administration and to act with his Republican associates, as well as his desire to see the Canal constructed, but pleading that it be brought to pass without taint or suspicion of national dishonor.²¹ After quoting from the Naval and diplomatic orders contained in House Doc. No.

8, he declared: "Now...I want to know, I think the American people want to know, and have a right to know, whether this mighty policeman, instructed to keep the peace on that Isthmus, seeing a man about to attack another, before he had struck his blow, manacled the arms of the man attacked, so that he could not defend himself, leaving the assailant free, and then instantly proceeded to secure from the assailant the pocketbook of the victim, on the ground that he was de facto the owner?"²²

Continuing, Senator Hoar asserted:

All our Government, by its own statement, seems to have done in its anxiety that transit should not be disturbed was not to take measures that violence should not occur, but to take measures that violence should not be prevented. It performed its duty of keeping uninterrupted the transit across the Isthmus only by interrupting it itself--interrupting it itself in its most sacred and rightful use, that of the lawful Government of the country moving its own troops over its own territory that it might prevent a breach of its peace and an unlawful revolution against its authority.

Mr. President, is there any doubt that, as now standing unexplained, this was an act of war?²³

Furthermore, Hoar stated that a precedent and example was being set for future U. S. relations with South America, and Europe was being told "there will never be any objection, any active opposition, or even any moral condemnation on our part if they do the same thing when they shall see fit."²⁴ He also asked: "Is this doctrine of eminent domain, of which we have heard so much, likely to help us get the coveted markets of South America or to make them like us better as customers or producers?"²⁵

If his resolution was adopted, such fears at home and abroad would be put to an end by the authoritative declarations of the President and Congress.²⁶ Ending his speech he pled for more information: "Now, I do not undertake to say--I do not say--that there has been anything, so far, on the part of our Government liable to any just criticism. But the American people and the Senate, as yet, know only part of the story."²⁷

Despite his assertions that he was not criticizing the Administration, leading elements on both sides took his speech to be a criticism of President Roosevelt's Panama policy. Senator Gorman praised Hoar's speech,²⁸ and Senator Teller said Hoar "did indicate as plainly as his words could do that he thought there had been a wrong perpetrated against the people of Colombia."²⁹ Republican Senator Foraker accused Hoar of severely criticizing the Panama transaction, and twice carried on an extended argument with him over just exactly what had been said in the speech, with Hoar claiming he was just seeking information.³⁰

Outlook magazine believed Senator Hoar's speech "probably presents

the best case that can be presented against the Administration's course in Panama. It is all the more effective because it is presented with apologies for if not eulogies of President Roosevelt."³¹ *The Nation* stated that: "Here is the most eminent Republican Senator, who would not abandon his party though it were to slay him--an able lawyer, chairman of the Judiciary Committee--who rises to inform the Senate and the nation that the President's action has been both brutal and illegal. Of course, Mr. Hoar puts the case hypothetically. He virtuously (or slyly) assumes that Mr. Roosevelt could justify his ways to man if he would only tell the whole truth."³²

In private letters Hoar showed he was reluctant to believe the President could have been guilty of misconduct regarding the origins of the Revolution, but "the unwillingness on the part of persons in the President's confidence to have the facts known" inspired "grave apprehension."³³

Senator Hoar made a second Senate speech on February 22, 1904, in which he said he expected to vote for the Panama Canal Treaty, explaining that "no man in this country desires it more eagerly than I do."³⁴ He then explained why he had introduced his resolution earlier: "I was receiving private letters expressing anxiety and alarm from Republican sources of the highest title to respect. The writers were puzzled and anxious." "They came from business men, from protectionists, from large employers of labor, from men of advanced years, from men who never gave other than a Republican vote and whose names were never absent from a Republican contribution. They were full of uneasiness and alarm."³⁵ He thought his resolution had done something to remove from the Panama transaction any taint or suspicion of national dishonor.³⁶

Senator Hoar now defended the Roosevelt Administration on three main points. (1) Noting that the President had denied on January 4 any Government complicity in the Panama Revolution, he said: "Is there any man on the face of the earth, friend or foe of Theodore Roosevelt, who doubts that clear and manly statement?"³⁷ (2) The act of recognition, he explained, was solely at the President's discretion.³⁸ (3) And although he believed the United States had guaranteed the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus in the Treaty of 1846 against both foreign and domestic insurrection, he felt that the United States had not bound itself to the idea that an oppressed people had no right to overthrow a tyrannical government. The United States was only bound to guarantee Colombian sovereignty in its lawful exercise, not when it became so intolerable that its subjects had the right of revolution. This guaranty of sovereignty extended to Panama as soon as it was recognized.³⁹

Hoar claimed that the President had indorsed his words spoken on December 17, 1903: "He has declared, as I did, that he thinks the charge

[of wrongdoing] unworthy of a serious denial. He has declared also, as I did, that having once treated it as worthy of attention it is better to make his denial complete and absolute, as he has done...."⁴⁰

Calling the Canal transaction the "greatest in our history save only the achievement of our independence and the abolition of slavery," Senator Hoar announced that "I not only find no difficulty in giving my vote for this treaty, but I give it with an unqualified pleasure and satisfaction."⁴¹

Senator Hoar's second speech created comment and analysis just as his first speech had done. Senator Berry stated "I believe in the first speech made by the Senator from Massachusetts and not in the last one."⁴² The *New York Times* proclaimed: "Naturally he is embarrassed, and is driven to explain that he did not mean what he plainly said in the beginnings. He had precisely the same experience in the treaty of Paris which closed the Spanish war. He had parted company with his party, and he found it necessary to his peace of mind to get back. He made all sorts of explanations in that case, as he is making them in the current case."⁴³

President Roosevelt described Hoar's switch with pleasure: "Even Hoar, by a path so bewilderingly devious that I am really unable to follow the windings, has come around to the support of the treaty."⁴⁴

Senator Hoar's decision can partially be explained by his actions in the past. His affection for the original fundamental doctrine of the Republican party--the equality of all men--helped to establish his party regularity;⁴⁵ he was reluctant to think badly of the nation's representatives; and he was reluctant to see the Senate interfere with the executive's prerogative in the formulation of foreign policy.⁴⁶ In addition, he had sought in regard to the annexation of Hawaii to make a distinction between two types of expansion: one in which willing and capable people were invited to share in the freedom, self-government, equality, education, and civil and religious liberty of the people of the United States (represented by Hawaii); the second in which rule over subject peoples and vassal states would break the U. S. Constitution and political principles.⁴⁷

Senator Hoar stressed the effect the Canal "is likely to have in binding together and to us the sixteen or seventeen republics of the American continent."⁴⁸ He quoted John Bright's vision during the Civil War which went beyond a united country again to "one vast confederation stretching from the frozen North in unbroken line to the glowing South," with "one people, and one language, and one law, and one faith...."⁴⁹ Hoar declared that this "was no ignoble dream."⁵⁰ And he continued: "The doctrine of the Declaration of Independence...is the doctrine henceforth to be the magnet which will draw men into that mighty federation and to share with us the peaceful dominion of self-government."⁵¹

Senator Hoar voted for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and against the

Bacon Amendment.⁵²

The following Republican Senators defended the Roosevelt Administration in Senate speeches: John Coit Spooner (Wisconsin),⁵³ Joseph B. Foraker (Ohio),⁵⁴ Shelby Moore Cullom (Illinois),⁵⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge (Massachusetts),⁵⁶ Charles W. Fairbanks (Indiana),⁵⁷ Weldon B. Heyburn (Idaho),⁵⁸ Orville H. Platt (Connecticut),⁵⁹ Chauncey M. Depew (New York),⁶⁰ Louis Emory McComas (Maryland),⁶¹ William M. Stewart (Nevada),⁶² Albert J. Hopkins (Illinois),⁶³ Jonathan P. Dolliver (Iowa),⁶⁴ Joseph V. Quarles (Wisconsin),⁶⁵ Charles W. Fulton (Oregon),⁶⁶ Porter J. McCumber (North Dakota).⁶⁷

TREATY OF 1846

It was argued that Colombia's guaranty to the United States of uninterrupted transit across the Isthmus was a servitude (a restriction upon sovereignty), which carved rights out of the sovereignty of Colombia and granted them to the United States.⁶⁸ Furthermore this was seen as a "real servitude" involving territory (including ways of communication), which did not lose its foundation when the original state disappeared. So after Colombia lost control of the Isthmus of Panama and the Republic of Panama was recognized "that grant of servitude was binding upon the Republic of Panama and the obligation of our treaty of 1846, article 35, to maintain the neutrality of the Isthmus and the rights of sovereignty and property was inherited by the Republic of Panama, and...we became bound by a treaty obligation to protect the whole Isthmus of Panama against any foreign invasion, including any invasion by Colombia..."⁶⁹ Being a local obligation, the servitude "ran with the land."⁷⁰ Thus since recognition "Panama stood as the grantor of the right of transit or passage, and we as guarantor, as we had been the guarantor of Colombia, as to the Isthmus."⁷¹ In addition it was claimed that the United States had the right, flowing from that servitude, to make improvements in communication on the Isthmus,⁷² and that the Treaty gave "an implied grant that upon reasonable considerations we might build a canal across the Isthmus."⁷³ Senator Dolliver stated that "we have in that Isthmus, and have had for fifty years, a property right carved out of the sovereignty first of New Granada, and then of Colombia, and now of the State of Panama that warrants every order the President of the United States has issued and every act that has been done..."⁷⁴

It was further argued that when Colombia could not or would not fulfill her obligation to protect Isthmian transit and American lives and property, the United States had the right under the Treaty of 1846 to protect the transit and American interests.⁷⁵ While Senator Fairbanks saw this as a collateral obligation with the United States even having the primary

duty,⁷⁶ Senator Quarles thought Colombia was the "first promisor" with the U. S. standing as a guarantor under certain conditions.⁷⁷ Senator Spooner stressed that: "It was the duty of Colombia, with the warnings she had had as to the sentiment and purposes on the Isthmus, to have anticipated that disorder by seasonably providing an adequate force to discharge her guaranty; and if she failed to do it until there had been such organized insurrection on the other side as would lead inevitably, when she attempted to do it, to war on the line of transit, the United States, in that failure of treaty duty by Colombia, had not only the right but the duty to say, 'You shall not fight on this line of railway; you shall not interrupt by military operations this right of transit or the fact of transit.'"⁷⁸ Senator Cullom stated that Colombia was not sending troops to keep transit open, but she "wanted to land troops on the Isthmus in order to wage a war in Panama, resulting in an interference with the transit."⁷⁹ Several Senators emphasized President Roosevelt's duty to protect Isthmian transit and American lives and property even without the Treaty of 1846,⁸⁰ and others saw the Treaty of 1846 as giving the United States outright not only the right of transit but the right and duty to preserve the freedom of such transit.⁸¹

At the same time it was stated that Colombia had full responsibility to deal with domestic insurrection, as the United States guaranty of Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus only dealt with foreign aggression.⁸²

It was further stated that when the United States protected the transit and American interests during the Panama Revolution, it operated equally against both sides;⁸³ that the orders to the war ships were too long delayed so that only one cruiser was available at the moment of outbreak;⁸⁴ that the "governing point" of the cablegrams was to maintain free and uninterrupted transit due to Colombia's unpreparedness rather than to prevent Colombia's assertion of its sovereignty;⁸⁵ that the Colombian troops from the *Cartagena* were permitted to land due to the delayed reception of the cablegram ordering the *Nashville* to prevent the landing;⁸⁶ that the revolutionists in the city of Panama had desired the Colombian troops landed at Colón from the *Cartagena* to cross the Isthmus by railway after the Colombian generals had been captured;⁸⁷ that the 42 men from the *Nashville* had landed due to threats by Colonel Torres to kill American citizens;⁸⁸ and that due to the report in October, 1903 by Captain Humphrey and Lieutenant Murphy, the President of the United States had every reason to believe that the Revolution would be a powerful one threatening the transit.⁸⁹

Article 35 of the Treaty of 1846 was seen as the most important part of the Treaty, with the articles on commerce, etc., deemphasized.⁹⁰

In the past, it was felt, the United States had repressed Panama's aspirations for freedom, but now this was at an end: "The failure of Colombia [in the past] to discharge her obligations has forced us, in the discharge of a plain duty and in the exercise of a plain right for the protection of American interests, to become an ally of Colombia against the people of the Isthmus. We have been an instrument of tyranny, not daring to cast away the sword of tyranny."⁹¹

As summarized by Senator Spooner: "There is no justification for imputing to the President and those who acted under him a purpose nominally to maintain the transit and protect American interests and citizens and life and property, but really a dark, damnable purpose to expel Colombia from the Isthmus in violation of treaty obligations, and to build up there an independent republic, from which we could obtain a canal. It will not do."⁹²

COLOMBIA

Colombia was accused of having treated Panama for years "as a subject colony from which to derive revenue."⁹³ As Senator Quarles put it: "Panama has been to the United States of Colombia the sheep that has been plucked and shorn from year to year and the wool has all gone to Bogota."⁹⁴ Senator Spooner explained that "if ever there was a people in the world who were entitled to relief from tyranny, blackmail, extortion, neglect and outrage, the people of the Department of Panama were...."⁹⁵ He asserted that Panama had lost her "home rule" in 1885 "to enable the politicians at Bogota to reap where they had not sown--to reap a harvest of dollars from the Isthmus of Panama while leaving only to the people of the Isthmus a harvest of death."⁹⁶ And he added: "To say that it [the Panama Revolution] was simply for a canal is to close the eye to the long history of misrule, violence, tyranny, and robbery."⁹⁷ Senator Depew claimed that the "Citizens of Panama...without a dissenting voice, reasserted the sovereignty of the State, which they had never surrendered, and proclaimed a Republic."⁹⁸

To top off this long series of wrongs towards Panama, it was added, the Hay-Herrán Treaty was rejected by Colombia.⁹⁹ For Panama there had been "but one ray of hope, one pathway to light out of that darkness, and that was the canal...."¹⁰⁰ The Colombian rejection of its treaty with the United States for a Canal "was the last straw that broke the camel's back."¹⁰¹ Of course, "Colombia had the right, technically, to reject that treaty, but she did it at her peril."¹⁰²

The rejection of the Hay-Herrán Treaty was seen as a scheme to extort money from the New Panama Canal Company and from the United States. It was claimed that opposition to the Treaty was purposely created, using

constitutional scruples, so that an appeal could be made for more money.¹⁰³ This ended in a scheme to repudiate the concession given to the New Panama Canal Company.¹⁰⁴ Senator Depew claimed that President Marroquin "counted first upon the cupidity of the United States to become a party to this robbery of the French and then to the assertion of the Monroe doctrine to prevent France from demanding and maintaining the rights of her citizens."¹⁰⁵ And Senator Stewart remarked that: "The wails of Colombia, under all the circumstances, sound very much like the lamentations of a gang of highwaymen when the train they intended to rob has passed and gone out of their reach."¹⁰⁶

Senator Fairbanks defended the "threat" to Colombia on June 9, 1903, by which the United States tried to ensure the ratification of the Hay-Herrán Treaty, as a reference to the adoption of the Nicaragua route, if the Treaty failed.¹⁰⁷

RECOGNITION OF PANAMA

In defense of the quick recognition of Panama it was argued that Panama was the sole sovereignty and authority on the Isthmus at the time of recognition, with no Colombian officials left in charge; that the government of Panama was in substantial control and recognized by its own people;¹⁰⁸ that there were precedents for quick U. S. recognition in the past;¹⁰⁹ that the important nations of Europe and around the world had also recognized Panama;¹¹⁰ and that it was the duty of the President to determine when and under which circumstances he would exercise his constitutional prerogative of recognition.¹¹¹

Furthermore it was stressed that the interests of the people of Panama "in establishing an independent Republic coincided not only with the interests of our Government, but with the interests of all other civilized nations."¹¹² Senator Lodge explained that: "The matter of recognition followed quickly because it was an occasion in which it was in the interests of the United States, as the recognizing Government, to act quickly."¹¹³ Senator McCumber, who believed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was "a hundredfold more favorable than that first submitted by the Colombian Government,"¹¹⁴ stated that: "If, as a matter of fact, the action of the Executive was accentuated by the desire of securing a proper treaty that he so early acknowledged the de facto Government of Panama, he was certainly, in my opinion, and I believe in the opinion of the American people, justified in so doing."¹¹⁵ Senator Spooner felt that the act of recognition depends upon sympathy and interest: "It involved our dignity as a government and the safety of the Republic, as a short canal will double the capacity of our Navy, and enable us to reach more quickly our coast on

the Atlantic or Pacific. It involved the Monroe doctrine in more ways than one, enabling us through that short canal to carry more efficiently its protection to the South American republics on the western coast."¹¹⁶ Senator Dolliver explained that year after year went by without recognition of the newly created states of South America because "no interest was involved, no motive was involved, and no service could be rendered to mankind by a premature recognition."¹¹⁷

Senator McComas doubted "whether there is a more undisputed instance of recognition than this in history. It is because the world knows we are not seeking territory. We are guarding the transit across the Isthmus, and we are going to dig the canal to develop better transit."¹¹⁸ And Senator Platt of Connecticut announced that: "If there was no precedent for it before, that precedent has now been written into the international law of the world. There never was a case like it. There probably never will be a case like it."¹¹⁹

THE SPOONER LAW

In denying that the Spooner Law had been violated by President Roosevelt, the Republican Senators claimed that the intent and purpose of the Law was for the acquisition of the superior Panama Canal route. Thus the President was justified in not turning to Nicaragua while there was still a proposition pending in the Congress of Colombia; and likewise it was of no vital importance whether the territory for the Panama Canal belonged to Colombia or Panama.¹²⁰

Senator McCumber asserted that the President had been made the agent of the U. S. Congress to secure that particular route: "We said to him, 'Secure the Panama route as our coast line.'"¹²¹ According to Senator Fairbanks, Congress had wisely provided the Nicaragua alternative even though Panama was preferable because "if Congress had committed itself absolutely to the Panama route, the Government would have been left at great disadvantage in negotiating terms with the Colombian Government."¹²²

Senator Spooner could "hardly conceive of a discreet, sensible President who, with the Congress of Colombia adjourning October 31 and the Congress of the United States to assemble on November 9, with a Congressional preference expressed in law for the Panama route, would have taken the subject into the Executive hand and attempted to foreclose it."¹²³ He also pointed out that attempts to replace the words "reasonable time" in the Law, before it was passed, with six, twelve, and eighteen months, had all failed; so he concluded that the Senate did not regard even

eighteen months as beyond "reasonable time" in which to reach an agreement with Colombia.¹²⁴ And he believed that France would have taken the place of the United States on the Isthmus of Panama if the United States had abandoned Panama for Nicaragua: "There would have been a French fleet down there looking after French interests, and the President would have been denounced here for his sacrifice of American interests."¹²⁵ As far as the McKinley protocols with Nicaragua and Costa Rica were concerned, Senator Spooner explained that they had never been sent to the Senate and thus were not binding.¹²⁶

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Senator Platt of Connecticut called the Panama transaction "a great act." "The President was equal to the occasion. Brave and fearless as he is, but neither rash nor impetuous, he did the right thing at the right time...."¹²⁷ Senator Hopkins believed "that when the candid historian comes to write of this period he will place this act of President Roosevelt as one of the crowning glories of his Administration."¹²⁸ Senator Depew thought that: "In the providence of the creation and decay of nations no state ever became independent so completely, so righteously or so timely as Panama. The hour struck for her when the world was watching the clock. No President ever did a more timely patriotic act than did President Roosevelt in his recognition and defense of the Republic of Panama."¹²⁹ Senator Fulton, who believed President Roosevelt would win the greatest majority in U. S. history in the Presidential election of November, 1904, stated that: "He will have many great achievements to his credit; but, in my judgment, the one upon which his fame--his enduring fame--will rest more than upon all others will be the high, patriotic duty he performed and the service he rendered this nation in assuring to it and to the civilized world the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama."¹³⁰ And Senator Dolliver felt that upon President Roosevelt "above all others history will reserve, after these noises are all silent, its choicest benediction, 'Well done, thou good and faithful servant of civilization.' "¹³¹

It was noted that "no great executive act of any President which contributed to the growth and glory of this country has ever been performed without a violent, vicious, vituperative attack upon the President who performed it."¹³²

In defending President Roosevelt, Senator Aldrich exclaimed: "If the President is guilty of the things which have been charged by the Senator from Tennessee [Carmack], he ought to be impeached."¹³³ Senator Platt of Connecticut also felt that he was listening to impeachments of the

President while Senator Patterson was speaking.¹³⁴

Charges that President Roosevelt and his Administration had conspired with the revolutionists were emphatically denied as "but the breath of suspicion." Attention was drawn to the fact that the Panama Revolution was expected, that it needed no encouragement, and that the President had denied all complicity.¹³⁵ And Senator Cullom stated that: "All of the correspondence in possession of the Executive Department has been laid before the Senate, either in open or executive session. There has been no concealment on the part of the Executive. That correspondence has been gone into in considerable detail here, and there is not one particle of evidence to show that any officer of the United States encouraged or instigated the revolution."¹³⁶

It was also denied that the U. S. Constitution had been violated. Senator Cullom agreed that war can only be declared by Congress, but in his opinion the Naval orders did not amount to a declaration of war--those orders were in accord with the Treaty of 1846 to keep the transit across the Isthmus open.¹³⁷

EXPANSIONISM

Senator Depew declared that: "For national defense, as well as national unity, there must be an unbroken line of coast from the northernmost limits of Maine to the northernmost limits of Alaska. For the employment of our capital and our labor in the ever-increasing surplus of our productions, we must reach, with the advantages which the canal would give us, the republics of South America and the countless millions in the old countries across the Pacific."¹³⁸

Senator McComas claimed that: "The world and the country now realize that the Republican Administration was right in Hawaii, right in Cuba, right in Porto Rico, right in the Philippines, and...is right again in the Panama incident of November."¹³⁹

Senator Stewart noted that: "The people did not commend the efforts of the Sioux, the Comanches, or the Apaches to stop the building of the various Pacific railroads, nor will they look favorably upon the conduct of the more unscrupulous aborigines of Colombia and their allies in this country in their desire to prevent the construction of an interoceanic canal."¹⁴⁰

And Senator Lodge commented that:

The portion of the country which I have the honor to represent in part is far removed from the canal, and yet it is of immense interest to the people of New England that there should be that quickened communication to the East. Deep as our interest is far up there on the

Atlantic coast, it is nothing to the interest of the people of the Gulf--to the people who are selling their cotton as well as their manufactures in the East. Most important of all, Mr. President, more important than any commercial advantage, is the fact that it makes the coast of the United States practically continuous from the Colombia River to the extremest boundary of Maine.

Mr. President, the commercial interest, the interests of our self-protection, involved in that canal are of the largest possible kind.¹⁴¹

Senator Heyburn believed that "dominion and control" over Santo Domingo "is necessary to the security of the investment that we are about to make in the construction of the Panama Canal, and I commend it to the careful attention of the Senate at this time."¹⁴² Senator Stewart agreed.¹⁴³

INTERNATIONAL EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE INTERESTS OF CIVILIZATION

Senator Stewart stated that: "The United States would have been justified at any time in going ahead with the work and constructing the canal, asking no questions, because a passage across the Isthmus is not the property of anybody, whether living on it or off it. That right of way was dedicated to all the world."¹⁴⁴ Senator Lodge did not think that the people of Colombia had "the right to stand across the pathway of the world's commerce and say, 'Here it shall not come.' I think that it is part of our duty to do just what we have done."¹⁴⁵ And Senator Platt of Connecticut asserted that when the Government owning the strip of land blocks the Canal, "there is reason for saying that the time will come when, if that canal can be built in no other way, the United States, as the trustee for the nations of the world, will do it with the strong arm; and I think the message of the President is entirely justified in that respect."¹⁴⁶

Senator Spooner was not ready to absolutely assert the doctrine of international eminent domain, and emphasized that the President had had no occasion to invoke this doctrine, but added: "If there is a doctrine of private way of necessity, I am not sure that in the last analysis any lawyer can deny that there may be, in the interest of humanity, of civilization, of universal commerce, an international way of necessity."¹⁴⁷ And Senator McCumber explained that: "While I am not prepared to advocate the policy of international eminent domain to be followed by this Government under any circumstances that I know of...I want to say that if conditions had not reached the point where a rule of international eminent domain would have been reconcilable with a clear national conscience, they certainly were crowding close and very close to that line."¹⁴⁸

According to Senator McComas one of the justifications for U. S. intervention rested on "the interests of civilization which impels us to put an end to frequent and wasteful civil wars distracting the world's traffic across the Isthmus."¹⁴⁹ Senator Stewart proclaimed that: "Civilization and progress and the aspirations of the American people are promoted by the action of the Administration."¹⁵⁰ And Senator Lodge emphasized that: "The civilized world has committed that work [of building the Canal] to us and has done so gladly. We stand in relation to that Isthmus not only for our own interest, but as the trustee of the interests of the whole civilized world."¹⁵¹

THE CANAL—ROUTE, TYPE AND TREATY

Senator Hanna challenged Senator Morgan's statements that there was a policy change after President McKinley's time away from a Nicaragua and toward a Panama route. He believed President McKinley was so impressed by the question and the eligibility of the Panama route that he wanted a thorough investigation and would abide by the decision of the Canal Commission.¹⁵²

Both Senator Stewart and Senator Dolliver stated they had been in favor of the Nicaragua route, with Stewart bowing to the will of the pro-Panama majority,¹⁵³ while Dolliver, whose first acute interest in the subject of the Canal came with the sailing of the *Oregon* during the War with Spain, was persuaded by the arguments in 1902 that Panama was the better route.¹⁵⁴ Senator Cullom believed that either route was feasible, with the Panama Canal sufficient for the time,¹⁵⁵ and Senator Spooner foresaw the day when two Canals would be needed.¹⁵⁶ Spooner's desire for a Panama Canal was affected by his belief that the only chance for a sea-level Canal, as against a lock Canal, was along the Panama route. He thought this aspect of the question had great weight with many other Senators also.¹⁵⁷ That there were other Senators who had not given up yet on a sea-level Canal is shown by statements made by Senators Dolliver,¹⁵⁸ Stewart,¹⁵⁹ and Quarles.¹⁶⁰ Quarles pleaded, "let us not vote for any canal unless it be a feasible sea-level canal...."¹⁶¹

Senator Platt of Connecticut charged that Senator Patterson's speech dissipated a mystery--the President of the United States was being assailed, sometimes in brutal language, because "there is a determination that the isthmian canal shall not be constructed across the Isthmus of Panama, but shall be constructed on the Nicaragua route."¹⁶² The *New York Times* responded by denying that either Senator Patterson or Carmack had made such an admission: "Like many others they may have preferred a canal at Nicaragua. But they now know, as everybody knows, that the Nicaragua Canal is as dead as JULIUS CAESAR." "Anybody who

denounced the President's acts he [Senator Platt] would have exposed to the world as a Nicaragua schemer, and so have set the President right. Sin might smear its crimson stain all over the Republican Party, yet it would seem as white as snow to the color-blind conscience of so good a thick-and-thin partisan as Senator PLATT of Connecticut."¹⁶³

Senator Aldrich charged that opposition to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was opposition to building the Canal at Panama in favor of forcing its move to a place where it could not be built (Nicaragua).¹⁶⁴ And Senator Depew asserted that: "The opponents of the treaty are really aiding the enemies of any canal."¹⁶⁵

Other Points

It was argued that Panama, as a government exercising governmental functions and expressing the popular will, had the power to make the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with the United States;¹⁶⁶ that compensation to Colombia would set a precedent for future claims;¹⁶⁷ that a resolution on compensation must not insinuate any guilt upon behalf of the United States;¹⁶⁸ that no government had ever been willing to submit to foreign arbitrament a question of national honor or political rights;¹⁶⁹ and that it was left to the President's discretion whether or not to withhold papers which, in his judgment, ought not to be made public.¹⁷⁰

Election Challenge--1904

Senator Lodge saw three elements within the Democratic party: those eager for the Panama Canal; those protesting their hatred of the sinner but willing to embrace the sin; and another element which "seems desirous to make this a party question and to extract from it political capital."¹⁷¹ He continued: "As a Republican I should ask nothing better than to have the Panama Canal made the issue in the impending campaign."¹⁷² He felt that the Democrats would be in a position of "sustaining Colombia and opposing the United States in digging the canal at Panama."¹⁷³

And Senator Spooner noted: "It is not to be expected that the harsh voice of criticism will be hushed until next November. That need not and will not disturb the President."¹⁷⁴

The Vote

The final vote on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was 66 to 14 (72 to 17 counting the pairs). No Republican Senator voted against the Treaty.¹⁷⁵

In addition there were no Republican Senators voting for the Bacon Amendment.¹⁷⁶

The Republican Senators faced the same combination of external pressures and internal desires that caused many Democratic Senators to vote for the Panama Canal Treaty. For example, Senator Julius C. Burrows (Michigan) presented a resolution to the Senate adopted by the Detroit Board of Commerce asking for the speedy ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty;¹⁷⁷ and Senator Depew pointed out that: "The advantages of the treaty with Panama over that with Colombia to the United States are incalculable."¹⁷⁸

In addition, as Laurence O. Ealy states: "The very extreme nature of the attacks on the treaty probably aided its ultimate acceptance because the moderates retreated when the abuse reached extreme proportions."¹⁷⁹

CHAPTER VII: THE ANTI—IMPERIALIST REACTION

What were the main Anti-Imperialist arguments? What was the position of the Anti-Imperialist movement in 1904? Why did the Anti-Imperialist movement have the influence or lack of influence it did on the Panama issue?

The Anti-Imperialist League was founded in Boston, Massachusetts on November 19, 1898, by individuals who feared the adoption of an imperial policy by the United States in the wake of the Spanish-American War. This action followed the establishment of an Anti-Imperialist Committee of Correspondence at Faneuil Hall in Boston on June 15, 1898. The original Anti-Imperialist League became the prototype for similar organizations formed throughout the country, including New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Cincinnati, Portland (Oregon), Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Chicago. There were at least 100 active centers by November, 1899. In that same month the original League became the New England Anti-Imperialist League, a branch of the American Anti-Imperialist League formed in Chicago the previous month to coordinate the activities of the various Leagues. But the New England League remained the institutional leader of the movement and continued as the most active of the Leagues. By 1904 the New England Anti-Imperialist League was the only really viable organization of its kind remaining, and it resumed its title as the Anti-Imperialist League in November, 1904. It continued in existence until the 1920s.¹

A National Association of Anti-Imperialist Clubs, founded in New York City, claimed a following of 700,000 throughout the United States at its zenith.²

In its first year, 52 prominent Americans served as officers of the original Anti-Imperialist League. Of these, 73% had college degrees and 50% had

graduate training. Among its over 40 vice presidents were Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Andrew Carnegie, Grover Cleveland, Samuel Gompers, John Sherman, and Carl Schurz; lawyers like Moorfield Storey and James C. Carter (both of whom served as president of the American Bar Association); distinguished clergy like Charles Henry Parkhurst, Henry C. Potter, and Theodore L. Cuyler; editors like Samuel Bowles (*Springfield Daily Republican*), and Herbert Myrick (the foremost agricultural editor in the United States); and educators like David Starr Jordan, Henry Wade Rogers, Herman E. Von Holst, Felix Adler, and William Graham Sumner. The first president of the League was George S. Boutwell, with Moorfield Storey becoming president in 1905.³ A large proportion of the most active leaders of anti-imperialism were political independents ("mugwumps").⁴

Between 1898 and 1904 the Anti-Imperialists fought against the Treaty of Paris with Spain, signed February 6, 1899, by which the United States annexed the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam; protested U. S. military action on the Philippine Islands from February, 1899 to July, 1902; reached the peak of their influence as they attempted to turn the election of 1900 into a referendum on imperialism; revived from their defeat to struggle against the atrocities of the Philippine War; but subsided so that in 1904 they were reduced to their original starting point, the Boston League.⁵

During this period the Anti-Imperialists criticized colonial imperialism as undesirable, unjust, and unconstitutional: foreign ventures would divert attention from the solution of grave domestic problems and lead to international complications; the struggle of the people of the Spanish islands for liberty should not end in one master replacing another; and the principle of government by the consent of the governed would be abandoned.⁶ They denied that colonies were necessary in order to capture the trade of an area; stated that colonies and imperialism were against the traditional foreign policy held since the days of the Declaration of Independence and Washington's Farewell Address; argued that a republican government could not preserve its own democracy if it tried to be an imperial government at the same time; and those among them who held racial beliefs argued that colonial peoples were unfit to have a place in the American political system.⁷

The Anti-Imperialists continued to fight for Philippine independence, but from 1903 to 1920 they also attacked the more sophisticated control techniques of financial and military intervention used by the United States in Latin America. Moorfield Storey, president of the Anti-Imperialist League throughout this period from 1905 and on,⁸ did not see the annexations of 1898-1899 as a temporary adventure in national self-assertion. His main concern was with the actual denial of self-government to the weaker nations. He advocated self-determination for Latin America,

with each small nation entitled to maintain its independence and have all its rights respected. He was more impressed by violations of national sovereignty in the Caribbean than by statements made by U. S. officials that they sought no further acquisition of colonies. Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic became for him "all American territorial acquisitions" and as such were susceptible to the anti-imperialist arguments used in connection with the Philippine Islands. He was suspicious of the argument that the United States had to intervene in Latin America due to fears of European intervention, and felt that it was hypocrisy to say Americans had a mission to teach these people self-government. And even if the United States had the doubtful right to intervene to protect American lives and property, such a right was inconsistently applied. In addition to protesting against the Latin America policy as a moral wrong, he was concerned over the expansion of presidential power.⁹

However, opposition to the new policy of Latin American intervention symbolized by the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine never approached the extent to which opposition to the Philippine policy had reached.¹⁰ After the election of 1900 the cause of anti-imperialism declined in political importance--it continued more as a moral than a political issue.¹¹ Latin America was largely seen as an American sphere of influence,¹² and not all anti-imperialists were against commercial expansion¹³ or even continental or hemispheric expansion in areas contiguous to the United States.¹⁴ And as traditional imperialism had lost ground by the end of 1900, so had organized anti-imperialism.¹⁵ In addition the high age of many of the original leaders of anti-imperialism played a roll, with several being deceased by the end of 1904.¹⁶ In fact some of the most prominent leaders had their roots in the anti-slavery movement.¹⁷

The Isthmian Canal is a connecting link between the colonial imperialism of the 1898-1899 period and the "dollar diplomacy" interventions in Latin America during the first quarter of the twentieth century. J. Fred Rippy describes this movement down the Caribbean and beyond as in many respects a continuation of the 1898 impulses: "In a word, we were engaging in economic and sentimental imperialism as well as in self-defense."¹⁸ And Julius W. Pratt sees the ownership and control of the Panama Canal as part of the "large policy" of 1898, with its aim of Western Hemisphere domination and the ability to compete in the Pacific and Far East.¹⁹ Foster Rhea Dulles states that: "Every one of the imperialists of the closing decade of the nineteenth century had urged that the United States undertake this great task of linking the Atlantic and the Pacific."²⁰ Walter LaFeber says that Alfred T. Mahan preached that American expansionists should first build an Isthmian Canal. This would be the necessary first

step.²¹ William B. Hixson, Jr. sees the Roosevelt Corollary, with its doctrine of instability in Latin America warranting U. S. intervention, as having "the protection of the Canal as its objective."²² Parker T. Moon states that the digging of the Panama Canal meant that Central America must become a U. S. "sphere of interest."²³ And Wallace Thompson writes that Theodore Roosevelt's Canal diplomacy and the recognition of Panama set up the final doctrine of the primacy of the "special interest" of the United States in the Caribbean region. Paramount interest was represented in the phrase, "the defense of the Panama Canal."²⁴

As one contemporary historian wrote in his 1904 book:

From the view-point of world politics the construction and operation of the canal as a government undertaking means the extension of the political control of the United States over the Spanish-American nations. Perhaps the canal may one day become "a part of the coast line of the United States." The next generation may see the fulfillment of the prophecy of de Tocqueville that the Anglo-American empire will some day extend from the polar ice to the tropics.²⁵

Writing in the same year, Wolf von Schierbrand stated that the importance of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty "to our future political, commercial, and naval expansion, in the Pacific as well as in the Caribbean Sea, can scarcely be overestimated. It will be the main pillar of our future strength in those all-important regions."²⁶

Anti-Imperialist leader Carl Schurz warned against just such possibilities in 1898:

Being once fairly started in the career of aggrandizement regardless of consequences, our imperialists will find an open ear when they tell us that our control of the Nicaragua Canal cannot possibly be safe unless that canal be bordered on both sides by United States territory, and that therefore we must have the whole country down to that canal and a good piece beyond.²⁷

The New England Anti-Imperialist League held its fifth annual meeting from November 28-30, 1903, just a few weeks after the Panama Revolution.²⁸ Winslow Warren, the first chairman of the executive committee of the Boston-formed League,²⁹ presided at the meeting. In his opening remarks he stated that: "The events of the past few weeks have given abundant food for thought to reflecting minds, and the ultimate end of our imperial strenuosity is becoming more and more apparent."³⁰ He continued: "When I think of what has recently happened in Panama, opera bouffe which may yet end in tragedy, I am reminded of De Quincey's essay upon murder as a fine art, wherein he showed that he who begun as a mere murderer might ultimately degenerate into a liar; so we, having begun with murder and outrage in the Philippines, so soon have come to burglary and

common stealing in Panama.”³¹

Secretary Erving Winslow continued the attack in his report:

The Republic should be a bulwark against the imperializing tendencies which are threatening the progress of the Anglo-Saxon race, whereas in the recent exploit of Panama we have shown ourselves past masters in the art of territorial bucaneeering. Perhaps, insignificant as it may seem, this event in its high-handed presumption and its inevitable consequences may be the means of awakening the American people from the intoxication which has so long possessed it and of leading it back to the ways of sanity, peace and humanity.³²

David G. Haskins, Jr., treasurer of the League, asserted in his report that: "The administration has approved and aided, if it has not instigated, a revolt in Panama against a friendly power. It has forcibly prevented that power from attempting to suppress the revolt; and with indecent haste has signed a treaty for the coveted canal with the agent of an irresponsible revolutionary committee."³³

George E. McNeill, a Massachusetts labor leader of national reputation who had taken a leading part in anti-imperialist work from the start, also spoke out against the Panama policy.³⁴ At the League's annual meeting he noted that: "A gentleman writes, apparently surprised that this episode, this last violation of all the traditions of our country, this creating of revolution in Panama, this acknowledgment of a secession government, should not have aroused the people...." But McNeill felt that only an appeal to the pockets of Americans would cause the air to wring with protests against the nation's foreign policy--it had to be shown that the policy did not pay. He believed that the hope of the country rested in the organized labor movement.³⁵

Reverend R. L. Bisbee noted that both the Panama and Philippine questions were symptoms of a disease which is very deep-seated: "We have bad blood in the nation."³⁶

Among the correspondence received by the League's office and presented as part of the report by the secretary, was a letter from Hon. Louis R. Ehrich:

"Our late performance in South America evidently amends the Golden Rule to mean that we must do to weak nations what they would possibly do to us if they were as strong and unscrupulous as we are. Mark the contrast: The millions of the Philippine people, after years of struggle for independence, after the adoption of a model constitution, and after having governed themselves in peace for six months, were denied recognition by our government. The mongrel handful of Panama insurgents, after a paper revolution, and without the slightest semblance of organized government, were recognized within six days. The

disheartening fact is that the connivance of our administration in the dismemberment of a sister republic is accepted so phlegmatically. The country ought to be ringing with the protests of citizens in mass-meetings assembled. A few brave editors' are the only voices heard in opposition. Does not this indicate a moral decadence of the American people...?"³⁷

Yale University's internationally famous professor of economics and sociology, William Graham Sumner, and the dean of the Yale Law School, Henry Wade Rogers, both vice presidents of the original Anti-Imperialist League,³⁸ joined a list of twenty prominent citizens of New Haven, Connecticut in signing and forwarding a petition to the U. S. Senate on the Panama matter. The New haven petition, signed December 24, 1903, and presented later by Senator Hoar, stated that "a belief has arisen in the minds of many in this country and abroad that in our relations with the State of Colombia we have acted with undue haste; that we have violated, and are about to violate, the rules of international law; and that we are adopting a line of conduct toward that country which we would not take against a stronger power." Therefore: "We respectfully ask that, before final ratification of the Hay-Varilla treaty, our action in Panama be subjected to careful and deliberate investigation, to the end, not only that the republic may do no wrong, but that its good repute in the world, which is dearer than any gain of lands or trade, should suffer no loss."³⁹ Theodore S. Woolsey, professor of international law at the Yale Law School, headed the list of signers, which also included Franklin Carter (formerly president of Williams College); Frank K. Sanders (dean of the Yale Divinity School); Yale professors B. W. Bacon (Divinity School), C. A. Lindsley (Medical School), John C. Schwab (political science), A. M. Wheeler, Bourne, Perrin, and Beers (all of the Yale academic department), and Carmalt (Medical School); Rev. Newman Smyth, Rev. Watson L. Philipps, and Rev. A. J. Haynes (pastors of the three leading Congregational churches); Thomas Hooker (member of the board of education along with Rev. Smyth and Rev. Philipps); Samuel L. Bronson; W. A. Wright; and Talcott H. Russell.⁴⁰

Senator Teller referred to the signers of the New Haven petition as "men who are entitled to discuss questions of this kind by virtue of their training and by virtue of their ability in the line of international law." It was "an indictment from a source that can not be cried down."⁴¹ *The Nation* called the rebuke of President Roosevelt by the Yale professors "perhaps the most damaging blow that his Panama venture has brought him."⁴² The *New York Times* found the petition "temperate, founded on well-established facts, logical, excellent in motive, and--negligible, so far as concerns the President and the majority of Senators needed for the ratification of the treaty with Panama."⁴³ It continued: "At present there appears to be no

public opinion which the President and the Senate feel themselves bound to respect demanding a halt in the scheme. It may come later. In the meantime the discussion will go on and these petitioners are of a class well fitted to conduct it."⁴⁴

Petition attempts ended in disappointment elsewhere. E. W. Ordway, secretary of the New York Anti-Imperialist League, cooperated with Moorfield Storey in Boston and Carl Schurz in regard to petitioning on the Panama intervention.⁴⁵ Storey produced a petition draft that was forwarded to Ordway and Schurz, and which Schurz thought was "excellent in matter and tone."⁴⁶ And in New York, Ordway, who sent petitions and copies of Article 35 of the Treaty of 1846, depended upon Storey to get most of the Boston names. Professor James and Fiske Warren, he wrote, would try for one name each.⁴⁷

But on December 10, 1903, Ordway wrote Storey that the petition was a failure in New York: "I have only seven names and most of those I felt sure of, seem unwilling to sign." He noted that there "seems a great lack of courage and unwillingness to act until they know how others stand--you can hardly call it caution for it exceeds that...."⁴⁸

They had been trying for "as many signatures as possible of men of repute outside of the old Anti-Imperialist ranks."⁴⁹ But even an Anti-Imperialist like C. F. Adams in Boston refused to sign,⁵⁰ even though he was very much against the Panama events.⁵¹

On December 14, 1903, Ordway wrote that: "It seems best to withdraw the petition--as we fear the names not on it would be more noticeable than the names signed." He added that he had "a rather remarkable list of eminent men" who think the Administration's course unwise and wrong, but who prefer not to sign.⁵²

Storey replied: "I am sorry that you find it impossible to obtain signatures to your petition, and am surprised at it." He went on to say that "a gentleman at Washington told me that the feeling was very strong and that congress was only waiting for some strong indication of public opinion to act. It seems a pity that we cannot get it. It is so clear a case that it is amazing men won't speak."⁵³ And Carl Schurz wrote Ordway: "I fear you were right with regard to the--at least temporary--failure of the memorial concerning the Panama affair. I do not see what else can be done than to wait for the effect of the answer to Senator Hoar's resolution of inquiry and the debate in the Senate."⁵⁴

William James, one of America's pioneering psychologists and philosophers and an Anti-Imperialist (becoming a vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League in 1904),⁵⁵ was disturbed by the reluctance of many citizens of Boston to protest the intervention in Panama, and commented that: "The organization of slick success in our age is only

equalled by the organization of political acquiescence. Between them we shall live in a new form of society."⁵⁶

One of the most important addresses on the Roosevelt Administration's Panama policy was given on December 5, 1903 by Moorfield Storey at the Massachusetts Reform Club.⁵⁷ Storey, former editor of the *American Law Review* (1873-79), was elected president of the American Bar Association in 1896, served as president of the Massachusetts Bar Association (1913-14), president of the Massachusetts Reform Club (1898-1901), president of the Anti-Imperialist League (1905 until its end), and president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (1910-29).⁵⁸ He was a leading member of the Independent movement advocating political and economic reforms since the 1870s, and in 1898 he helped form the original Anti-Imperialist League.⁵⁹ His address on "The Recognition of Panama" was published by the New England Anti-Imperialist League,⁶⁰ and printed in the *Congressional Record*.⁶¹

In his address Storey charged that the "course of the administration is wrong legally and morally.":

It violates at once the solemn obligations of a treaty and the well-settled rules of international law. It teaches the weaker republics of this hemisphere to distrust and fear us, and to adopt perhaps the Mexican proverb, "There is no such wolf as the shameless Yankee." It tarnishes the fair name of this country among the nations of the world. It establishes a precedent which is sure in the future to embarrass us. It sets an unhappy example of lawlessness to our citizens, already too prone to disregard the law at the dictates of passion or interest. Far worse than all these it lowers the moral standard of our whole people, since many just and honest men struggle to apologize for action which their consciences disapprove and which, if taken by Germany or England, they would indignantly condemn, either because they confound their country with the politicians who represent it and believe that patriotism compels them to defend whatever these politicians do, or because they feel bound to stand by their party, right or wrong, and to put their party above their country.⁶²

But, he continued: "It is not patriotic to defend such action. The true patriot must desire for his country that 'righteousness' which 'exalteth a nation.'"⁶³

Storey quoted John Quincy Adams, Charles Sumner, and William McKinley on the necessity of delaying recognition until independence is established as a fact.⁶⁴ He noted Secretary Hay's plea that there was no organized opposition from Colombia, but asked "Why? Because the United States withstood the forces of the government, forbade them to fire,

and forced them to leave the isthmus."⁶⁵ He also rejected Hay's defence that the machinery of revolution had been prepared in advance by the Panamanians: "The machinery of revolution was on our gunboats. It was our forces that accomplished the independence of Panama."⁶⁶ And he asked: "Since when was a self-elected junta of three, supported by foreign bayonets against their lawful rulers, not elected by the people, and with absolute power unfettered by constitutional restraint, a government 'republican in form'?"⁶⁷ Summing up his criticism of the recognition aspect of the Panama question, he stated:

Remember our denunciation of England's action during the Civil War. Remember our repeated refusals to recognize Cuba, our long delay in recognizing the South American republics, our action toward the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, our denial that the Philippine Republic existed, though it had legislature, courts, schools, and the devoted support of a whole people, and then tell me where are the precedents which justify the administration's course. It is a gross violation of international law. It is the doctrine of the Ostend Manifesto adopted and put in force by the government of the United States. It is war.⁶⁸

Storey quoted the Treaty of 1857, Secretaries Seward, Fish, and Bayard, as well as President Cleveland (1885),⁶⁹ and stated that it was Colombia's duty under the Treaty of 1846 to protect travel across the Isthmus, and to pay damages in case she failed. It was her duty and right to use all force necessary for the purpose, and the United States agreed to help her, not act against her: "It is impossible to torture language so as to find in the treaty any right on our part to prevent her keeping order and protecting travel on her own territory, especially in the face of our 'positive' and 'efficacious' guaranty of her sovereignty. Such language cannot mean, 'If any of your subjects revolt and so seem likely to interfere with travel, we, the United States, shall have the right to help them and prevent your asserting your sovereign rights against them.'"⁷⁰

He noted that the Canal was wanted, but not at any cost: "We want many good things in this world....But we do not believe in securing these good things by lawless violence....It is not safe to let a strong man decide what is just to the weak. Such a doctrine means anarchy. Justice is the same for individuals and nations, and a great power has no more right to rob a weak one than the prize-fighter has to plunder the minister."⁷¹ "Robbery is wrong, but it lacks the element of mean hypocrisy which attends obtaining goods by false pretences."⁷²

Storey concluded his address by pleading: "Let us strive to save our country from such shame and dishonor now by vigorously protesting against the spoliation of Colombia, and let us urge our countrymen to

believe that a deserved reputation for scrupulously regarding the rights of others--a sincere belief in justice--is worth more than all the dollars which can be piled upon our broad territory."⁷³

Two weeks later Storey wrote Carl Schurz: "The Panama business has given the Jingo feelings, I think, a set back and the tide may turn at any moment if indeed, it has not already turned...."⁷⁴

In a letter to General William J. Palmer of Colorado Springs, who agreed with his address, Storey called the Panama episode "a most mortifying chapter in the history of the country," and asserted that the Government had gone into the filibustering business: "I believe that the thing has hurt Roosevelt more than anything that he has done. People feel bound to support it because it is done by the Republican Administration, but under the surface it has created a feeling of distrust which is spreading. Men ask themselves what he will do next and question how far it is safe to trust him for four more years with power which he uses so recklessly."⁷⁵ He was prepared to see a change in public opinion before next June whereby Roosevelt would lose his nomination, or if nominated lose his election "if only the Democratic Party will have a spasm of good sense."⁷⁶

Storey wrote Senator Teller his gratitude for the Colorado Senator's opposition to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, and he hoped that a majority of the Democratic Party would be found standing firm against it. He felt that the wrong done could be undone if the Treaty failed; if confirmed, a permanent stain would be left on the country's good name. He wished it could be held up at least until proper arrangements were made with Colombia.⁷⁷

In an address before the American Peace Society, of which he was a member, summarized in the *Advocate of Peace* for June, 1904, Storey asserted that the United States had rejected Colombia's request to submit the interpretation of the Treaty of 1846 to the Hague Court because the Roosevelt Administration realized it could coerce Colombia without fear of reprisals, and felt that the tribunal would declare against the United States.⁷⁸

Storey continued to make critical references to the Panama events in the years to come, including during his presidential address at the Anti-Imperialist League's annual meeting in 1906.⁷⁹

Dr. Theodore S. Woolsey, Yale professor of international law, who had been criticizing the drift of the United States toward imperialism for over a decade,⁸⁰ wrote a critique of the Panama policy in the lawyers' periodical *The Green Bag* for January, 1904.⁸¹ He emphasized that: "National reputation is more valuable than national progress. From a purely material standpoint, what our country may gain in ease of communication it may more than offset by awakening political mistrust."⁸² Woolsey concluded:

(1) The hasty recognition of a new State in Panama was not in accordance with the law of nations.

(2) To justify it by the Treaty of 1846 requires a new and forced construction of that instrument.

(3) To prevent Colombia's coercion of Panama is an act of war.

(4) The "man in the street's" verdict, that our smart politics served Colombia right, disregards law, sets a dangerous precedent, detracts from the national dignity, and may injure our influence and trade amongst the Latin-American States.

(5) Our duty was and is to let Colombia recover Panama if she can; our policy, to use her troubles to get favorable canal action from the rightful sovereign.

(6) Our recognition, if persisted in, makes of Panama a treaty-making agent, but for ourselves only.

(7) The canal treaty, negotiated and ratified by the Junta, with no constitutional authority or other authorization, is of doubtful validity and the defect will need to be subsequently cured.⁸³

Woolsey's conclusions were quoted in papers like the Omaha *Morning World-Herald*⁸⁴ and New York *Times*, with the latter seeing in them a confirmation of its own views from a high authority.⁸⁵

In a 1903 Thanksgiving Day sermon, Rev. Dr. Newman Smyth, another signer of the New Haven petition, criticized segments of the religious press for their defense of the Panama activities: "We are not to be satisfied with hypocritical explanations or pretenses, or with any such easy justification of it, superficial in reasoning and with large spaces in it vacant of facts, as has appeared in papers representing the religious sense of the community, like *The Outlook*."⁸⁶

Rev. Smyth also spoke at a banquet of the Aldine Association held January 28, 1904, in which he emphasized that three notable discoveries were made by the U. S. Government in November, 1903: (1) a diplomatic discovery--a "substantial property right" was found to be carved out of the sovereignty of Colombia giving a right to destroy the property of Colombia; (2) a military discovery--a strategic necessity of preventing Colombian troops from landing because the U. S. needed to keep trains running on a single line of railroad; (3) and the discovery of a "new star, although still nebulous," was made by the telescope of the Department of State in Washington, while Mr. Ehrman was still searching in Panama for evidence of it (a de facto Government). He continued: "A final discovery surpasses all these in novelty. Lying germinant under the cover of a treaty not yet ratified with Panama were detected certain 'inchoate rights' to assume a military protectorate over the entire isthmus in denial of the sovereignty of Colombia, and in violation of a treaty contract which has

never to this day been legally annulled."⁸⁷ And he concluded: "We offer not merely criticism of our course as lawless and fraught with consequences of lawlessness which no man can foresee; we propose a positive programme: Ratification with reparation; ratification an accomplished fact when justice is done and honor saved! Not till then."⁸⁸

Rev. Dr. Charles Parkhurst, who became a vice-president of the original Anti-Imperialist League in 1899,⁸⁹ discussed the U. S. Government's attitude in the Panama affair as well as Russia's relations to weaker powers in a sermon January 24, 1904 at the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church. His theme was that considerations of advantage rather than moral convictions were the guiding principle of up-to-date diplomacy. He rejected the plea of "interests of civilization," as civilization could not be promoted by undoing any part of it. The first question to be settled was what is right, not what is expedient. But there were many considerations operating at the present time besides those of pure morality--there were personal, national, partisan, and commercial ambitions at work. He noted that U. S. relations with the Oriental peoples had always been based on consideration of the stronger for the weak, "a policy in beautiful accord with which was the statement, made some months ago when it was easier to make such statements than it is now by our Secretary of State at Washington, that one dominant principle that ought to actuate in all our diplomatic relations with other nations is the principle of doing unto others as we would that others should do unto us."⁹⁰

In a letter to the *New York Times*, Rabbi Alter Abelson of New York cited a Biblical parable to President Roosevelt about a rich man with many flocks and herds who hosted a wayfarer with a pet lamb that he seized from a poor man. The Rabbi concluded: "I hope the President will read the above, and think over the course he pursued with regard to Panama, and acknowledge his error as David did."⁹¹

James C. Carter, president of the American Bar Association and one of the original vice-presidents of the first Anti-Imperialist League,⁹² was among the stern censors of the "crime" committed against Colombia.⁹³

Charles Francis Adams, Jr., another original vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League,⁹⁴ and president of the Massachusetts Historical Society,⁹⁵ warned against the recognition of Panama in an interview with the *Boston Advertiser*, calling the whole case exceptional: "Exceptional in violating international law. Exceptional in violating every tradition of the past in this republic. Exceptional in violation of treaty rights."⁹⁶ He said that it would be the same as if Great Britain had recognized South Carolina after the stars and stripes had been hauled down from Fort Sumter. He added that "what has been done has been a succession of high-handed measures, outside any warrant in international law. No rules apply. No

precedent exists. And no similar action would be tolerated in any other power."⁹⁷

Former Democratic president Grover Cleveland, also an original vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League,⁹⁸ and who extended his hand to General Rafael Reyes when Reyes arrived in the United States on November 28, 1903 to present Colombia's claims,⁹⁹ wrote an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* of February 20, 1904 which was reprinted by the New England Anti-Imperialist League.¹⁰⁰ Cleveland noted that the Democratic party had been consistent and unremitting in its advocacy of an interoceanic Canal: "It is, nevertheless, not within the mandates of the Democratic creed that, even in consummating so noble an enterprise as this, the territorial rights of any other nation should be disregarded, or that our national good faith should be subjected to reasonable suspicion." Democracy insists that this great work "be clean and free from the taint of national wrong-doing," and that the justice of "conflicting claims and contested authority as may grow out of the step already taken for the location and construction of the Panama Canal shall be regarded in a spirit of broad conciliation and with ready and scrupulous care for the dictates of international morality as well as the rules of international law."¹⁰¹

Andrew Carnegie, the steel king, who put some of his wealth at the disposal of the anti-imperialist movement and who was an original vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League,¹⁰² wrote in a letter of January 18, 1904 that: "This Panama *folly* has hurt many people and alarmed them--so needless--game flying to our hands--patience only required. Now we are in false position with our Southern Republic naturally jealous, or afraid of us--all for nothing. Many friendly to President asking if he does such wild impetuous things now what wont he do if in for four years?"¹⁰³ In 1885, when U. S. policy toward Colombia had been different, Carnegie had praised the U. S. action in Colombia when rebellion endangered the Panama Railroad that year, calling it friendly to a small and weak sister, with no interference with Colombia and no suspicion aroused.¹⁰⁴

Carnegie was against the Panama Canal itself, writing President Roosevelt on March 11, 1904 that: "The Canal appears secure, but it is a terrible waste of public money. A Railroad to transport ships across the Isthmus could be built for a fourth of the money which we will spend there over the canal; even better and cheaper than all cargo should be lifted from ships into cars, transported across the Isthmus and put again into ships for less money than the biggest ships could take it through the Canal, even free of tolls."¹⁰⁵

William Jennings Bryan, Democratic candidate for president in 1896 and 1900, fought for the cause of anti-imperialism before and after 1903 in his periodical *The Commoner*, on the lecture platform, and in party councils.¹⁰⁶

He wrote several editorials in *The Commoner* criticizing the Panama events, noting that: "The injury done to Colombia was great enough, but it was not nearly so great as the injury we have done ourselves by violating a solemn treaty and overriding respect for law and national obligation."¹⁰⁷ Referring to President Roosevelt's Message to Congress at the beginning of December, 1903, Bryan stated:

So far as the administration's Panama policy is concerned, Mr. Roosevelt does not hesitate to accept the responsibility, making it very plain, indeed, that he is proud of his achievements with respect to the new republic on the isthmus. Silted down, Mr. Roosevelt's defense of his Panama policy is that "the end justifies the means," although he makes an effort, and a feeble one, to show that there are precedents for his course....¹⁰⁸

Bryan asserted that "there is ample evidence that representatives of the United States deliberately encouraged a scheme to destroy the sovereignty, which this government was pledged to maintain, and gave encouragement to a secession movement among the citizens of a South American republic, with which we were under treaty agreement."¹⁰⁹ He continued: "However popular Mr. Roosevelt's filibustering expedition against Colombia may be, it is safe to say that our connection with the Panama revolt will be regarded as one of the black spots in American history."¹¹⁰

Bryan accused President Roosevelt of not being candid on the Panama question in his December Message to Congress, ignoring the question of sovereignty while pushing to the front perfect neutrality, omitting this deliberately as he quoted Secretary of State Seward (1865) and Attorney-General Speed (1865) that the guarantee was only against foreign governments. The Roosevelt Administration, Bryan explained, is doing exactly what Seward and Speed said should not be done: "It is embroiling this government in the revolution in Colombia; it is depriving this government of its perfect neutrality in connection with such domestic altercations; and it is supplying to the insurgents on the isthmus the force for their use and benefit in spite of the fact that Mr. Seward said that the United States could not comply with a requisition of that character."¹¹¹ Neither references to international law, precedents set by the government, nor quotations from American statesmen could be used by President Roosevelt to justify the action taken.¹¹²

Referring to an article written in August (before the Revolution) in the *Chicago Record-Herald* by its Washington correspondent Walter Wellman, which predicted that the United States would maintain freedom of transit during a revolution in Panama out of which a new state would emerge protected by the United States, ensuring the Canal, Bryan noted that Mr. Wellman then "revealed a little secret" when he declared: "In this

connection it is interesting to know that for several years Mr. Roosevelt has believed the United States must ultimately take possession of the isthmus as a sort of trustee for civilization. According to his philosophy the owners of great corporations have not the right to do as they like with their property regardless of the interests of the people, nor have the rulers of states the right to do whatever they please with their territory irrespective of the world's needs...."¹¹³ Bryan pointed out that the republican Mr. Wellman had predicted that there would be cries of "robbery" and "imperialism" but that a number of Senators and public men had already told the President public sentiment would uphold him.¹¹⁴

Bryan further referred to a November 11 article by Wellman in the same paper about the attendance of President Roosevelt and his wife at the National Theatre the night before. One of the lines in the opera "Barbette" ran: "What, a diplomat steal? A diplomat never steals. He only annexes!" According to Wellman the entire audience turned towards the President's box, and Roosevelt laughed as heartily as anyone, and "waved his hand in glee" at Senator Hanna. Bryan's comment: "It was bad enough for the president of the United States to give his sanction to a filibustering expedition against a weak and helpless power with which we were under solemn treaty agreement. But have we not the right to insist that the president shall not make sport of so serious a situation, displaying before a theatre audience the great pride he evidently has in a very questionable transaction for which transaction his administration is responsible?"¹¹⁵

The difference between the Roosevelt-Hay interest in the integrity of China and indifference toward the integrity of Colombia was also marked by Bryan.¹¹⁶

The *Advocate of Peace*, published by the American Peace Society, whose president Robert Treat Paine, Jr. was also known for his anti-imperialism, and which was edited by the Quaker pacifist Benjamin F. Trueblood (secretary of the Society 1892-1915), joined in the condemnation of the Panama affair.¹¹⁷ It claimed that there was no excuse to "justify the headlong and officious way in which the Administration has rushed the new republic into existence."¹¹⁸ "The simple truth is, laying aside all circumlocution of expression, that the new state is a child of our violence, prematurely brought into existence by the overshadowing might of the United States. The impending revolution was known at Washington, and not discouraged--a very practical way of encouraging it."¹¹⁹

The *Advocate of Peace* stressed that the Canal, which was at the bottom of the whole thing, "could have been secured without this rash, and in essence brutal, conduct, without the rending asunder of a nation. A little more patience with the Colombian government would have made the ratification of a new treaty possible."¹²⁰ "We shall some day feel

thoroughly ashamed of this infantile and bumptious exploit, which from one point of view is as ridiculous as from another it is disreputable."¹²¹ The *Advocate of Peace* asserted that the revolutionists would not have proceeded without assurance of U. S. support and that the new republic could not have sustained itself; and although it knew of no evidence that the U. S. Government took any direct hand in inciting the Revolution, "indirect inducement is often more effective than direct, and its morality not a whit better. But the revolution once started, the whole power of the government's protection was thrown forthwith around it."¹²² Unheeding Colombia's protest, "the United States with its gigantic might stood with drawn sword over the revolutionary government and did not allow any attempt at suppression. Thus the rending of the Colombian nation in twain becomes to all intents and purposes our deed, and we shall have to bear the stain of it."¹²³

An article in the *Advocate of Peace* written under a pseudonym accused the Administration of violating the Treaty of 1846, of violating international law by its hasty recognition, and of virtually confessing collusion with the Panama revolutionists by its defense based on the commercial interests of the world and the demands of civilization.¹²⁴

Of all the many periodicals and magazines criticizing or defending the Panama situation,¹²⁵ the anti-imperialist publication *The Nation* stands out.¹²⁶ *The Nation* called "The Panama Dishonor" the "most ignominious thing we know of in the annals of American diplomacy."¹²⁷ And all for what?: "To aid a struggling people? To take a stand for freedom or for republican institutions? To avert a danger? No; but just for a handful of silver, just for a commercial advantage which we ought all to spurn if not come by honorably."¹²⁸ "If the chivalrous President had not picked out an emaciated invalid to beat with his stick," his conduct would have led to a bloody conflict.¹²⁹ "It is evident that the master-motive of both Mr. Roosevelt and Secretary Hay in all this Panama recklessness has been a thorough contempt of the Colombians because they are not altogether such as we are, and because they are weak."¹³⁰ Pointing out that in his January 4, 1904 Message to Congress, President Roosevelt had spoken of the Colombians as "anti-social" and referred to their "imperfect development," *The Nation* adds: "How could such wretched inferiors expect to have their rights respected by the flower of Christian civilization? The old conception that laws were made for the protection of the weak has no place in Mr. Roosevelt's philosophy. Whom we can afford to despise we may wrong with impunity."¹³¹

The Nation called President Roosevelt's plea of doing what the general good requires "the stereotyped plea of irresponsible tyrants in all ages."¹³² Asserting that the President's Message of January 4 showed a great

advance over his Message of the previous December in recognizing that precedents had been broken, *The Nation* stated that his defense was now simply based on national interests and the interests of civilization: "In other words, when we want a thing intensely, we are entitled to trample upon propriety and the law in order to get it!"¹³³ "What the interests of civilization really require is that *his* lawless doctrines be repudiated."¹³⁴ "In the Panama lynching, he put himself squarely alongside the Cossack. Russia announces that she will sacredly respect all treaties referring to Manchuria so long as they do not run counter to her own interest. That is exactly what Mr. Roosevelt really signifies by his talk about the interests of civilization being superior to a treaty."¹³⁵

In an editorial entitled "From Grotius to Grosvenor," *The Nation* explained that "Amherst surpasses Leyden at one definition--'the right of eminent domain among States.' ": "...the rulers of mankind have racked their brains to frame pretexts for aggression. No more will this be necessary. Henceforth they will only have to plead 'the right of eminent domain.' "¹³⁶

Comparing the recognition policies of President Roosevelt and President Monroe, *The Nation* added that: "Clearly, it was not the Monroe Doctrine of recognition which Secretary Hay had in mind when he said that 'the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule' were the sufficient bases of our foreign policy. Colombians, who are sadly ignorant of the Scriptures, will be tempted to think that what he really said was, 'the good old rule'--that they should take who have the power."¹³⁷

Noting that some people were looking about as for some supernatural intervention to prevent the completion of the outrage against Colombia, *The Nation* explained that the penalty for national aggression is not always direct or immediate: "It comes in subtle ways, delayed often, but none the less sure. In our own case, it is probable, one form of punishment will be a deterioration in the Presidency. This may not come in Roosevelt's day. But his example will live and work mischief after him."¹³⁸

Referring to the telegraph by Secretary Moody to the commander of the *Cincinatti*, September 20, 1902, during earlier trouble on the Isthmus, to simply prevent the line of transit from being converted into a theatre of hostilities, and which stated that transportation of Government (Colombian) troops not in violation of treaty and not endangering transit or provoking hostilities may not be objectionable, *The Nation* said that: "Mr. Roosevelt departed not only from the policy of foregoing Presidents, but from his own of a year before. The same treaty which in 1902 led him to aid Colombia, in 1903 compelled him to antagonize her. This is obviously to convert a treaty into a nose of wax."¹³⁹

The Nation desired an Isthmian Canal, and had been for the Panama

route for a long time, so it was deeply disappointed that "improper and illegal methods employed" compelled it to oppose the Administration's plan. It hoped that the President would adopt measures to do away with the legal and moral difficulties, even suggesting that the people of Panama be merged again into the sovereignty of Colombia--whereupon Colombia should validate the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty performed by Panama.¹⁴⁰

The Nation strongly opposed ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty by the U. S. Senate, noting that: "Democratic Senators who say they can make political capital out of the President's lawless course in Panama while at the same time voting to ratify the treaty, are wildly deluded. All of them who support the treaty will rightly be held to be thereby condoning the abhorrent means by which it was obtained."¹⁴¹ Just before the vote on the Treaty, *The Nation* said:

And when ratification is at last complete--when lawless aggression combined with conspiracy finally insures to the covetous United States the thing that is its neighbor's--the Senate could add an almost religious solemnity to the occasion by chanting in unison these words of Washington: "It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence."¹⁴²

After the vote it noted that the Canal would be built and the world would benefit, "but no good can come to the men who have used abhorrent means to bring this work about. The historic record will show that, as Senator Hoar declared in the Senate on December 17, President Roosevelt committed a lawless act of war against a friendly but defenceless nation, and then 'proceeded to secure the pocketbook [the canal] of the victim.' If this be glory, make the most of it."¹⁴³

Criticism of the Administration's Panama policy came from individuals of many walks of life, whether connected with anti-imperialist organizations or not. Among these were General Nelson A. Miles;¹⁴⁴ Professor Henry Loomis Nelson of the department of political science at William's College;¹⁴⁵ Professor MacVane of Harvard;¹⁴⁶ ex-U. S. Senator George Franklin Edmunds of Vermont;¹⁴⁷ former Governor Daniel H. Chamberlain in an "Open Letter to John Hay" in the *New York Times* of October 2, 1904;¹⁴⁸ George L. Fox in his 1904 booklet *President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat: The Panama Affair in a Nutshell*;¹⁴⁹ Lyman E. Cooley of Chicago;¹⁵⁰ Washington lawyer George Prescott Montague;¹⁵¹ C. F. Lummis in *Out West* for December, 1903;¹⁵² J. P. Gordy in "The Ethics of the Panama Case";¹⁵³ William Cullen Dennis in "The Panama Situation in the Light of International Law";¹⁵⁴ and others.¹⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The Anti-Imperialists were concerned with the denial of self-determination in Latin America and the lack of respect for weaker nations as expressed in U. S. interventions in the area in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

Specifically on the Panama issue, the Roosevelt Administration was accused of violating the integrity of Colombia and showing contempt for its rulers; of violating the rules of international law, past traditions, and treaty rights; of promoting aggression through the doctrine of international eminent domain; of damaging the United States itself by overriding respect for law and national obligations, thus setting precedents for lawlessness and political distrust at home, and leading to a deterioration of the Presidency; of damaging relations with Latin America by creating distrust; and of violating moral standards by doctrines of force, seizure, expediency, and ends justifying means, and by separating national justice from individual justice.

The Anti-Imperialist movement declined in political importance after its defeat in 1900, and by 1904 was largely reduced to its starting point, the original Anti-Imperialist League with headquarters in Boston. Its decline was further affected by disunity over hemispheric or contiguous expansion as well as different positions on commercial expansion; with the high age of many of its original members also playing a part. Other factors specifically affecting the lack of Anti-Imperialist influence on the Panama issue included the high popularity of the trans-isthmian Canal, the presentation of an accomplished fact by President Roosevelt in the form of an independent Panama and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, and the unwillingness to attack the policy to which the President was committed.

CHAPTER VIII: THE PANAMA ISSUE IN THE ELECTION OF 1904

How was the Panama issue approached in the election of 1904 by the Republicans and Democrats? Did the issue have any effect upon the election results? Why or why not?

The Anti-Imperialists, having looked forward to the election of 1904 as an opportunity to vindicate their views, renewed their criticism of the Republican Administration's Philippine policy,¹ and continued their attacks upon the U. S. attitude toward Panama in particular and Latin America in general. In fact some, like Carl Schurz, already saw the dangers inherent in what was to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. On May 26, 1904, Schurz wrote to Rollo Ogden, editor of the New York *Evening Post* and *The Nation*, suggesting: "Do you not think that

President Roosevelt's letter to the Cuba dinner, in which he assumes police power over the whole American continent, deserves more attention than the press has so far given it? I have seen your paragraph about it, which was very good. But does not the matter call for the heaviest artillery?"² Schurz continued: "Of all of Roosevelt's pronunciamientos this seems to me the most alarming. It is almost bad enough to be regarded as a symptom of an unbalanced mind. And to think of this man being in a place of power in which he can bring on war at any time! I think a vigorous effort should be put forth by the press to make the conservative mind of the country understand the real significance of this Rooseveltiade."³

President Roosevelt, nominated as the Republican presidential candidate at the Chicago National Convention held June 21-23, 1904,⁴ and attempting to become the first non-elected President to successfully be elected in his own right,⁵ was anxious about his chances.⁶ But he saw the Panama issue as a benefit, rather than a hindrance to his goal. He wrote to a campaign manager on October 9, 1904: "Can you not tell our speakers to dwell more on the Panama Canal? It does not seem to me that nearly enough stress is laid on this. Give them Mr. Root's speech about Panama, and tell them to dwell on it. The more they force that issue the better it is. We have not a stronger card."⁷

The Republican policy was to take credit for the fulfillment of the long-cherished dream of an Isthmian Canal, and to place the Democrats in a position of not daring to attack the Panama affair for fear of being seen as opponents of the Canal. The Republican platform of 1904 proclaimed that the great work of connecting the Pacific and the Atlantic was at last begun, due to the Republican party, and the President's "prompt and vigorous action in Panama, which we commend in the highest terms, not only secured to us the canal route, but avoided foreign complications which might have been of a very serious character."⁸ And President Roosevelt, in his Nomination Response Address, July 27, 1904, stated that: "The construction of the canal is now an assured fact; but most certainly it is unwise to intrust the carrying out of so momentous a policy to those who have endeavored to defeat the whole undertaking."⁹

Yet the President felt called upon to defend his Panama actions, not only in his above Address,¹⁰ but in his Letter of Acceptance of the Republican nomination for the presidency, September 12, 1904: "Our opponents can criticize what we did in Panama only on condition of misstating what was done. The Administration behaved throughout not only with good faith, but with extraordinary patience and large generosity toward those with whom it dealt. It was also mindful of American interests. It acted in strict compliance with the law passed by Congress."¹¹ And in the days just before the election he felt the weight of the opposition, writing to Rudyard Kipling on November 1, 1904: "So in Panama, I have to encounter the

opposition of the vague individuals of serious minds and limited imaginations who think that a corrupt pithecoïd community...is entitled to just the treatment that I would give, say, to Denmark or Switzerland. Then, in addition, I have the representatives of the transcontinental railways, who are under no delusion, but who do not want a competing canal."¹²

The Democrats responded generally by emphasizing the means by which the Canal was gained, and directing attacks upon President Roosevelt as a person. In his opening speech as Temporary Chairman of the Democratic National Convention held in St. Louis, July 6-9, 1904, John Sharp Williams of Mississippi noted that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty had been rendered possible only by Democratic votes in the Senate, "votes difficult for Democrats to cast, because of the manner in which the mushroom Republic had been ushered into the world," adding that the Democrats would construct the Canal "speedily, honestly and economically," when entrusted with power.¹³ Williams felt that: "However shamefully the Panama Republic was born, and however shameful our connection as a government with it, it *was* born and is now recognized by us...."¹⁴

The Democratic platform on the Isthmian Canal was quoted directly from the above speech by Representative Williams: "The Democracy when entrusted with power will construct the Panama Canal speedily, honestly and economically, thereby giving to our people what Democrats have always contended for--a great inter-oceanic canal, furnishing shorter and cheaper lines of transportation, and broader and less trammelled trade relations with the other peoples of the world."¹⁵

Judge Alton B. Parker of New York state, chosen as the Democratic presidential candidate over William Randolph Hearst, and representing the conservative wing of Democracy,¹⁶ criticized the Panama events in his Letter of Acceptance, September 26, 1904:

The methods by which the Executive acquired the Panama Canal route and rights are a source of regret to many. To them, the statement that thereby a great public work was assured to the profit of our people is not a sufficient answer to the charge of violation of National good faith. They appreciate that the principles and healthy convictions which in their working out have made us free and great, stand firmly against the argument or suggestion that we shall be blind to the nature of the means employed to promote our welfare. They hold that adherence to principle, whether it works for our good or ill, will have a more beneficent influence on our future destiny than all our material upbuilding, and that we should ever remember that the idea of doing a wrong to a smaller, weaker nation, that we, or even all mankind, may have a resultant good, is repugnant to the principles upon which our

government was founded.¹⁷

At the same time Parker stressed that the Canal should be pressed to completion.¹⁸

In notifying octogenarian multi-millionaire Henry G. Davis of his nomination as Democratic vice-president candidate,¹⁹ John Sharp Williams stated that "having joined the holy alliance of land grabbing nationalities; having discovered that God's command against robbery and theft does not apply to men in the aggregate, acting as nationalities, when robbing communities of their independence or 'benevolently assimilating' their resources; amid all these reversals of historical blunders of our past, I boldly aver that we need not despair of the republic."²⁰

In his Letter of Acceptance of the vice-president candidacy, October 3, 1904, Henry G. Davis hailed the inception of the building of the Canal, adding:

...but we deprecate the action of the present Administration, which inflicted a wound upon our national honor by its disregard of the rights of a weaker nation, in order to gain a doubtful credit for energy in forwarding that great enterprise. Territory of a neighboring republic, with which we are at peace, was seized by a band of revolutionists, protected by the guns of the United States Navy, and erected into a State over night, which the President promptly recognized as an independent nation--a gross offense against a friendly republic which it was helpless to resent.²¹

Davis continued: "These and many other unwarranted things that belong more to an Empire than a Republic have occurred under the present Administration, and brought deep concern and alarm to thoughtful and patriotic minds. They must be regarded as the first fruits of Imperialism and show how fast we are drifting towards absolutism and centralized power."²²

The Campaign Text Book of the Democratic Party of the United States, 1904 contained a strong seven-page criticism of the Panama events, charging that "the first overt act in the Panama revolution was performed by the Navy Department in Washington, and not on the Isthmus--in the immediate interest of the New Panama Canal Company."²³ It noted that most Americans admit the end was desirable, "yet the Democrats insist that the means were unjustifiable; and the whole controversy hinges upon the nature of the means employed, and not upon the end."²⁴ It continued:

The President's course in his dealings with Colombia and with the Panama question furnishes a characteristic story of hasty and unconstitutional action and usurpation of power. Whether it was the duty of the Senate to accept the situation he had created as an accomplished fact which it could not change, or to defeat the treaty he

had negotiated with the Government which he had practically set up by force, or by the threat of force, may be a matter of question, but there can be no doubt as to the character of the President's conduct throughout.²⁵ It accused the friends of the Administration, after the President had secured the separation of Panama in violation of the Constitution, of a studied effort "to becloud the whole question by raising the cry that the President's critics were opposing the canal, and that he had taken the only course to secure its construction."²⁶ And in addition to quotes from statements by Senator Carmack, Senator McLaurin, and Senator Gorman,²⁷ the *Campaign Text Book* quoted international lawyer and former Third Assistant Secretary of State under President Harrison, William Morton Grinnell: "His [Roosevelt's] conduct with regard to the Panama Canal is ridiculous. It is more absurd than illegal, for it amounted to an enunciation of the doctrine of eminent domain applied to a foreign State. The whole affair was a violation of international law, and...was nothing more or less than giving sanction to, or at least conniving at, the dismemberment of a republic which was in a sense the ward of the nation."²⁸

The Parker Constitutional Club of eminent New York lawyers,²⁹ in a detailed report signed by Wheeler H. Peckham, John G. Carlisle, William B. Hornblower, John G. Milburn, Adrian H. Joline, William Church Osborn, and Howard Taylor, condemned the course of President Roosevelt in regard to Panama and declared his action offensive not only to the law of nations, but to the standards of international honor and morality observed by the United States heretofore. The report said that the President "did not refrain from aggression upon Colombia." Noting that the President, in his Letter of Acceptance, had charged his critics with misstating the facts, the report stated: "There is not a single fact above set forth which is not supported by the records and admitted by the Administration."³⁰

At a campaign meeting at which Parker spoke, held in Newark, New Jersey on November 1, 1904, chairman Richard V. Lindabury, president of the Lawyer's Constitution Club, said in his remarks: "If you like a President who would thus declare war upon a sister country without the approval of Congress--if you like that sort of thing, then cheer and vote for Roosevelt."³¹ And at the Reform Club's Parker meeting in Carnegie Hall, October 20, 1904, Senator Culberson of Texas attacked the Panama events.³²

Ten months earlier, on December 24, 1903, the *New York Times* had attacked John Sharp William's notion of keeping the question of the Panama Republic and the question of the Panama Canal separate, calling it a surrender to the Administration and stating that if the Democrats "would make intelligent use of it the Democrats have in the Panama

crime an issue upon which they might win."³³ The *Times* now brought the Panama issue into the election campaign, noting the special emphasis laid upon the theory of the interests of civilization, and charging that: "The President violated the treaty because he desired above all things to have the Panama Canal begun under his Administration."³⁴ Continuing its criticism of the Panama affair on September 9, 1904, the *Times* declared: "Everybody knows that if Judge PARKER had been President he would have resorted to no such lawless courses to bolster up the Panama conspirators. For that reason Judge PARKER would be a safer President than Mr. ROOSEVELT."³⁵

Just before the election the *Times* quoted in length from a letter by New York state Republican Senator Edgar T. Brackett, written in March, 1904 to Secretary Shaw, which severely criticized the President's record in regard to the Panama Canal. Senator Brackett pointed out: "The feeling with respect to the canal is much more serious, and reaches way down to the nation's sense of right and wrong; indeed, it goes back to the injunction, 'Thou shalt not steal.' "³⁶ He compared the Panama case to the hiring of a thug to take a coveted fine watch owned by a neighbor away from him because he refused to sell it at the desired price, and then buying the watch from the thug. He did not think this was justified, nor did the majority of the people with whom he conversed think so: "Refine, as the President's apologists may, the case suggested, in the public mind, is analogous to just what was done. Denial of any fomenting of the secession of Panama will not convince that there was none. The succession of events is held too plain a proof for the denial to prove effective."³⁷

The Democrats sought the help of the Independents and Anti-Imperialists in their campaign against President Roosevelt. The Democratic presidential candidate Judge Parker wrote on August 29, 1904 to Carl Schurz,³⁸ asking for his help: "It is of the first importance that the addresses of Secretary Hay and Mr. Root be answered at once by a man of intellectual strength, character and position. It is a great favor to ask of you, but as no one fills all of the requirements so well, I make bold to ask you to do it."³⁹ Schurz replied that he would not be making any speeches, only writing,⁴⁰ and the result was Carl Schurz's "Open Letter to the Independent Voter," sent in September, 1904 to James W. Pryor, general secretary of the Parker Independent Clubs.⁴¹

A large section of Schurz's long letter was devoted to the Panama issue. He accused President Roosevelt of violating the Spooner Law, recognizing the right of secession despite four years of bloody Civil War to maintain the opposite principle, recognizing the independence of a seceded state while interfering with a "mailed hand" to prevent the federal Government from enforcing its lawful authority, and flagrantly violating the Treaty of 1846

by cooperating with the rebels of Panama in destroying the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama.⁴²

Schurz further called the interests of civilization excuse "lamentably futile. In the first place, the cause of civilization is not promoted but hurt when a great republic like ours breaks its solemn treaties and adopts the nefarious doctrine that the end justifies the means."⁴³ In the second place, if negotiations with Colombia had been continued patiently, it was reasonable that she would have yielded, especially if negotiations had been begun with Nicaragua as required by law. What was needed was "a President possessing more patience and discretion, and a temperament less given to dramatic vehemence."⁴⁴

Schurz noted that other nations might regard President Roosevelt's high-handed proceeding in creating and recognizing Panama as "very smart, but they will be impressed with the fact that when such a thing is possible similar or even worse things are not impossible."⁴⁵ "In our further dealings with foreign governments we shall no doubt be met with profuse politeness, but also with a watchful eye for good faith, patience, and generosity of the same kind."⁴⁶

The United States must not be surprised, Schurz explained, if on occasion the Latin American countries should be more inclined to enter into a combination of foreign powers against her than with her, and if they were moved to trade more willingly with other countries: "'El peligro del Norte'--the Northern peril--has become among our Southern neighbors a current phrase. The dismemberment of the Republic of Colombia and the slicing off from it of a territory which really has become a dependency of the United States serve to them as proof of our sinister schemes...."⁴⁷

Schurz went on to criticize Roosevelt's new doctrine of the United States as the paramount policeman of the whole American continent. Referring to the brutal form of lynching in some U. S. states and the loosened ties of civilized society in Colorado, he stated: "If President Roosevelt were asked to 'interfere' there with a strong hand, he would say that he had no Constitutional power to do so. What power has he to 'interfere' in the South American republics when they fail to pay their debts due to other people, or do or permit things loosening the ties of civilized society?"⁴⁸ Schurz called the Roosevelt doctrine "a manifestation of Mr. Roosevelt's real nature.":

He sees an object which appears to him good or desirable. His impetuous temperament urges him forward to attain this object, and in the rush he is apt to despise anything standing in the way, to forget laws, and treaties, and precedents, and adverse rights and interests, and to regard everybody opposing him as an enemy of the public welfare, if not as his own. He considers the Panama Canal a good thing, and to get it he rushes forward regardless of other obligations and consequences. He

thinks it desirable that the South American republics should be honest, and orderly, and prosperous, and forthwith he proclaims it to be our duty to make them so, in a manner insulting to them and discreditable to his own common sense.⁴⁹

To elect President Roosevelt, Schurz asserted, "would be so hazardous a venture that clear-headed and sober-minded Americans may well, for their country's sake, shrink from the risk."⁵⁰ "His is a master nature, but this Republic does not want in the Presidency a Master--least of all one who cannot master himself."⁵¹ "President Roosevelt is an exceedingly interesting, picturesque, and forcible character, who would have found a most congenial and glorious field of action at the time of the Crusades, but sometimes strangely fails to appreciate the higher moral aims of modern civilization."⁵²

Schurz did not expect the millenium under the Democratic party, but thought he might well expect a return to Constitutional and legal government, the arrest of lavish public expenditures, the overhaul of Government departments and the end of corrupt practices, the scaling down of military expenditures, a move against the corruptions of the tariff system, and that the Democrats would "do away with our utterly undemocratic, financially wasteful, and politically demoralizing colonial policy...."⁵³ He went on to praise Parker's temperament and mental habit, knowledge and reverence for law, and courage to resist opponents and friends in obedience to his sense of duty. Alton B. Parker would be a wise choice for the people.⁵⁴

Schurz ended his "Open Letter" by affirming that he was speaking as an Independent, not a partisan, as one who sought only the good of the country.⁵⁵

Schurz's "Open Letter" was released to the press on October 2, 1904,⁵⁶ and appeared in full the next day in the New York *Evening Post*.⁵⁷

Judge Parker wrote to Schurz on October 5, 1904: "I want to thank you for the most valuable contribution that has thus far been made to the campaign."⁵⁸

Gamaliel Bradford, a vice president of the original Anti-Imperialist League,⁵⁹ thought the most important part of the "Open Letter" was the analysis of the character of President Roosevelt, and he wished it could be published in pamphlet form and circulated by the million.⁶⁰

William A. Croffut, who founded and became secretary of the Washington Anti-Imperialist League,⁶¹ wrote to Schurz: "I think your letter will do more than any other one utterance to beat Roosevelt, but I greatly and sadly fear that it will not be enough."⁶²

Moorfield Storey read Schurz's "Open Letter" with "warm admiration and entire sympathy,"⁶³ and Felix Adler thought it "ranks with the best

of your utterances, both in conception and mode of expression."⁶⁴

E. V. Abbot talked about the "Open Letter" with John Sharp Williams at Democratic headquarters, and was shown the *Evening Post* proof sheets upon which Williams had written "that it was the best campaign literature that had yet appeared." Abbot informed Schurz that the pamphlet was to be printed by the 100,000 in both English and German, and sent broad-cast over the country.⁶⁵

Other Anti-Imperialist sources continuing their criticisms of the Panama policy during the election campaign included Charles Francis Adams, Jr. in a speech at Carnegie Hall under the auspices of the West-side Parker Independent Club,⁶⁶ and *The Nation*.⁶⁷ In an editorial entitled "Mr. Hay on Panama," *The Nation* noted that Secretary Hay, in a recent Carnegie Hall speech, had "defined Mr. Roosevelt as 'unsafe' only in the sense that a disinfectant is unsafe for a microbe." "Excellent!," *The Nation* continued, "Nothing could be happier, unless it is suggested to the hearer to run over some of the microbes in the political world to which the Roosevelt formaldehyde has been applied with lethal effect."⁶⁸

On election day, November 8, 1904, Roosevelt received 7,628,461 popular and 336 electoral votes; Parker received 5,084,223 popular and 140 electoral votes. Parker won the popular vote in 12 states, all in the South.⁶⁹

It was a great victory for President Roosevelt in an election where the issues were not clearly drawn, attributed largely to his personal popularity and dynamic campaign. In contrast Parker, politically inexperienced and largely unknown outside of New York, had carried on a sedentary and lackluster campaign.⁷⁰

In five states where Roosevelt won by large pluralities, progressive Democrats were elected as Governor: Massachusetts (Douglas), Minnesota (Johnson), Montana (Toole), Colorado (Adams), and Missouri (Folk). While Roosevelt won Missouri by a plurality of 30,000, Joseph Folk became Governor by an even larger margin. In Massachusetts William L. Douglas was chosen Governor by a plurality of about 35,000 while Roosevelt received a plurality of nearly 93,000. In addition to these five Governors, progressive Democrats lost narrowly in Washington and Rhode Island, where Roosevelt won overwhelmingly. The Democrats also supported LaFollette in Wisconsin.⁷¹

According to Bryan's biographer Paola E. Coletta, the country had "gone Rooseveltian, not Republican."⁷² Eugene H. Roseboom says that Roosevelt had captured the popular imagination; not since President Jackson had there been such a popular hero.⁷³ And contemporary sources like the *New York Times* attributed the victory to Roosevelt's personal popularity.⁷⁴

John Sharp Williams had realized that the Democrats had "no more

chance of winning the election than a snowball had of staying in the lower regions."⁷⁵ But Theodore Roosevelt was "stunned by the overwhelming victory we have won. I had no conception that such a thing was possible."⁷⁶ He had carried not only all the states he had predicted as probably Republican, but all he had listed as doubtful, and all but one he had put down as probably Democrat.⁷⁷

President Roosevelt wrote after the election: "I do not want to be vindictive, but I must say that I particularly enjoy the showing made as to the utter impotence of the *Evening Post*, Carl Schurz, Francis Adams, Moorfield Storey, and that set."⁷⁸ And he received "grim pleasure" from the New York situation: "Four years ago the New York *Herald*, *Times*, *World*, *Sun*, and *Evening Post* and the Brooklyn *Eagle* were violently against Bryan and for McKinley. This year the *Sun* has been neutral and the others violently against me and for Parker; yet I have actually increased the majority, and have a larger plurality over Parker in New York than McKinley had over Bryan. It is astounding...."⁷⁹

At the sixth annual meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League, held in Boston from November 26-28, 1904, League president George S. Boutwell took pleasure in the fact that Samuel W. McCall, an anti-imperialist, was elected in the 8th Massachusetts district "by a majority so large that the majorities given to President Roosevelt upon a percentage basis are insignificant."⁸⁰ Boutwell also emphasized that William L. Douglas, whom he called an open anti-imperialist, had been elected Governor of Massachusetts over Governor Bates who stood for President Roosevelt.⁸¹

Speaking on the same occasion, however, Rev. A. A. Berle noted that: "We stand today, apparently in the shadow of a great defeat." He continued: "Theodore Roosevelt represents today the temper and the point of view of the American people, as to armies, navies, world power, Panama republics and American police duty on the Western Hemisphere."⁸²

Frank B. Sanborn disagreed with Rev. Berle in his remarks about a great defeat: "It is perfectly demonstrated by figures that the cause of anti-imperialism in Massachusetts has triumphed by at least 75,000 majority."⁸³ He pointed out that their candidate for Governor, Douglas, a pronounced anti-imperialist, had won by about 36,000. And Mr. McCall in his Congressional district ran about 3,000 ahead of President Roosevelt. There were other anti-imperialists elected to Congress: "Put these figures together and you will find that the 80,000 plurality of Roosevelt does not represent imperialism at all, but it represents that uncertain state of mind such as people get into when they have made a bad bargain and don't know what to do with it."⁸⁴

Moorfield Storey, in a letter to Carl Schurz, summed up his view of the election results: "If I thought it meant that the American people approve

the tariff, the Philippine policy and Panama, I should be discouraged a good deal but I think Roosevelt's majority was due to the votes of many who believe in none of these things. I fancy it was the Bryan element of the party voting against Parker and not for Roosevelt."⁸⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The Republican strategy in the election of 1904 was to emphasize their accomplishment in procuring the long-desired trans-Isthmian Canal; thus placing the Democrats in a position of not daring to attack the Panama issue for fear of being seen as opponents of the Canal. The Democrats responded by emphasizing the means by which the Canal was gained, and by directing personal attacks upon the President. The Democrats sought the help of the Independents and Anti-Imperialists in their campaign against President Roosevelt, with Judge Parker successfully appealing to Carl Schurz as the most capable person to lead the attack.

The Panama issue was only one of several issues in the campaign, and perhaps all the issues were overshadowed by the personal popularity of Theodore Roosevelt. But the forthright action portrayed by the President in securing the Canal was one of the reasons for his high popularity. He saw the Panama issue as beneficial to himself and urged that it be stressed by his campaign leaders.

Not only Roosevelt's popularity, but the popularity of the Canal itself, and the willingness of many who were critical of the Panama events to accept the fruits of a wrong policy, made it difficult for the opposition to influence the election more than marginally on the basis of the Panama issue.

CHAPTER IX: AFTERMATH

Why did the United States agree in 1921 to pay Colombia 25 million dollars for the settlement of their differences arising out of the Panama Revolution?

Reports of Colombian forces advancing on and landing in Panama, as well as Colombian war measures and U. S. countermeasures, occupied the press from the middle part of November, 1903 until well into January, 1904.¹ U. S. army and navy preparations were made in the eventuality that Colombia would forcibly try to recapture the Isthmus.² In Bogotá economic boycott petitions against the United States were widely circulated and signed, and the Executive's advisory council voted 10 to 1 to hand Minister Beaupré his passport. Although fear of open hostilities with the United

States deterred the Colombian Government from this latter act, the severance of diplomatic relations continued to be discussed.³

Meanwhile special Colombian envoy General Reyes made direct complaints to the Roosevelt Administration and proposed arbitration of his country's grievances at The Hague.⁴ But by January 12, 1904 he had given up hope and was about ready to leave Washington.⁵

The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was approved by President Roosevelt on February 25, 1904, and formally proclaimed the next day. The seven members of the Isthmian Canal Commission selected by the President to organize the construction of the Panama Canal called at the White House on March 8, and held their first meeting on March 22, 1904.⁶

The transfer of the property and rights of the New Panama Canal Company to the United States occurred on May 4, 1904,⁷ with Treasury Secretary Leslie Shaw handing a 40 million dollar warrant to J. P. Morgan and Company, which was handling the transfer of gold and exchange to France, a few days later.⁸ In France the 40,000,000 dollars (206,000,000 francs) were divided between the 226,296 bondholders of the de Lesseps Panama Canal Company (stockholders received nothing), who were awarded approximately 62% of the money (128,600,000 francs), and the 6,796 stockholders of the New Panama Canal Company, who were awarded approximately 38% of the money (77,400,000 francs). The bondholders of the de Lesseps Company received a payout of about 10 cents on the dollar of their investment, and the New Panama Canal Company stockholders received 129.78 francs per 100 franc share.⁹

A special committee of the Isthmian Canal Commission reported in May, 1911 that the United States received full value for its money, placing the total value of the acquisitions at 42,799,826 dollars, of which \$ 25,389,240 was for useful French excavation and \$ 9,644,320 was for Panama Railroad stock.¹⁰

Following the transfer Secretary Hay wrote to Bunau-Varilla: "It is not often given to any man to render such a service to two countries and to the civilized world as you have done."¹¹ But while Panama also received its ten million dollars,¹² within a year it was necessary for President Roosevelt to send Secretary Taft to Panama to adjust differences and pacify the new country, which complained it had been led into a very disadvantageous Canal bargain by its alien Minister.¹³ United States-Panama clashes began already in early 1904 when the United States insisted that Panama had to acknowledge the right of U. S. intervention in its new Constitution (and not merely in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty). Finally Article 136 of the Panama Constitution gave the United States the right to "intervene, in any part of Panama, to reestablish public peace and constitutional order."¹⁴

As far as the Canal Zone itself was concerned, Hay coined the phrase

"titular sovereignty" in 1904 to describe Panama's rights in the Zone while the United States exercised sovereignty.¹⁵ The Isthmian Canal Commission was given legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Canal Zone, with one of its members, Major General George W. Davis, being appointed Governor. The Commission was responsible to the War Department, which in turn was responsible to President Roosevelt.¹⁶

Although the Spooner Act contemplated a lock Canal, the Isthmian Canal Commission was encouraged to investigate both types,¹⁷ with the final authorization for a lock Canal being given in 1906.¹⁸ The neutral, yet fortified Panama Canal was opened on a basis of equality in toll charges on August 15, 1914, with the total cost of the original construction placed at more than 365 million dollars.¹⁹

Meanwhile Roosevelt stressed in 1905 that "we must remember that in undertaking to build the Panama Canal we have necessarily undertaken to police the seas at either end of it; and this means that we have a peculiar interest in the preservation of order in the coasts and islands of the Caribbean."²⁰

Attempts to settle the dispute between the United States and Colombia over the events of November, 1903 were renewed. The Colombian Minister at Washington, Mendoza, presented a recapitulation of the events and urged arbitration on October 21, 1905, with a subsequent note on April 6, 1906.²¹ U. S. Secretary of State Elihu Root denied Colombian grievances on February 10, 1906, but pursuant to a suggestion by Root when he stopped in Colombia during a visit to South America during the same year, Enrique Cortes was sent to Washington in order to work out a settlement with Root.²² This led to the Root-Cortes-Arosemena tripartite agreements between the United States and Colombia, the United States and Panama, and Colombia and Panama, dated January 9, 1909. Colombia was offered \$ 2,500,000 (Panama's first ten annuities received from the United States) and special privileges in regard to the Canal and Canal Zone, in return for its recognition of Panama's independence and a settlement of its claims against the United States. The United States and Panama ratified the agreements to which they were a part, but opposition in Colombia led to the downfall of all three agreements and to the overturn of the Colombian Government.²³

Charges that American speculators had purchased stock in the New Panama Canal Company from French citizens before the Panama Revolution circulated already in 1904,²⁴ were nourished by testimony before the Senate Committee on Inter-Oceanic Canals in 1906,²⁵ and came to a head in 1908. The New York *World*, which was opposing the election of William Howard Taft that year as Roosevelt's successor, published several articles in the closing weeks of the campaign implying that a syndicate of

Americans had obtained part of the 40 million dollars paid to the New Panama Canal Company. Other newspapers reprinted these articles, and on November 2, 1908 the Indianapolis *News* printed an editorial asking "Who Got the Forty Million?" This possibly had an effect on the Indiana voting, where Taft slipped through to gain the state's electoral vote but the Democrats had success with their state ticket.²⁶

President Roosevelt was angry at the articles and the editorial, and attacked the Indianapolis *News* on December 1, 1908, denying any knowledge of a syndicate. He also denied that Douglas Robinson, his brother-in-law, and Charles P. Taft, brother of President-elect William H. Taft, were involved in the transaction in any way.²⁷

The New York *World* took full responsibility for the articles, and in an editorial of December 8, 1908, entitled "The Panama Scandal--Let Congress Investigate," accused President Roosevelt of deliberate misstatements, rehashed evidence presented to the Senate Committee in 1906, and concluded: "Whether Douglas Robinson, who is Mr. Roosevelt's brother-in-law, or any of Mr. Taft's brothers associated himself with Mr. Cromwell in Panama exploitation or shared in these profits is incidental to the main issue of letting in the light."²⁸

In a special Message to Congress, December 15, 1908, President Roosevelt charged that the real offender in the false allegations was Joseph Pulitzer, editor and proprietor of the *World*, and that he should be prosecuted by federal authorities because his libel was against the U. S. Government.²⁹ The *World* replied by accusing the President of attacking freedom of the press, and denied it had made any accusations against Charles Taft or Douglas Robinson.³⁰

Attorney-General Bonaparte, under orders from President Roosevelt, began proceedings on February 17, 1909 in the courts of the District of Colombia against the New York *World*, Indianapolis *News*, and individual editors. However the charges were dropped when an attempt to remove the Indianapolis defendants to the District of Colombia for trial failed. Meanwhile new indictments were drawn up in the New York Southern District on March 4, 1909, against the *World*. The charges consisted of circulation of the offending libel issues on federal reservations, specifically at West Point and the New York City post office.³¹

The *World* asserted that although it was charged with criminal libel against Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Charles P. Taft, Douglas Robinson and others, it was actually being politically persecuted. It again raised the issue of freedom of the press, noting that any paper could be charged with printing something offensive to the President if copies were circulated in any of 2,809 Government reservations.³² Eventually the charges were dismissed by the federal trial judge on

February 25, 1910, as libel was a violation of state law for which a federal court had no jurisdiction. The Government appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed the dismissal on January 3, 1911.³³

Much of the evidence gained by the *World* over a two-year period in preparation for its defense on the charges of libel, in case the trial reached that stage, was presented to the Rainey Committee in 1912.³⁴

The stage was set for the formation of the Rainey Committee in a speech made by ex-President Theodore Roosevelt on March 23, 1911 at the University of California, in which he asserted:

The Panama Canal I naturally take special interest in because I started it. There are plenty of other things I started merely because the time had come that whoever was in power would have started them. But the Panama Canal would not have been started if I had not taken hold of it, because if I had followed the traditional or conservative method I should have submitted an admirable state paper occupying a couple of hundred pages detailing all of the facts to Congress and asking Congress' consideration of it.

In that case there would have been a number of excellent speeches made on the subject in Congress; the debate would be proceeding at this moment with great spirit and the beginning of work on the canal would be fifty years in the future. Fortunately the crisis came at a period when I could act unhampered. Accordingly I took the isthmus, started the canal, and then left Congress not to debate the canal, but to debate me.

In portions of the public press the debate still goes on as to whether or not I acted properly in taking the canal. But while the debate goes on the canal does too, and they are welcome to debate me as long as they wish, provided that we can go on with the canal.³⁵

The New York *Times*, which cited Roosevelt as saying "I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate...",³⁶ responded with an editorial entitled "A Belated Confession": "Ex-President ROOSEVELT was uncommonly frank in his address at the Charter Day exercises of the University of California. He openly, and even boastfully, admitted that the despoiling of Colombia of her most precious province, Panama, was his own personal act."³⁷ The *Times* continued: "Quite so. 'I took the Canal Zone.' This is the opinion expressed by THE TIMES when the deed was perpetrated, that Mr. ROOSEVELT took the Canal Zone."³⁸ Noting that the act had had a lasting effect in engendering suspicion and alarm in the South American republics, the editorial concluded: "The act was characteristic. So is the boast."³⁹

The Nation responded by declaring: "When he says, 'I took it,' everybody knows that he is stating the exact fact, and that there is no need of looking further to fix the responsibility for the theft."⁴⁰ It asserted that

"Mr. Roosevelt has now done his best to open the eyes of the malevolently blind to what was going on when he 'took' the Canal Zone."⁴¹

On March 28, 1911 the Colombian Minister to the United States, Francisco de Paul Borda, called the attention of Secretary Knox to the Roosevelt speech in a note, and stated that he was forced to renew the Colombian protest of 1903. He was so aroused that he demanded satisfaction on the basis of this "confession."⁴² The Colombian consul general in New York, Francisco Escobar, joined in the uproar by publishing an attack on "I took the Isthmus" in 1911.⁴³

Henry G. Granger, a former U. S. consular agent in Colombia, was instructed by *The Independent* to study the question of Colombian claims, and published his results on August 17, 1911, beginning with a discussion of Roosevelt's speech. He showed that the United States should either consent to arbitration at The Hague or adopt the more "manly" course of voluntary payment, due to its intervention.⁴⁴

Theodore Roosevelt attempted to clarify his 1903 position in an editorial in *Outlook*, October 7, 1911, in which he stated: "I was prepared, if necessary, to submit to Congress a recommendation that we should proceed with the work in spite of Colombia's opposition, and indeed had prepared a rough draft of a Message to that effect, when events on the Isthmus took such shape as to change the problem."⁴⁵ But in his *Autobiography*, Roosevelt still referred to the fact that he took Panama, this time saying "I took Panama without consulting the Cabinet."⁴⁶

Roosevelt's editorial in 1911 did not stop the renewed criticism of his actions regarding the Panama Revolution. Leander T. Chamberlain wrote in the *North American Review*, February, 1912, that:

Yet the self-appointed protagonist of imperial efficiency still declares, "We did harm to no one, save as harm is done to a bandit by a policeman who deprives him of his chance for blackmail." The verdict of history reads, "The policeman himself turned bandit. In the name of equity and under the guise of friendship, he smote the innocent and plundered the defenseless!"⁴⁷

Chamberlain accused Roosevelt of seeing, "as through the mists of apocalyptic vision, an indeterminate and indeterminable something which he calls 'collective civilization.'" ⁴⁸ And he joined the call for reparative action to end the national reproach.⁴⁹

Alfred T. Mahan answered Chamberlain's article in the October, 1912 *North American Review*, concluding that "the summary ejection of Colombia from property which she could not improve herself, and against the improvement of which by another she raised frivolous obstacles, is precisely in line with transactions going on all over the world...."⁵⁰ He continued: "India, Egypt, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, all

stand on the same general basis as Panama.”⁵¹

Early in 1912 General Pedro Nel Ospina, the new Colombian Minister to the United States, thought a proposed visit of Secretary of State Knox to Central and South America was “inopportune” and said unpleasant things about unfinished business between his country and the United States.⁵²

Meanwhile, on April 6, 1911, shortly after Roosevelt’s March 23 speech, Representative Henry T. Rainey of Illinois had introduced a resolution into the House,⁵³ which stated:

Whereas a former President of the United States has declared that he “took” Panama from the Republic of Colombia without consulting Congress; and

Whereas the Republic of Colombia has ever since petitioned this country to submit to The Hague Tribunal the legal and equitable question whether such taking was in accordance with or in violation of the treaty then existing between the two countries, and also whether such taking was in accordance with or in violation of the well-established principles of the law of nation; and

Whereas the Government of the United States professes its desire to submit all international controversies to arbitration and has conducted treaties with many other nations agreeing to submit all legal questions to arbitration, but has steadily refused arbitration to the Republic of Colombia: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives be, and the same hereby is, directed to inquire into the same; send for books, papers, and documents; summon witnesses; take testimony; and report the same, with its opinion and conclusion thereon, to this House with all convenient speed.⁵⁴

Rainey thus fulfilled his promise to ask for a full Congressional inquiry made in 1908 at the time the syndicate charges were being discussed. It was possible for him to make a move at this time due to Democratic control of the House following the 1910 mid-term elections.⁵⁵

The Rainey resolution was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,⁵⁶ following which the Democratic-controlled Committee began hearings on the resolution. Although the House took no final action on the resolution,⁵⁷ the documentary evidence and testimony presented in 1912 and 1913 became House Report No. 32, 62d Congress, 2d Session: *The Story of Panama*.⁵⁸ Henry N. Hall, a staff correspondent of the *New York World*, was a key witness, presenting evidence which he and Earl Harding had obtained in several fact-finding trips abroad in 1909 and 1910, at the time the *World* was preparing its defense on the libel charges.⁵⁹ The whole history of the choice of Panama over Nicaragua and the origins of the Panama Revolution was presented.⁶⁰ Among the evidence was a letter from

Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero sent from New York October 18, 1903 to his son Dr. Raoul A. Amador, an acting assistant surgeon in the U. S. Army at Fort Revere, Massachusetts:

The plan appears to me good. A portion of the Isthmus will be declared independent, on which the United States will not permit forces of Colombia to arrive to attack us. They will convoke an assembly, which will invest with authority a minister who will be named by the new Government to make a treaty without necessity of later ratification by that assembly. The treaty, being approved by both parties, the new Republic will already be protected by the United States, and they will add the other settlements which were not forming part of that Republic, and which will also remain under the protection of the United States.⁶¹

The story of the stock syndicate was also reviewed, with its source possibly being one of Cromwell's press agents, Jonas Whitley, whose name recurs throughout the testimony, and who might have been a *World* agent planted in Cromwell's office. In any case the evidence did not prove or disprove the syndicate allegations with any objective finality.⁶²

The Rainey Report became a justification for Democratic policy claiming Colombia had a legitimate grievance against the United States.⁶³ Already in 1911 Representative Sulzer (New York), chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Senator Gallinger (New Hampshire) had favored arbitration on Colombia's claims, while Senator Newlands (Nevada) and Senator Bacon (Georgia) had favored direct payment.⁶⁴

Before the Democrats came to power in 1913 under Woodrow Wilson, however, there was an attempt at a settlement with Colombia by the Republican Taft Administration. James T. Du Bois was dispatched as U. S. Minister to Bogotá, being formally received on November 18, 1911.⁶⁵ He frankly stated his sincere sympathies for Colombia at the time of his appointment, and was informed that this was no bar as friendly relations with Colombia were desired. He carried on an investigation at Bogotá for two years and became convinced that, instead of being "blackmailers" and "bandits," the public men of Colombia compared well with those of other countries in intelligence and responsibility, while the social life in the "Athens of South America" was as refined and cultured as in any capital of the world.⁶⁶

Du Bois actively launched negotiations with Colombia in January, 1913,⁶⁷ after informing Secretary Knox on September 30, 1912 that he had seen a change in Colombia away from a universal demand for arbitration to open desire for direct negotiations.⁶⁸ But he says that his instructions prepared by the Taft Administration "were drawn with so much regard for Colonel Roosevelt's feelings that I orally informed the Department that I might as well try to fly to heaven in a battleship as to go to Bogotá with

those instructions and expect to succeed; and so it was."⁶⁹ These instructions included giving Colombia ten million dollars for a perpetual lease of two islands and an unlimited option to build a canal through the Atrato route.⁷⁰

Ratification of the tripartite treaties was also a part of the offer made by Du Bois. Although he became convinced that Colombia had no intention of signing an agreement until the views of the coming Democratic Administration were known, Du Bois continued to negotiate, arguing that there was a possibility of Colombia receiving as much as \$ 49,946,000 under an arbitration clause for her reversionary rights under the Panama Railroad and Canal concessions, exclusive of the ten million dollars cash payment.⁷¹ In a memorandum of February 15, 1913, he even declared that the Government and the people of the United States "honestly regret [*lamentan sinceramente*] anything should have occurred to mar in any way, the long and sincere friendship" between the two nations.⁷²

Under the Wilson Administration, with William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State, and Democratic control of both the Senate and the House, Thaddeus A. Thomson was sent to Bogotá as Minister with instructions to seek a favorable adjustment of the dispute.⁷³ Propositions and counter-propositions ended in the signing of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty on April 6, 1914, with its official title the "Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia for the settlement of their differences arising out of the events which took place on the Isthmus of Panama in November, 1903."⁷⁴

The purpose of the Treaty was stated in the preamble: "to remove all the misunderstandings growing out of the political events in Panama in November, 1903; to restore the cordial friendship that formerly characterized the relations between the two countries, and also to define and regulate their rights and interests in respect of the interoceanic canal, which the Government of the United States is constructing across the Isthmus of Panama."⁷⁵

Article I, causing the greatest reaction, stated:

The Government of the United States of America, wishing to put at rest all controversies and differences with the Republic of Colombia arising out of the events from which the present situation on the Isthmus of Panama resulted, expresses, in its own name and in the name of the people of the United States, sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations.⁷⁶

Under Article III the United States agreed to pay 25 million dollars in gold to Colombia within six months after the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty.⁷⁷ This pecuniary balm, on top of the "sincere regret," was

called "canalimony" by one wit.⁷⁸

In addition Colombia was to receive under Article II the right to use the Canal for transporting troops, materials of war, and ships of war without paying charges; the right to transport the products of its soil and industry, as well as its mails, across the Canal free of charges and duties other than those the United States would pay; the right for its products to enter the Canal Zone and U. S.-occupied auxiliary islands and mainland on equality with similar U. S. products; the right for its citizens to cross the Canal Zone free of tolls, taxes, or duties except those to which citizens of the United States were subject; the right to use the Panama Railroad when the Canal was closed upon equal footing with the United States; and the right for Colombian coal, petroleum, and sea salt passing from one of its coasts to the other to be transported on the Railroad free of charges except the actual cost of handling and transportation, which was not to exceed one-half of the ordinary freight charges levied upon similar products of the United States passing over the Railroad and in transit from one port to another of the United States.⁷⁹

Under Article IV Colombia recognized Panama as an independent nation and agreed to the boundary defined by the Treaty. In consideration of this recognition, the United States agreed to help conclude a treaty of peace and friendship between Colombia and Panama with a view to establishing diplomatic relations and adjusting questions of pecuniary liability between Colombia and Panama.⁸⁰

The Colombian Congress approved the Treaty on June 9, 1914,⁸¹ and President Wilson transmitted it to the U. S. Senate on June 16, 1914, where it was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations the same day.⁸²

Shortly after the Treaty had been worked out Secretary of State Bryan issued a statement to the press stating that it was not only the duty of the United States "to do justice to Colombia, but in case of doubt as to what is just, we must resolve that doubt against ourselves and in favor of Colombia."⁸³ Whether Colombia's feelings of aggrievance were justified or not, Bryan explained, she had suffered a financial loss worth more than 25 million dollars. Ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty would restore friendly relations with Colombia and give the United States prestige throughout Latin America.⁸⁴

Reaction to the signing of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty was mixed. Theodore Roosevelt was furious, writing in *Outlook*, May 23, 1914, that "it would be an act of infamy to pay even a dollar to a nation which, in crooked greed, tried by blackmail to smirch the good name of America."⁸⁵ He further denounced the Treaty in a public statement on June 25.⁸⁶

Ex-U. S. Minister to Colombia James T. Du Bois replied by deeply regretting the antagonism displayed toward the Treaty "in certain

quarters, and I deplore Colonel Roosevelt's bitter and misleading attack embodied in his recent public statement."⁸⁷ If the armed interference preventing Colombia from maintaining its sovereignty over Panama was the "highest international morality," Du Bois felt "*the lowest must be amazing*, and 99 per cent of the people who know the facts will support this view."⁸⁸ He asserted that Roosevelt "put himself in the position of the dentist apprentice who pulled the wrong tooth; he cannot put it back and he does not want his employers to realize his mistake."⁸⁹ Recalling his own failure to conclude a treaty with Colombia due to the tender regard for Roosevelt in his instructions, Du Bois noted that the Wilson Administration had taken a broader and more correct view of the entire matter, presenting a Treaty that should be heartily approved. To object to the Treaty as an apology was not just; that was an unreasonable interpretation of a chivalrous act. Compensation for the physical value of the Panama Railroad (\$ 16,446,000), for the 64 unpaid annuities for the Railroad (\$ 16,000,000), and for that part of Colombia's national debt incurred in the interests of Panama before the Revolution, would altogether amount to about \$ 36,000,000.⁹⁰ The Republican Du Bois stated that he had been urged not to make his statement, but he was putting justice and his country ahead of his love of party.⁹¹

Moorfield Storey was heartened by the attempt to pay Colombia reparations and concluded that "nine months of President Wilson's administration...have shown that he and his associates have a far juster appreciation of our obligations to other countries than has been exhibited by their Republican predecessors since 1898...."⁹² He continued to hope for ratification of the Treaty, writing in 1916 that: "Dollars are not to be weighed in the balance against national honor; and no sum which Colombia will accept in reparation of the wrong which was done her, can be too much if we can thereby regain the position among the nations of the world which we lost when in violation of express treaty, as well as of moral law, we robbed Colombia of the territory through which now runs the Panama Canal."⁹³

The *Literary Digest*, noting that "Everybody approves" the Administration's desire to end all differences with Colombia, found that "a large portion of the press, including many influential newspapers outside the Democratic ranks," thought the Treaty should be ratified, although many saw no reason for handing over to Colombia as much as 25 million dollars, and still more thought the "sincere regret" distasteful.⁹⁴

Current Opinion quoted the Indianapolis *News* as saying that the Treaty would, if ratified, "set this government right with Colombia and the whole of South America and with its own conscience."⁹⁵ But *Current Opinion* felt that very few papers agreed with the *News* that the Treaty should be

ratified just as it stood, with many objecting to the apology and others to the large sum--some agreeing to the one but not the other, very few willing to agree to both.⁹⁶ The *New York Journal of Commerce* believed that every decent American ought to be willing to have their country express regret for what happened, as well as pay some sort of "a solatium" to Colombia; and the *Philadelphia Bulletin* believed a wrong was done to Colombia and an amende honorable, in form as well as substance, should be made. The *Baltimore Sun* thought the payment would be a good business proposition because of the better feeling it would establish in South America. On the other hand the *Boston Transcript* asserted that Bryan could have but one purpose, to smirch the Roosevelt Administration; and the *Louisville Evening Post* thought the Treaty was a basis for Theodore Roosevelt's reelection in 1916. The *Washington Post* called attention to the fact that Hay and Roosevelt had made positive and final denial that the United States had taken any collusive part in fomenting or inciting the uprising.⁹⁷

Hannis Taylor, counsel for Colombia, reviewed the facts in 1914 so people would know why the payment was to be made to Colombia.⁹⁸

Theodore Roosevelt continued to criticize the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty in 1915, writing "The Panama Blackmail Treaty" in the February issue of *Metropolitan*. Referring to the attempt of Colombian leaders in 1903 to raise the amount the United States would pay for the Canal privilege, Roosevelt charged: "The attempt was blackmail then; and to yield to it now is to yield to blackmail."⁹⁹

As Roosevelt was outspoken in condemning the "rape of Belgium" by the Central European powers during the first part of World War I, the German General von Bernhardt and the Austrian Baron von Hengelmüller used Roosevelt's article to draw analogies between that invasion and the "seizure of Panama" in 1903 by the United States on the principle that the "interests of the American people are higher and greater than abstract principles of international law." In their opinion the action in Belgium contained the same type of motivation.¹⁰⁰

Roosevelt's response is contained in a letter to William Roscoe Thayer of July 2, 1915:

To talk of Colombia as a responsible Power to be dealt with as we would deal with Holland or Belgium or Switzerland or Denmark is a mere absurdity. The analogy is with a group of Sicilian or Calabrian bandits; with Villa and Carranza at this moment. You could no more make an agreement with the Colombian rulers than you could nail currant jelly to a wall--and the failure to nail currant jelly to a wall is not due to the nail; it is due to the currant jelly. I did my best to get them to act straight. Then I determined that I would do what ought to be done without regard to them. The people of Panama were a unit in desiring the

Canal and in wishing to overthrow the rule of Colombia. If they had not revolted, I should have recommended Congress to take possession of the Isthmus by force of arms; and, as you will see, I had actually written the first draft of my Message to this effect. When they revolted, I promptly used the Navy to prevent the bandits, who had tried to hold us up, from spending months of futile bloodshed in conquering or endeavoring to conquer the Isthmus, to the lasting damage of the Isthmus, of us, and of the world. I did not consult Hay, or Root, or anyone else as to what I did, because a council of war does not fight; and I intended to do the job once for all.¹⁰¹

At the Panama-Pacific Historical Congress held in California July 19-23, 1915, Roosevelt argued against the payment of money to Colombia: "If the United States was right in its action, then it is an infamy to pay twenty—five million dollars, or any other sum to Colombia; and if the United States was not right in its action, it is an infamy to be on the canal, or to hold this Exposition here, because the canal has been filched."¹⁰²

Joseph C. Freehoff, statistician with the Public Service Commission of New York City, who accused the Roosevelt Administration of collaborating with the Panama separatists in his book *America and the Canal Title*,¹⁰³ believed the Canal Zone was "filched": "Our government took the Canal Zone from Colombia at the point of a bayonet. It was unwilling to pay the price determined by due process of law. Our title is therefore stolen."¹⁰⁴

Opposition to the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty prevented it from even being reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the session in which it was introduced.¹⁰⁵ It was reported out in early 1916, with a recommendation to make the expression of regret mutual and to reduce the indemnity to 15 million dollars, but Colombia made it clear no changes were acceptable and party spirit postponed the Treaty ratification.¹⁰⁶ On March 14, 1917 the Treaty was again reported out of the Senate Committee, with certain suggested amendments, and with a minority report by Lodge, McCumber, Borah, Brandegee, and Fall objecting to the buying of friendship under a blackmail demand and declaring that "this treaty is an admission that the conduct of this country in acquiring the right to construct a canal across the Isthmus of Panama was a wrong committed against Colombia."¹⁰⁷ The ratification was once more postponed, whereupon United States entrance into World War I laid the Treaty aside temporarily.¹⁰⁸

On December 2, 1918 President Wilson urged "an early and favorable action" on the vital matter of the Treaty, and in February, 1919 Minister Hoffman Philip obtained Colombian executive approval to the elimination of the "sincere regret" clause and some other minor changes suggested by the Senate Committee. The revised Treaty was reported favorably by that

Committee, with the Senate now organized by the Republicans after the mid-term election of 1918, and Theodore Roosevelt deceased, on July 29, 1919.¹⁰⁹

However, despatches from Bogotá reported the issuance of a June 20, 1919 decree declaring Government ownership of all hydrocarbons beneath the soil of Colombia. This was interpreted as a confiscation of oil deposits purchased by Americans, and Senator Lodge secured the recommitment of the Treaty to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where it was referred to a subcommittee composed of McCumber, Smith of Arizona, and Fall.¹¹⁰

It was believed that with the solution of this problem the basis would be laid for the development of one of Colombia's greatest sources of wealth--petroleum,¹¹¹ but the Colombian Government lamented that the ownership of subsoil rights should affect the ratification of the Treaty of April 6, 1914.¹¹²

Following a solution to the question of ownership of subsoil rights satisfactory to the United States by a Colombian Supreme Court decision and a Colombian Petroleum Law approved December 29, 1919,¹¹³ the President of Colombia could not understand even further delay in the conclusion of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty. He wrote to U. S. Minister Hoffman Philip on January 9, 1920: "If as a condition for its approval there should still be required the celebration of certain contracts with citizens of the United States, this would imply ignorance of the obligations recognized in the pact of 1914 which are absolute and independent from all other matters, and would result in the indefinite postponement of said pact...."¹¹⁴

Minister Philip replied that: "It has been entirely in a spirit of friendly interest for the prosperity of Colombia that Mr. Philip has taken liberty of expressing his personal opinion to President Suarez to the effect that the celebration by Colombia of important contracts with citizens of the United States at this time would, in all probability, have a most favorable bearing upon the treaty situation."¹¹⁵

The U. S. Senate Committee again reported the Treaty favorably on June 3, 1920, but the nearness of adjournment caused postponement, and the final debate on the Treaty did not take place in the Senate until the Republican Harding Administration came to power in 1921 with control of all branches of government. President Warren G. Harding urged the approval of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, now seven years old, in a special Message of March 9, 1921.¹¹⁶

Senator Lodge (Rep., Massachusetts) turned out to be the leading Republican spokesman for the Treaty, stressing that it had been altered for the better since 1917, except for the amount of money to be paid to Colombia; that it carried no confession of wrongdoing; that Colombia was the only South American nation with both an Atlantic and Pacific coast,

coasts on which there were good harbors capable of development; that Colombia guarded the approaches to the Canal, considered so important by Theodore Roosevelt; that ratification of the Treaty would have a good effect on all South American nations; and that the value of Colombia's claims for the Panama Railroad, Panama Railroad annuities, and Panama Canal rights under the Wyse Concession, etc., came to \$ 50,146,942.75.¹¹⁷

In addition Senator Lodge asserted that: "We have received every assurance short of a written treaty that this treaty now pending before us will be followed by a treaty of amity and commerce with Colombia...."¹¹⁸ He noted that U. S. exports had been falling off, adding: "It is an old saying that 'trade follows the flag,' but in these times in which we are now living it may be more truly said that trade and commerce follow investments."¹¹⁹ He continued by pointing out that the United States was in competition with other governments, with oil, a vital necessity to every great maritime nation, being the most conspicuous example.¹²⁰ Lodge then presented a list of oil companies belonging to the Royal Dutch-Shell Combine,¹²¹ with a graphic table and map showing the extent of this Combine.¹²² He stated that indications were very strong that perhaps the largest oil fields in the world were on the point of development in Venezuela and Colombia, but there was a danger that the Colombian fields would fall into the hands of the British combination.¹²³

Lodge quoted from a letter written by Theodore Roosevelt to Albert B. Fall on March 21, 1917, in which, Lodge said, Roosevelt approved Senator Fall's plan to ratify the Treaty with amendments to be followed by another treaty of amity and commerce with Colombia; so the present Treaty did not reflect upon the former President.¹²⁴ Lodge also quoted from two letters of March 21, 1921 written by Fall, now Secretary of the Interior, to himself, in which Fall stressed his assurance that Colombia would sign an additional treaty; pointed out the seriousness of the present crisis in regard to the oil developments throughout the world; sent Lodge information on the Royal Dutch-Shell Combine; and stated that the United States was even more justified now than in 1917 "in going to any extreme which our self-respect and our great respect and love and honor for the great American, Roosevelt, will justify in carrying out that great American policy which he so clearly understood, even if some person not understanding conditions and misunderstanding his attitude, may criticize us as having changed our opinions at the dictation of some greasy oil corporation."¹²⁵

Senator McCumber (Rep., North Dakota) supported the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, announcing that "I am voting to stake \$ 25,000,000...on the effort of the President to secure without an additional donation a supplemental agreement that will be worth to this country many times that sum."¹²⁶ Among other things he was influenced "by the immense

opportunities that will be opened up to American capital and to American commerce, and consequent American advantage, in the development of the vast oil fields of Colombia...."¹²⁷ Noting that the United States was intensely interested in the future world's supply of petroleum, he stated that if reports were true "no place on the globe has the potential possibilities of oil supply comparable with Colombia."¹²⁸ And, he continued, "to the extent that American capital develops Central and South American industries will trade naturally be turned in our direction."¹²⁹

Senator Shortridge (Rep., California) felt that ratification of the Treaty would restore faith and confidence in the minds of many who doubt the sincerity of the United States, help protect the Panama Canal, and help to strengthen bonds with all American Republics. He asked for peace and reconciliation with all the peoples of the earth.¹³⁰

Increased trade rivalry with Europe helped influence the decision of Senator New (Rep., Indiana) to support the Treaty,¹³¹ while Senator Knox (Rep., Pennsylvania) felt the United States was "morally bound to compensate Colombia, not for what she lost but for what we gained."¹³² It was not what the United States was now getting, Knox said, but "what we have already received that makes the treaty conscionable and just."¹³³ What the United States had gained was the difference between the Hay-Herrán Treaty and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, Knox explained: "The facts is under the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty we practically took Panama. We did not take it from Colombia; we took it with their consent from the Panamans..¹³⁴ Fellow Republican Senator Sterling seconded his views that Colombia's loss was largely "our great gain," and also stressed trade and commerce.¹³⁵

Democratic Senator Pomerene (Ohio) was delighted to see that Senator Lodge "like Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus, 'had seen a new light.'¹³⁶ He announced in his support for the Treaty that "the more I have studied this question the more convinced I am that the United States was wrong, in part, and the Colombian Government right, in part."¹³⁷ Despite the great benefit of the Panama Canal, he felt "the United States can never justify itself by doing the right thing in the wrong way."¹³⁸ Fellow Democratic Senator Smith agreed, stating that "we are making reparation for having taken advantage of a weak nation in the hour of its extreme weakness."¹³⁹

Senator Williams (Dem., Mississippi) stated that "men make a mistake whenever they contend that a valuable end justifies a bad means."¹⁴⁰ However he was "mighty glad when we did not have any apology in the treaty, although we owed one. I was mighty glad to escape that."¹⁴¹

While Senator Ransdell (Dem., Louisiana) mentioned the promotion of friendly relations with Latin America in his support of the Treaty,¹⁴²

Senator Wolcott (Dem., Delaware) announced: "I shall vote for the treaty because I conceive that Colombia has a just grievance against us. Our conduct toward her was such as to give her a claim for compensation against us founded, if not in technical right, yet unquestionably in good morals. This claim has a twofold source. It arises under the treaty of 1846, and it also arises because of our precipitate recognition of the new Republic of Panama."¹⁴³

Republican Senator Kellogg (Minnesota) opposed ratification of the Treaty "because it writes the word 'shame' across the pages of American history. I am opposed to this treaty because it is an acknowledgment of guilt, and I believe we are not guilty. I am opposed to this treaty because I do not believe the good will and friendship of nations is to be bartered in international markets."¹⁴⁴

Senator Borah (Rep., Idaho) agreed: "We owe Colombia nothing." "The name of Roosevelt should not be dishonored. The brand of shame should not be put upon our country."¹⁴⁵

Senator Johnson (Rep., California) noted that there had "come a wondrous change over the spirit of the dreams of some of those on this side of the Chamber."¹⁴⁶ He asked: "If it was a blackmail demand for 17 years, tell me, some of you gentlemen whose views have undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, tell me when the blackmail demand shed its awful outer garment and became a rosy—hued request with which we were bound to comply?"¹⁴⁷

Senator Kenyon (Rep., Iowa) recalled that in the 1918 campaign leaders of his Republican party had denounced the Treaty "as the crowning infamy in the attempt of Woodrow Wilson to slur the life and character of Theodore Roosevelt."¹⁴⁸ Three years later "Republican leaders have now turned a complete somersault, and what was an infamous crime under Woodrow Wilson becomes a very divine proceeding under the administration of the Republican Party."¹⁴⁹ In opposing the Treaty he explained: "If we stole this land, Roosevelt stole it; if we did steal it, and if it was wrong, we ought to apologize—not only pay the money, which is a halfway apology, a half-baked apology, but apologize like a manly nation. That is the issue."¹⁵⁰ He also felt that bought friendship was "not worth a cent on the thousand dollars."¹⁵¹

Senator Lenroot (Rep., Wisconsin) held the memory of Theodore Roosevelt dear, and declared that if he was alive today the Senator of Massachusetts (Lodge) and the Secretary of the Interior (Fall) would be of the same opinion as they were in 1917. In addition, ratification of the Treaty would be the beginning of unjust demands from other nations.¹⁵²

Senator Norris (Rep., Nebraska) also believed a precedence would be set by paying for good will; and doubted that the oil money would get beyond

Wall Street to the U. S. Treasury.¹⁵³ In addition he thought the special Canal privileges given to Colombia would soon make the Canal free to everybody at the expense of the U. S. taxpayers, as all nations with which the United States had favored-nation clauses could demand the same privileges, and since the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty had promised equality to all nations in regard to Canal privileges.¹⁵⁴

Some Democratic Senators also opposed ratification of the Treaty. Senator Watson (Dem., Georgia) charged that Lodge had consented to the Treaty "because of an oil proposition that Secretary Fall had pipe-lined into this treaty."¹⁵⁵ He called the 25 million dollars "an indirect subsidy to the oil interests of this country."¹⁵⁶ He asked, "are we the agents for the Standard Oil Co.--that and nothing more?"¹⁵⁷ It was a heavy responsibility, he stressed, to ask the Senators to confess to their constituents that 25 million dollars of their money was taken "in order to open up the oil fields of Colombia to the oil companies of this country...."¹⁵⁸

Senator Reed (Dem., Missouri) stated that the "payment of this money would be a confession of ravishment of Colombia by the United States."¹⁵⁹ "This twaddle...about not having harmed Colombia and yet owing her \$ 25,000,000 is not worthy a debate in a county school district by a class of boys 14 years of age. It will fool nobody, not even the man who indulges in it."¹⁶⁰ He asserted the money was intended "to secure the advantages of other concessions which some one told somebody else in confidence Colombia would some time make to the United States...."¹⁶¹ He also believed that other nations with favored-nation clauses with the United States would be getting the same Canal and Canal Zone privileges as Colombia; and in addition these special favors to Colombia would not create good will in the rest of Latin America.¹⁶² Reed claimed that recently attorneys for oil companies, and parties in interest, had come to Washington, stating that the Treaty must be ratified in order to protect the oil interests. He wondered "how much influence that argument has had in causing a number of gentlemen to about face on this question?"¹⁶³

The amendments suggested by the Committee on Foreign Relations were made to the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty before the final vote on ratification. Article I, expressing "sincere regret," was struck out,¹⁶⁴ and Article II became Article I with each succeeding Article moved up one number.¹⁶⁵ To the now Article I on Colombia's rights in respect to the Panama Canal and Railway was added "the title to which is now vested entirely and absolutely in the United States of America, without any encumbrances or indemnities whatever."¹⁶⁶ In the same Article references to Colombia's rights "even in case of war between Colombia and another country" were struck out; and to the clause giving special privileges on the Panama Railroad to Colombian coal, petroleum and sea salt passing from one of Colombia's coast to the

other were added the phrases "for Colombian consumption" and "whenever traffic by the canal is interrupted."¹⁶⁷ The now Article II, under which Colombia was to be paid 25 million dollars within six months after the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty, was changed so that the amount would be paid in five installments of five million dollars each--the first payment within six months after the exchange of ratifications and the rest in four annual installments.¹⁶⁸ Finally the preamble was altered to take note of the fact that the United States "has constructed" the Panama Canal instead of "is constructing" it.¹⁶⁹

Several other proposed amendments, which did not come from the Committee on Foreign Relations, were all rejected.¹⁷⁰ These included an amendment by Senator Poindexter to change the payment to 15 million dollars (defeated 68 to 22); a substitute Article by Senator Ransdell to pay Colombia 30 million dollars plus a loan not to exceed 25 million dollars (defeated without the yeas and nays being asked for); and an amendment by Senator Borah stating "that neither said payment nor anything contained in this treaty shall be taken or regarded as an admission that the secession of Panama in November, 1903, was in any way aided or abetted by the United States of America, its agents or representatives, or that said Government in any way violated its obligations to Colombia." (defeated twice, the first time in the Committee of the Whole, 49 to 39, and then 58 to 30).¹⁷¹

On April 20, 1921 the U. S. Senate voted for ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty signed April 6, 1914, with amendments. The vote was 69 for and 19 against.¹⁷² Of those voting yea, 40 were Republican and 29 were Democrats; whereas 15 Republicans and 4 Democrats voted nay.¹⁷³

Colombia then agreed to the Treaty revisions, on December 24, 1921, and the Treaty was proclaimed in effect on March 1, 1922.¹⁷⁴

According to *Outlook*, the passage of the Treaty was welcomed by Democratic, reactionary Republican, and pacifist papers.¹⁷⁵ The *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* (Dem.) called the Senate ratification "an act of justice tardily performed...With inexcusable delay, but yet with finality,...we have repaired a wrong, so far as the payment of money can repair it....We congratulate President Harding upon his courage in reviving Mr. Wilson's policy."¹⁷⁶ The *Buffalo Commercial* (Rep.) noted the "insignificance" of the amount, the elimination of the regret clause, the effect upon good relations with South America, and "the assistance it will give the United States in the world-wide hunt for oil. There are vast oil fields in Colombia, which should be developed by us."¹⁷⁷ The *New York Times* (Ind.Dem.) asserted that the voting to ratify the Treaty "meant a severe intellectual and moral strain for many Republican Senators. They had to approve what they had vehemently and virtuously condemned four years ago. And they had to

find arguments for their change of front. This was in some ways harder than the change itself...."¹⁷⁸ Thus Senator Lodge, according to the *Times*, had invited the Senate to look at the larger aspects of the question unable to be seen four years earlier: international amity, trade, Colombia's harbors situated on two oceans, "and had Senators duly weighed the vital necessity of oil and were they aware that Colombia contained vast and unexploited deposits to which Americans held claims and concessions only waiting on the ratification of the treaty?"¹⁷⁹

Outlook found that Democratic papers which were opposed to the ratification were sarcastic toward the Republican "turn-coat" Senators, while Republican papers "whose editors dare think for themselves" could not refrain either.¹⁸⁰ The New York *Tribune* (Rep.) referred to those "who would screen the transaction, saying that it is an act of largess to quiet the Colombians though they have no just claim."¹⁸¹ The New York *Herald* (Rep.) thought Senator Lodge's new position was statesmanship of expediency rather than justice, and called the putting through of the Treaty "the steam-rolled execution of a close corporation machine."¹⁸² The Chicago *Tribune* (Rep.) was against bribing Colombia to get oil in that country.¹⁸³ And the Kansas City *Star* (Rep.) stated: "The striking out of the apology to Colombia is simply a subterfuge. The payment of the \$ 25,000,000 is the essential apology, the essential admission of wrongdoing."¹⁸⁴

Literary Digest found support for the Treaty in papers like the Springfield *Republican*¹⁸⁵ and Boston *Post*, the latter having declared before ratification: "That Uncle Sam owes Colombia the money for what we seized is indisputable, and we cannot expect the good will of the southern republics until we pay the debt."¹⁸⁶

In an editorial entitled "A Vindication," written just after the Senate vote, the New York *World* recalled its earlier struggle against the law suits, claiming that the accumulated mass of evidence it had gained from its investigation "was irresistible in its demonstration that what had taken place in Panama was not a revolution but a most sordid and shameless conspiracy into which Theodore Roosevelt had dragged the United States Government in order to gratify his personal ambition."¹⁸⁷ Now, the *World* continued, Republican Senators had been forced to ratify the Treaty with Colombia "and make reparation for the wrong that Mr. Roosevelt inflicted on a weak and defenseless nation. The most flagrant act of Prussianism in the history of the United States is now definitely repudiated by the political party that ardently defended it for nearly eighteen years."¹⁸⁸ The good name of the United States had been vindicated; the stain erased from its honor.¹⁸⁹

Senate Resolution No. 150, agreed to February 13, 1924, led to President

Calvin Coolidge sending to the Senate on March 14, 1924 the diplomatic correspondence with Colombia in connection with the ratification of the Treaty concluded April 6, 1914, "and in connection with the securing of any oil concessions for American citizens."¹⁹⁰

U. S. investments in Colombia increased from 30 million dollars in 1920 to over 280 million dollars by 1929.¹⁹¹

CONCLUSIONS

After a long period of political debate, agreement was finally reached in 1921 to pay Colombia 25 million dollars. Two main factors converged to make this agreement possible: the desire to restore national honor by making amends for the wrong done to Colombia; and the desire to restore cordial relations with Latin America in general and Colombia in particular in order to lay the basis for investments, with resulting trade, in the area.

CHAPTER X: IN RETROSPECT

Reaction to the outward thrust of the Roosevelt Administration in the area of the Isthmus of Panama was a product of anti-imperialist, party-political, and regional and economic influences.

As early as 1896 Theodore Roosevelt wrote that it was to the "interest of civilization" that the United States "should be dominant in the Western Hemisphere."¹ In 1899 he asserted that "every expansion of a great civilized power means a victory for law, order, and righteousness."² By 1901 Roosevelt was announcing that the United States, in its attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine, should show justice and make it clear that injustice would not be tolerated, especially "now that we are looking forward to the building of the Isthmian Canal."³ He explained that: "No nation capable of self government, and of developing by its own efforts a sane and orderly civilization, no matter how small it may be, has anything to fear from us."⁴ But: "Barbarism has, and can have, no place in a civilized world. It is our duty toward the people living in barbarism to see that they are freed from their chains, and we can free them only by destroying barbarism itself. The missionary, the merchant, and the soldier may each have to play a part in this destruction, and in the consequent uplifting of the people."⁵ In a Message communicated to Congress, signed December 2, 1902, President Roosevelt drew attention to the fact that the trans-Isthmian Canal would be of advantage to the United States industrially and materially, but also:

It will be of advantage to the countries of tropical America. It is earnestly to be hoped that all of these countries will do as some of them have already done with signal success, and will invite to their shores commerce and improve their material conditions by recognizing that

stability and order are the prerequisites of successful development. No independent nation in America need have the slightest fear of aggression from the United States. It behooves each one to maintain order within its own borders and to discharge its just obligations to foreigners. When this is done they can rest assured that, be they strong or weak, they have nothing to dread from outside interference.⁶

Theodore Roosevelt's views on the interests of civilization and toward "barbaric" or partly "barbaric" nations bear resemblance to the teachings of his former professor at Colombia University, John W. Burgess,⁷ who wrote in his book *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* that "we must conclude, from the manifest mission of the Teutonic nations, that interference in the affairs of populations not wholly barbaric, which have made some progress in state organization, but which manifest incapacity to solve the problem of political civilization with any degree of completeness, is a justifiable policy."⁸ Professor Burgess believed "that it is in the interest of the world's civilization that law and order and the true liberty consistent therewith shall reign everywhere upon the globe....Both for the sake of the half-barbarous state and in the interest of the rest of the world, a state or states, endowed with the capacity for political organization, may righteously assume sovereignty over, and undertake to create state order for, such a politically incompetent population."⁹

In the mind of President Roosevelt the "bandits of Bogota," obstructing the construction of the Canal necessary for human progress, gave another warning of the dangers of independence for countries to whom the "advancement of civilization" was of secondary importance.¹⁰ Thus he could write to Kermit Roosevelt the day after Panama revolted: "Colombia has behaved infamously about the treaty for the building of the Panama Canal; and I do not intend in the police work that I will have to do in connection with the new insurrection any longer to do for her work which is not merely profitless but brings no gratitude. Any interference I undertake now will be in the interest of the United States and of the people of the Panama Isthmus themselves."¹¹ Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt compared the Colombian Government to hold-up men: "In its essence, what has happened is that Colombia tried to hold up the United States, and that the United States has taken away its gun."¹² And to justify the action taken against Colombia to prevent the Panama Canal from being obstructed, he emphasized the U. S. mandate from "collective civilization" in his January 4, 1904 Special Message to Congress.¹³

President Roosevelt further believed in what he called the Jackson-Lincoln Theory of the Presidency, that occasionally great national crises arise calling for immediate and vigorous action under which the President must act as the steward of the people.¹⁴ He asserted that where swift action

was required, the Executive and not Congress must decide,¹⁵ and in the instance of the Panama Revolution he claimed: "The vital work, getting Panama as an independent republic, on which all else hinged, was done by me without the aid or advice of anyone, save in so far as they carried out my instructions; and without the knowledge of anyone."¹⁶

In addition Theodore Roosevelt was influenced by strong feelings of nationalism, his conviction that his country could never act wrongly or unjustly,¹⁷ his impatience to achieve that which he considered important,¹⁸ his eagerness to see work begun on the Canal before he left office,¹⁹ and his desire to start the Canal to help impress the American people that he was entitled to be President in his own right.²⁰

Theodore Roosevelt was furthermore influenced by the Navalism and security interests of Alfred T. Mahan and by the economic expansionism of Brooks Adams, writing reviews of publications by both men.²¹ In his Special Message of January 4, 1904, in which he defended his Panama actions, President Roosevelt explained: "In all the range of our international relations, I do not hesitate to affirm that there is nothing of greater or more pressing importance than the construction of an interoceanic canal. Long acknowledged to be essential to our commercial development, it has become, as the result of the recent extension of our territorial dominion, more than ever essential to our national self-defense."²²

Roosevelt's Canal diplomacy set up the final doctrine of primacy of the interests of the United States in the Caribbean. Paramount interest ultimately became represented by the phrase "the defense of the Panama Canal,"²³ with this special "Canal policy" denying to foreign powers the control of the Canal or the approaches to it.²⁴

This policy was closely linked to the Roosevelt Corollary doctrine of instability in Latin American lands justifying U. S. intervention. President Roosevelt emphasized the connection in a speech in 1905:

The digging of the canal will, of course, greatly increase our interest in the Caribbean Sea. It will be our duty to police the canal, both in the interest of other nations and in our own interest. To do this it is, of course, indispensable to have an efficient navy..., and also to possess, as we already possess, certain strategic points to control the approach to the canal. In addition it is urgently necessary that the insular and continental countries within or bordering upon the Caribbean Sea should be able to secure fair dealing and orderly liberty within their own borders.²⁵

He went on to state that the United States had no purpose of aggression upon any republic, "only in the last resort, it may occasionally be necessary to interfere by exercising what is virtually an international police power, if

only to avoid seeing some European power forced to exercise it."²⁶

Furthermore the completion of the Panama Canal following the Panama Revolution transformed the Caribbean into a great commercial and investing centre.²⁷

A large and vocal minority objected to the means used to gain the Canal Zone and the Panama Canal, although the majority of the people in the United States acquiesced to the means and accepted the results.

The Anti-Imperialists had always especially emphasized that imperialism was morally wrong; their concern was with the morality and justice of American policies; and this moral integrity was their special strength.²⁸ This was all the more true after the election of 1900 when Anti-Imperialism declined in political importance but continued as a moral issue.²⁹

The Panama issue gave special room for this emphasis, whether it was an Anti-Imperialist like Moorfield Storey protesting against the moral wrong,³⁰ or a politician like Henry Moore Teller "thundering warnings like a national Jeremiah...."³¹ Particularly denounced was the doctrine that the "end justifies the means." The *Springfield Republican* bemoaned the fact that: "The feeling that 'everybody wants a canal' has swept aside opposition and has overpowered the scruples of conscience."³² It noted that: "Some of the defenders of the Panama raid are saying that posterity will applaud because 'posterity will view the completed canal.' This is a kind of appeal to future generations that is not at all flattering to those who come after us. For the assumption is that posterity will care nothing for the means employed to accomplish so splendid an end."³³

Public Opinion concluded that "No one can deny that the majority opinion of the country approves the course of the administration, little as this course can be justified on moral grounds....The sum of public opinion in this matter being simply that we want an isthmian canal above all things, and that the government has taken the surest means of attaining this object."³⁴ Henry Litchfield West, a defender of the Panama action, explained it this way: "The fact is that the revolution in Panama, whereby a new republic was created, whether or not conceived in this country, was a step necessary to the inauguration of the canal enterprise, and as such has been accepted by the American people."³⁵ West continued: "It may not argue a high standard of conscience to say that when the American people want something of real value, they do not care how, when, or where it is obtained; and yet the popular acquiescence in the Panama episode would seem to indicate that such is the fact."³⁶

Some critics accused Theodore Roosevelt of not relating personal morals to national morals, with even *The Nation* praising "the President's absolute personal honesty, his courage, his independence, his many manly

qualities...."³⁷

On the party-political level the Democrats continued their criticism of "Republican" imperialism, a theme which they had emphasized since 1898 and even earlier. However, while the Republicans remained fairly solid in their defense of the Panama issue, the Democrats were divided between accepting or rejecting the fruits of a wrong policy, with some even accepting the policy itself while most totally rejected it.

Republican broker and editor George Lyon, Jr. stated that he would bow to the inevitable although he was "hardly in sympathy with our actions in Panama."³⁸ Editor Whitelaw Reid, author of *Problems of Expansion*, published in New York in 1900, represents the other extreme of Republican opinion, writing to President Roosevelt on November 9, 1903: "It looks as if your Panama coup would be overwhelmingly successful. It is obviously the right thing for the country, which, according to my notion, as you know, has the right to assert its paramount authority at any rate, in any great emergency, any where in the Caribbean Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. That, now-a-days, is the chief use of the Monroe Doctrine."³⁹

While Democratic Senator Arthur Pue Gorman could accuse the Roosevelt Administration of committing "the most flagrant action by the Executive Department that has ever taken place in the Government,"⁴⁰ Southern Democrat W. G. McAdoo could write to President Roosevelt strongly commending his Panama policy: "I am gratified by your sound, vigorous and patriotic treatment of this question and I am ashamed of the high-bound partisanship which impels some of our Democrats, and all of our Pharisees, to oppose you."⁴¹

Regional and economic interests also help to explain why a majority accepted the Panama events despite the objections of a vocal minority. All sections of the United States would benefit from the trans-Isthmian Canal, although in different ways; yet the Democratic-dominated South in particular believed it had the most to gain. Some Southerners even saw the Canal as bringing economic salvation to the South, and an opportunity to catch up with the North. While the majority of Democratic Southerners criticized the means used to gain the Panama Canal, enough of them were willing to overlook both this and their preference for the Nicaragua route to help ensure the success of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.

It was believed that through a trans-Isthmian Canal the manufactured products of the Northeast would gain access to the markets of the Pacific Coast of the United States and South America, and the ability to compete in the export market to Asia.⁴² The Pacific slope, which strongly urged the Canal, would benefit by access to the manufacturing areas of the United States and Europe for its agricultural, mining, and forestry products, as well as through increased population and the eventual development of its

own manufacturing.⁴³ The South would benefit from an immensely shortened route to Asia for its cotton, wider markets for its coal and other mining products, the development of its own manufacturing, the development of its seaports as the region became a vital crossroads of world trade, and by the shifting of internal trade patterns to North-South lines from the present East-West dominance.⁴⁴

While people like President Roosevelt stressed that all sections of the United States would greatly benefit from the trans-Isthmian Canal, with the Gulf and South Atlantic and Pacific Coast benefitting most,⁴⁵ the greatest disagreement came over the effect of the Canal upon inland areas of the Mid-West and West. George L. Fox chided Representative Hitt of Illinois and Senator Foraker of Ohio for being the two chief apologists for Theodore Roosevelt's dishonor, yet "it is hard to name two states which will receive less benefit than these from the Isthmian Canal."⁴⁶ He claimed that citizens west of the Alleghenies, east of the Rockies, and north of the Ohio and Missouri "are to be robbed under the form of taxation for the possible benefit of the Seaboard States, the west coast of South America and Europe. They are great grain-producing states, and crossed by great railroads, with which the Isthmian Canal will compete for the benefit of European shipowners."⁴⁷

However Emory R. Johnson stated that no other part of the United States would gain as much as the states about the Great Lakes and in the upper Mississippi Valley. He foresaw this area with the most varied industrial activity, great agricultural production, immense quantities of lumber, coal fields, and the richest iron mines in the country, being connected by waterways to the Mississippi River. Chicago and other Lake ports would benefit most, but also cities like St. Paul and Minneapolis, and he asserted that the people of Chicago were "well aware of the value" of the Canal to them. Furthermore the Canal would develop the region on both sides of the Rocky Mountains, increase total trade and develop higher grades of traffic, all to the benefit of the anti-Canal transcontinental Railroads.⁴⁸ Charles M. Harvey agreed that the upper Mississippi River area would benefit as well as the lower Mississippi region, naming such centers as Chicago, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Omaha, St. Paul, Kansas City and St. Louis; and claiming that the great interior Railroad centers like Indianapolis, Wichita, and Denver would also benefit: "The railroads will be benefited even more promptly and more powerfully than the rivers."⁴⁹

S. A. Thompson noted that the Walker Commission had found a practically unanimous opinion among Railway officials between the Mississippi River and the Atlantic that the trans-Isthmian Canal would be beneficial to them, but that no such agreement was found among the managers of the lines west of the Mississippi. Thus many of the latter,

Thompson says, had striven by every available means to prevent or delay at the utmost the legislation necessary for the construction of the Canal. But in his opinion, while all portions of the United States would benefit, the Railroads of the Western states would benefit the most. The transportation trinity of local roads, continental railroads, and world-wide waterways would complement each other.⁵⁰

Archibald R. Colquhoun believed that the Railroad trust monopolies had greatly hampered the development of the Western states, checking desirable immigration and the settlement of a working agricultural class, due to the expense and difficulty of conveying produce to the great markets of the world. But he felt that the Canal, which they opposed, would not only bring cheaper freight rates but conduce to increased business and new markets for the Railroad's themselves.⁵¹

President Roosevelt stated in Denver, Colorado, May 9, 1905, that "when the canal comes into operation I think it will have a very important regulatory effect in connection with the transcontinental commerce of the great railroads. I think when such is the case those great railroads will have to revise their way of looking at the interests of certain inland cities."⁵²

While Western Railroad promoter C. P. Huntington stated the Railroad officials' economic case against a Nicaragua Canal in an address before the Galveston Chamber of Commerce on March 16, 1900,⁵³ his fellow collector of Western Railroads, Edward Harriman, indicated in 1901 that he was not averse to a Panama Canal,⁵⁴ and Emory R. Johnson found by 1902 that "anything like a united opposition to the canal project on the part of railway officials" had ended sometime before.⁵⁵ There were, however, some who thought that "the Pacific Railroad Ring throws its weight for the Panama job for the reason that it is the best thing they can do to stave off the construction of an Isthmian canal for years to come."⁵⁶

The *Railway World* of Philadelphia denied the repeated charges that the transcontinental Railroads had been blocking the Isthmian Canal project, saying that these charges "have never had any substantial basis in fact," but have been the product of "very fertile imaginations." It predicted that the short-haul business of the trans-continental Railroads would increase after the construction of the Panama Canal, carrying goods from interior points to the seabords for transportation through the Canal.⁵⁷ In 1926 the president of the Illinois Central Railway, Charles H. Markham, wrote that latitudinal trans-continental transportation was suffering from Panama Canal competition, but that new traffic had develop to and from the Panama Canal over the longitudinal lines.⁵⁸

The popularity of the trans-Isthmian Canal in the 1890s and into the 1900s throughout the United States is shown by resolutions, memorials, petitions, and utterances by state legislatures;⁵⁹ Chamber's of

Commerce;⁶⁰ local Board's of Trade;⁶¹ Canal conventions;⁶² the National Board of Trade;⁶³ the National Association of Manufacturers;⁶⁴ and by state political platforms and state conventions.⁶⁵



Very few historians join William Roscoe Thayer, Wolf von Schierbrand, and Robert A. Friedlander in their defense of the actions of the Roosevelt Administration on the Isthmus of Panama.⁶⁶

Samuel Flagg Bemis concludes that the "intervention of 1903 is the one really black mark in the Latin American policy of the United States, and a great big black mark, too."⁶⁷ Dexter Perkins calls it "an episode which is not the most satisfying to Americans who wish to see their country observe the highest standards of international conduct."⁶⁸

In the opinion of Foster Rhea Dulles the "whole episode shows Roosevelt at his worst. Here was the impetuous, unthinking jingo demanding action, at whatever cost, and then attempting to cover his unjustified impatience with a cloak of specious morality."⁶⁹ "There was a reckless irresponsibility about his policy of taking over the Panama Canal Zone."⁷⁰ Howard C. Hill states that "Panama is the first instance of the swinging of the Big Stick in international affairs."⁷¹

William H. Harbaugh concludes that: "In 1903 Roosevelt's driving ambitions and his belief that inferior nations should not be permitted to retard the advance of civilization combined to prompt him to acquire the Panama Canal Zone under circumstances that left a legacy of ill-will."⁷² Dana G. Munro expresses his view that "there are probably few North Americans today who would attempt to defend the way in which the President, to use his own words, 'took the Canal Zone.'⁷³

J. Fred Rippy declares that the "operations of the war vessels of the United States in the Panama area in November, 1903, was an instance of imperialism if there ever has been such a thing as imperialism...."⁷⁴ In the view of Henry F. Pringle the "true story of Panama is an irrefutable answer to Roosevelt's repeated contention that his dealings with Colombia were honorable or justified by law."⁷⁵

Elmer Ellis explains: "That the country and Congress were eager to accept this affront to international decency can only be accounted for by a fairly wide acceptance of the high-flown imperialism of Mahan and Beveridge, and by the effective way in which President Roosevelt stated the issue as a choice between the highly popular isthmian canal or submission to 'inefficient bandits.'⁷⁶

William Franklin Sands asserts that: "In the creation of Panama, as in the annexation of Hawaii, we had offered a ready-made politico-diplomatic pattern for Japanese expansion. That same pattern was later to be

discernible in the seizure of Ethiopia and in the taking of Austria and the Sudetenland.”⁷⁷ Miles P. DuVal, Jr. claims that “Roosevelt’s impulsive diplomatic intervention, done under the impetus of the westward expansion of the United States into the Pacific, was an event of far-reaching consequences. It had wide repercussions in Latin America and did not escape notice by Japan.”⁷⁸ And Matthew Josephson notes that: “Probably nothing impressed ‘Tsar Rooseveltoff’s’ fellow monarchs more deeply than the swift, forthright manner in which he rubbed out large obstacles barring the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone by the American government.”⁷⁹

Among the points stressed by these and many other historians are the guarantees of and precedents under the Treaty of 1846;⁸⁰ the fact that the Treaty of 1846 had never been interpreted before 1903 as conferring upon the United States a construction servitude;⁸¹ and that due to the many options open to President Roosevelt, including the Nicaragua route or continued negotiations with Colombia, neither the safety of the United States nor the interests of civilization were at stake.⁸² E. Taylor Parks, who gives the most complete point by point refutation of the Roosevelt Administration’s defense in a chapter entitled “A Case in International Morality,”⁸³ concludes that: “Of all of Roosevelt’s *ex post facto* logic his ‘collective civilization’ argument is probably the most far-fetched and erroneous. It assumes the existence of a doctrine of international eminent domain (in truth non-existent)....”⁸⁴

That the United States guaranteed the success of the Panama Revolution by its intervention is hardly a disputable point among historians; one debatable area, however, is the extent to which the Roosevelt Administration directly encouraged the Revolution before it was carried out.

Historians state that Washington actively encouraged the Revolution,⁸⁵ that Roosevelt “tacitly encouraged” the revolt in Panama,⁸⁶ that the United States “fomented a revolution in Panama,”⁸⁷ that the United States aided and protected the Revolution,⁸⁸ that “covert encouragement was given by the Roosevelt administration to revolution on the Isthmus” but that it did not instigate the Revolution,⁸⁹ that Roosevelt “acquired the Panama Canal by shielding and perhaps indirectly fomenting the secession of Panama,”⁹⁰ that there is no evidence of a deliberate “master strategy” conceived and directed by the President’s office,⁹¹ that the charge that the Washington Government was in a direct sense responsible for the uprising in Panama is not sustained by the evidence,⁹² or that there is no evidence high Government officials conspired although they did nothing to discourage the Revolution.⁹³

Dana G. Munro points out that the charges that Theodore Roosevelt instigated or helped plan the Panama Revolution are probably unfounded,

but that the difference between what Roosevelt denied doing (fomenting the Revolution) and what he admittedly did, does not seem so great as it apparently did to him. It is clear, Munro continues, that the President and Secretary Hay tacitly encouraged Philippe Bunau-Varilla, if only by receiving him and permitting him to discuss his plans.⁹⁴ Nicholas Roosevelt says about the meeting of President Roosevelt and Bunau-Varilla: "Nothing definite was said, but I am sure that each knew what the other had in mind."⁹⁵ William Roscoe Thayer writes: "Many years later I discussed the transaction with Mr. Roosevelt, chaffing him with being a wicked conspirator. He laughed, and replied: 'What was the use? The other fellows in Paris and New York had taken all the risk and were doing all the work. Instead of trying to run a parallel conspiracy, I had only to sit still and profit by their plot--if it succeeded.' "⁹⁶

Introduction

- 1 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 1502 (February 2, 1904); pp. 1661-1662 (February 5, 1904); p. 135 (December 11, 1903); p. 427 (January 4, 1904); p. 2137 (February 20, 1904); pp. 1460-1462 (February 1, 1904).
- 2 *Ibid.*, pp. 1766-1770 (February 9, 1904); p. 704 (January 13, 1904); p. 2206 (February 22, 1904); etc.
- 3 *Ibid.*, parts 1, 2, and 3.
- 4 For the Senate debate in 1921 see U. S., *Congressional Record*, 67th Congress, Special Session and 1st Session, LXI: 1921, pp. 75-491.

Chapter I: Historical Background

- 1 Samuel Eliot Morison, *The European Discovery of America: The Southern Voyages, 1492-1616*, New York, 1974, pp. 245-46, 200-203; Walter LaFeber, *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective*, New York, 1978, p. 3.
- 2 Sheldon B. Liss, *The Canal: Aspects of United States-Panamanian Relations*, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1967, p. 11.
- 3 Laurence O. Ealy, *Yanqui Politics and the Isthmian Canal*, University Park, Pennsylvania State Un., 1971, p. 5; Morison, *The European Discovery*, pp. 600-601.
- 4 LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, pp. 4-5; Gerstle Mack, *The Land Divided: A History of the Panama Canal and Other Isthmian Canal Projects*, New York, 1944, pp. 40-46.
- 5 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 5; Mack, *The Land Divided*, pp. 46 ff.
- 6 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 6-7. An English version of this treatise was first published in 1922: Pierre-André Gargáz, *A Project of Universal and Perpetual Peace*, ed. and trans. George S. Eddy, New York, 1922.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 8 Alexander von Humboldt, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*. I. Lexington, Kentucky, 1957, pp. 16-47. Originally 1808?
- 9 Liss, *The Canal*, p. 12; LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 9.
- 10 Henry Steele Commager (ed.), *Documents of American History*. I. New York, 1968, p. 244.
- 11 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 10; E. Taylor Parks, *Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934*, New York, 1968, pp. 3-8; William D. McCain, *The United States and the Republic of Panama*, New York, 1970, p. 7; Liss, *The Canal*, p. 13.
- 12 Commager, *Documents of American History*, I, pp. 244-45.
- 13 John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, Washington, 1906, p. 2.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 15 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, pp. 187-88; Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, pp. 3-4.
- 16 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, pp. 189+197.
- 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 198-201.
- 18 Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, pp. 5-10.
- 19 William M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909*, I, Washington, 1910, pp. 312-13; Senate Doc. No. 357, 61st Congress, 2d Session.
- 20 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 1116-1117 (January 25, 1904).

- 21 Senate Doc. 474, 63rd Congress, 2d Session (1913-1914): *Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal*, pp. 272-73.
- 22 David McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914*, New York, 1977, p. 35; Fessenden Nott Otis, *Illustrated History of the Panama Railroad*, New York, 1971, pp. 16-22, 46-52. Originally 1862; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 27; LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 12.
- 23 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, p. 36.
- 24 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 33-34; Liss, *The Canal*, pp. 14-15.
- 25 Jackson Crowell, "The United States and a Central American Canal, 1869-1877," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 49 (February, 1969), pp. 27-28, 37-38; McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 19-28; Liss, *The Canal*, p. 15. The advantages of the Nicaragua route over the Panama route according to President Grant were: the economy by which it could be constructed--under \$ 100,000,000 as compared to at least \$ 400,000,000 for Panama; it cut 500 more miles off the distance between New York and the West Coast than the Panama route; its admirable approaches from both west and east; it did not require the creation of an artificial lake to control flooding caused by heavy rainfall as at Panama (especially on the Chagres River); it did not require the tunneling or open cuts necessary at Panama; and it did not have Panama's unhealthy impassable swamps. Ulysses S. Grant, "The Nicaragua Canal," *North American Review*, 132 (February, 1881), pp. 110-12.
- 26 Crowell, "The United States and a Central American Canal, 1869-1877," pp. 33-39, 42-45, 50-51.
- 27 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58 th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 1132-1133 (January 25, 1904).
- 28 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 101-02, 127-31, 135-36. The French had also tried until near the very end to build a sea-level canal instead of a lock canal.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp. 203, 240, 235; U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 1132, 1134 (January 25, 1904).
- 30 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 35-37.
- 31 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 204-34; Mack, *The Land Divided*, pp. 397-404.
- 32 Quoted in Norman J. Padelford, *The Panama Canal in Peace and War*, New York, 1942, p. 12.
- 33 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 1134-1136 (January 25, 1904).
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 1118 (January 25, 1904); Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 37-38, 40; Paul J. Scheips, "United States Commercial Pressures for a Nicaragua Canal in the 1890s," *The Americas*, 20 (April, 1964), p. 334.
- 35 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 254-55.
- 36 Quoted in Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in Imperialism*, New York, 1925, p. 263.
- 37 Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation*, New York, 1967, p. 143.
- 38 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 44-47; Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, pp. 385-86.
- 39 Hay to McKinley, March 13, 1900, and McKinley to Hay, March 13, 1900, in William Roscoe Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, II, Boston, 1915, pp. 226-28.
- 40 Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts*, pp. 782-83.

- 41 Philippe Bunau-Varilla stated the case for the Panama route in *Comparative Characteristics of Panama and Nicaragua*, New York, June 2, 1902: Canal sailing time--Panama 12 hours, Nicaragua 33 hours; sailing time between terminals--Panama 21 hours, Nicaragua 64 and 1/2 hours; excavation--Panama 94,863, 703 cubic yards, Nicaragua 227,711,605 cubics yards; depth of great cuts--Panama 103 feet, Nicaragua 297 feet; locks--Panama 2 double and 1 single, Nicaragua 8; length of canal navigation after deduction for lakes--Panama 42.09 miles, Nicaragua 141.88 miles; radius of sharpest curves--Panama 8,202 ft, Nicaragua 4,045 ft. Senator John T. Morgan, the chief advocate for a Nicaragua route for many years, summed up the case for Nicaragua (McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 261-63): Nicaragua was closer to U. S. ports than Panama; Nicaragua offered the lowest pass anywhere from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego; it had 50-odd miles of lakes and perhaps as much as 60 miles of navigable river; Lake Nicaragua offered a limitless amount of water at the summit level of the canal; Nicaragua was politically stable, relatively free from disease unlike Panama, and had a great potential for development; it would be a fresh start without the scandals connected with the Panama route. Morgan also saw a Canal as restoring prosperity to the South, as it would be 700-800 miles closer to the Gulf ports than to New York or Boston.
- 42 William Cromwell, quoted in Arthur H. Dean, *William Nelson Cromwell, 1854-1948: An American Pioneer in Corporation, Comparative and International Law*, New York, 1957, p. 131.
- 43 Senate Doc. No. 54, 57th Congress, 1st Session (1901-1902): *Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission, 1899-1901*, pp. 1, 3, 9, 263.
- 44 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 53.
- 45 Senate Doc. No. 123, 57th Congress, 1st Session (1901-1902): *(Supplementary) Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission*, pp. 1, 3, 9-10.
- 46 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 2024 (February 18, 1904).
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 1136 (January 25, 1904).
- 48 *Ibid.*
- 49 Dean, *William Nelson Cromwell*, pp. 129 + 131. Claims that Cromwell paid \$ 60,000 to the Republican National Campaign in 1900 to help determine Hanna's position in favor of Panama are based on testimony by Henry N. Hall of the New York *World*, but Hall named Philippe Bunau-Varilla as his source. (House Report No. 32, 62d Congress, 2d Session: *The Story of Panama: Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives*, Washington, 1913, p. 158). Bunau-Varilla said categorically: "I never thought, and therefore never said, such a thing." (Bunau-Varilla, quoted in Julius W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire*, New York, 1951, p. 96.)
- 50 Dean, *William Nelson Cromwell*, pp. 136-37.
- 51 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 162-63, 180-81, 277.
- 52 Charles D. Ameringer, "The Panama Canal Lobby of Philippe Bunau-Varilla and William Nelson Cromwell," *American Historical Review*, 68 (January, 1963), p. 347. According to Maron J. Simon, *The Panama Affair*, New York, 1971, p. 247, the contracting firm of Artigue, Sonderegger, Bunau-Varilla et Cie., started by

- Philippe and his brother Maurice along with two others to dig at the Culebra Cut in Panama, became a stockholder in the New Panama Canal Company, buying 2,200,000 francs worth of shares. Ameringer, p. 348, also mentions this. Many other historians state that Bunau-Varilla was a shareholder in the New Panama Canal Company; for example Dean, *William Nelson Cromwell*, p. 140. And testimony before the Committee on Inter-oceanic Canals listed the firm of Artigue, Sonderegger et Cie. as subscribing to 2,200,000 francs of stocks in the New Panama Canal Company out of the 60,000,000 sold. (U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 1449 (February 1, 1904.)) However Bunau-Varilla was reported in the press as denying that he was a stockholder. (Lincoln, *Nebraska State Journal*, November 13, 1903, p. 6.)
- 53 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *Panama: The Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection*, London, 1913, pp. 146-51.
- 54 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *From Panama to Verdun: My Fight for France*, pp. 96-100 in a typewritten manuscript in the Bunau-Varilla papers, Library of Congress, Box 15.
- 55 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 306 + 315; Dwight Carroll Miner, *The Fight for the Panama Route: The Story of the Spooner Act and the Hay-Herrán Treaty*, New York, 1940, p. 146; Senate Doc. No. 253, 57th Congress, 1st Session (1901-1902): *Hearings before the Senate Committee on Inter-oceanic Canals*, parts 1, 2, and 3; Herbert Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work*, New York, 1912, p. 380.
- 56 Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna*, pp. 376-83; McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 316, 318-23.
- 57 Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna*, p. 384.
- 58 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *Panama: The Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection*, p. 247; Bunau-Varilla papers, Library of Congress, Box 4. The latter contains one of the stamps, with the accompanying inscriptions.
- 59 Miner, *The Fight for the Panama Route*, pp. 154-55; Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna*, pp. 384-85.
- 60 Miner, *The Fight for the Panama Route*, p. 156.
- 61 Senate Doc. No. 474, 63rd Congress, 2d Session (1913-1914): *Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal*, pp. 277-88. The negotiations between Hay and Martínez Silva, José Vicente Concha, and then Tomás Herrán are described in Miles P. DuVal, Jr., *Cadiz to Cathay: The Story of the Long Struggle for a Waterway Across the American Isthmus*, Stanford, 1940, pp. 170-206.
- 62 Hay to Herrán, January 22, 1903 quoted in DuVal, *Cadiz to Cathay*, p. 204.
- 63 DuVal, *Cadiz to Cathay*, p. 205.
- 64 *Ibid.*, pp. 208-11. The key amendment, dealing with the defense of the canal, was defeated 46-24.
- 65 Mr. Beaupré, U. S. consul at Bogotá, to Secretary of State John Hay, May 4, 1903, Senate Doc. No. 51, 58th Congress, 2d Session (1903-1904): *Correspondence Concerning the Convention Between the United States and Colombia for the Construction of an Inter-oceanic Canal Across the Isthmus of Panama*, p. 15.
- 66 Beaupré to Hay, July 9, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 35.
- 67 Beaupré to Hay, September 30, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 77. The argument used was that the extension had been made by the President while the Constitution was not in force during civil war, without the approval of Congress. (U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 2024 (February 18, 1904).)
- 68 Beaupré to Hay, May 4, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 15.
- 69 Beaupré to Hay, August 5, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 45.

- 70 Hay to Beaupré, June 9, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 18. The reaction of Colombia to this threat is described in Beaupré to Hay, August 15, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 54; July 5, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 30.
- 71 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 1502 (February 2, 1904); Beaupré to Hay, October 17, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 1825 (February 10, 1904).
- 72 LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, pp. 23-24.
- 73 Roosevelt to Hay, in Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 567.
- 74 President Roosevelt in his Message to Congress, January 4, 1904, U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 419 (January 4, 1904).
- 75 President Roosevelt in *ibid.*, pp. 419-420.
- 76 President Roosevelt in *ibid.*, p. 420.
- 77 Beaupré to Hay, July 5, 1903, Senate Doc. No. 51, 58th Congress, 2d Session, (1903-1904): *Correspondence...United States and Colombia...*, p. 30.
- 78 Beaupré to Hay, September 11, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 65.
- 79 Beaupré to Hay, October 21, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 86.
- 80 President Roosevelt in his Message to Congress, January 4, 1904, U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 420-421 (January 4, 1904).
- 81 Baltimore *American*, December 21, 1903, as quoted in U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 1772-1773 (February 9, 1904); LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 31; McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 341-42; Charles D. Ameringer, "Philippe Bunau-Varilla: New Light on the Panama Canal Treaty," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 46 (February, 1966), p. 30.
- 82 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *Panama: The Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection*, p. 295-97.
- 83 *Ibid.*, pp. 310-12.
- 84 Roosevelt to Bigelow, January 6, 1904, in Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 689.
- 85 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *Panama: The Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection*, pp. 317-19. Hay also gave Bunau-Varilla a book, *Captain Macklin*, about an American soldier and a French general leading a revolutionary army in Honduras. See also William Roscoe Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, II, Boston, 1915, p. 316.
- 86 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *From Panama to Verdun*, pp. 156-68 in a typewritten manuscript in Bunau-Varilla papers, Library of Congress, Box 15; William D. McCain, *The United States and the Republic of Panama*, New York, 1970, p. 14; McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, p. 356.
- 87 President Roosevelt in his Message to Congress, January 4, 1904, U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 421 (January 4, 1904).
- 88 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 831 (January 18, 1904).
- 89 *Ibid.*
- 90 Loomis to Ehrman, November 3, 1903, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1903, Washington; Government Printing Office, 1904, p. 231.
- 91 Felix Ehrman to Hay, November 3, 1903, *ibid.*

- 92 Ehrman to Hay, November 3, 1903, *ibid.*
- 93 Oscar Malmros to Hay, November 3, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 235.
- 94 Malmros to Hay, November 3, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 236.
- 95 Loomis to Ehrman, November 3, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 231.
- 96 Loomis to Malmros, November 3, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 236.
- 97 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 365-76; Ehrman to Loomis, November 9, 1903, U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 1519 (February 2, 1904); Reports of Commander Hubbard November 5 and 8, 1903, *ibid.*, pp. 1516-1517 (February 2, 1904).
- 98 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 805 (January 15, 1904).
- 99 Hay to Ehrman, November 6, 1903, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1903*, p. 233.
- 100 November 6, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 234. Italics mine. This was likely Colombia's first knowledge that there had been a revolution. Panama was isolated from Bogotá by jungle and mountains, and the only way Colombia could now put down the revolution was by sending troops by sea--but this route was effectively blocked by the U. S. Navy.
- 101 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 390-97; Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *Panama: The Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection*, pp. 377-86. The cable to de la Espriella is on page 384 of Bunau-Varilla's book.
- 102 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 1460-1462 (February 1, 1904).

Chapter II: The Canal Zone and Imperialism

- 1 The word imperialism will be used to describe intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, whether for economic or other reasons, and whether for the actual acquisition of territory or not.
- 2 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 703 (January 13, 1904).
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 709.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 871 (January 19, 1904).
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 962 (January 21, 1904).
- 6 William D. McCain, *The United States and the Republic of Panama*, New York, 1970, p. 18.
- 7 William Appleman Williams, *The Contours of American History*, London, 1961, pp. 416-17.
- 8 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 1766 (February 9, 1904). The American vice-consul in Panama City, Felix Ehrman, participated in meetings at which the revolution was planned. (Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 60.)
- 9 Alfred Thayer Mahan, "A Twentieth-Century Outlook," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, September, 1897, in Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, London, 1898, pp. 260-61.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 261.
- 11 Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Isthmus and Sea Power," *Atlantic Monthly*, 72 (October, 1893) in *ibid.*, p. 98.
- 12 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political*, Port Washington, New York, 1968, p. 34. Originally 1902.

- 13 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, London, 1890, p. 88.
- 14 Quoted in LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 17.
- 15 Brooks Adams, *America's Economic Supremacy*, New York, 1900, p. 84.
- 16 Josiah Strong, *Expansion Under New World-Conditions*, New York, 1900, p. 149.
- 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 156-57.
- 18 Frederick J. Turner, "The Problem of the West," *Atlantic Monthly*, 78 (September, 1896), p. 296.
- 19 Quoted in Rubin Francis Weston, *Racism in U. S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946*, Columbia, South Carolina, 1972, pp. 45-46.
- 20 Quoted in LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 17.
- 21 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Lodge, October 27, 1894, in Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), *Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, I, New York, 1925, p. 139.
- 22 Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life," Speech before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses*, London, 1903, p. 9.
- 23 William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1947, p. 113. Roosevelt's reviews of Mahan's works are found in *Atlantic Monthly*, LXVI (October, 1890), pp. 563-67; *ibid.*, LXXI (April, 1893), pp. 556-59; *Political Science Quarterly*, IX (March, 1894), pp. 171-73; *Bookman*, V (June, 1897), pp. 331-34.
- 24 Göran Rystad, *Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics at the Turn of the Century*, Lund, Sweden, 1975, pp. 27-28 and footnote pp. 313-14.
- 25 Gordon K. Lewis, "The Rise of the American Mediterranean," *Studies on the Left*, 2, no. 2 (1961), p. 49-50.
- 26 President Roosevelt in his Message to Congress, January 4, 1904, U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 418-419 (January 4, 1904). (Roosevelt quoted from Secretary of State Cass to Mr. Lamar, Minister to Central America, July 25, 1858. Cass' letter is found in John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, Washington, 1906, pp. 4-5).
- 27 President Roosevelt in *ibid.*, p. 419.
- 28 President Roosevelt in *ibid.*, p. 424.
- 29 McCain, *The United States and the Republic of Panama*, p.x.
- 30 McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, p. 250.

Chapter III: The Press and the Panama Issue: The Attackers

- 1 Philadelphia *Record*, Nov. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 2 Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, Nov. 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 1903, p. 8.
- 3 New York *Times*, Nov. 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 24, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 8, 9, 15, 22, 23, 1903, p. 6; Dec. 8, 19, 1903, p. 8.
- 4 New York *American*, Nov. 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 24, 1903, p. 16.
- 5 New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 12, 17, 18, 23, 1903, p. 6.
- 6 Pittsburgh *Post*, Nov. 7, 14, 17, 19, 26, 27, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6, 1st section.
- 7 Pittsburgh *Dispatch*, Nov. 8, 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 8 Wilmington *Every Evening*, Nov. 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 1903, p. 4.

- 9 Washington *Post*, Nov. 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 26, 28, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6, 2d section.
- 10 Baltimore *Sun*, Nov. 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 11 Baltimore *News*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690.
- 12 New York *Staats Zeitung*, quoted in Albany *Evening Journal*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 13 Springfield *Daily Republican*, Nov. 7, 14, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20, 23, 27, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6 (*Sunday Republican*).
- 14 Boston *Post*, Nov. 7, 9, 17, 18, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 10.
- 15 New Haven *Evening Register*, Nov. 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 1903, p. 6.
- 16 Manchester *Union*, Nov. 7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 17 Seattle *Daily Times*, Nov. 12, 18, 28, 1903, p.6; Nov. 15, 22, 1903, p. 6 (*Sunday Times*).
- 18 Portland *Daily Journal*, Nov. 12, 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 19 San Francisco *Examiner*, Nov. 7, 11, 12, 24, 27, 1903, p. 16; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 14.
- 20 Denver *Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4. It began by stating that an Isthmian Canal was "a very popular project in the South and West," which was now dependent upon a treaty with Panama, so the sovereignty claims of Colombia should not be tolerated and Theodore Roosevelt must not be timid (*ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4.); but then it switched to attack.
- 21 Helena *Independent*, Nov. 9, 14, 17, 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 22 Tucson *Citizen*, Nov. 7, 16, 21, 23, 1903, p. 2.
- 23 Salt Lake *Herald*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), pp. 691-92.
- 24 Omaha *Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 25 Indianapolis *Sentinel*, Nov. 10, 14, 23, 27, 1903, p. 4; Dec. 2, 1903, p. 4. The *Sentinel*, which had said in latter August, 1903 that "it would be almost justifiable" to incite a revolution in Panama (*Literary Digest*, 27 (August 29, 1903), p. 246.), originally made statements favorable to U. S. action on the Isthmus (Indianapolis *Sentinel*, Nov. 4, 6, 1903, p. 4.), but soon switched to attack.
- 26 Milwaukee *Journal*, Nov. 13, 20, 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 27 Topeka *Daily Capital*, Nov. 13, 15, 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 28 Springfield, *Illinois State Register*, Nov. 15, 18, 21, 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 29 Chicago *Chronicle*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690; quoted in Springfield *Daily Republican*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6; and quoted in Helena *Independent*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 30 Chicago *American*, quoted in LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 39,
- 31 Chicago *Evening Post*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690.
- 32 St. Paul *Globe*, cited in Sioux Falls *Daily Argus Leader*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 10.
- 33 Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section; Nov. 17, 28, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 2.
- 34 Columbia *State*, Nov. 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 35 Memphis *Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 24, 1903, p.4.
- 36 Raleigh *News and Observer*, Nov. 7, 13, 17, 18, 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 37 Atlanta *Journal*, Nov. 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, edit. section. In its earliest reaction the *Journal* thought the people of the United States and of the world in general would show little disposition to condemn the Administration for countermining the Railroads. A Canal was wanted. (*ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 6.)
- 38 Wheeling *Register*, Nov. 24, 25, 30, 1903, p. 4. It started out by stating that there were no legal grounds upon which to fault-find the Administration (*ibid.*, Nov. 8, 9, 1903, p. 4.), but then changed to an attack upon the Administration.

- 39 Nashville *Banner*, Nov. 7, 12, 13, 14, 21, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 10, 11, 17, 19, 26, 27, 28, 1903, p. 4.
- 40 Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Times*); Nov. 9, 11, 12, 20, 23, 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 41 Wilmington *Morning Star*, Nov. 24, 28, 1903, p. 2.
- 42 Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4. In the beginning the *Times-Dispatch* did not want to pass judgment (*ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.), hoping that the suspicion that the United States was privy to the revolutionary movement was not justified as it would be wrong to help dismember a sister republic in order to get canal franchises (*ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4.); and feeling that U. S. involvement could not be "proved," (*ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.) although it had "suspicion, amounting almost to conviction" that "the revolution was instigated by our Government...." (*ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.) But then it was influenced by the conspiracy charges of the New York *Evening Post* and Philadelphia *Record*, and stated: "Of course we do not vouch for the truthfulness of this story. But having been told first by the New York *Evening Post* and subsequently by the Philadelphia *Record*, both very reliable newspapers, it is impossible not to attach some credence to it. It does, indeed, look as though the President and Mr. Hay gave countenance to the revolution and gave the conspirators to understand that if it succeeded, the new republic would be at once recognized and the snug sum of \$ 10,000,000 would be paid by the United States government as a reward." (*ibid.*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4.) The Administration would have to meet this charge and the sooner the better. (*ibid.*)
- 43 Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 1903, p. 4; Dec. 1, 1903, p. 4.
- 44 Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat*, Nov. 13, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 1903, p. 4.
- 45 Jackson *Weekly Clarion-Ledger*, Nov. 19, 26, 1903, p. 4.
- 46 Augusta *Chronicle*, Nov. 7, 13, 16, 21, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 29, 1903, p. 12.
- 47 New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, Nov. 10, 13, 19, 21, 25, 1903, p. 6. In its first reactions it accepted the independence of Panama as a "fait accompli" and predicted the annexation of Panama to the United States (*ibid.*, Nov. 7, 6, 11, 1903, p. 6.), but soon turned to attack.
- 48 Charleston *News and Courier*, Nov. 9, 11, 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 49 Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 17, 20, 26, 1903, p. 4.
- 50 Birmingham *Age-Herald*, Nov. 5, 7, 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 16.
- 51 Montgomery *Advertiser*, Nov. 8, 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 52 Houston *Post*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 12, 13, 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 53 Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman*, Nov. 10, 12, 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 54 Norfolk *Virginian-Pilot*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 691; quoted in Wilmington *Morning Star*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 2,
- 55 Savannah *Press*, quoted in Atlanta *Constitution*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6.
- 56 Selma *Times*, cited in Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 57 Nashville *News*, cited in *ibid.*
- 58 Memphis *News*, cited in *ibid.*
- 59 New York *Times*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 8.
- 60 Birmingham *Age-Herald*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 61 Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 62 Springfield *Daily Republican*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6. Similar statements to the above were made by the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, Nov. 8, 20, 1903, p. 8; Denver *Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6; New Haven *Evening Register*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; New York *American*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 16; Seattle *Daily Times*, Nov.

- 15, 1903, p. 6 (*Sunday Times*); Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Houston *Post*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 63 Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 8.
- 64 *Ibid.*
- 65 Denver *Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 66 Topeka *Daily Capital*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 67 Manchester *Union*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 68 Baltimore *Sun*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 69 Springfield, *Illinois State Register*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 70 Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 71 New York *American*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 16.
- 72 Milwaukee *Journal*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 73 Raleigh *News and Observer*, Nov. 17, 1903, p.4.
- 74 New York *Times*, Dec. 19, 1903, p. 8.
- 75 New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 23, 1903, p.6. Colombia's first protest was on November 8, 1903. See the New York *Times*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 17, 22, 1903, p. 2, on the protests.
- 76 Boston *Post*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Topeka *Daily Capital*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nashville *Banner*, Nov. 26, 17, 1903, p. 4; Charleston *News and Courier*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Wilmington (N. C.) *Morning Star*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 2; Little Rock, Arkansas *Gazette*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4; Seattle *Daily Times*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6 (*Sunday Times*); Wilmington (Del.) *Every Evening*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 77 Springfield *Daily Republican*, Nov. 9, 1903, p.6.
- 78 *Ibid.*
- 79 Springfield *Daily Republican*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 80 *Ibid.*
- 81 Denver *Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 82 *Ibid.*
- 83 Pittsburg *Post*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6, 1st section.
- 84 Baltimore News, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690.
- 85 Topeka *Daily Capital*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 86 Omaha *Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 87 Washington *Post*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6, 2d section.
- 88 Boston *Post*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 89 Philadelphia *Record*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 90 Charleston *News and Courier*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4,
- 91 *Ibid.*
- 92 Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 24, 1903, p.4.
- 93 Tucson *Citizen*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2.
- 94 Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 95 Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 96 New York *Times*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8; Wilmington (Del.) *Every Evening*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Montgomery *Advertiser*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4; Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 97 Nashville *Banner*, Nov. 10, 19, 1903, p.4.
- 98 New York *Times*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 8.
- 99 New York *Times*, Nov. 22, 1903, p. 6.
- 100 *Ibid.*
- 101 New York *Times*, Dec. 8, 1903, p. 8.

- 102 *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1903, p. 6.
- 103 *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 8.
- 104 *New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 105 *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 8.
- 106 *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1903, p. 6.
- 107 *Ibid.* The *Times* wrongly has 1895 instead of 1885.
- 108 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 109 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4.
- 110 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 111 *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 9, 1903, p.6.
- 112 *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 113 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 114 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4.
- 115 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 116 *Topeka Daily Capital*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 117 *Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 4. For other attacks on the Roosevelt Administration in regard to the Treaty of 1846 see the *Boston Post*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; *Seattle Daily Times*, Nov. 22, 1903, p. 6. (*Sunday Times*); *Denver Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; *Tucson Citizen*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 2; *Omaha Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; *Columbia State*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; *Nashville Banner*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; *Little Rock Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 118 *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8.
- 119 *New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6.
- 120 *New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 8.
- 121 *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8.
- 122 *Ibid.*
- 123 *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 124 *Salt Lake Herald*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), pp. 691-92.
- 125 *Birmingham Age-Herald*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 16.
- 126 *Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 127 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 128 *Ibid.*
- 129 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 130 *New Haven Evening Register*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 131 *New Haven Evening Register*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6.
- 132 *New Haven Evening Register*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 24, 1903, p. 6.
- 133 *Houston Post*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 134 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 135 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8.
- 136 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6 (*Sunday Republican*).
- 137 *Manchester Union*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6.
- 138 *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 139 *Helena Independent*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 140 *Chicago Chronicle*, quoted in *Helena Independent*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 141 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 8; *Wilmington (Del.) Every Evening*, Nov. 13, 16, 1903, p. 4; *Boston Post*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; *San Francisco Examiner*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 16; *Milwaukee Journal*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; *Wheeling Register*, Nov. 30, 1903, p. 4; *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6. The *Washington Post* saw no

parallel between Texas and Panama, as Texas fought its own battles against Mexico, set up and operated its own institutions, and had an independent state to offer when it asked for U. S. recognition--and even then the United States took six months to think it over; yet the *Post* felt no precedent was needed: "The thing is done and there's the end of it." (*Washington Post*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 6.)

- 142 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 143 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 144 *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 145 *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 8.
- 146 *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 8.
- 147 *New York American*, Nov. 24, 12, 11, 10, 9, 7, 5, 1903, p. 16; *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 20, 27, 1903, p. 6; *Jackson Weekly Clarion-Ledger*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; *Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 148 *Denver Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 149 *Chatanooga Daily Times*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Times*).
- 150 *New York American*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 16.
- 151 *New York Times*, Nov. 7, 11, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 9, 22, 23, 1903, p. 6.
- 152 *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 22, 1903, p. 6.
- 153 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 154 *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 155 *Jacksonville Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 156 *Tucson Citizen*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 2.
- 157 *Milwaukee Journal*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 158 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 159 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4. The doctrine of eminent domain allows a state to confiscate with compensation private property and land needed for the common good, for example for the building of a road through one's property.
- 160 *Ibid.*
- 161 *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 8. John Hay defended the Administration's course in a statement issued November 6, 1903. (*New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 1.)
- 162 *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 163 *Pittsburg Post*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 164 *Pittsburg Post*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 165 *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 8.
- 166 *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 167 *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 168 *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 169 *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 170 *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 171 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 172 *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4. Dr. Leander Starr Jameson invaded the South African Republic (*Transvaal*) on December 29, 1895 but was defeated by the Boers, surrendering on January 2, 1896. (William L. Langer (compiler and editor), *An Encyclopedia of World History*, Boston, 1952, pp. 856, 744.)
- 173 *Washington Post*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 174 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6. The U. S. Ministers were respectively Soule, Mason, and Buchanan. The Democratic Pierce Administration was in power at the time. Roosevelt, in his draft, recommended to Congress to give notice to Colombia that "we can no longer submit to trifling or insincere dealing on the part of those whom the accident of position has placed

in temporary control of the ground through which the route must pass;...and that if they fail to come to such agreement with us, we must forthwith take the matter into our own hands.” (Quoted in *ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6.)

- 175 Chicago *Chronicle*, quoted in *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 176 New York *Times*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6.
- 177 New Haven *Evening Register*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 178 Topeka *Daily Capital*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 179 New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 180 Nashville *Banner*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 181 Raleigh *News and Observer*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 182 Atlanta *Journal*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6.
- 183 Wheeling *Register*, Nov. 25, 24, 1903, p. 4--quote Nov. 24.
- 184 New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 185 Charleston *News and Courier*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 186 Wilmington *Every Evening*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 187 Springfield, *Illinois State Register*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 188 New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 189 Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 190 Columbia *State*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 191 Houston *Post*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 192 Boston *Post*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 193 New York *American*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 16; Pittsburg *Dispatch*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4; Boston *Post*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Manchester *Union*, Nov. 19, 21, 1903, p. 6; Helena *Independent*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Tucson *Citizen*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2; Omaha *Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Memphis *Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4; Wilmington (N. C.) *Morning Star*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 2; Jackson *Weekly Clarion-Ledger*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4. The New York *Times*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 8, said that the United States had fomented the separatist spirit; and the Washington *Post*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6, stated that it had at least not protested or discouraged the secession movement.
- 194 Norfolk *Virginian-Pilot*, quoted in Wilmington *Morning Star*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 2.
- 195 Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Times*).
- 196 Portland *Daily Journal*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 197 Springfield *Daily Republican*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8. See also Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6 (*Sunday Republican*).
- 198 Milwaukee *Journal*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6.
- 199 New York *Times*, Dec. 8, 1903, p. 8.
- 200 Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4.
- 201 Baltimore *Sun*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 202 New York *American*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 16.
- 203 Philadelphia *Record*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 204 Washington *Post*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6.
- 205 Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 206 Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 207 Philadelphia *Record*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4.
- 208 Raleigh *News and Observer*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 209 New Haven *Evening Register*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 210 Milwaukee *Journal*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 211 New York *Times*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 8. See also Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8.
- 212 Baltimore *Sun*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 213 Springfield *Daily Republican*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.

- 214 *Manchester Union*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 215 *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 216 *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 217 *Augusta Chronicle*, Nov. 29, 1903, p. 12. Recognition of Panama took place on the following dates, in 1903: France Nov. 16, China Nov. 26, Austro-Hungary Nov. 27, Germany Nov. 30, Denmark Dec. 3, Russia Dec. 6, Sweden and Norway Dec. 7, Belgium Dec. 9, Nicaragua Dec. 15, Peru Dec. 19, Cuba Dec. 23, Great Britain Dec. 24, Italy Dec. 24, Japan Dec. 28, Costa Rica Dec. 28, Switzerland Dec. 28. (U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 471 (January 5, 1904).)
- 218 *Pittsburg Dispatch*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 219 *Ibid.*
- 220 *Little Rock, Arkansas Democrat*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 221 *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 8.
- 222 *New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 8.
- 223 *Little Rock, Arkansas Democrat*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 224 *Augusta Chronicle*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 225 *Augusta Chronicle*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 226 *Charleston News and Courier*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 227 *Ibid.*
- 228 *Columbia State*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 229 *Nashville Banner*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 230 *Nashville Banner*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6.
- 231 *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 232 *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 233 *Little Rock Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 12, 10, 7, 6, 1903, p. 4.
- 234 *Raleigh News and Observer*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4; *Chatanooga Daily Times*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; *Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *Houston Post*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6.
- 235 *Indianapolis Sentinel*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 236 *Chicago Chronicle*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690.
- 237 *Springfield, Illinois State Register*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 238 *Tucson Citizen*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2.
- 239 *Pittsburg Post*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6; 1st section.
- 240 *Wilmington Every Evening*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 241 *Tucson Citizen*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 2.
- 242 *Columbia State*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 243 *Columbia State*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 244 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 245 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6.
- 246 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 20, 27, 1903, p. 6.
- 247 *Pittsburg Post*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 248 *Ibid.*
- 249 *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1903, p. 8.
- 250 *New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 5, 6, 19, 1903, p. 8.
- 251 *New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8.
- 252 *Omaha Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 253 *Omaha Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 254 *New York American*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 16.

- 255 New York *American*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 16.
- 256 New York *American*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 16.
- 257 San Francisco *Examiner*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 16. The Chicago *American* was another Hearst paper.
- 258 Pittsburg *Dispatch*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4.
- 259 Boston *Post*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 260 New Haven *Evening Register*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6.
- 261 Salt Lake *Herald*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), pp. 691-92.
- 262 Raleigh *News and Observer*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 263 Indianapolis *Sentinel*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 264 Indianapolis *Sentinel*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 265 Philadelphia *Record*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 266 Memphis *Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 8, 10, 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 267 Denver *Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 268 Little Rock, *Arkansas Democrat*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 4.
- 269 Houston *Post*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 270 Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 271 Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 272 Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 6.
- 273 Augusta *Chronicle*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 274 Nashville *Banner*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 275 Nashville *Banner*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4. It quoted vice-president Harrahan of the Illinois Central Railroad as saying, "whether it be Nicaragua or Panama, let a canal be built by one route or the other." (*ibid.*)
- 276 Nashville *Banner*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 4.
- 277 Savannah *Press*, quoted in Atlanta *Constitution*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6.
- 278 Wilmington *Morning Star*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 2.
- 279 Atlanta *Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 280 Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 281 Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 282 Little Rock, *Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 283 Birmingham *Age-Herald*, Nov. 5, 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 284 Birmingham *Age-Herald*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 285 *Ibid.*
- 286 Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Times*).
- 287 Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 288 Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 20, 23, 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 289 New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 290 Milwaukee *Journal*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 291 Washington *Post*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 28, 1903, p. 6 on the *Post's* acceptance of Panama's independence.
- 292 New York *Staats Zeitung*, quoted in Albany *Evening Journal*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 293 New York *Times*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8; Omaha *Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Chatanooga *Daily Times*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Times*); Raleigh *News and Observer*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4. The latter paper stated that while C. P. Huntington lived no Canal bill could pass Congress, as he had the most perfect lobby since Credit Mobilier, but after his demise no one was powerful enough to block a Canal for the sake of the Railroads: "Then, when action could no longer be postponed, Hanna, (the representative of the railroads who wish no

- canal) suddenly became an advocate of the Panama route. He thought he would secure a ten year struggle in Congress between the friends of the two routes and thus delay action." But to Hanna's surprise Senator Morgan preferred a Panama route to no Canal at all. (*Raleigh News and Observer*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.)
- 294 *Raleigh News and Observer*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 295 *Raleigh News and Observer*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *Atlanta Journal*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 6; *Chatanooga Daily Times*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Times*).
- 296 *New York American*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 16.
- 297 *Tucson Citizen*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 2.
- 298 *Columbia State*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 299 *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 300 *Chatanooga Daily Times*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4. Earlier the *Daily Times* indicated that turning to Nicaragua would teach the transcontinental Railroads a useful lesson in honesty and fair dealing. (*ibid.*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Times*).)
- 301 *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 302 *Boston Post*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 303 *New York American*, Nov. 9, 10, 1903, p. 16.
- 304 *Pittsburg Post*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6.
- 305 *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 306 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 307 *Omaha Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4.
- 308 *New Haven Evening Register*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 309 *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1903, p. 8.
- 310 *Springfield, Illinois State Register*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 311 *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 312 *Charleston News and Courier*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 313 *Milwaukee Journal*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 314 *Atlanta Journal*, Nov. 18, 24, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 22, 1903, p. 4, edit. section.
- 315 *Atlanta Journal*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, edit. section.
- 316 *Atlanta Journal*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 317 *New Haven Evening Register*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6.
- 318 *Indianapolis Sentinel*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 319 *Springfield, Illinois State Register*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 320 *Little Rock, Arkansas Gazette*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 321 *Omaha Morning World-Herald*, Nov. 5, 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 322 *Philadelphia Record*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 323 *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1903, p. 8.
- 324 *Seattle Daily Times*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 325 *Seattle Daily Times*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 6.
- 326 *Chicago Chronicle*, quoted in *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 327 *Wilmington Morning Star*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 2.
- 328 *Columbia State*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 329 *Columbia State*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 330 *Columbia State*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 331 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 332 *Ibid.*
- 333 *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 334 *Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 335 The earlier stand of these anti-imperialist papers is found in *Literary Digest*, 17 (July 9, 1898), pp. 32-38; *Public Opinion*, 27 (November 16, 1899), p. 615; Daniel

Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, p. 261 and throughout; William E. Diez, "Opposition to American Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1898-1932," unpublished Ph.d. dissertation, Un. of Chicago, 1948, p. 108; etc.

Chapter IV: The Press and the Panama Issue: The Defenders

- 1 Baltimore *American*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6.
- 2 New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 28, 1903, p. 4.
- 3 New York *Commercial Advertiser*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 4 Brooklyn *Daily Eagle*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 5 New York *Sun*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 6 New York *Press*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 4.
- 7 New York *Daily Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 10.
- 8 New York *Herald*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 10, 1st section; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 24, 1903, p. 10.
- 9 New York *Commercial*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 10 New York *Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 1.
- 11 Harrisburg *Patriot*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 12 Albany *Evening Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4.
- 13 Newark *Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2, 2d section; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 28, 1903, p. 2, 2d section.
- 14 Newark *Evening News*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6 (*Sunday News*); Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 15 Philadelphia *North American*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8.
- 16 Philadelphia *Inquirer*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 8.
- 17 Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, 2d section; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6;

- Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 18 *Washington Evening Star*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4.
- 19 *Washington Times*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 20 *New York World*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6. In an editorial Nov. 8, 1903, p.2, edit.section, the *World* attacked the Administration, but then after a period of silence it began to defend the Administration on Nov. 19, 1903.
- 21 *Buffalo News*, in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), pp. 690-91.
- 22 *Buffalo Express*, in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690.
- 23 *Boston Evening Transcript*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 10.
- 24 *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 25 *Boston Daily Globe*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 10.
- 26 *Boston Herald*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 29, 1903, p. 16.
- 27 *Boston Journal*, in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 689.
- 28 *Concord Evening Monitor*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4; Dec. 2, 1903, p. 4.
- 29 *Hartford Daily Courant*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 10.
- 30 *Bangor Daily News*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 31 *Burlington Daily Free Press*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 32 *Providence Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 12; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 14; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 12; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 14; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 12; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 10.
- 33 *Providence Daily Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12 (*Sunday Journal*); Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 34 *Hartford Times*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 35 *Salt Lake Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, 1st section; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 36 *Salt Lake Deseret Evening News*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 37 *Idaho Daily Statesman*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 6.
- 38 *Bismarck Daily Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p.2.
- 39 *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 28, 1903, p. 8.
- 40 *Montana Record*, quoted in *Helena Independent*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 41 *Portland New Age*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Black Weekly. Other Black Weeklies like

the *Topeka State Ledger*, *Washington Colored American*, *Washington Bee*, *Indianapolis Freeman*, *Kansas City Rising Son*, *Chicago Broad Ax*, had no mention of Panama.

- 42 *Portland Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4 (*Sunday Oregonian*); Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 8.
- 43 *Albuquerque Daily Citizen*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 2.
- 44 *Arizona Republican*, Nov. 7, 1903, p.2; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 28, 1903, p. 2.
- 45 *Tacoma Daily Ledger*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 28; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 29, 1903, p. 28.
- 46 *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 10.
- 47 *Los Angeles Daily Times*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6, 1st section.
- 48 *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 49 *San Francisco Chronicle*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 50 *San Francisco Call*, in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 691.
- 51 *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 52 *Des Moines Register and Leader*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 18; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4.
- 53 *Chicago Record-Herald*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 12; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 12.
- 54 *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 18 (*Sunday Tribune*); Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 16 (*Sunday Tribune*); Nov. 18, 1903, p. 12; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 12; Nov. 24, 1903, p. 6.
- 55 *Detroit Free Press*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 29, 1903, p. 4, 2d section.
- 56 *Minneapolis Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 57 *Minneapolis Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 58 *Indianapolis Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 59 *Detroit Evening News*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 5, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 2.
- 60 *Kansas City Star*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 61 *St. Louis Republic*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 5; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 8.
- 62 *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, edit. section; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, edit section; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 19, 1903,

- p. 8; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 4, edit. section; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 24, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 8.
- 63 *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 64 *Kansas State Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 12; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 65 *Sioux City Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 66 *Duluth News Tribune*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 8, 2d section; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 67 *Grand Rapids Herald*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 68 *Ohio State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 69 *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 70 *Cincinnati Enquirer*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 71 *Wisconsin State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 72 *Nebraska State Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 73 *Illinois State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 74 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section (*Sunday Sentinel*); Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section (*Sunday Sentinel*); Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 75 *Chicago Daily News*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 8.
- 76 *Nashville American*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 4.
- 77 *Mobile Register*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 78 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6.
- 79 *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 15, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 6, 1st section.
- 80 On October 3, Philippe Bunau-Varilla wrote John Bassett Moore (Professor of International Law at Columbia Un., New York, and earlier Assistant Secretary of State in 1898) suggesting that "the high interpretation of the treaty of 1846, combined with the theory of eminent domain, would cut the gordian knot before which President Roosevelt finds himself." (Bunau-Varilla to Moore, October 3, 1903, John Bassett Moore papers, Library of Congress, Box 134. Bunau-Varilla also stated: "There will be room for a Roosevelt doctrine, in international law, perfecting and completing the Monroe Doctrine." That is, "the proclamation of

the right of protecting the European (and North-American interests) against South-American interference.”)

On August 12, 1903, Assistant Secretary of State Francis Loomis wrote Moore: "I had an interesting talk with the President on the canal question on Friday, and told him something of your views with reference to the possibility of proceeding under a license to dig without a formal treaty. Your suggestion interested him very much, and he said he would like to have you prepare a memorandum on the subject setting forth your views, and asked me to communicate with you." (Loomis to Moore, August 12, 1903, Moore papers, Library of Congress, Box 134.) In the resulting memorandum sent by Professor Moore to President Roosevelt, entitled "Considerations on the present situation with respect to the canal treaty with Colombia," Moore quoted the statement by Secretary Cass to Mr. Lamar, minister to Central America, July 25, 1858, on not allowing the interests of civilization to be blocked. (Moore papers, Library of Congress, Box 134.) President Roosevelt quoted this Cass doctrine in his Message to Congress, January 4, 1904. (See chapter 1.) Moore also made amendments and additions to President Roosevelt's draft of his January 4 Message to Congress. (Moore papers, Library of Congress, Box 134.)

- 81 *Albany Evening Journal*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 82 *Detroit Evening News*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 2.
- 83 *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 10. See also Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 84 *Portland Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 85 *Providence Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 10.
- 86 *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 87 *St. Louis Republic*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 5.
- 88 *St. Louis Republic*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8.
- 89 *St. Louis Republic*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 8.
- 90 *San Francisco Chronicle*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 91 *Tacoma Daily Ledger*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 15, 1903, p. 28.
- 92 *New York Commercial*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 93 *New York Commercial*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 94 *Des Moines Register and Leader*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 95 *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 16.
- 96 *Detroit Free Press*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 29, 1903, 2d section.
- 97 *Nebraska State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6.
- 98 *New York Herald*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 8.
- 99 *Duluth News Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 100 *Duluth News Tribune*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 4.
- 101 *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 102 *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 103 *New York Sun*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6.
- 104 *Kansas City Star*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8.
- 105 *San Francisco Call*, in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 691.
- 106 *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 691.
- 107 *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, edit. section. See also Nov. 19, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 4, edit. section.
- 108 *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 109 *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 110 *Arizona Republican*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2.
- 111 *Providence Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 10.
- 112 *New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.

- 113 New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 114 Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 115 Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 116 Detroit *Evening News*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 2.
- 117 Detroit *Evening News*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2.
- 118 Detroit *Evening News*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 2.
- 119 Detroit *Evening News*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 2.
- 120 Detroit *Evening News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 2.
- 121 Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 122 Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section. See also Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, 2d section.
- 123 Cincinnati *Commercial Tribune*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 124 Nashville *American*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4.
- 125 Minneapolis *Journal*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 126 Wall Street *Journal*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 1.
- 127 Wall Street *Journal*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 1.
- 128 Hartford *Times*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6.
- 129 Boston *Evening Transcript*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 10.
- 130 Philadelphia *Inquirer*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 8.
- 131 Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4.
- 132 Albuquerque *Daily Citizen*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 2.
- 133 Indianapolis *Journal*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 134 Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8.
- 135 Des Moines *Register and Leader*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 136 Buffalo *Express*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690.
- 137 Hartford *Daily Courant*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 10.
- 138 New Orleans *Times-Democrat*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6.
- 139 New Orleans *Times-Democrat*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6.
- 140 Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4.
- 141 Bangor *Daily News*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 142 Portland *Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6.
- 143 Atlanta *Constitution*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 144 Nebraska *State Journal*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6.
- 145 St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8.
- 146 Baltimore *American*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6.
- 147 Wall Street *Journal*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 1.
- 148 Hartford *Times*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6.
- 149 Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 150 Tacoma *Daily Ledger*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 151 Philadelphia *North American*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8.
- 152 Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 153 Des Moines *Register and Leader*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 154 St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8.
- 155 Providence *Daily Journal*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 156 Detroit *Free Press*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4.
- 157 Atlanta *Constitution*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 158 New Orleans *Times-Democrat*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 6.
- 159 San Francisco *Chronicle*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 160 Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 161 Chicago *Daily Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6. See also the Sunday Tribune, Nov. 8,

1903, p. 18.

- 162 Detroit *Free Press*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section.
- 163 Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 8.
- 164 Providence *Daily Journal*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 165 St. Louis *Republic*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 166 Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6.
- 167 Chicago *Daily News*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8.
- 168 Minneapolis *Tribune*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 169 President Roosevelt also used this explanation in his Message to Congress, January 4, 1904. Furthermore the President stated: "If the treaty of 1846 did not in terms bind New Granada to grant reasonable concessions for the construction of means of interoceanic communication, it was only because it was not imagined that such concessions would ever be withheld." (President Roosevelt in U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 423-424 (January 4, 1904).) In early September Bunau-Varilla had sent President Roosevelt a copy of his September 2 article in *Le Matin* in which he suggested that a Canal was within the purview of the meaning of Article 35 of the Treaty of 1846. (DuVal, *Cadiz to Cathay*, pp. 280-81.) Chicago *Record-Herald*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Detroit *Free Press*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Detroit *Evening News*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 2; New York *Sun*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6; New York *Daily Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 8; Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 8; Portland *New Age*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Sioux City *Journal*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Seattle *Post-Intelligencer*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; Chicago *Daily News*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 8; Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6; Nebraska *State Journal*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; Milwaukee *Sentinel*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6.
- 170 Minneapolis *Journal*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 171 Baltimore *American*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6.
- 172 New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4. The idea that the Treaty of 1846 was "a covenant running with the land" had first been suggested to President Roosevelt on November 6, 1903 by Oscar S. Straus (former diplomat to Turkey and later Secretary of Commerce and Labor), to show that the guarantee of Isthmian transit was still in effect despite the name changes from New Granada to Colombia and now to Panama. Roosevelt sent Straus to explain his idea to Secretary Hay, who then included the idea in his speech defending President Roosevelt. The speech appeared in the press November 7. (Oscar S. Straus papers, Library of Congress, Box 3.) On November 12, 1903, Roosevelt wrote Straus: "Your 'Covenant running with the land' idea worked admirably. I congratulate you on it." (Roosevelt to Straus, November 12, 1903, Straus papers, Library of Congress, Box 3.) On November 13, 1903 John Bassett Moore wrote Straus: "So you had a finger in the pie! I find a good deal of amusement in reflecting on the end reached from the premise of my memorandum, and almost as much on the conclusion reached from your suggestion. Perhaps, however, it is only a question of words--that is to say, it is indifferently, a question of the 'covenant running with the land' or a question of the 'covenant running (away!) with the land'!!" (Moore to Straus, November 13, 1903, Straus papers, Library of Congress, Box 3.)
- 173 Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 174 Seattle *Post-Intelligencer*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 175 Grand Rapids *Herald*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 176 New York *Daily Tribune*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8.

- 177 *Hartford Daily Courant*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 10; Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8.
- 178 *Portland Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6.
- 179 *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 10.
- 180 *Idaho Daily Statesman*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 181 *New York Daily Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8.
- 182 *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 183 *Kansas City Star*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 8; *Salt Lake Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 8; *Kansas State Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; *Sioux City Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; *Tacoma Daily Ledger*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 28; *Grand Rapids Herald*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 10; *Providence Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 14; *Ohio State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6; *Newark Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; *Providence Daily Journal*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; *Illinois State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 184 *Baltimore American*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 185 *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 186 *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 12.
- 187 *Burlington Daily Free Press*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 188 *Los Angeles Daily Times*, Nov. 17, 1903, 1st section.
- 189 *Providence Daily Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 10.
- 190 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 191 *New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 192 *Sioux City Journal*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 4.
- 193 *New York Herald*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 10.
- 194 *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6.
- 195 *New York Commercial*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6.
- 196 *Mobile Register*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 197 *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 8.
- 198 *Baltimore American*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4.
- 199 *New York Herald*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 10.
- 200 *New York Herald*, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 10. See also Nov. 8, 1903, p. 10.
- 201 *Washington Evening Star*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 4.
- 202 *Portland Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 8.
- 203 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 204 *New York Press*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6.
- 205 *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 8.
- 206 *Idaho Daily Statesman*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4. See also Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4.
- 207 *Nashville American*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4.
- 208 *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 209 *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 9, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8.
- 210 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 211 *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 212 *Detroit Free Press*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 213 *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4.
- 214 *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 10.
- 215 *Burlington Free Press*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4. Hearst became a presidential candidate in the 1904 election.
- 216 *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.

- 217 *Idaho Daily Statesman*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4,
- 218 *Boston Evening Transcript*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 10.
- 219 *Detroit Free Press*, Nov. 7, 1903, p.4.
- 220 *New York Press*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6.
- 221 *New York Herald*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 10.
- 222 *Portland Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8.
- 223 *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6.
- 224 *Kansas State Journal*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4.
- 225 *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4.
- 226 *Newark Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 227 *Illinois State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 228 *The Railway World*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 27 (December 12, 1903), p. 816.
- 229 *Indianapolis Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 230 *San Francisco Chronicle*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 231 *Mobile Register*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 232 *Salt Lake Tribune*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 233 *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 8.
- 234 *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; *New York Daily Tribune*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; *Baltimore American*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; *Des Moines Register and Leader*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 18; *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6, 1st section, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; *Philadelphia Press*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section; *Arizona Republican*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 2; *Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 1, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 1; *Bangor Daily News*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; *Ohio State Journal*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; *Albany Evening Journal*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4; *Providence Sunday Journal*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 12; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 8; *Milwaukee Sunday Sentinel*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section; *Chicago Daily News*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; *Washington Evening Star*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6.
- 235 *Duluth News Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6; *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 8; *Chicago Daily News*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; *Bangor Daily News*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; *New York Sun*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; *New York Daily Tribune*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; *Des Moines Register and Leader*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 18.
- 236 *Newark Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2, 2d section; *Indianapolis Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; *Minneapolis Journal*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 237 *Detroit Free Press*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 238 *Kansas City Star*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; *Providence Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 12.
- 239 *Indianapolis Journal*, Nov.17, 1903, p. 4; *Concord Evening Monitor*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4.
- 240 *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 241 *Los Angeles Daily Times*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6, 1st section.
- 242 *Minneapolis Tribune*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4.
- 243 *Cincinnati Enquirer*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6.
- 244 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 245 *Kansas City Star*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4.
- 246 *Baltimore American*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 247 *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8.
- 248 *Washington Evening Star*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.

- 249 Milwaukee *Sunday Sentinel*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section.
- 250 Hartford *Times*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 6.
- 251 Philadelphia *Press*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 2d section.
- 252 Milwaukee *Sunday Sentinel*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section; Sioux City *Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Duluth *News Tribune*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4; New York *Commercial*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; Arizona *Republican*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 2, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 2; Tacoma *Daily Ledger*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 29, 1903, p. 28; Grand Rapids *Herald*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Sioux Falls *Daily Argus-Leader*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 10; Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Portland *Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 8; Providence *Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 12; Ohio *State Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; Albany *Evening Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 4; Cincinnati *Enquirer*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 6; Newark *Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; Newark *Evening News*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; Philadelphia *Inquirer*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Los Angeles *Daily Times*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; Detroit *Free Press*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Baltimore *American*, Nov. 22, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6; New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; New York *Commercial Advertiser*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; New York *Sun*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6; New York *Press*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; New York *Daily Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Idaho *Daily Statesman*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4; Chicago *Daily News*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8; Indianapolis *Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Minneapolis *Journal*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 24, 1903, p. 4; Minneapolis *Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; Washington *Times*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6; Colorado Springs *Gazette*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4; Atlanta *Constitution*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 253 Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 254 New York *Commercial*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6.
- 255 Salt Lake *Deseret Evening News*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.
- 256 New York *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4.
- 257 Milwaukee *Sunday Sentinel*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section.
- 258 New York *Commercial Advertiser*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 259 Des Moines *Register and Leader*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 18; New York *Commercial*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6.
- 260 Chicago *Sunday Tribune*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 12; Detroit *Free Press*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Brooklyn *Daily Eagle*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4; New York *Sun*, Nov. 4, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6; New York *Press*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Bangor *Daily News*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4; Cincinnati *Enquirer*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; Newark *Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4.
- 261 Milwaukee *Sentinel*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 4.
- 262 Philadelphia *Inquirer*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8.
- 263 Arizona *Republican*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 2; Hartford *Times*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; Colorado Springs *Gazette*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; Portland *Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 8; Philadelphia *North American*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 8; Newark *Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 4.
- 264 Des Moines *Register and Leader*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4; Providence *Daily Journal*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 6.
- 265 Los Angeles *Daily Times*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6, 1st section.
- 266 Wisconsin *State Journal*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 4.

- 267 *Portland Morning Oregonian*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6.
- 268 *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, Nov. 5, 1903, p. 8.
- 269 *Baltimore American*, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 8.
- 270 *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 12.
- 271 *Philadelphia Press*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 272 *Boston Evening Transcript*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 8; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 12, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; *Detroit Free Press*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; *Detroit Evening News*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 2, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 2; *Baltimore American*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6; *St. Louis Republic*, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 8, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 5; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 8; *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, Nov. 7, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 4; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 4; *New York Sun*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 6, 1903, p. 6; *Idaho Daily Statesman*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; *Kansas State Journal*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 12, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; *Albuquerque Daily Citizen*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 2, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 2; *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 10, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 10; *Burlington Daily Free Press*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 27, 1903, p. 4; *Nashville Banner*, Nov. 22, 1903, p. 4; *Providence Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 12; *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 8, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 8, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 8; *Philadelphia Press*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6; *Illinois State Journal*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4; *Los Angeles Daily Times*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6, 1st section, Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6, 1st section; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 4; *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; *Hartford Times*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 6; *Minneapolis Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 6; *Washington Times*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6; *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4; *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6; *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 273 *Colorado Springs Gazette*, Nov. 9, 1903, p. 4. See also *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 10.
- 274 *Detroit Evening News*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 2.
- 275 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 276 *Burlington Daily Free Press*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 277 *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 278 *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 279 *Idaho Daily Statesman*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 4.
- 280 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section.
- 281 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 282 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6.
- 283 *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 6.
- 284 *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 285 Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, p. 261 and throughout the book.
- 286 *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), pp. 690-91.
- 287 *Literary Digest*, 27 (November 21, 1903), p. 690.
- 288 *Literary Digest*, 17 (July 9, 1898), pp. 32-36.
- 289 *Public Opinion*, 27 (November 16, 1899), p. 615.
- 290 *Public Opinion*, 26 (February 2, 1899), p. 133.
- 291 *New York World*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 2, edit. section.
- 292 *New York World*, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 2, edit. section.
- 293 *New York World*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 8.

- 294 *New York World*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 295 *New York World*, Nov. 20, 1903, p. 6. See also Nov. 21, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 2, edit. section; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 24, 1903, p. 8; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 6; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 6.
- 296 *Boston Herald*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 297 *Boston Herald*, Nov. 29, 1903, p. 16.
- 298 *Boston Herald*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 6.
- 299 *Boston Herald*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 6.
- 300 *Boston Herald*, Nov. 14, 1903, p. 6.
- 301 *Boston Herald*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 302 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.
- 303 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 15, 1903, p. 4, 3rd section.
- 304 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 6.
- 305 *Atlanta Constitution*, Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4.
- 306 *Tacoma Daily Ledger*, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 4.
- 307 In the determination of the political division of the attacking and defending papers I have found most in the *Literary Digest* numbers for November, 1903 to February, 1904-especially Vol. 27 (November 21, 1903), pp. 689-92. Other sources used are *Literary Digest* and *Public Opinion* articles from 1898-1900; and in addition N. W. Ayer and Sons *Directory, Newspapers and Periodicals 1909*, Philadelphia, 1909. The disadvantage of the latter source is that it does not give any changes that may have been made in the past. It was used for the *Idaho Daily Statesman*, *Bismarck Daily Tribune*, *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, *Montana Record*, *Arizona Republican*, *Kansas State Journal*, *Duluth News Tribune*, *Wisconsin State Journal*, *Illinois State Journal*, *Chicago Daily News*, *Concord Evening Monitor*, *Bangor Daily News*, *Providence Evening Bulletin*, *Harrisburg Patriot*, *Newark Evening News*, *Helena Independent*, *Tucson Citizen*, *Wheeling Register*, *Seattle Daily Times*, *Portland Daily Journal*, *Arkansas Gazette*, *Jackson Weekly Clarion-Ledger*, *Augusta Chronicle*, *Arkansas Democrat*, *Illinois State Register*, *Selma Times*, *Savannah Press*.

Chapter V: The Senate Debate: The Democrats

- 1 The House of Representatives was cut off from any decision-making role on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama despite the fact that it had originally helped pass the Spooner Law for a canal treaty with Colombia or Nicaragua. However this did not prevent members of the House from using this body as a forum to attack the Roosevelt Administration on the Panama issue, beginning with interpositions into a debate on a Pension Appropriation Bill. House members attacking included: House minority leader John Sharp Williams (Dem., Mississippi); John R. Thayer (Dem., Massachusetts); Hugh A. Dinsmore (Dem., Alabama); Edward M. Bassett (Dem., New York); Thetus W. Sims (Dem., Tennessee); Jack Beall (Dem., Texas); John W. Gaines (Dem., Tennessee); Joseph A. Goulden (Dem., New York). (U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 140-141 (December 11, 1903), p. 260 (December 15, 1903); pp. 1484-1490 (February 1, 1904); pp. 128-136 (December 11, 1903), pp. 291-295 (December 16, 1903), pp. 1571-1572 (February 3, 1904); pp. 290-291 (December 16, 1903); pp. 346-348 (December 17, 1903), pp. 1490-1491 (February 1, 1904); pp. 215-220 (December 14, 1903); p. 199 (December 14, 1903); pp. 657-659 (January 12, 1904).) John Sharp Williams asserted that "the so-called Republic of Panama is an abortion upon the surface of the earth-misbegotten, hag-born, and, to use the words of William Shakespeare, ditch-delivered."

(*Ibid.*, 141 (December 11, 1903).) He charged that for the first time in its history the United States had "interfered in the internecine affairs of Central or South America." (*Ibid.*) Williams was accused of being willing to accept stolen goods after relieving his qualms by denouncing the thievery, to which he replied: "I can recognize the illegitimacy of the birth of a child and yet deal with the child as an existing entity on the surface of the globe." (*Ibid.*, p. 260 (December 15, 1903).) To Representative Sims, however, who was against ratification of the Treaty, "they who receive stolen property, knowing it to be stolen, are liable morally and legally." (*Ibid.*, p. 347 (December 17, 1903).) Representative Beall perhaps summed up the case for many Democrats when he said: "It is not because a canal is to be built that Democrats are dissatisfied; it is not because the Panama route may be the route by which the canal will be built that Democrats criticize the recent conduct of the President; it is not because they hope to restore to Colombia the sovereignty over Panama that Democrats attack the President; but it is to protest against a wrong, to appeal to the conscience of the American people to disavow an act which if established as a precedent will endanger our peace in the future and which will lessen the confidence of the world in our moral integrity as a nation." (*Ibid.*, p. 215 (December 14, 1903).) Missouri Democrat Champ Clark, an Anti-Imperialist (Pomeroy, *American Neo-Colonialism*, p. 104), noted much later that: "Roosevelt was severely criticized for what was called his high-handed proceedings in creating the Panama Republic, and even his best friends must admit that his conduct was precipitate and contrary to the rules in such cases made and provided. But he achieved his desire--the Canal which will remain as his monument till time shall be no more--and it is one of the world's greatest benefactions." (Champ Clark, *My Quarter Century of American Politics*, I, New York, 1920, p. 462.)

House members defending the Administration included: R. Wayne Parker (Rep., New Jersey); Charles H. Grosvenor (Rep., Ohio); Edgar D. Crumpacker (Rep., Indiana); Robert R. Hitt (Rep., Illinois); Nehemiah D. Sperry (Rep., Connecticut); Robert Adams, Jr. (Rep., Pennsylvania). (U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 296-299 (December 16, 1903); pp. 1487-1491 (February 1, 1904); pp. 257-260 (December 15, 1903); pp. 136-140 (December 11, 1903), pp. 295-296 (December 16, 1903); pp. 1570-1571 (February 3, 1904); pp. 197-200 (December 14, 1903).) Representative Grosvenor stated that "there is a power, and it is moving in the civilized world, a power greater than the little contemptible spirit of the Colombian Senate, a power that says that in the interest of civilization, in the interest of prosperity, in the interest of the millions of American people, in the interest of the millions of the people in the Orient, a canal shall be built; and woe to the politician or the newspaper man or the college professor that gets in the way of this mighty movement of a mighty people to do a mighty thing." (*ibid.*, p. 1489 (February 1, 1904).) Representative George W. Norris (Rep., Nebraska) was assailed by doubts, but followed Theodore Roosevelt "step by step." (George W. Norris, *Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris*, New York, 1945, p. 147.)

- 2 New York Times, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 2, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 1, Nov. 13, 1903, p. 1, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 2; *The Commoner*, III (November 27, 1903), p. 6.
- 3 New York Times, Dec. 16, 1903, p. 1; John R. Lambert, *Arthur Pue Gorman*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1953, p. 303.
- 4 Lambert, *Arthur Pue Gorman*, pp. 304-05; New York Times, Jan. 27, 1904, p. 1.
- 5 New York Times, Jan. 19, 1904, p. 8; Shelby M. Cullom, *Fifty Years of Public Service*, Chicago, 1911, p. 383; *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*

of the United States of America, Vol. 35, 58th Cong., 1st, 2d & 3d Sessions from Nov. 9, 1903 to March 3, 1905....(Government Printing Office, Wash., D. C., 1931), p. 224 (February 23, 1904)-hereafter *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35.

- 6 Cullom, *Fifty Years*, pp. 383-84. Secretary Hay had written Senator Cullom on January 20, 1904 that Panama "will consider themselves as entitled to make amendments as well as we, and it needs only a glance at the treaty to show what an infinite field of amendments there is from every point of view. The Junta in making their report to the present Constitutional Convention said that, although many of the provisions seemed harsh and hard, yet it was judged for the public good to accept it as it was. When they get the amended treaty in their hands again, they will compare it with the treaty we made with Colombia, and see how vastly more advantageous to us this treaty is than that one was...." (Hay to Cullom, January 20, 1904, in *ibid.*, pp. 384-85. See also Hay to Cullom and Hay to Spooner, January 20, 1904, in Reel 2, John Hay papers, Library of Congress.)
- 7 Cullom, *Fifty Years*, p. 385; *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, pp. 224-227 (February 23, 1904).
- 8 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 465-466 (January 5, 1904); pp. 614-616, 618-619, 625, 627-635 (January 12, 1904); pp. 1311-1321 (January 28, 1904); pp. 1366-1379 (January 29, 1904); p. 1728 (February 8, 1904); pp. 2244-2245, 2260-2261 (February 23, 1904)-hereafter *CR*, 58-2; *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, pp. 224-225 (February 23, 1904).
- 9 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 318-320 (December 17, 1903); pp. 473-474 (January 5, 1904); p. 795 (January 15, 1904); pp. 1034-1036 (January 22, 1904).
- 10 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 617-618 (January 12, 1904); pp. 703-710 (January 13, 1904); pp. 1765-1771 (February 9, 1904); pp. 2200-2202 (February 22, 1904).
- 11 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 714-715, 717-719 (January 13, 1904); p. 801 (January 15, 1904); pp. 961-962, 964-966 (January 21, 1904); p. 1245 (January 27, 1904); pp. 1305-1306, 1309-1310, 1322 (January 28, 1904); pp. 2141-2144, 2146 (February 20, 1904).
- 12 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2131-2134 (February 20, 1904).
- 13 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 623-625 (January 12, 1904); pp. 795-806 (January 15, 1904); pp. 828-836 (January 18, 1904); pp. 966-967 (January 21, 1904); pp. 2246-2247 (February 23, 1904). Teller was elected to the Senate as a Republican in 1876, 1885, and 1891; as an Independent Silver Republican in 1897; and as a Democrat in 1903. (*A Biographical Congressional Directory, 1774-1911*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1913, p. 1047.)
- 14 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 871-876 (January 19, 1904); pp. 912-923, 924 (January 20, 1904).
- 15 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2245-2246 (February 23, 1904).
- 16 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 112-113 (December 11, 1903); p. 488 (January 6, 1904); p. 1101 (January 25, 1904); pp. 1176-1177 (January 26, 1904); pp. 1303-1304, 1306, 1322-1323 (January 28, 1904); p. 1365 (January 29, 1904); p. 2207 (February 22, 1904).
- 17 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 752-757 (January 14, 1904); pp. 1033-1034 (January 22, 1904).
- 18 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 364-368 (December 18, 1903); pp. 613-622 (January 12, 1904); p. 2248 (February 23, 1904).
- 19 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1661-1667 (February 5, 1904).
- 20 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 1st Session, XXXVII, pp. 424-433 (November 23, 1903); pp. 443-460 (November 24, 1903); p. 508 (December 1, 1903)-hereafter *CR*, 58-1; *CR*, 58-2, pp. 76-82 (December 9, 1903); p. 178 (December 14, 1903); p. 238 (December 15, 1903); p. 361 (December 18, 1903); pp. 425-427, 434-441 (January 4, 1904); pp. 516-532 (January 7, 1904); pp. 911,

- 912 (January 20, 1904); pp. 952-958 (January 21, 1904); pp. 1116-1124 (January 25, 1904); pp. 1240-1242 (January 27, 1904); p. 1302 (January 28, 1904); pp. 1448-1460 (February 1, 1904); pp. 1912-1920 (February 12, 1904); p. 2014 (February 18, 1904); pp. 2120-2129 (February 20, 1904); *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 194 (January 27, 1904); pp. 225-226 (February 23, 1904).
- 21 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 399-402 (December 19, 1903).
- 22 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1363-1364 (January 29, 1904).
- 23 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1243-1246 (January 27, 1904); pp. 2247-2250 (February 23, 1904).
- 24 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1763-1765 (February 9, 1904).
- 25 *CR*, 58-2, p. 700 (January 13, 1904; pp. 1170-1175 (January 26, 1904); p. 1246 (January 27, 1904).
- 26 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1173 (January 26, 1904).
- 27 *CR*, 58-1, p. 428 (November 23, 1903).
- 28 *CR*, 58-2, p. 830 (January 18, 1904).
- 29 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1665 (February 5, 1904).
- 30 *CR*, 58-2, p. 836 (January 18, 1904).
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2127 (February 20, 1904).
- 33 *CR*, 58-2, p. 400 (December 19, 1903).
- 34 *CR*, 58-2, p. 401 (December 19, 1903).
- 35 *CR*, 58-2, p. 915 (January 20, 1904).
- 36 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1765 (February 9, 1904).
- 37 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2131-2132 (February 20, 1904).
- 38 *CR*, 58-2, p. 709 (January 13, 1904).
- 39 *CR*, 58-2, p. 872 (January 19, 1904).
- 40 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2143-2144 (February 20, 1904).
- 41 Senator Stone, in *CR*, 58-2, p. 1174 (January 26, 1904).
- 42 Senator Simmons, in *CR*, 58-2, p. 1245 (January 27, 1904).
- 43 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 832-833 (January 18, 1904). Bayard's report, February 19, 1887, is also quoted in Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, p. 42. Moore, pp. 34-43, also has the other quotations cited by Teller from Seward, Fish, and Cleveland.
- 44 *CR*, 58-2, p. 800 (January 15, 1904).
- 45 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1767 (February 9, 1904). Carmack also quotes here from Fish and Bayard. For a discussion of the Treaty of 1857, see Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, pp. 34-36.
- 46 *CR*, 58-2, p. 618 (January 12, 1904). See also p. 1768 (February 9, 1904). Carmack quoted Hay's telegram to Ehrman, November 6, 1903, in part, which stated that Panama would be looked upon "to keep open the isthmian transit in accordance with the obligations of existing treaties governing the relation of the United States to that territory." See also *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1903, p. 233. Senator Mallory quoted from vice-consul Ehrman's communication to the Provisional Government on November 7, 1903, which was based on these instructions: "...I have to inform you that the provisional government will be held responsible for the protection of the persons and property of citizens of the United States, as well as to keep the isthmian transit free, in accordance with obligations of existing treaties relative to the isthmian territory." (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 1663 + 1666 (February 5, 1904).)
- 47 *CR*, 58-2, p. 707 (January 13, 1904).
- 48 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1665 (February 5, 1904).
- 49 *CR*, 58-2, p. 367 (December 18, 1903). Daniel quoted here from former Secretary of State Fish in 1873, as well as from former Secretary Seward. See also pp. 619-623

- (January 12, 1904), where Daniel quotes from former Secretaries Evarts (1880) and Blaine (1881) to show that the U. S. had guaranteed Colombian sovereignty over the Isthmus.
- 50 CR, 58-2, p. 962 (January 21, 1904),
- 51 CR, 58-2, p. 1764 (February 9, 1904).
- 52 CR, 58-2, p. 799 (January 15, 1904).
- 53 CR, 58-2, p. 1033 (January 22, 1904).
- 54 CR, 58-2, p. 1764 (February 9, 1904).
- 55 CR, 58-2, p. 912 (January 20, 1904).
- 56 CR, 58-2, p. 875 (January 19, 1904). See also Senator Mallory, in CR, 58-2, p. 1666 (February 5, 1904); Senator Culberson, quoted from the *Houston Post*, Jan. 10, 1904, in the *New York Times*, Jan. 11, 1904, p. 2.
- 57 Senator Teller, in CR, 58-2, p. 800 (January 15, 1904); Senator Newlands in *ibid.*, p. 753 (January 14, 1904). See also Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, p. 6, for this part of Article 35.
- 58 CR, pp. 833-834 (January 18, 1904). See also p. 804 (January 15, 1904). The President's quote is from his Annual Message to Congress, December 7, 1903, wherein he defended his Panama action. (See CR, 58-2, p. 9 (December 7, 1903).)
- 59 CR, 58-2, p. 753 (January 14, 1904). See CR, 58-2, p. 424 (January 4, 1904) where Roosevelt says in his Special Message to Congress of January 4, 1904: "If the treaty of 1846 did not in terms bind New Granada to grant reasonable concessions for the construction of means of interoceanic communication, it was only because it was not imagined that such concessions would ever be withheld."
- 60 CR, 58-2, p. 873 (January 19, 1904). See Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, p. 6, for the part of Article 35 stating the terms regarding the length of the Treaty.
- 61 CR, 58-2, p. 1769 (February 9, 1904).
- 62 CR, 58-2, p. 624 (January 12, 1904).
- 63 CR, 58-2, p. 796 (January 15, 1904).
- 64 CR, 58-2, pp. 830-831 (January 18, 1904). Teller quotes from such international law authorities as Lawrence, Wheaton, and George B. Davis. For example, Davis, *Elements of International Law*, pp. 102, 103: "Not only is armed interference in behalf of insurgents not justifiable, but the furnishing of any assistance, direct or indirect, or even a failure to strictly observe neutral obligations, is a just cause of offense."
- 65 CR, 58-2, pp. 828-829 (January 18, 1904); pp. 799-800 (January 15, 1904). Teller quotes from such authorities as W. E. Hall, H. W. Bowen, and Creasy. For example, Hall, *International Law*, pp. 89-90: "Until independence is so consummated that it may reasonably be expected to be permanent, insurgents remain legally subject to the state from which they are trying to separate. Premature recognition, therefore, is a wrong done to the parent state; in effect, indeed, it amounts to an act of intervention." And Bowen on *International Law*, p. 135: "...revoltors should not be recognized as belligerents until they have effected a political organization capable of performing the duties of a nation and of meeting the responsibilities of one, and have shown that their rebellion is in fact a war and conducted according to the rules of war."
- 66 CR, 58-2, p. 831 (January 18, 1904).
- 67 CR, 58-2, p. 1766 (February 9, 1904).
- 68 CR, 58-2, p. 704 (January 13, 1904).
- 69 CR, 58-2, p. 705 (January 13, 1904). See also Senator Money, in CR, 58-2, pp.

- 2131-2132 (February 20, 1904); Senator Daniel, in *ibid.*, pp. 365-366 (December 18, 1903); Senator Mallory, in *ibid.*, p. 1665 (February 5, 1904).
- 70 Message by President Jackson, December 31, 1836, quoted in *CR*, 58-2, p. 400 (December 19, 1903). Pettus also quoted from such authorities as *Vattel's Law of Nations*, Cap. V, p. 160; *I Kent's Commentaries*, p. 25, note 1. (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 399-400 (December 19, 1903).)
- 71 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1764 (February 9, 1904).
- 72 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1764-1765 (February 9, 1904).
- 73 *CR*, 58-2, p. 365 (December 18, 1903).
- 74 *CR*, 58-2, p. 366 (December 18, 1903).
- 75 *CR*, 58-2, p. 367 (December 18, 1903).
- 76 *CR*, 58-2, p. 319 (December 17, 1903).
- 77 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1173 (January 26, 1904).
- 78 *CR*, 58-2, p. 752 (January 14, 1904).
- 79 *CR*, 58-2, p. 319 (December 17, 1903).
- 80 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1767 (February 9, 1904).
- 81 *Ibid.*
- 82 *CR*, 58-2, p. 707 (January 13, 1904). Carmack quoted from Senate Doc. 51, 58th Congress, 2d Session (1903-04): *Correspondence Concerning the Convention Between the United States and Colombia for the Construction of An Interoceanic Canal Across the Isthmus of Panama*. A dispatch from Hay to Beaupré, November 11, 1903, responding to a Colombian request as to whether or not its warships would be permitted to land, stated: "It is not thought desirable to permit landing of Colombian troops on the Isthmus, as such course would precipitate civil war and disturb for an indefinite period the free transit which we are pledged to protect."
- 83 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 752, 754 (January 14, 1904)--quote p. 754.
- 84 *CR*, 58-2, p. 754 (January 14, 1904).
- 85 *Ibid.* Article 19 of the Panama Railroad concession said: "In compensation for these exemptions the company binds itself to transport gratuitously and without the Government having to pay anything, either for freight or for any other cause, the troops, chiefs and officers, and their equipage, ammunition, armament, clothing, and all similar effects that may belong to, are or may be destined for the immediate service of the Government of the Republic, or of the State of Panama." The French Panama Canal Company's concession stated: "The company shall carry gratis through the canal, or on the auxiliary railway, the men destined for the service of the nation, for the service of the State through whose territory the canal may pass, or for the service of the police, with the object of guarding against foreign enemies or for the preservation of public order, and shall transport gratis the baggage of such men, their war materials, armaments, and clothing which they may need for the service assigned to them." (quoted in *ibid.*)
- 86 *CR*, 58-2, p. 402 (December 19, 1903).
- 87 *CR*, 58-2, p. 465 (January 5, 1904).
- 88 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1665, 1667 (February 5, 1904)--quote p. 1665.
- 89 *CR*, 58-1, p. 426 (November 23, 1903).
- 90 Carmack, in *CR*, 58-2, p. 710 (January 13, 1904); Patterson, in *ibid.*, pp. 918, 923 (January 20, 1904).
- 91 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 804-805 (January 15, 1904). See President Roosevelt's Message in *CR*, 58-2, pp. 423-425 (January 4, 1904). See above for Teller's views on the Treaty of 1846. Teller denied that national safety was involved, and even if national interest was involved no condition of need for the Canal justified the United States in violating international law. (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 805, 796 (January 15, 1904).)

- 92 CR, 58-2, p. 805 (January 15, 1904).
 93 *Ibid.*
 94 *Ibid.*
 95 CR, 58-2, p. 835 (January 18, 1904).
 96 *Ibid.*
 97 CR, 58-2, p. 915 (January 20, 1904).
 98 CR, 58-2, p. 1245 (January 27, 1904).
 99 CR, 58-2, p. 1174 (January 26, 1904).
 100 CR, 58-2, p. 1364 (January 29, 1904).
 101 CR, 58-2, pp. 803-804 (January 15, 1904),
 102 CR, 58-2, p. 1244 (January 27, 1904).
 103 CR, 58-2, p. 1664 (February 5, 1904).
 104 CR, 58-2, p. 1174 (January 26, 1904).
 105 CR, 58-2, p. 1172 (January 26, 1904). Stone was referring to President Roosevelt's Message of January 4, 1904.
 106 CR, 58-2, p. 919 (January 20, 1904). For the three alternatives Roosevelt foresaw see chapter 1.
 107 *Ibid.* See chapter 1 for the orders to the Navy.
 108 *Ibid.*
 109 CR, 58-2, p. 920 (January 20, 1904).
 110 CR, 58-2, p. 707 (January 13, 1904).
 111 CR, 58-2, p. 706 (January 13, 1904).
 112 *Ibid.*
 113 CR, 58-2, pp. 707-708 (January 13, 1904). Carmack included Teague's articles from the *Baltimore American* for Dec. 10, 21, 23, and 28, 1903 as an appendix to his speech of February 9, 1904. (CR, 58-2, pp. 1771-1777 (February 9, 1904).) Senator Daniel also quoted from correspondent Teague. Referring to him in his speech of December 18, 1903 as a Republican lawyer writing to a Republican paper (*ibid.*, p. 367 (December 18, 1903).), Daniel cites Teague in an appendix to his speech as saying "all Panama believes that the revolution was made possible by Washington's foreknowledge of what was proposed and an expressed determination by the Government at Washington to give moral and physical support to the revolutionists. There is reason for this belief, for it was not actually decided to attempt the coup which resulted in the creation of the Republic until advices were received from the States to the effect that if it should be attempted the United States would back it up." (Teague in the *Baltimore American*, Dec. 12, 1903--dated Panama, Dec. 7, 1903, quoted in CR, 58-2, p. 369 (December 18, 1903).)
 114 CR, 58-2, p. 707 (January 13, 1904). For further attacks on Bunau-Varilla by Carmack see p. 1770 (February 9, 1904), and pp. 2200-2202 (February 22, 1904).
 115 CR, 58-2, p. 1920 (February 12, 1904). Morgan accused President Roosevelt of taking sides with the New Panama Canal Company in 1902 by backing Colombia against insurrectionists in order to get the Panama Canal from Colombia; and of taking sides with the New Panama Canal Company in November, 1903 by backing Panama against Colombia in order to get the Panama Canal from Panama: "All roads that the President travels leads to the Panama Canal." (CR, 58-2, p. 526 (January 7, 1904); CR, 58-2, p. 1919 (February 12, 1904); and CR, 58-1, p. 457 (November 24, 1903).) The quote is from the latter source. Morgan quotes Assistant Secretary of the Navy Darling to Admiral Silas Casey, October 29, 1902: "While approving your attitude, the Department wishes to impress upon you that the relations of the United States with Colombia are

- much strained. You must adopt measures as conciliatory as is consistent with dignity United States, overlooking matters of minor importance. Negotiations for ship canal are at present at a standstill on account of a feeling of irritation on part of Colombian representative." (CR, 58-1, p. 455 (November 24, 1903).)
- 116 CR, 58-2, p. 81 (December 9, 1903).
- 117 CR, 58-2, p. 2246 (February 23, 1904).
- 118 Senator Culberson, quoted in James William Madden, *Charles Allen Culberson: His Life, Character and Public Service...*, Austin, Texas, 1929, p. 306. The Iroquois Club speech is contained in pages 305-310. See also p. 132. Madden does not give the exact date of the speech.
- 119 CR, 58-2, p. 871 (January 19, 1904); p. 914 (January 20, 1904).
- 120 CR, 58-2, pp. 918, 916-917 (January 20, 1904). Patterson quoted from Hay to Beaupré, June 9, 1903 (see chapter 1), and from President Roosevelt's Message to Congress, January 4, 1904. Roosevelt said: "That there might be nothing omitted, Secretary Hay, through the minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow from her rejection of the treaty." (President Roosevelt, in CR, 58-2, p. 419 (January 4, 1904).
- 121 CR, 58-2, p. 871 (January 19, 1904).
- 122 Senator Pettus, in CR, 58-2, p. 401 (December 19, 1903); Senator Stone, in *ibid.*, p. 1174 (January 26, 1904).
- 123 CR, 58-2, p. 1175 (January 26, 1904),
- 124 CR, 58-2, p. 1364 (January 29, 1904).
- 125 CR, 58-2, pp. 1661-1662 (February 5, 1904).
- 126 CR, 58-2, p. 1246 (January 27, 1904).
- 127 CR, 58-2, p. 2248 (February 23, 1904).
- 128 See his resolution and amendment below.
- 129 CR, 58-2, pp. 1366-1379 (January 29, 1904).
- 130 CR, 58-2, p. 319 (December 17, 1903).
- 131 CR, 58-2, p. 709 (January 13, 1904).
- 132 *Ibid.*
- 133 *Ibid.*
- 134 See below under the Democratic vote.
- 135 Francis Bulter Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1944, pp. 408-11. Tillman had been humiliated when Roosevelt withdrew an invitation for him to attend a White House banquet, held February 24, 1902 in honor of Prince Henry of Prussia, a naval officer. Tillman was a member of the Senate Naval Committee. Roosevelt had made disparaging remarks about Tillman as early as 1896.
- 136 CR, 58-2, p. 715 (January 13, 1904).
- 137 CR, 58-2, p. 717 (January 13, 1904).
- 138 CR, 58-2, p. 965 (January 21, 1904).
- 139 CR, 58-2, p. 965 (January 21, 1904); p. 801 (January 15, 1904); pp. 714-715 (January 13, 1904).
- 140 CR, 58-2, p. 79 (December 9, 1903).
- 141 CR, 58-1, p. 451 (November 24, 1903). For further attacks by Morgan outside the Senate, see Box 19, Morgan papers, Library of Congress: In a letter to Secretary Hay in February, 1904, Morgan accused Hay of arrogance and disdain, compelled to do the imperial will of a master whom he feared, led by the mercenary cunning of Bunau-Varilla.
- 142 CR, 58-2, p. 1764 (February 9, 1904).
- 143 CR, 58-2, p. 756 (January 14, 1904).

- 144 Lambert, *Arthur Pue Gorman*, pp. 300-313; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (ed.), *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968*, III, New York, 1971, p. 1974; Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 689-footnote.
- 145 Lambert, *Arthur Pue Gorman*, pp. 307-08, 312-13; Schlesinger, *History of American Presidential Elections*, III, pp. 1974, 2014. Schlesinger states that Gorman failed to appreciate the intensity of Southern sentiment for a Canal, and quotes a New Orleans editor as observing that Gorman's maneuver cost him all chance of nomination, "for it is not conceivable that the delegates from the South...would vote for a man who went out of his way to attack the material and sentimental interests of this section so wantonly." (Schlesinger, p. 1974.)
- 146 Theodore Roosevelt characterized Gorman as leading out in an effort "to dragoon the democratic senators to voting in a mass against the treaty." (Roosevelt to George Harvey, December 19, 1903, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 673.)
- 147 *CR*, 58-2, p. 320 (December 17, 1903).
- 148 *CR*, 58-2, p. 319 (December 17, 1903).
- 149 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1766 (February 9, 1904).
- 150 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1765 (February 9, 1904).
- 151 *CR*, 58-2, p. 614 (January 12, 1904).
- 152 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 618-619 (January 12, 1904).
- 153 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 630-631 (January 12, 1904).
- 154 J. Rogers Hollingsworth, *The Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan*, Chicago, 1963, p. 204.
- 155 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 614ff (January 12, 1904); pp. 711ff (January 13, 1904); p. 1103 (January 25, 1904); p. 1242 (January 27, 1904); pp. 1366-1379 (January 29, 1904); p. 1467 (February 1, 1904); pp. 1501ff (February 2, 1904); pp. 1661ff (February 5, 1904); pp. 1702ff (February 8, 1904); p. 1728 (February 8, 1904); pp. 1763ff (February 9, 1904); pp. 1823ff (February 10, 1904); pp. 2015ff (February 18, 1904); pp. 2120ff (February 20, 1904); pp. 2191ff (February 22, 1904); pp. 2244ff (February 23, 1904).
- 156 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1728 (February 8, 1904); p. 2245 (February 23, 1904).
- 157 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, pp. 224-225 (February 23, 1904); *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2245 & 2260-2261 (February 23, 1904).
- 158 All 24 voting yea were Democrats: Bacon, Bailey, Bate, Berry, Blackburn, Carmack, Clarke of Arkansas, Clay, Cockrell, Dubois, Foster of Louisiana, Gorman, Latimer, McCreary, Mallory, Money, Morgan, Newlands, Patterson, Pettus, Simmons, Taliaferro, Teller, Tillman. Those paired for yea were also Democrats: McLaurin, Martin, Overman. For the remaining Democrats: Culberson, Daniel, Stone, Clark of Montana did not vote; while McEnery and Gibson voted nay. (*Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 225 (February 23, 1904); *CR*, 58-2, p. 2261 (February 23, 1904); *New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1904, p. 1. The *Congressional Record* voting list leaves out the following: Yeas-Bailey, Carmack, Foster of Louisiana, Gorman, Simmons; Nays (Republicans)-Bard, Elkins.)
- 159 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, pp. 225-226 (February 23, 1904).
- 160 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 226 (February 23, 1904).
- 161 *Ibid.*
- 162 *Ibid.*
- 163 *Ibid.*

- 164 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 194 (January 27, 1904).
- 165 *CR*, 58-2, p. 911 (January 20, 1904). The Bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations after second reading. (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 952-953 (January 21, 1904).)
- 166 *CR*, 58-2, p. 953 (January 21, 1904).
- 167 *CR*, 58-2, p. 958 (January 21, 1904).
- 168 *CR*, 58-2, p. 955 (January 21, 1904).
- 169 *CR*, 58-2, p. 958 (January 21, 1904).
- 170 *CR*, 58-1, p. 508 (December 1, 1903). Morgan also used newspaper information (*New York Evening Post*, Dec. 8, 1903), that two U. S. officers participated in the Panama Revolution: Colonel Black, U. S. Army Canal inspector, who was the first to raise the Panama flag at Colón; and Felix Ehrman, vice-consul at Panama, whose bank in Panama (he was director) was reported to have provided funds to bribe the Colombian officers. Morgan said he appealed to the same class of authorities that the President does--newspapers: "I do not know if it is true [Ehrman's payments] or not. It has been stated for days and weeks." (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 521-522 (January 7, 1904).) Morgan included newspaper articles in an appendix which described the Revolution, including the part played by men like Colonel Shaler: *Washington Post*, Dec. 7, 1903; *New York Evening Post*, Dec. 8, 26, 1903; *New York Tribune*, Dec. 21, 25, 28, 1903, and Jan. 2, 1904; *Hartford Courant*, Dec. 24, 1903. (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 532-541 (January 7, 1904).)
- 171 *CR*, 58-2, p. 178 (December 14, 1903).
- 172 *CR*, 58-2, p. 238 (December 15, 1903). See also p. 1448 (February 1, 1904). Resolution No. 57.
- 173 *CR*, 58-2, p. 361 (December 18, 1903). He referred to Sec. 5286 of US Revised Statutes, defining neutrality.
- 174 *CR*, 58-2, p. 912 (January 20, 1904). See also p. 1116 (January 25, 1904). Concurrent resolution No. 36. See below under Democratic Vote on the McKinley protocols.
- 175 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1240 (January 27, 1904). Resolution No. 110. Withdrawn as Morgan was informed it was to be sent to the Senate in executive session. (*CR*, 58-2, p. 1302 (January 28, 1904).)
- 176 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1240-1242 (January 27, 1904). See also p. 1302 (January 28, 1904). Resolution No. 109.
- 177 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2014 (February 18, 1904).
- 178 *Ibid.*; *CR*, 58-2, p. 2294 (February 24, 1904).
- 179 See above under Personal Attacks and Politics on Newlands' proposition of disavowal.
- 180 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1033-1034 (January 22, 1904). For Spooner's appeal see *ibid.*, p. 756 (January 14, 1904).
- 181 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1033 (January 22, 1904).
- 182 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1033-1034 (January 22, 1904).
- 183 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1034 (January 22, 1904).
- 184 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1247 (January 27, 1904).
- 185 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1302 (January 28, 1904).
- 186 *CR*, 58-2, p. 700 (January 13, 1904).
- 187 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1170-1171 (January 26, 1904). This resolution, No. 84, was to lie on the table subject to recall. (*ibid.*, pp. 1175-1176 (January 26, 1904); p. 1246 (January 27, 1904).)
- 188 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 473-474 (January 5, 1904). Called up for debate, pp. 703ff

- (January 13, 1904); pp. 752ff (January 14, 1904); pp. 795ff (January 15, 1904); pp. 827ff (January 18, 1904); pp. 865ff (January 19, 1904); pp. 912ff (January 20, 1904); pp. 958ff (January 21, 1904); pp. 1023ff (January 22, 1904).
- 189 CR, 58-2, p. 795 (January 15, 1904).
- 190 CR, 58-2, p. 1035 (January 22, 1904).
- 191 CR, 58-2, p. 1036 (January 22, 1904).
- 192 CR, 58-2, p. 1035 (January 22, 1904).
- 193 CR, 58-2, p. 1550 (February 3, 1904).
- 194 CR, 58-2, p. 1101 (January 25, 1904); p. 1177 (January 26, 1904); p. 1247 (January 27, 1904); pp. 1303ff (January 28, 1904); pp. 1361-1365 (January 29, 1904).
- 195 CR, 58-2, p. 1365 (January 29, 1904). The two main amendments were one by Culberson inserting "since June 28, 1902" and one by Cullom adding at the end "if not, in his judgment, incompatible with the public interest." The latter amendment passed, despite Culberson using precedents from the time of President Polk in 1848 to argue against it, with 39 yeas, 20 nays, and 31 not voting. (CR, 58-2, p. 1303 (January 28, 1904); p. 1365 (January 29, 1904); pp. 1303-1304 (January 28, 1904).)
- 196 CR, 58-2, p. 1303 (January 28, 1904). Others speaking for the right to receive information included Senator Bacon, Senator Tillman, and Senator McLaurin. Bacon argued that Congress should receive all information it requested from the Executive as it was up to Congress to decide whether the papers requested were compatible with public interest or not (*ibid.*, pp. 1311-1321 (January 28, 1904).); Tillman argued for the right of the Senate, as a coordinate branch of the treaty-making power, to receive all information connected with the Panama Treaty in order to determine whether or not to ratify the President's action in negotiating it (*ibid.*, p. 1322 (January 28, 1904); p. 1309 (January 28, 1904).); and McLaurin argued for the right to receive in confidence all information on correspondence concerning the Canal in order to pass judgment on the Treaty. (*ibid.*, pp. 1363-1364 (January 29, 1904).)
- 197 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, pp. 205-206 (February 4, 1904). The President's message and accompanying papers were subsequently printed as Executive H, 58th Congress, 2d Session. Although the injunction of executive secrecy was removed from the vote on the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and on the Bacon Amendment, February 23, 1904, it was not removed from executive proceedings and the official executive documents. (*ibid.*, p. 206 (February 4, 1904); p. 227 (February 23, 1904).) Earlier information contained in the Senate documents referred to by the President, as well as House Doc. No. 8, was sent to Congress in open session, in response to resolutions by Senator Cullom and Congressman Hitt (both Republicans), etc. (See CR, 58-2, pp. 402 & 404 (December 19, 1903); CR, 58-2, pp. 820 & 878 (January 18 & 19, 1904); CR, 58-1, pp. 260 & 489 (November 16 & 27, 1903).)
- 198 CR, 58-2, pp. 112-113 (December 11, 1903); p. 488 (January 6, 1904); p. 2207 (February 22, 1904).
- 199 CR, 58-2, p. 2207 (February 22, 1904).
- 200 *Ibid.*
- 201 CR, 58-2, pp. 613-614 (January 12, 1904). See also p. 1103 (January 25, 1904); p. 1243 (January 27, 1904). It was resolution No. 81.
- 202 CR, 58-2, p. 2261 (February 23, 1904); *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 227 (February 23, 1904).
- 203 *Ibid.*
- 204 *Ibid.* Dubois, a former Republican, was returned to the Senate in 1901 as a Silver

- Republican but shortly thereafter became a Democrat. (*A Biographical Congressional Directory*, p. 616; Henry F. Graff (ed.), *American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Testimony taken from Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines--1902*, Boston, 1969, p. xix.) Dubois spoke in condemnation of Roosevelt's Panama policy at a Democratic caucus meeting November 16, 1903. (*The Commoner*, III (November 27, 1903), p. 6.)
- 205 *Ibid*; Clay, in *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1707-1712 (February 8, 1904); Clarke, in *ibid.*, pp. 1507-1521 (February 2, 1904). See below on their reasons.
- 206 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 225 (February 23, 1904). These three were Culberson, Daniel, and Stone--with the first two voting against the Treaty. The fourth, Clark of Montana, as well as the two who voted against the Amendment (McEnery and Gibson), did not give Senate speeches on the Panama issue.
- 207 *New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1904, p. 6.
- 208 Theodore Roosevelt to Samuel White Small, December 29, 1903, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 685.
- 209 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1765 (February 9, 1904). On November 13, 1903, Secretary of the Treasury Shaw wrote to Roosevelt that "resolutions by Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce and other business associations throughout the South would have a very desirable effect. I believe Senator Hanna would be able to inaugurate such a movement." (Shaw to Roosevelt, November 13, 1903, Reel 38 (Series 1), Theodore Roosevelt papers, Library of Congress.)
- 210 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1766 (February 9, 1904). Carmack had defended the Philippine people in a speech on imperialism in the House January 12, 1899, and later spoke several times on the Philippine issue in the Senate--February 3, April 25-26, May 8, 1902 and February 9, 1903. (Paul Franklin Bumpus, *Carmack: The Edward Ward Carmack Story*, Nashville, Tennessee, 1977, pp. 37-38; pages 38-99 contain Carmack's speeches referred to here.) Carmack was earlier editor of the *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, which also attacked the Panama events, in the 1890s. (Bumpus, p. 6.)
- 211 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 709-710 (January 13, 1904).
- 212 Carmack in his campaign speech for Senate re-election, November 20, 1905, in Nashville, in Bumpus, *Carmack*, p. 170.
- 213 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1765 (February 9, 1904).
- 214 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1771 (February 9, 1904).
- 215 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 703, 710 (January 13, 1904).
- 216 Benjamin Ryan Tillman, "Causes of Southern Opposition to Imperialism," *North American Review*, 171 (October, 1900), pp. 439-446; B. R. Tillman, *The Race Issue and Annexation of the Philippines*, Washington, 1900; Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 22 (September, 1935), p. 218; Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," *Journal of Southern History*, 24 (August, 1958), pp. 324-25; Pomeroy, *American Neo-Colonialism*, pp. 104 & 106. Tillman included racial arguments to prevent bringing Filipinos into the framework of American life.
- 217 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1245 (January 27, 1904).
- 218 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1364 (January 29, 1904).
- 219 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2133 (February 20, 1904); *New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1904, p. 6.
- 220 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1763 (February 9, 1904).
- 221 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1765 (February 9, 1904).

- 222 *Ibid.*
- 223 Hollingsworth, *The Whirligig of Politics*, p. 203; Baron, "Anti-Imperialism and the Democrats," p. 223; August C. Radke, "Senator Morgan and the Nicaraguan Canal," *Alabama Review*, 12 (January, 1959), pp. 6-7.
- 224 Radke, "Senator Morgan and the Nicaraguan Canal," pp. 7-17; A. L. Venable, "John T. Morgan, Father of the Inter-Oceanic Canal," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 19 (March, 1939), pp. 376-87. Radke, who links Morgan's early indorsement of a Canal to his expansionism, states that by the end of the 1890s the expansionist program was a fait accompli except for the Canal—an omission largely due to the conflict over the site. (Radke, pp. 6-7.)
- 225 Radke, "Senator Morgan and the Nicaraguan Canal," pp. 10-17; *CR*, 58-1, p. 424 (November 23, 1903). Morgan was replaced by Senator Hanna.
- 226 *CR*, 58-1, p. 425 (November 23, 1903). Morgan also wrote a 20-page letter to a Mr. Watterson explaining his stand, in which he accused the transcontinental Railroads, the opponents of any Canal, of adopting the Panama route as it could never be used profitably by sailing vessels. (Box 19, Morgan papers, Library of Congress.)
- 227 Bunau-Varilla to Morgan, November 9, 1903, Box 19, Morgans papers, Library of Congress.
- 228 See for example, Venable, "John T. Morgan, Father of the Inter-Oceanic Canal," pp. 376-87; *Birmingham Age-Herald*, Feb. 27, 1904, p. 4.
- 229 *CR*, 58-2, p. 436 (January 4, 1904).
- 230 *CR*, 58-2, p. 436 (January 4, 1904); pp. 2122 & 2124 (February 20, 1904). Morgan cited *Williams v. Bruffy* (96 U. S., 176) on the inability of a de facto government to convey territory. (p. 436.) And Senator Stone declared that the Panama Commission sent to negotiate a Canal Treaty after the Revolution, arriving in Washington on November 18, 1903 only to discover one was already signed by Hay and Bunau-Varilla, was ignored and dismissed without apology. They had no alternative but to accept: "The Administration held the whip handle and could drive them as it would." (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 1173-1174 (January 26, 1904).) Acting of its own free will, Stone said, Panama would never have granted some of the concessions and rights in the Treaty. (*ibid.*, p. 1174 (January 26, 1904).) See also Senator Gorman, in *ibid.*, p. 319 (December 17, 1903).
- 231 *CR*, 58-2, p. 439 (January 4, 1904); p. 953 (January 21, 1904).
- 232 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1116-1122 (January 25, 1904); p. 953 (January 21, 1904); & *CR*, 58-1, pp. 448-451 (November 24, 1903); pp. 429-430 (November 23, 1903). Negotiations were needed with Costa Rica as the San Juan River ran along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border for part of the canal route.
- 233 *CR*, 58-2, p. 953 (January 21, 1904).
- 234 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2128 (February 20, 1904). Morgan quotes the following pledge by Panama to France in response to French demands: "The Republic of Panama solemnly, expressly, and definitely undertakes vigilantly to protect French interests, as also to maintain and to interpret in the most liberal spirit the contracts concluded before November 3. Those contracts referring to the Isthmus follow the transmission of sovereignty and bind the Republic of Panama. All those contracts are maintained, and particularly the contract prolonging the cession up to 1910." (Quoted by French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Delcassé, in the Chamber of Deputies November 23, 1903, as cited in the *London Times*, Nov. 24, 1903. *CR*, 58-2, p. 78 (December 9, 1903).) See also *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1448-1460 (February 1, 1904). Morgan asserted that the New Panama Canal Company was largely made up of men who had robbed the old

Panama Canal Company and who had subscribed to stock in the new Company in order to be released from their liabilities or judgments. (CR, 58-1, p. 426 (November 23, 1903); CR, 58-2, pp. 1455-1456 (February 1, 1904).) Morgan cited the final report of the Isthmian Canal Commission, pp. 83 & 84, as his source. (CR, 58-2, p. 1455 (February 1, 1904); CR, 58-1, p. 431 (November 23, 1903).) Further he accused the New Panama Canal Company of being the cause of two civil wars in Colombia--the one from 1898-1902 and the present conflict. (CR, 58-2, p. 526 (January 7, 1904).) In 1898 the New Panama Canal Company offered President Sanclemente one million dollars in French gold to extend the Wyse Concession from 1904 to 1910; the Colombian Congress, under its power to pass on contracts alienating national property (Article 76 of the Colombian Constitution), refused the extension; this led to civil war during which Sanclemente in April, 1900, by decree as a dictator, accepted the money and extended the concession. (CR, 58-2, pp. 526-527 (January 7, 1904); CR, 58-1, pp. 430-431 (November 23, 1903); CR, 58-1, pp. 446-447 (November 24, 1903).) In the latter source Morgan quotes from the declaration by the Liberals when they took up arms that they were trying to prevent an extension of time to the New Panama Canal Company.

- 235 Graff, *American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection*, pp. xviii, xx.
- 236 Senator Culberson, quoted from the *Houston Post*, Jan. 10, 1904, in the *New York Times*, Jan. 11, 1904, p. 2.
- 237 *Ibid*. Similarly, in a speech before the Iroquois Democratic Club of Chicago, Culberson stated that "the administration, through a sham revolution, had seized and appropriated the property" of Colombia. "The motive was selfish and mercenary; and the contest was between the ambition and avarice of the powerful and the rights and interests of the weak and helpless." (Culberson, quoted in Madden, *Charles Allen Culberson*, pp. 309 & 310.)
- 238 Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," p. 324. Lasch quotes Daniel as fearing that the race problem in the United States would be compounded by the introduction of a "mess of Asiatic pottage."
- 239 CR, 58-2, p. 364 (December 18, 1903).
- 240 E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920*, Philadelphia, 1970, p. 110.
- 241 Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement...", p. 218.
- 242 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 56-57; Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation*, New York, 1963, p. 257.
- 243 *Literary Digest*, 18 (February 18, 1899), pp. 183-84. Teller felt that the U. S. was compelled to have some relations with the Philippine people, although he was against owning the Philippine Islands in the complete sense of the term; and he saw no commercial advantage if the Philippines had to be held by force. (Henry Moore Teller, *The Problem in the Philippines*, Washington, 1902, p. 3.) See also Merle E. Curti, *Bryan and World Peace*, New York, 1971, p. 123; Ernest R. May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay*, New York, 1968, pp. 203-204. Teller was a former Republican, then Independent Silver Republican Senator, first elected as a Democrat in 1903. (*A Biographical Congressional Directory*, p. 1047.)
- 244 William E. Leuchtenberg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 39 (December, 1952), p. 488.

- 245 Elmer Ellis, *Henry Moore Teller: Defender of the West*, Caldwell, Idaho, 1941, pp. 353-54. Ellis states that Teller had always favored a Canal but opposed the specific projects brought up.
- 246 *CR*, 58-2, p. 834 (January 18, 1904); pp. 2246-2247 (February 23, 1904).
- 247 *CR*, 58-2, p. 967 (January 21, 1904).
- 248 *CR*, 58-2, p. 836 (January 18, 1904); p. 967 (January 21, 1904)--the quote is from the latter.
- 249 Patterson was elected in 1901 with the combined support of Democrats, Populists, and Silver Republicans. As a Democratic member of the Senate Committee on the Philippines--1902, he spoke against the Republican Administration's Philippine policy. (Graff, *American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection*, p. xx.) Patterson was owner of the *Denver Rocky Mountain News*, which he had purchased shortly before 1895 (Frank Luther Mott, *American Journalism: A History, 1690-1960*, 3rd ed., New York, 1962, pp. 567 & 570.), and which attacked the Panama policy of the Roosevelt Administration.
- 250 *CR*, 58-2, p. 871 (January 19, 1904).
- 251 *CR*, 58-2, p. 918 (January 20, 1904).
- 252 *CR*, 58-2, p. 923 (January 20, 1904).
- 253 *CR*, 58-2, p. 922 (January 20, 1904).
- 254 *CR*, 58-2, p. 923 (January 20, 1904).
- 255 See above under Personal Attacks and Politics.
- 256 Erving Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League," *The Independent*, LI (May 18, 1899), p. 1350; Schlesinger, *History of American Presidential Elections*, III, p. 1974.
- 257 Lala Carr Steelman, "Senator Augustus O. Bacon, Champion of Philippine Independence," in *Essays in Southern Biography*, II, East Carolina Dept. of History, Greenville, North Carolina, 1965, pp. 91-113; Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement....," p. 218; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 111 & 179; Harold Baron, "Anti-Imperialism and the Democrats," *Science and Society*, 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1957), p. 230; May, *American Imperialism*, p. 204; Pomeroy, *American Neo-Colonialism*, p. 104.
- 258 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2245 (February 23, 1904).
- 259 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1238 (January 27, 1904). The Atlanta petition was presented to the Senate by Senator Clay on January 27, 1904.
- 260 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2245 (February 23, 1904).
- 261 *Ibid.*
- 262 *Ibid.*
- 263 , *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2131-2132 (February 20, 1904).
- 264 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2133 (February 20, 1904).
- 265 *Ibid.*
- 266 *Ibid.*
- 267 *Ibid.* See above under Senator McLaurin.
- 268 *Ibid.*
- 269 *Ibid.*
- 270 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1667 (February 5, 1904).
- 271 *Ibid.* In his defense he stated that Panama's independence had to be recognized as an accomplished fact; and rejection of the Treaty might lead to war with Colombia as the United States would probably be compelled to defend Panama under the Treaty of 1846 if Colombia attacked her. (*ibid.*)
- 272 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1664 (February 5, 1904). Mallory gives a history of Colombia's

counter proposals: First by a committee of three Senators which reported on August 29, 1903 with a new project for the New Panama Canal Company to pay Colombia 50,000,000 francs for the transfer of its rights to the United States, and for the United States to pay Colombia 20,000,000 dollars instead of the original 10 million. Colombia would look after public sanitation, but the mixed tribunals in the canal zone would be left about the same as under the Hay-Herrán Treaty. So Mallory concluded that pecuniary gain rather than constitutional objections formed Colombia's motives. Second by another committee, to whom this project was referred, which reported on October 14, 1903 for the project to be indefinitely postponed. But among its new points, as quoted in Senate Doc. No. 51, 58th Congress, 2d Session, p. 84, was one calling for the Colombian Congress to consider the question of the validity of the legislative decree No. 721 of 1900 granting a new 6-year extension of the New Panama Canal Company's franchise to October 31, 1910. President Marroquin dissolved the Congressional session on October 31, 1903, before the project of August 29 could be voted upon or the report of October 14 discussed. (*CR*, 58-2, pp. 1661-1662 (February 5, 1904).)

273 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1661 (February 5, 1904).

274 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2246 (February 23, 1904).

275 *Ibid.*

276 *Ibid.*

277 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2248 (February 23, 1904). Simmons quoted Elihu Root, ex-Secretary of War, as saying at a speech in Chicago February 22, 1904: "In considering these charges we may well thrust aside as carrying no weight of authority the expressions of those who, while they condemn the conduct of our Government, are in favor of the treaty. They curiously reverse the divine rule, and seem to hate the sinner while they love the sin." (*ibid.*)

278 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2249 (February 23, 1904); p. 1245 (January 27, 1904).

279 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2248-2249 (February 23, 1904).

280 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1244 (January 27, 1904).

281 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1245-1246 (January 27, 1904). Simmons stated that the votes to give Hawaii and the Philippines administration and good government did not condone the wrongs of the United States in those places. (*ibid.*)

282 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1243 (January 27, 1904).

283 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1244 (January 27, 1904).

284 *Ibid.*

285 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1246 (January 27, 1904).

286 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1171 (January 26, 1904).

287 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1174 (January 26, 1904).

288 *New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1904, p. 1.

289 *New York Times*, Dec. 24, 1903, p. 8.

290 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1507 (February 2, 1904).

291 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1520 (February 2, 1904).

292 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1515 (February 2, 1904).

293 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1516 (February 2, 1904).

294 *Ibid.*

295 *Ibid.*

296 *Ibid.*

297 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1508 (February 2, 1904).

298 *Ibid.*

299 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1515 (February 2, 1904).

- 300 CR, 58-2, p. 1510 (February 2, 1904).
 301 CR, 58-2, p. 1511 (February 2, 1904).
 302 CR, 58-2, pp. 1509-1510 (February 2, 1904).
 303 CR, 58-2, p. 1515 (February 2, 1904).
 304 *Ibid.* Clarke accused President Marroquin of refusing to sign the Hay-Herrán Treaty despite having negotiated to that end for several years--instead first placing the entire responsibility upon the Colombian Congress (*ibid.*, p. 1512 (February 2, 1904).); he accused the Colombian Administration of manufacturing a false public opinion by making it appear the resentment of implied U. S. threats was the basis for Senate rejection of the Treaty (*ibid.*, p. 1513 (February 2, 1904).); he accused Colombia of placing rejection upon the hypocritical and unfounded ground of invasion of sovereignty by the Treaty (*ibid.*, p. 1514 (February 2, 1904)); he asserted that the U. S. had aided Bogotá in putting down revolution in 1902 on the promise that Colombia would close successful Canal negotiations (*ibid.*, p. 1511 (February 2, 1904).--[Article 7 of the capitulation of the Liberal Herrera on November 21, 1902 stated that a Congress would be elected to which Canal negotiations would be submitted (CR, 58-1, p. 456 (November 24, 1903).)]); and he accused President Marroquin of encouraging the Panama Revolution so that he could declare martial law, thus giving to himself alone the power to ratify the Hay-Herrán Treaty. (CR, 58-2, pp. 1517-1519 (February 2, 1904).)
 305 CR, 58-2, p. 1707 (February 8, 1904).
 306 *Ibid.*
 307 CR, 58-2, pp. 1707-1708 (February 8, 1904).
 308 CR, 58-2, p. 1709 (February 8, 1904).
 309 *Ibid.*
 310 CR, 58-2, pp. 1709-1710 (February 8, 1904). Clay used statistics contained in a report of the Committee on Inter-oceanic Canals presented to the Senate January 3, 1901, report No. 1337, part 6, to show the distance advantage of New York over Liverpool via a Nicaragua canal to the major commercial centers of the world. New York was favored by 21% over Liverpool.
 311 CR, 58-2, p. 1710 (February 8, 1904).
 312 *Ibid.*
 313 CR, 58-2, pp. 1710-1711 (February 8, 1904).
 314 CR, 58-2, p. 1711 (February 8, 1904).
 315 CR, 58-2, p. 1238 (January 27, 1904). Governor Terrell of Georgia had also indorsed the recognition of Panama (New York Times, Dec. 24, 1903, p. 8.), and the New York Times cited an unnamed Georgia member of Congress as saying that the people down his way wanted the Canal so bad they would be willing to accept stolen property in order to get it. (New York Times, Jan. 8, 1904, p. 6.)
 316 CR, 58-2, p. 1711 (February 8, 1904). Among the friends of an Isthmian Canal Clay listed the junior Senator from Maryland, the senior Senator from Alabama, and the two Senators from Texas.
 317 CR, 58-2, p. 1712 (February 8, 1904).

Chapter VI: The Senate Debate: The Republicans

- 1 New York Times, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 1; CR, 58-1, p. 151 (November 9, 1903); New York Times, Nov. 11, 1903, p. 1.

- 2 *CR*, 58-1, p. 151 (November 9, 1903).
- 3 *CR*, 58-1, p. 260 (November 16, 1903); p. 489 (November 27, 1903). These made up House Doc. No. 8.
- 4 *CR*, 58-1, p. 183 (November 11, 1903).
- 5 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 402 & 404 (December 19, 1903).
- 6 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 116 (December 8, 1903).
- 7 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Own Letters*, I, London, 1920, p. 305. Bishop continues: "As they were leaving an eminent Senator from a Western State, noted for ability as an expert political balancer, said in a low tone to Hay: 'Do it, but be as gentle as you can with Colombia.' 'Which,' said Hay, in reporting the incident to me, 'reminded me of the instruction of the Western outlaw chief: 'Kill him, but kill him easy!' '" (*Ibid.*)
- 8 Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., November 15, 1903, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 625.
- 9 Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 689 (footnote).
- 10 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 64.
- 11 Shelby M. Cullom, *Fifty Years of Public Service*, Chicago, 1911, p. 382.
- 12 *Literary Digest*, 18 (February 18, 1899), pp. 183-84; Erving Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League," *Independent*, LI (May 18, 1899), p. 1349.
- 13 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 629-631 (January 12, 1904). Quote p. 631.
- 14 *CR*, 58-2, p. 630 (January 12, 1904).
- 15 *CR*, 58-2, p. 702 (January 13, 1904). See also *CR*, 58-2, p. 912 (January 20, 1904); p. 1103, (January 25, 1904); p. 1247 (January 27, 1904); p. 1367 (January 29, 1904).
- 16 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2261 (February 23, 1904).
- 17 For example compare Senator Hoar's opposition to the Treaty with Spain and his attacks upon the suppression of the Filipino rebellion, with his approval of the annexation of Hawaii in July, 1898 and his support for President McKinley in the election of 1900. See Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900*, New York, 1968, pp. 139-164; Richard E. Welch, Jr., "Senator George Frisbie Hoar and the Defeat of Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1900," *Historian* 26 (May, 1964), pp. 362-80; Richard E. Welch, Jr., *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans*, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, pp. 205-284; Richard E. Welch, Jr., "Opponents and Colleagues: George Frisbie Hoar and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1898-1904," *New England Quarterly*, 39 (1966), pp. 182-209; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 56, 115-16; Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, pp. 105-107, 114-115, 119, 121-122, 133; George F. Hoar, "President M'Kinley or President Bryan," *North American Review*, CLXXI (October, 1900), pp. 473-486. Although not a mouthpiece for the Anti-Imperialist League, Hoar presented the League's petitions to the Senate, chosen for this purpose because of his sympathy with the League's objects and his opposition to the Treaty with Spain. (Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League," p. 1348.)
- 18 Theodore Roosevelt to Samuel White Small, December 29, 1903, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 685.
- 19 Cullom, *Fifty Years*, pp. 212-13.
- 20 *CR*, 58-2, p. 65 (December 9, 1903). See also *CR*, 58-2, p. 93 (December 10, 1903); pp. 316-318 (December 17, 1903); pp. 363ff (December 18, 1903); p. 1253 (January 27, 1904).

- 21 CR, 58-2, pp. 316-317 (December 17, 1903).
- 22 CR, 58-2, p. 317 (December 17, 1903).
- 23 CR, 58-2, p. 318 (December 17, 1903).
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 *Ibid.*
- 26 *Ibid.*
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 CR, 58-2, pp. 318-319 (December 17, 1903).
- 29 CR, 58-2, p. 624 (January 12, 1904).
- 30 CR, 58-2, pp. 322-323 (December 17, 1903); pp. 2196-2200 (February 22, 1904).
- 31 "Senator Hoar's Speech," *Outlook*, 75 (December 26, 1903), p. 982.
- 32 "Senator Hoar and the President," *The Nation*, 77 (December 24, 1903), p. 496.
- 33 Hoar to Reverend Daniel Merriam, December 11, 1903, quoted in Welch, *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans*, p. 298.
- 34 CR, 58-2, p. 2192 (February 22, 1904).
- 35 CR, 58-2, pp. 2192-2193 (February 22, 1904).
- 36 CR, 58-2, p. 2196 (February 22, 1904).
- 37 CR, 58-2, pp. 2193-2194 (February 22, 1904).
- 38 CR, 58-2, p. 2194 (February 22, 1904). See also his first speech on this same idea. (CR, 58-2, p. 317 (December 17, 1903).)
- 39 CR, 58-2, pp. 2194-2195 (February 22, 1904).
- 40 CR, 58-2, p. 2195 (February 22, 1904).
- 41 CR, 58-2, p. 2196 (February 22, 1904).
- 42 CR, 58-2, p. 2246 (February 23, 1904).
- 43 *New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1904, p. 8.
- 44 Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, February 16, 1904, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, p. 731.
- 45 Frederick H. Gillett, *George Frisbie Hoar*, Boston, 1934, pp. 279-80.
- 46 Welch, *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans*, p. 205.
- 47 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 115-16.
- 48 CR, 58-2, p. 2192 (February 22, 1904).
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 *Ibid.*
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 CR, 58-2, p. 2261 (February 23, 1904).
- 53 CR, 58-2, pp. 621-623 (January 12, 1904); pp. 711-719 (January 13, 1904); pp. 1319-1323 (January 28, 1904); pp. 2015-2026 (February 18, 1904); pp. 2134-2147 (February 20, 1904).
- 54 CR, 58-2, pp. 321-324 (December 17, 1903); pp. 2196-2200 (February 22, 1904).
- 55 CR, 58-2, pp. 2202-2207 (February 22, 1904).
- 56 CR, 58-2, pp. 459-473 (January 5, 1904).
- 57 CR, 58-2, pp. 1501-1507 (February 2, 1904).
- 58 CR, 58-2, pp. 1667-1669 (February 5, 1904).
- 59 CR, 58-2, pp. 923-924 (January 20, 1904); pp. 958-964 (January 21, 1904).
- 60 CR, 58-2, pp. 758-762 (January 14, 1904).
- 61 CR, 58-2, pp. 426-432 (January 4, 1904).
- 62 CR, 58-2, pp. 432-434 (January 4, 1904); pp. 1175-1176 (January 26, 1904); pp. 1669-1670 (February 5, 1904).
- 63 CR, 58-2, pp. 1702-1707 (February 8, 1904).
- 64 CR, 58-2, pp. 1023-1032 (January 22, 1904).
- 65 CR, 58-2, pp. 865-871 (January 19, 1904).

- 66 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1777-1781 (February 9, 1904).
- 67 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1823-1828 (February 10, 1904).
- 68 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 874 (January 19, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 1031 (January 22, 1904).
- 69 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2144-2145 (February 20, 1904) & p. 874 (January 19, 1904)--the quote is in the latter. See also Cullom in *ibid.*, p. 2203 (February 22, 1904); Fulton in *ibid.*, p. 868 (January 19, 1904); Heyburn in *ibid.*, p. 1668 (February 5, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, pp. 1505-1506 (February 2, 1904).
- 70 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 1376 (January 29, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, p. 1505 (February 2, 1904); Depew in *ibid.*, p. 762 (January 14, 1904); Quarles in *ibid.*, p. 868 (January 19, 1904).
- 71 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2146 (February 20, 1904).
- 72 Quarles in *CR*, 58-2, p. 865 (January 19, 1904).
- 73 McCumber in *CR*, 58-2, p. 1826 (February 10, 1904).
- 74 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1031 (January 22, 1904).
- 75 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 799 (January 15, 1904) & p. 2135 (February 20, 1904).
- 76 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1504 (February 2, 1904).
- 77 *CR*, 58-2, p. 866 (January 19, 1904).
- 78 *CR*, 58-2, p. 622 (January 12, 1904).
- 79 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2206 (February 22, 1904).
- 80 Platt of Connecticut in *CR*, 58-2, pp. 962-963 (January 21, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, p. 622 (January 12, 1904), p. 2135 (February 20, 1904), p. 2142 (February 20, 1904); Quarles in *ibid.*, p. 867 (January 19, 1904).
- 81 Fairbanks in *CR*, 58-2, p. 1506 (February 2, 1904); Foraker in *ibid.*, p. 617 (January 12, 1904); Hopkins in *ibid.*, p. 1705 (February 8, 1904); Depew in *ibid.*, p. 761 (January 14, 1904).
- 82 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2135 (February 20, 1904), p. 2134 (February 20, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 755 (January 14, 1904); Quarles in *ibid.*, p. 866 (January 19, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, p. 1503 (February 2, 1904); Fulton in *ibid.*, pp. 1777-1778 (February 9, 1904).
- 83 Lodge in *CR*, 58-2, p. 620 (January 12, 1904), p. 471 (January 5, 1904).
- 84 McComas in *CR*, 58-2, p. 430 (January 4, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, p. 1506 (February 2, 1904).
- 85 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2138 (February 20, 1904); McCumber in *ibid.*, p. 1827 (February 10, 1904).
- 86 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2139 (February 20, 1904); McCumber in *ibid.*, p. 1827 (February 10, 1904).
- 87 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2139 (February 20, 1904). Spooner cites Commander Hubbard's report of November 8, 1903. See *CR*, 58-2, p. 422 (January 4, 1904), for Hubbard's report.
- 88 Fairbanks in *CR*, 58-2, p. 1505 (February 2, 1904). Commander Hubbard stated that on November 4, 1903 he had been informed by the U. S. consul that he had received notice from Torres through the prefect of Colón that if Generals Tobal and Amaya were not released by 2 o'clock he "would open fire on the town of Colon and kill every United States citizen in the place...."
- 89 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2139 (February 20, 1904).
- 90 Cullom in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2205 (February 22, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, p. 2025 (February 18, 1904), p. 2134 (February 20, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 1030 (January 22, 1904).
- 91 Spooner in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2136 (February 20, 1904). See also McComas in *ibid.*, pp. 428, 429, & 430 (January 4, 1904); Stewart in *ibid.*, p. 1175 (January 26, 1904);

- Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 1027 (January 22, 1904).
- 92 CR, 58-2, p. 2139 (February 20, 1904).
- 93 Stewart in CR, 58-2, p. 432 (January 4, 1904).
- 94 CR, 58-2, p. 869 (January 19, 1904).
- 95 CR, 58-2, p. 623 (January 12, 1904). See also Stewart in *ibid.*, p. 1175 (January 26, 1904); Hopkins in *ibid.*, pp. 1704-1705 (February 8, 1904); Lodge, quoting New York *Evening Post*, Dec. 17, 1903, in *ibid.*, pp. 469-470 (January 5, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 1027 (January 22, 1904); Depew in *ibid.*, p. 760 (January 14, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, pp. 1502-1503 (February 2, 1904); Fulton in *ibid.*, pp. 1778-1791 (February 9, 1904). The Bogotá Government was accused of making no public improvements in Panama, and of taking 225,000 dollars out of the yearly 250,000 dollars paid by the Panama Railroad Company back to Bogotá, etc. Merrill A. Teague, listed as staff correspondent for papers across the country, was one of the sources used for this information. For example, Senator Fulton adds as an appendix to his speech a report from Panama by Teague taken from the Portland *Morning Oregonian* of Dec. 19, 1903, which summarized with the statement: "In a word, the motto at Bogota was to take everything from and give nothing to Panama." (CR, 58-2, p. 1781 (February 9, 1904))-the full appendix is in pp. 1779-1781.)
- 96 CR, 58-2, p. 2136 (February 20, 1904). In the new Constitution of Colombia in 1886 a much stronger central organization was created under President Nunez. Senator Lodge stated that the Colombian Constitution of 1858, which recognized the sovereignty of the several states, was the last one to which Panama ever gave its assent. (CR, 58-2, p. 469 (January 5, 1904).) And Senator Depew said that Nunez had arbitrarily annulled the Constitution under which Panama had remained part of Colombia, with its right of secession. (CR, 58-2, p. 761 (January 14, 1904).)
- 97 CR, 58-2, p. 2137 (February 20, 1904).
- 98 CR, 58-2, p. 760 (January 14, 1904). See the second last footnote above.
- 99 Fairbanks in CR, 58-2, p. 1506 (February 2, 1904).
- 100 Spooner in CR, 58-2, p. 2143 (February 20, 1904).
- 101 Quarles in CR, 58-2, p. 869 (January 19, 1904). This expression was used by Teague in December, 1903--see CR, 58-2, p. 1781 (February 9, 1904).
- 102 Platt of Connecticut in CR, 58-2, p. 964 (January 21, 1904).
- 103 Lodge in CR, 58-2, pp. 466-468 (January 5, 1904; Depew in *ibid.*, pp. 759-760 (January 14, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, p. 1502 (February 2, 1904); Hopkins in *ibid.*, pp. 1704-1705 (February 8, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, pp. 2023-2024 (February 18, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 1029 (January 22, 1904). Spooner said that the power to alienate territory was almost a test of sovereignty; and that the President of Colombia had the constitutional right to do this with the approval of Congress afterwards--without authorization beforehand. He further claimed that Colombian insincerity was shown by the offer by Marroquin after the Panama Revolution to declare martial law and ratify the Treaty by decree. (See Beaupré to Hay, November 6, 1903, in CR, 58-2, p. 1518 (February 2, 1904). Beaupré leaves the name of the person who made the offer blank.)
- 104 McComas in CR, 58-2, p. 429 (January 4, 1904); Depew in *ibid.*, pp. 759-760 (January 14, 1904).
- 105 CR, 58-2, p. 760 (January 14, 1904).
- 106 CR, 58-2, p. 434 (January 4, 1904).
- 107 CR, 58-2, pp. 916-917 (January 20, 1904).
- 108 Cullom in CR, 58-2, p. 2203 (February 22, 1904); Platt of Connecticut in *ibid.*, p.

- 964 (January 21, 1904); Foraker in *ibid.*, p 324 (December 17, 1903); McComas in *ibid.*, p. 429 (January 4, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, pp. 2140-2141 (February 20, 1904); Quarles in *ibid.*, pp. 865 & 867 (January 19, 1904); McCumber in *ibid.*, p. 1826 (February 10, 1904). Spooner quoted from *Dana's Wheaton*, p. 42, that it was not necessary for the parent state to have ceased from all efforts to regain its power, although it was necessary that the contest should have been virtually decided. (p. 2141.)
- 109 Foraker in *CR*, 58-2, p. 323 (December 17, 1903); McComas in *ibid.*, p. 428 (January 4, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, pp. 1025-1026 (January 22, 1904). Senator Patterson pointed out however that the examples cited, such as the recognition of the French Republic after the Franco-Prussian War, did not involve secession or rebellion. (*CR*, 58-2, p. 1026 (January 22, 1904).)
- 110 Dolliver in *CR*, 58-2, p. 1026 (January 22, 1904); Platt of Connecticut in *ibid.*, p. 923 (January 20, 1904); McComas in *ibid.*, p. 427 (January 4, 1904); Hopkins in *ibid.*, p. 1703 (February 8, 1904); Lodge in *ibid.*, p. 471 (January 5, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, p. 2144 (February 20, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, p. 1506 (February 2, 1904); Heyburn in *ibid.*, p. 1668 (February 5, 1904).
- 111 Fulton in *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1777-1778 (February 9, 1904); Heyburn in *ibid.*, p. 1668 (February 5, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, pp. 717-718 (January 13, 1904), p. 2140 (February 20, 1904); Lodge in *ibid.*, pp. 461-466 (January 5, 1904); Hopkins in *ibid.*, p. 1703 (February 8, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, pp. 1505-1506 (February 2, 1904). Lodge stated: "My proposition, therefore, as to the recognition of a state and government, is that it is primarily and may be, as has always happened, an exclusively Executive function." (p. 466.)
- 112 Hopkins in *CR*; 58-2, p. 1704 (February 8, 1904).
- 113 *CR*, 58-2, p. 471 (January 5, 1904).
- 114 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1827 (February 10, 1904).
- 115 *Ibid.*
- 116 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2144 (February 20, 1904).
- 117 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1025 (January 22, 1904).
- 118 *CR*, 58-2, p. 431 (January 4, 1904).
- 119 *CR*, 58-2, p. 964 (January 21, 1904).
- 120 Cullom in *CR*, 58-2, p. 2206 (February 22, 1904); Lodge in *ibid.*, p. 466 (January 5, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, pp. 712-717 (January 13, 1904), pp. 2018 & 2021 (February 18, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 1025 (January 22, 1904); Quarles in *ibid.*, p. 865 (January 19, 1904); McCumber in *ibid.*, pp. 1823-1824 (February 10, 1904); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, pp. 1502 & 1506 (February 2, 1904).
- 121 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1827 & 1824 (February 10, 1904). Quote from p. 1824.
- 122 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1506 (February 2, 1904).
- 123 *CR*, 58-2, p. 717 (January 13, 1904).
- 124 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 2021-2022 (February 18, 1904).
- 125 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2025 (February 18, 1904).
- 126 *CR*, 58-2, p. 2020 (February 18, 1904).
- 127 *CR*, 58-2, p. 964 (January 21, 1904).
- 128 *CR*, 58-2, pp. 1706-1707 (February 8, 1904).
- 129 *CR*, 58-2, p. 762 (January 14, 1904).
- 130 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1779 (February 9, 1904).
- 131 *CR*, 58-2, p. 1032 (January 22, 1904). For similar statements to the above statements see also: Cullom in *ibid.*, p. 2207 (February 22, 1904); Stewart in *ibid.*, p. 434 (January 4, 1904); Lodge in *ibid.*, p. 473 (January 5, 1904).
- 132 Platt of Connecticut in *CR*, 58-2, p. 964 (January 21, 1904). See also Hopkins in

- ibid.*, p. 1706 (February 8, 1904); Dolliver in *ibid.*, p. 1024 (January 22, 1904); Spooner in *ibid.*, p. 2015 (February 18, 1904). Comparisons were particularly made with attacks upon President Lincoln during the Civil War.
- 133 CR, 58-2, p. 710 (January 13, 1904). Senator Tillman, noting that the Senate could not prepare articles of impeachment, replied: "Then what are we to do if the House fails to do its duty?" (*Ibid.*)
- 134 CR, 58-2, p. 919 (January 20, 1904).
- 135 Spooner in CR, 58-2, p. 2137 (February 20, 1904)--quote from here, p. 715 (January 13, 1904); Cullom in *ibid.*, p. 2203 (February 22, 1904); Platt of Connecticut in *ibid.*, p. 959 (January 21, 1904); Foraker in *ibid.*, pp. 322-323 (December 17, 1903); Fairbanks in *ibid.*, pp. 1503-1506 (February 2, 1904); McCumber in *ibid.*, pp. 1823 & 1826-1827 (February 10, 1904); McComas in *ibid.*, pp. 426-427 (January 4, 1904); Stewart in *ibid.*, p. 434 (January 4, 1904).
- 136 CR, 58-2, p. 2203 (February 22, 1904).
- 137 CR, 58-2, p. 2206 (February 22, 1904).
- 138 CR, 58-2, p. 759 (January 14, 1904).
- 139 CR, 58-2, p. 432 (January 4, 1904).
- 140 CR, 58-2, p. 434 (January 4, 1904).
- 141 CR, 58-2, p. 472 (January 5, 1904).
- 142 CR, 58-2, p. 1669 (February 5, 1904).
- 143 CR, 58-2, pp. 1669-1670 (February 5, 1904).
- 144 CR, 58-2, p. 434 (January 4, 1904).
- 145 CR, 58-2, p. 472 (January 5, 1904).
- 146 CR, 58-2, p. 964 (January 21, 1904). He believed that the term international eminent domain was a misnomer however.
- 147 CR, 58-2, pp. 802-803 (January 15, 1904).
- 148 CR, 58-2, p. 1826 (February 10, 1904).
- 149 CR, 58-2, p. 430 (January 4, 1904).
- 150 CR, 58-2, p. 1176 (January 26, 1904).
- 151 CR, 58-2, p. 472 (January 5, 1904). Senator Quarles claimed that: "We have already entered into a convention with the British Government whereby we stand as the representative of collective civilization...." (CR, 58-2, p. 870 (January 19, 1904).)
- 152 CR, 58-1, pp. 464-465 (November 24, 1903).
- 153 CR, 58-2, p. 432 (January 4, 1904).
- 154 CR, 58-2, p. 1024 (January 22, 1904).
- 155 CR, 58-2, p. 2207 (February 22, 1904).
- 156 CR, 58-2, p. 712 (January 13, 1904), p. 2021 (February 18, 1904).
- 157 CR, 58-2, p. 2018 (February 18, 1904), p. 712 (January 13, 1904).
- 158 CR, 58-2, p. 1031 (January 22, 1904).
- 159 CR, 58-2, p. 2247 (February 23, 1904).
- 160 CR, 58-2, p. 870 (January 19, 1904).
- 161 *Ibid.*
- 162 CR, 58-2, pp. 923-924 (January 20, 1904). Platt was referreing to Patterson's preceeding speech of January 20, 1904.
- 163 New York Times, Jan. 22, 1904, p. 8.
- 164 CR, 58-2, p. 710 (January 13, 1904).
- 165 CR, 58-2, p. 758 (January 14, 1904). Depew, connected with the New York Central Railroad Company for 56 years, becoming president in 1885 and chairman of the board of directors in 1889 (Chauncey M. Depew, *My Memories of Eighty Years*, New York, 1922, pp. 225-27), stated he was not aware of any

railroad combination against a canal, "but if such a combination does exist, then its allies and its most efficient assistants are to be found among those who, under any device or excuse, are endeavoring to defeat the treaty with the Republic of Panama." (CR, 58-2, p. 758 (January 14, 1904).)

- 166 Fairbanks in CR, 58-2, p. 1506 (February 2, 1904). Cullom in *ibid.*, p. 2205 (February 22, 1904) called Panama a de jure government, but cited authority that even a revolutionary de facto government had the right to alienate a part of its public domain. (He cited Taylor; and Wheaton, p. 46.)
- 167 Platt of Connecticut in CR, 58-2, p. 1380 (January 29, 1904).
- 168 Aldrich in CR, 58-2, p. 627 (January 12, 1904).
- 169 Spooner in CR, 58-2, p. 1373 (January 29, 1904).
- 170 Spooner in CR, 58-2, pp. 1310 & 1322 (January 28, 1904).
- 171 CR, 58-2, p. 472 (January 5, 1904).
- 172 *Ibid.*
- 173 CR, 58-2, p. 473 (January 5, 1904).
- 174 CR, 58-2, p. 2146 (February 20, 1904).
- 175 CR, 58-2, p. 2261 (February 23, 1904); *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 227 (February 23, 1904). Republican Senators voting yea were: Aldrich (Rhode Island), Alger (Michigan), Allee (Delaware), Allison (Iowa), Ankeny (Washington), Ball (Delaware), Bard (California), Beveridge (Indiana), Burnham (New Hampshire), Burrows (Michigan), Clapp (Minnesota), Clark (Wyoming), Cullom (Illinois), Depew (New York), Dietrich (Nebraska), Dillingham (Vermont), Dolliver (Iowa), Dryden (New Jersey), Elkins (West Virginia), Fairbanks (Indiana), Foraker (Ohio), Frye (Maine), Fulton (Oregon), Gallinger (New Hampshire), Gamble (South Dakota), Hale (Maine), Hansbrough (North Dakota), Heyburn (Idaho), Hoar (Massachusetts), Hopkins (Illinois), Kean (New Jersey), Kearns (Utah), Kittredge (South Dakota), Lodge (Massachusetts), Long (Kansas), McComas (Maryland), McCumber (North Dakota), Millard (Nebraska), Mitchell (Oregon), Nelson (Minnesota), Penrose (Pennsylvania), Perkins (California), Platt (Connecticut), Platt (New York), Proctor (Vermont), Quarles (Wisconsin), Scott (West Virginia), Smoot (Utah), Spooner (Wisconsin), Stewart (Nevada), Warren (Wyoming), Wetmore (Rhode Island). Republican Senators paired for yea were: Quay (Pennsylvania), Foster (Washington), Hawley (Connecticut), Burton (Kansas). There were no abstentions. There was one Republican vacancy at the time of the vote as Senator Hanna had died on February 15, 1904, and Charles Dick, elected to fill the vacancy, did not take his seat until March 23, 1904. (*A Biographical Congressional Directory*, p. 394.)
- 176 *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. 35, p. 225 (February 23, 1904). Six of the 56 Republican Senators neither voted nor were paired on the Bacon Amendment: Aldrich, Long, Quarles, Stewart, Foster of Washington, Burton. Paired against the Amendment were: Cullom, Hawley, Quay.
- 177 CR, 58-2, p. 2243 (February 23, 1904).
- 178 CR, 58-2, p. 762 (January 14, 1904).
- 179 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 64.

Chapter VII: The Anti-Imperialist Reaction

- 1 E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920*, Philadelphia, 1970, pp. 120-28, 133-34; Erving Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League," *Independent*, LI (May 18, 1899), p. 1347; William B. Hixson, Jr., *Moorfield Storey and the Abolitionist Tradition*, New York,

- 1972, p. 51.
- 2 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 139.
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28, 140-43, 270; Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, pp. 50-51.
- 4 Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900*, New York, 1968, p. 5.
- 5 Daniel Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, pp. 256-57; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 295; Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 22 (September, 1935), pp. 220, 223.
- 6 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 129-30.
- 7 Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, pp. 216-20.
- 8 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 83, 270.
- 9 Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, pp. 51-52, 71-73, 77.
- 10 *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 69.
- 11 Richard E. Welch, Jr., *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans*, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, p. 281.
- 12 Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, p. 51.
- 13 See for example Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansionism, 1860-1898*, Ithaca, New York, 1965, pp. 412-17; and William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York, 1962, pp. 37-43, 91, even sees an informal economic empire based on the Open Door notes winning the struggle between Anti-Imperialists and Imperialists (i.e., a third group, a coalition of Anti-Imperialists and Imperialists won); and John W. Rollins, "The Anti-Imperialists and Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy," *Studies on the Left*, 3, no. 1 (1962), p. 18, believes that Anti-Imperialists were for an anti-colonial expansion of the marketplace.
- 14 Göran Rystad, *Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics at the Turn of the Century*, Lund, Sweden, 1975, pp. 25-30; Göran Rystad, "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism: American Expansionism and Its Critics at the Turn of the Century," n.p., n.d., pp. 2-3, 24.
- 15 Rystad, "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism...", p. 27. Professor Rystad sees expansionism losing favor due to loss of public support as the expansionist propaganda promoting a humanitarian-idealistic picture was subject to critical examination during the election campaign of 1900. The protracted and bloody war in the Philippines; and the fact that business began to see territorial expansion as costly, unnecessary, and hazardous, and empires as obsolete, also were factors (Rystad, *Ambiguous Imperialism*, p. 23.)
- 16 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 270.
- 17 Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, pp. 257-58.
- 18 J. Fred Rippy, *Latin America in World Politics: An Outline Survey*, New York, 1938, p. 279.
- 19 Julius W. Pratt, "The 'Large Policy' of 1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 19 (September, 1932), p. 223.
- 20 Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Imperial Years*, New York, 1956, p. 244.
- 21 Walter LaFeber, "A Note on the 'Mercantilistic Imperialism' of Alfred Thayer Mahan," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 48 (March, 1962), p. 682.
- 22 Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, p. 69.
- 23 Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, New York, 1961, p. 428.
- 24 Wallace Thompson, "The Doctrine of the 'Special Interest' of the United States in the Region of the Caribbean Sea," *Annals of the American Academy of*

Political and Social Science, 132 (July, 1927), p. 155.

- 25 Charles Henry Huberich, *The Trans-Isthmian Canal: A Study in American Diplomatic History (1825-1904)*, Austin, Texas, 1904, p. 31.
- 26 Wolf von Schierbrand, *America, Asia and the Pacific*, New York, 1904, p. 147. See also William Thorp, "The Control of the Approach to the Panama Canal," *World's Work*, 7 (March, 1904), pp. 4594-4599. And Charles M. Harvey, "The Panama Canal and the Mississippi Valley," *World's Work*, 7 (February, 1904), p. 4429, says: "The protectorate over Panama...is only a preliminary to annexation, and the rest of Central America sooner or later will be with us."
- 27 Carl Schurz, *Our Future Foreign Policy*, New York, 1898, p. 9. (An address delivered at the National Conference at Saratoga, New York, August 19, 1898.) See also Carl Schurz, "The Issue of Imperialism," (an address at the Un. of Chicago, January 4, 1899), in Frederic Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, VI, New York, 1913, p. 12: "If we build and own the Nicaragua Canal, instead of neutralizing it, we shall easily persuade ourselves that our control of that canal will not be safe unless we own all the country down to it, so that it be not separated from our borders by any foreign, and possibly hostile, Power."
- 28 Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League November 28, 1903 and It's Adjournment Nov. 30, (New England Anti-Imperialist League, Boston, n.d.).
- 29 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 127-28.
- 30 Winslow Warren, in Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the NEAIL, p. 4.
- 31 Winslow Warren, in *ibid.*
- 32 Erving Winslow, in *ibid.*, p. 7.
- 33 David G. Haskins, Jr., in *ibid.*, p. 17.
- 34 Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, pp. 14, 249.
- 35 George E. McNeill, in Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the NEAIL, p. 36.
- 36 Rev. R. L. Bisbee, in *ibid.*, p. 37.
- 37 Hon. Louis R. Ehrich, letter to NEAIL, in *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
- 38 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 128, 143, 141. Rogers, president of Northwestern University 1890-1900 (*ibid.*, p. 143.), was an active opponent of imperialism. (Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement...," p. 219.) Sumner attacked the imperial impulse in *The Conquest of the United States by Spain*, Boston, 1899.
- 39 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 624 (January 12, 1904), p. 1570 (February 3, 1904); *Gunton's Magazine*, 26 (February, 1904), pp. 159-69; *Outlook*, 76 (January 23, 1904), pp. 201-03; *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1904, p. 6. Senator Teller in the *Congressional Record*, p. 624, quotes sections of the petition from the *New York Times* of Jan. 12. *Gunton's Magazine* and *Outlook* quote the whole petition.
- 40 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 624 (January 12, 1904); *Gunton's Magazine*, 26 (February, 1904), pp. 159-60. A counter-petition sent to Senator Platt of Connecticut, and also signed by citizens of New Haven, petitioned the Senate to ratify the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. It was signed by nearly 100 men, including 40 connected with Yale University (among them 32 professors and 4 deans), 23 businessmen, 13 lawyers, 10 bank executives (7 presidents), and 4 railroad executives (2 presidents). (U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 1570-1571 (February 3, 1904), p. 1489 (February 1, 1904).)
- 41 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, p. 624

(January 12, 1904).

- 42 *The Nation*, 78 (January 14, 1904), p. 21.
- 43 *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1904, p. 6.
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 E. W. Ordway to Moorfield Storey, Dec. 2, 1903; Ordway to Storey, Dec. 5, 1903; Ordway to Storey, Dec. 10, 1903; Ordway to Storey, Dec. 14, 1903, in Box 1, Moorfield Storey papers, Library of Congress; and Carl Schurz to Ordway, Nov. 24, 1903; Schurz to Ordway, Dec. 13, 1903; Storey to Ordway, Dec. 17, 1903, in Reel 95, Carl Schurz papers, LC.
- 46 Schurz to Ordway, Nov. 24, 1903, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.
- 47 Ordway to Storey, Dec. 2, 1903, Box 1, Storey papers, LC.
- 48 Ordway to Storey, Dec. 10, 1903, Box 1, Storey papers, LC. One would not sign unless some of his party leaders first signed, others said they would sign if the petition was non-partisan, and some could not judge the legal side of the issue themselves. (Ordway to Storey, Dec. 5, 1903, Box 1, Storey papers, LC.)
- 49 Schurz to Ordway, Nov. 24, 1903, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.
- 50 Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 249.
- 51 See below.
- 52 Ordway to Storey, Dec. 14, 1903, Box 1, Storey papers, LC.
- 53 Storey to Ordway, Dec. 17, 1903, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.
- 54 Schurz to Ordway, Dec. 13, 1903, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.
- 55 Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, chapter 3; Daniel B. Schirmer, "William James and the New Age," *Science and Society*, 33, no. 4 (Winter, 1969), pp. 434-35; Henry James (ed.), *The Letters of William James*, II, London, 1920, pp. 74, 93-94, 166-67, 288-90; Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of Williams James*, II, London, 1936, pp. 306-16.
- 56 William James to Ordway, Dec. 6, 1903, in Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 249.
- 57 Moorfield Storey, *The Recognition of Panama*, Boston, 1904.
- 58 Portfolio for Moorfield Storey papers, LC.
- 59 Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, pp. 19ff., 49; Geoffrey Blodgett, *The Gentle Reformers*, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 267-68; Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement...", pp. 215, 217. For Storey's fight for Philippine independence see Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, pp. 58ff.; and Moorfield Storey and Marcial P. Lichauco, *The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925*, New York, 1926.
- 60 Moorfield Storey, *The Recognition of Panama*, Boston, 1904; Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 248.
- 61 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 58th Congress, 2d Session, XXXVIII, pp. 2129-2131 (February 20, 1904). It was printed as a supplement to the remarks of Senator Morgan. In addition Senator Teller quoted from Storey's address (*ibid.*, pp. 829, 832-833 (January 18, 1904).), and it was referred to by Senator Quarles (*ibid.*, p. 866 (January 19, 1904).)
- 62 Storey, *Recognition of Panama*, p. 19.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 64 *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 66 *Ibid.*
- 67 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 68 *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
- 69 *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

- 71 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 72 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 73 *Ibid.*
- 74 Storey to Schurz, Dec. 19, 1903, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.
- 75 Storey to General William J. Palmer, Jan. 23, 1904, in M. A. De Wolfe Howe, *Portrait of an Independent: Moorfield Storey, 1845-1929*, Boston, 1932, p. 231.
- 76 *Ibid.*
- 77 Storey to Senator H. M. Teller, Feb. 4, 1904, in *ibid.*, pp. 232-33.
- 78 David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1976, pp. 123-24, 84. Other Anti-Imperialist peace advocates to attack the Panama policy in the years to come included Charles F. Dole and Ernest H. Crosby. They seconded these criticisms of the Roosevelt Administration as well as attacking the intervention in the Dominican Republic under the Roosevelt Administration, and succeeded in getting passed resolutions in the Anti-Imperialist League protesting "the rape of Panama" and the establishment of a protectorate over the Dominican Republic. (*ibid.*, p. 124-Patterson cites the League's Reports for 1905 and 1912.) And international law professor Charles Cheney Hyde presented a critique of the Panama case at the Second National Peace Congress, held in Chicago, May 2-5, 1909. (*ibid.*, footnote to p. 124.)
- 79 Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League November 24, 1906 and It's Adjournment December 3. (The Anti-Imperialist League, Boston, n.d.), pp. 28, 33. See also references Storey made on March 3, 1917 to Lord Bryce (*Howe, Portrait of an Independent*, p. 316), and April 23, 1919 to William A. Ketcham (*ibid.*, p. 328.)
- 80 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 260, 24-25, 55.
- 81 Theodore S. Woolsey, "The Recognition of Panama and Its Results," *The Green Bag*, 16 (January, 1904), pp. 6-12. Woolsey also signed the New Haven petition. (see above.)
- 82 *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- 83 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- 84 Omaha *Morning World-Herald*, Jan. 30, 1904, p. 4.
- 85 New York *Times*, Jan. 19, 1904, p. 8. Woolsey criticized the Administration's acts already in early November, 1903. (See New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 10, 1903, p. 6.)
- 86 Rev. Smyth, quoted in "Have We Suppressed Facts?," *Outlook*, 75 (December 12, 1903), p. 880.
- 87 Rev. Smyth, quoted in New York *Times*, Jan. 29, 1904, p. 1.
- 88 *Ibid.* Other speakers at the banquet criticizing the Panama events included Frederick C. Penfield, author and ex-Consul to Egypt, just back from Colombia, who felt that "despite the casuistry of editorial opinion in this country, there is much to make amends for in this Panama affair." (F. C. Penfield, quoted in *ibid.*) And Frederick A. Obler, writer on Panamanian affairs, asserted that "the revolution of Panama was a cut-and-dried affair. It was not only bloodless, but it had very little blood in its veins." (F. A. Obler, quoted in *ibid.*) A cartoon on the program's title page showed Uncle Sam marrying a hoary Atlantic Triton and a blushing Pacific mermaid with their hands meeting across the Isthmus. The legend said: "It this marriage legal?" (New York *Times*, *ibid.*)
- 89 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 128, 11-12.
- 90 Rev. Parkhurst, quoted in New York *Times*, Jan. 25, 1904, p. 7.
- 91 Rabbi Alter Abelson, letter to the editor, Nov. 24, 1903, in New York *Times*,

- Nov. 29, 1903, p. 25. The parable told by Nathan to David is found in II Samuel 12: 1-10.
- 92 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 141, 127; Erving Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League," p. 1347.
- 93 William Roscoe Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, II, Boston, 1915, p. 324.
- 94 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 127; Erving Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League," p. 1347. See also Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, chapter 6; Edward Chase Kirkland, *Charles Francis Adams, Jr., 1835-1915: The Patrician at Bay*, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, pp. 183-85.
- 95 Charles Francis Adams, *Charles Francis Adams, 1835-1915: An Autobiography*, Boston, 1916, p. 208. Adams was a former president of the Union Pacific Railroad (1884-1890). (*ibid.*, p. 193.) He was the grandson of one U. S. president and the great-grandson of another, and a brother of Henry and Brooks Adams. (Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 107.)
- 96 C. F. Adams, Jr., in the *Boston Advertiser*, quoted in the *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6.
- 97 *Ibid.* See also *New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, Nov. 17, 1903, p. 4; *The Watchman*, Nov. 19, 1903, p. 5.
- 98 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 127; Erving Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League," p. 1347.
- 99 Charles D. Ameringer, "Philippe Bunau-Varilla: New Light on the Panama Canal Treaty," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 46 (February, 1966), p. 47. Cleveland's attorney-general, Wayne MacVeagh, served as adviser and lobbyist for General Reyes as Reyes corresponded with Secretary Hay and attempted to prevent the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. (*ibid.*; Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, pp. 674-footnote, + 689--Roosevelt to John Bigelow, January 6, 1904.) On December 23, 1903 Reyes handed Hay a 22-page memorandum of complaints and grievances which was the result of MacVeagh's work, according to Hay. (Hay to Theodore Roosevelt, Dec. 24, 1903, in Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, II, pp. 319-20.)
- 100 Grover Cleveland, *The Democracy's Opportunity*, Boston, 1904, in Box 8, Storey papers, LC.
- 101 *Ibid.*
- 102 David Healy, *United States Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1970, p. 220; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 127. See also Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, chapter 8, where Carnegie opposed the Philippine policy. However Carnegie stated in his article, "Distant Possessions--The Parting of the Ways," *North American Review*, CLXVII (August, 1898), p. 242, that "No protest need be entered against such legitimate and peaceful expansion in our own hemisphere, should events work in that direction."
- 103 Carnegie to Morley, January 18, 1904, Box 102, Andrew Carnegie papers, LC.
- 104 Andrew Carnegie, *Triumphant Democracy or Fifty Years' March of the Republic*, Garden City, New York, 1933, pp. 317ff., especially p. 321. copyright 1885.
- 105 Carnegie to President Roosevelt, March 11, 1904, Box 103, Carnegie papers, LC. Later in his *Autobiography* Carnegie wrote that: "It was perhaps not worth building at that time, but it was better to spend three or four hundred millions upon it than in building sea monsters of destruction to fight imaginary foes. One may be a loss and there an end; the other might be a source of war...." (Andrew

Carnegie, *Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie*, London, 1920, p. 360.)

- 106 Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement...", pp. 228-29, 211, 212, 213, 217, 218; Merle Eugene Curti, *Bryan and World Peace*, New York, 1971, pp. 119ff.; Paul W. Glad, *The Trumpet Soundeth: William Jennings Bryan and His Democracy*, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1966, pp. 75-77. Bryan attacked the principal imperialist arguments that acquisition of colonies would make the U. S. a world power, that commercial interests made an empire desirable, that American control over far-flung territories would facilitate the spread of Christianity, and that there was no honorable retreat from the position the U. S. had taken. However he distinguished between imperialism (which involved the conversion of a republic into an empire by the taking of colonies) and expansion (the taking in of contiguous territory which could be made into states). (Glad, *The Trumpet Soundeth*, p. 75; Rystad, "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism," p. 17.)
- 107 "The Great Injury," *The Commoner*, III (December 4, 1903), p. 2.
- 108 "The President's Message," *The Commoner*, III (December 11, 1903), p. 1.
- 109 "...A Black Spot...", *The Commoner*, III (November 20, 1903), p. 1.
- 110 *Ibid.*
- 111 "Mr. Roosevelt on Panama," *The Commoner*, III (December 11, 1903), pp. 1-2--quote from p. 2.
- 112 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 113 "To Take What We Need," *The Commoner*, III (November 13, 1903), p. 3.
- 114 *Ibid.*
- 115 "Waved his hand in Glee," *The Commoner*, III (November 20, 1903), p. 1.
- 116 Paola E. Coletta, *William Jennings Bryan: I. Political Evangelist, 1860-1908*, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1964, p. 304.
- 117 "Panama and Afterwards," *Advocate of Peace*, 65 (December, 1903), pp. 214-15; Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 8; Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, pp. 27, 124. Responding to the request of an unnamed person, Trueblood also sent letters to Carl Schurz, Andrew Carnegie, and Cardinal Gibbons, etc., asking whether they would join about 25 persons in making a request for arbitration on the dispute with Colombia--and asking what they thought of the propriety of the idea. Trueblood stated: "It would not of course be a Peace Society movement, but a request of individual citizens as such." (Trueblood to Schurz, January 28, 1904, Reel 78, Schurz papers, LC.)
- 118 "Panama and Afterwards," *Advocate of Peace*, 65 (December, 1903), p. 214.
- 119 *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15.
- 120 *Ibid.*, p. 215.
- 121 *Ibid.*
- 122 *Ibid.*
- 123 *Ibid.*
- 124 Pax Pace, "Violation of International Treaties and International Law: The Case of Panama," *Advocate of Peace*, 66 (January, 1904), pp. 11-16--especially 12-14.
- 125 Besides the ones already mentioned, and *The Nation*, those criticizing included: *Gunton's Magazine* (*Gunton's Magazine*, 26 (February, 1904), pp. 147-48--although it had defended the Panama action earlier in Vol. 25 (December, 1903), pp. 532-33.), which said that "to ignore the legal method of procedure, even with ruffians, tends to undermine the institutions of civilized society. Like lynching, it strengthens the force of mob law and weakens the force of legal authority. This is dangerous in either domestic or international policy."; *The Friend*--published by the Society of Friends (*The Friend*, LXXVII (November 28, 1903), p. 160; (December 26, 1903), p. 192.), which had earlier opposed American

rule over the Philippines. (Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, pp. 312-13.); *The American Syren and "Shipping" Illustrated*--a New York organ of trade with South American countries (*American Syren and Shipping*, quoted in *Topeka Daily Capital*, Nov. 26, 1903, p. 4.), which felt that all business interests with trade connections with South America condemned the Panama matter--it had been interviewing merchants and manufacturers of New York and other important eastern and southern ports on the question. This latter magazine also disapproved of the choice of the Panama route (*The American Syren and "Shipping" Illustrated*, Dec. 5, 1903, in Box 19, John Tyler Morgan papers, LC.), and stated: "Of all the humbugs sprung upon the American public the Panama canal highway robbery scheme bangs the bush." (*ibid.*)

Those defending included: *Overland Monthly*, 42 (December, 1903), p. 555; *Everybody's Magazine*, 9 (December, 1903), p. 841 + 10 (January, 1904), p. 131, + 10 (February, 1904), p. 279; *Engineering Magazine*, 26 (December, 1903), pp. 420-21, + 26 (January, 1904), pp. 577-78, + 26 (February, 1904), pp. 735-36; *American Agriculturalist*, 72 (November 14, 1903), p. 10, + 72 (December 5, 1903), p. 12; *The Independent*--although it called for arbitration on Colombia's claims (*The Independent*, quoted in *Gunton's Magazine*, 26 (February, 1904), pp. 160-61, + *The Independent*, LXXI (August 17, 1911), p. 347); *The Watchman* (Baptist), 86 (January 21, 1904), p. 6, + 86 (January 7, 1904), p. 5--but see earlier statements made before Pres. Roosevelt's Message to Congress in early January in 85 (November 12, 1903), p. 5, + 85 (November 19, 1903), p. 5, + 85 (November 26, 1903), p. 5, + 85 (December 10, 1903), p. 6, + 85 (December 17, 1903), p. 6; *Colliers*, 32 (December 19, 1903), p. 5, + 32 (November 21, 1903), p. 6; *The Forum*, 35 (January, 1904), pp. 346-48, + 35 (April, 1904), p. 496; *World's Work*, 7 (December, 1903), pp. 4170-71, 4169-70, 4171, + 7 (January, 1904), pp. 4275, 4272 and 4275, 4275-76, + 7 (November, 1903), p. 4059, + 7 (February, 1904), pp. 4388-89; *Outlook*, 75 (November 14, 1903), pp. 624-25, + 75 (November 21, 1903), pp. 676-78, + 75 (November 28, 1903), pp. 726-28, + 75 (December 12, 1903), pp. 880-81, + 75 (December 26, 1903), pp. 982-84, + 76 (January 9, 1904), pp. 100-02, + 76 (January 16, 1904), pp. 153-54, + 76 (January 23, 1904), pp. 201-03; *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, 28 (November, 1903), p. 524, + 28 (December, 1903), p. 643, + 29 (January, 1904), pp. 13-14, + 29 (February, 1904), p. 141. Of the above the *American Agriculturalist* had earlier opposed expansion because of the menace of Philippine products (Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement...", p. 220.); the *Watchman* had been more cautious on expansion than many religious publications (Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, p. 292.); *Outlook* had been against expansion in its opening phases (Diez, "Opposition to American Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1898-1932," unpublished Un. of Chicago dissertation, 1948, p. 28); and *Colliers* had been opposed to imperialism. (Grand Forks *Daily Herald*, Nov. 28, 1903, p. 8.) On the Panama events the *American Agriculturalist* declared that: "The public in general and farmers in particular will not be pleased if the United States senate should unduly delay ratification of the pending treaty with the new republic of Panama." (*American Agriculturalist*, 72 (December 5, 1903), p. 12.) *The Watchman* declared that "we exercised the same right of intervention in the interests of civilization, commerce and humanity that we exercised in 1898 in intervening in Cuba. That defence is thoroughly intelligible." (*The Watchman*, 86 (January 21, 1904), p. 6.) *Outlook* called the Administration's course "just, humane, deliberate, and philanthropic, the action of an efficient servant of justice, liberty, and civilization." ("Panama: Not Haste, but Speed,"

Outlook, 75 (November 28, 1903), p. 727.) *Colliers* noted that the "progress of the superior races into the domains of the inferior is never unaccompanied by distasteful details." (*Colliers*, 32 (November 21, 1903), p. 6.) *World's Work* thought that Roosevelt and Hay had saved the world a lot of trouble; that "they gave help to revolutionists" was a mere incidental. ("The President's Recognition of Panama," *World's Work*, 7 (December, 1903), p. 4171.) It felt that South America, by the peaceful ways of trade, must more and more "come virtually under North American direction." "Such development will go on faster than ever after the canal is cut." ("The Ultimate 'Conquest' of Latin-America," *World's Work*, 7 (January, 1904), p. 4275.) *Overland Monthly* asserted that "the Colombian Government has simply complied with the law which applies to all things, animate or inanimate, the survival of the fittest." (*Overland Monthly*, 42 (December, 1903), p. 555.) In *The Forum* A. Maurice Low thought the world would applaud Roosevelt and his Cabinet for giving a twentieth century reading to the Monroe Doctrine, and asserted that a powerful nation has moral obligations to spread civilization: "The moment they [states] prove themselves unfit and unable to perform their part in relation to the world at large, the moment they show that instead of being for the well-being and progress of the world they are a detriment and impede progress, it is the duty of the world to take means to suppress evil." (*The Forum*, 35 (January, 1904), pp. 346-47.) He continued: "The hegemon of the Western hemisphere is the United States. Her power is paramount, as all the world recognizes. She is mistress of the Caribbean Sea; her ships dot that American lake; and on her rests the responsibility of preserving peace and maintaining order. Geographical location, political necessities, and the force of circumstances have made this country the policeman of the Western hemisphere." (*ibid.*, pp. 347-48.)

Magazines which editorially ignored the Panama question include: *The Farm Journal*, *The Iron Age*, *Catholic World*, *Missionary Review of the World*, *The Methodist Review*, *Appleton's Magazine*, *The Arena*, and *American Federationist*. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, became one of the original vice-presidents of the Anti-Imperialist League in 1898, stepped aside in 1900, and became a vice-president again in 1904. (Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 127; William George Whittaker, "Samuel Gompers, Anti-Imperialist," *Pacific Historical Review*, 38 (November, 1969), pp. 429, 444, 445.) But he did not attack the Panama policy in his report to the 23rd annual convention of the A. F. of L. at Boston. (*American Federationist*, 10-part 2 (December, 1903), pp. 1276-1295.) In fact, Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 249, states that Gompers put the A. F. of L. on record in favor of the Government's action in Panama at the Boston convention.

The Railroad Gazette, 36 (February 26, 1904), p. 144, and *The Rand-McNally Banker's Monthly*, 26 (December, 1903), p. 460, confined themselves to technical and financial aspects of the Canal.

- 126 *The Nation* was now under the editorship of Rollo Ogden, along with the New York *Evening Post*. Already in the 1880s *The Nation* (published in New York) was considered the "bible" for the Boston anti-imperialists. (Frederic Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, VI, New York, 1913, p. 350; Blodgett, "The Mind of the Boston Mugwump," p. 621.)
- 127 "The Panama Dishonor," *The Nation*, 77 (November 12, 1903), p. 374.
- 128 *Ibid.*
- 129 " 'Knights of the Big Stick' ," *The Nation*, 79 (October 13, 1904), p. 288.
- 130 " 'Inchoate Rights' ," *The Nation*, 78 (January 7, 1904), p. 5.

- 131 *Ibid.*
- 132 *The Nation*, 77 (November 12, 1903), p. 371.
- 133 "The President on the Defensive," *The Nation*, 78 (January 7, 1904), p. 4.
- 134 "'The Interests of Civilization'," *The Nation*, 78 (January 21, 1904), p. 42.
- 135 *Ibid.*
- 136 "From Grotius to Grosvenor," *The Nation*, 77 (November 26, 1903), p. 419. *The Nation* adds: "What a tremendous use Russia can make of Professor Grosvenor's law!" (*ibid.*)
- 137 "Haste and Repentance," *The Nation*, 77 (November 19, 1903), p. 398.
- 138 "The Appeal to Conscience," *The Nation*, 77 (November 26, 1903), p. 418.
- 139 "A Treaty of Wax," *The Nation*, 77 (December 3, 1903), p. 438.
- 140 "An Honorable Way Out," *The Nation*, 77 (December 31, 1903), p. 518.
- 141 *The Nation*, 78 (January 28, 1904), pp. 59-60.
- 142 *The Nation*, 78 (February 18, 1904), p. 120.
- 143 *The Nation*, 78 (February 25, 1904), p. 139.
- 144 Madden, *Charles Allen Culberson*, p. 310.
- 145 Henry Loomis Nelson, "The Pirate Code: Which Has Been Followed in Dealing with Colombia," in *Boston Herald*, quoted in George L. Fox, *President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat: The Panama Affair in a Nutshell*, New Haven, Connecticut, 1904, pp. 7-9; *The Green Bag*, 16 (January, 1904), pp. 50-51. Professor Nelson called the restoration of the pirate code a return "to fifteenth and sixteenth century immorality." (p. 8 in Fox; p. 50 in *The Green Bag*.)
- 146 *The Watchman*, 85 (November 19, 1903), p. 5; *Boston Advertiser*, quoted in *Springfield Daily Republican*, Nov. 16, 1903, p. 6.
- 147 *New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1904, p. 6--Edmunds criticized the dismemberment of Colombia at a peace meeting held in the Garrick Theatre in Philadelphia October 16, 1904. Edmunds was a vice-president of the original Anti-Imperialist League. (Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 127.)
- 148 James Ford Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, Port Washington, New York, 1965, pp. 272-73.
- 149 George L. Fox letter of Dec. 27, 1903 to the editor of the *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, Dec. 30, 1903, reprinted in George L. Fox, *President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat*, pp. 40-53. This booklet is a compilation of various attacks upon the Panama affair. Fox believed Roosevelt's "Rough Rider diplomacy" was tainted with dishonor and subversive of all national precedents, laws, and the Constitution. (*ibid.*, p. 40.) And he was firmly convinced that the Panama Canal was a very risky financial measure involving enormous waste of public money. (*ibid.*, p. 41.)
- 150 Cooley to Morgan, November 11, 1903, Box 19, John Tyler Morgan papers, LC.
- 151 Memorandum from Montague to Hon. Richard Olney (former Secretary of State under Cleveland), December 31, 1903, Box 156, Richard Olney papers, LC. Montague summarized the most important points considered at a recent conversation he had with Olney on the Panama matter, criticizing the Administration's Panama policy as at variance with principles of justice and international law, in direct violation of the Treaty of 1846, inconsistent with the good faith of those who favored the Nicaragua route yet had voted for Panama, in violation of U. S. law, and contrary to the U. S. Constitution. He stated that the opposition only had to refuse ratification and insist steps be taken for a Nicaragua canal. He desired to show "that the sacrifice of the nation's honor to the spirit of commercialism or to the love of military glory is entirely unnecessary, and is likely to accomplish the reverse of that which is aimed at."

- (*ibid.*) Richard Olney took a suggestion to a lunch given December 21, 1903 by Mr. Hamlin in honor of John Sharp Williams "that, in order to ensure the peaceable as well as speedy construction of the canal, this treaty shall be operative only when and after provision has been made by treaty between the United States and Colombia for indemnifying Colombia for loss of territory or other damage arising from the recognition by the United States of the independence of the State of Panama...." (Olney, in Box 156, Olney papers, LC.)
- 152 C. F. Lummis, in *Out West*, December, 1903, extracts in Fox, *President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat*, pp. 4-7. Lummis stated that a world highway "is poor walking if it must be paved with the broken tablets of a nation's honor." (*ibid.*, p. 6.)
- 153 J. P. Gordy, "The Ethics of the Panama Case," *Forum*, 36 (July, 1904), pp. 115-24. Gordy saw a switch from President Roosevelt's December 7, 1903 Message where he based his defense on the Treaty of 1846 to Roosevelt's January 4, 1904 Message where he emphasized the relation of the Panama Canal to international commerce. (*ibid.*, pp. 119-20.) Gordy called Roosevelt's doctrine that the U. S. had the right to interfere in the affairs of South American states in the interest of civilization a "dangerous doctrine." (*ibid.*, p. 117.) If nations had the right to do what they pleased to consider the interests of civilization, "international law is at an end, and we are back again in the Middle Ages." (*ibid.*, p. 116.) He noted that the one country with the greatest interest in the Canal "arrogates to itself the right to decide whether such a canal is so necessary to civilization as to justify setting aside the ordinary principles of international law!" It was especially difficult to apply international eminent domain with the absence of the necessary tribunals. (*ibid.*, p. 121.) He also stated that when Colombia gave the United States the right of free transit she did not mean to relinquish it for herself in certain contingencies. (*ibid.*, p. 118.) And referring to Roosevelt's statement that his action had saved great suffering and waste of life, etc., Gordy asked: "But is he quite sure that he has not established a precedent that may lead to a far greater loss of life than he has averted?" (*ibid.*, p. 124.)
- 154 William Cullen Dennis, "The Panama Situation in the Light of International Law," *The American Law Register*, 52 (May, 1904), pp. 265-306. Noting that there were three propositions in Article 35 of the Treaty of 1846: (1) New Granada guaranteed to the United States free and open transit, (2) United States guaranteed to New Granada the neutrality of the Isthmus so free transit would not be interrupted, (3) United States guaranteed the sovereignty and property of New Granada over the Isthmus (with no mention of a guarantee against domestic violence); Dennis concludes that New Granada had the primary duty to maintain freedom of traffic, and that although the United States may enforce its guaranty of neutrality (so free transit was not interrupted) unasked "they must do so subject to the paramount rights of sovereignty and self-defence which are reserved to the local sovereign since nowhere expressly granted away." (*ibid.*, pp. 268-69, 305--quote p. 305.) He added that "the treaty does not give the right to the United States to exclude the forces of their ally and co-guarantor from her own territory because the presence of these forces is likely to render the task of the United States more difficult; and that the United States were therefore technically not justified by any or all of the provisions of the treaty in preventing the Colombian soldiers at Colon from proceeding to Panama on the morning after the revolution. This was an act of political intervention; its justification must be found in considerations of ethics and expediency. It

cannot be found in law." (*ibid.*, pp. 305-06.)

- 155 Businessman William F. Draper, a Republican, former U. S. Congressman from Massachusetts and Ambassador to Italy (William F. Draper, *Recollections of a Varied Career*, Boston, 1908, pp. 178, 374, 219, 246ff., 273, 317ff.), talked with President Roosevelt January 11, 1904. (*ibid.*, p. 378.) Draper records the conversation: "I then said that I did not approve of his dealings in connection with Panama, if the papers reported the facts correctly. He replied, 'You do not know all there is to it,' to which I agreed, and the interview terminated." (*ibid.*, p. 379.)

David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford University and a leading Anti-Imperialist, becoming a vice-president of the original Anti-Imperialist League in 1899 and the author of *Imperial Democracy* (Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 88, 128; David Starr Jordan, *Imperial Democracy*, New York, 1899.), and who had foreseen the possibility of Theodore Roosevelt's and other's "manifest destiny" leading among other things to the seizure of Nicaragua as a guarantee for the security and neutrality of a canal there (David Starr Jordan, "Lest We Forget," Palo Alto, California, August 10, 1898, pp. 24-25—an address given at Stanford May 25, 1898.), wrote later in his autobiography that Theodore Roosevelt's Administration was marred by two incidents: "These were the 'Seizure of the Canal Zone,' without consideration of International Law, and the theatrical world cruise of the American navy." (David Starr Jordan, *The Days of a Man*, II, Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, 1922, pp. 422-23.)

Richard F. Pettigrew, U. S. Senator from South Dakota 1889-1901 (*A Biographical Congressional Directory*, p. 919), a Silver Republican and an opponent of imperialism (Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement....," p. 218.), later wrote: "We had scarcely reduced the Philippines to subjection when the Roosevelt administration became involved in the taking of Panama, one of the most infamous episodes that ever disgraced American history." (R. F. Pettigrew, *Imperial Washington*, Chicago, 1922, p. 335. See also pp. 336-39.) He concluded: "Is there any more glaring chapter of infamous conduct in the treatment of one nation by another than this proceeding on the part of the United States? I know of nothing that parallels it in its infamy except the annexation of Texas, the acquisition of Hawaii and of the Philippines." (*ibid.*, p. 339.)

Defenders of the Panama action included Edwin Maxey, "Legal Aspects of the Panama Situation," *Yale Law Journal*, XIII (December, 1903), pp. 85-89; and Willis Fletcher Johnson, "Justice and Equity in Panama," *Forum*, 36 (July, 1904), pp. 125-37. Maxey defended the recognition of Panama as Colombian forces had withdrawn, and it was reasonably sure Panama would be able to resist Colombia; and he said the Treaty of 1846 guaranteed Colombian sovereignty against European interference, not against the people of the Isthmus. (Maxey, pp. 85-87, 88.) Johnson justified the Administration's action on the basis of domestic obligations, legal obligations to Colombia (the Treaty of 1846), equity to Colombia, and law and equity to other nations. (Johnson, pp. 126, 127-31, 131-35, 135-36.)

Support for Theodore Roosevelt came in the form of letters to the President from such men as Whitelaw Reid, Nov. 9, 1903; James R. Sheffield, Nov. 9, 1903; Frank C. Travers, Nov. 9, 1903; W. G. McAdoo, Nov. 16, 1903; W. L. Chandler, president of the Spanish Claims Commission, Nov. 18, 1903; and J. G. Schurman, president of Cornell University, Nov. 22, 1903. (Reel 38 (Series 1), Theodore Roosevelt papers, LC.)

Chapter VIII: The Panama Issue in the Election of 1904

- 1 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 261-62, 264; Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, pp. 249-53.
- 2 Schurz to Ogden, May 26, 1904, in Frederic Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, VI, New York, 1913, p. 350. In his Message to Congress, December 6, 1904, Roosevelt officially announced that chronic wrong-doing or impotence by nations in the Western Hemisphere might force the United States to the exercise of an international police power. (Commager, *Documents of American History*, II, p. 33.)
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 350-51.
- 4 Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, New York, 1958, p. 338.
- 5 John Holladay Latané, "America as a World Power, 1897-1907," Vol. 25 of Albert Bushnell Hart (ed.), *The American Nation: A History*, New York, 1907, p. 224. Tyler, Fillmore, Johnson, and Arthur were all succeeded by Presidents from a different party. (*ibid.*)
- 6 Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, October 15, 1904, in Joseph Bucklin Bishop (ed.), *Theodore Roosevelt's Letters to His Children*, New York, 1919, p. 108: "I have not any idea whether we will win or not."; Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, July 14, 1904, in H. C. Lodge (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, II, New York, 1925, p. 90: "In short, I think we have a hard and uphill fight ahead of us."; Theodore Roosevelt to Rudyard Kipling, November 1, 1904, in Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown In His Own Letters*, I, London, 1920, p. 333: "So only a merciful Providence can tell what the outcome will be."
- 7 Theodore Roosevelt to Nathan Bay Scott, October 9, 1904, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, p. 978.
- 8 Donald Bruce Johnson and Kirk H. Porter (compilers), *National Party Platforms, 1840-1972*, Urbana, Illinois, 1975, pp. 138, 140--quote from p. 140.
- 9 W. F. Johnson (ed.), *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, New York, 1909, p. 44.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 50. See also p. 51. For further Republican references to the Panama policy see Elihu Root, "External Policies in 1904,"--address as temporary chairman of the Republican National Convention, June 21, 1904, in Elihu Root, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports*, Cambridge, Mass., 1916, pp. 103-04 (edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott); and Charles Warren Fairbank's reply to his notification as Republican vice-president candidate, August 3, 1904, in William Henry Smith, *The Life and Speeches of Hon. Charles Warren Fairbanks, Republican Candidate for Vice-President*, Indianapolis, 1904, p. 241.
- 12 Theodore Roosevelt to Rudyard Kipling, November 1, 1904, in Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, pp. 332-33.
- 13 Speech of the Temporary Chairman, John Sharp Williams, July 6, 1904, in *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention held in St. Louis, Mo., July 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1904*, New York, n.d., p. 37--hereafter Official Report...DNC.
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 The Democratic Platform, 1904, in *Official Report...DNC*, p. 151. See also William's speech, in *ibid.*, p. 37.

- 16 For discussions of the conservative reorganizers maneuvering against Bryanism 1900 to 1904 see Louis W. Koenig, *Bryan: A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan*, New York, 1971, pp. 366ff. Bryan opposed Parker's nomination, although he supported Parker half-heartedly in the coming election campaign. (*ibid.*, pp. 377, 394-96.) Bryan's revival in the Democratic party, leading to his nomination as presidential candidate in 1908, began at the 1904 convention in St. Louis, where he made his "Keeping the Faith" speech--which he considered the high water mark of his oratorical success, and where he dominated the platform negotiations. (*ibid.*, p. 388, 391; Coletta, *William Jennings Bryan: I*, p. 339; William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan*, Chicago, 1925, pp. 148-57.) The Democratic platform condemned "executive usurpation," imperialism, protective tariffs and trusts; and called for Philippine independence. It was silent on the subject of the gold standard, as it was generally agreed that this was no longer a political issue due to the recent increase in production of gold and silver. A famous telegram from Parker was read at the Convention, wherein he announced he regarded the gold standard as irrevocably established, and said he would refuse the nomination if this view was unsatisfactory. (Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, pp. 340-42; Koenig, *Bryan*, pp. 389-91.)
- 17 Letter of Acceptance of Alton B. Parker, September 26, 1904, in *Official Report... DNC*, p. 409.
- 18 *Ibid.*, pp. 408-09, 409.
- 19 Koenig, *Bryan*, p. 389.
- 20 Notification Address of John Sharp Williams, at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., August 17, 1904, in *The Campaign Text Book of the Democratic Party of the United States, 1904*, New York, 1904, p. 44--hereafter *Democratic Campaign Text Book, 1904*.
- 21 Letter of Acceptance of Henry G. Davis, Elkins, W. Va., October 3, 1904, in *Official Report...DNC*, p. 437.
- 22 *Ibid.* Parker also made strong attacks against imperialism, for example in his Speech of Acceptance, Esopus, New York, August 10, 1904, in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (ed.), *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968*, III, New York, 1971, pp. 2022-2023; and in his Letter of Acceptance, September 26, 1904. (*New York Times*, Sept. 26, 1904, pp. 1-2.)
- 23 *Democratic Campaign Text Book, 1904*, p. 214.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 216.
- 25 *Ibid.*
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 217.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 218-20.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 220.
- 29 Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, p. 343.
- 30 *New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1904, p. 6. The Parker Constitution Club also issued a report on November 2, 1904 attacking what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, quoting Roosevelt's letter of May 20. (*ibid.*, Nov. 3, 1904, p. 5. See also the letter above from Schurz to Ogden, May 26, 1904.)
- 31 Richard V. Lindabury, quoted in *New York Times*, Nov. 2, 1904, p. 2.
- 32 "The Conspiracy," *The Nation*, 79 (October 27, 1904), p. 328; *New York Times*, Oct. 22, 1904, p. 8. Culberson produced a letter from Roosevelt to Albert Shaw written 25 days before Panama seceded, in which Roosevelt named taking the Canal territory by force as one of his alternatives and cast aside the proposition made "at this time" to foment the secession of Panama. Culberson also compared

a January 21, 1903 letter from Hay to Herrán that the reasonable time to conclude negotiations with Colombia had come to a close, with the President's Message of January 4, 1904 that there had not been a lapse of reasonable time justifying turning to Nicaragua. (*The Nation*, 79 (October 27, 1904), p. 328.) President Roosevelt said that his letter to Shaw had been published a year before; and that the Hay letter referred to reasonable time for perfecting the Hay-Herrán Treaty before laying it before the U. S. Senate for ratification, while his Presidential Message about reasonable time referred to the action of Colombia after the U. S. Senate had ratified the Hay-Herrán Treaty. (Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, October 22, 1904, in Lodge, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, II, pp. 103-04.)

33 *New York Times*, Dec. 24, 1903, p. 8.

34 *New York Times*, July 25, 1904, p. 6.

35 *New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1904, p. 6.

36 *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1904, p. 5. Senator Brackett, whom the *Times* calls a trusted lieutenant of Gov. Odell, was opposing Roosevelt's nomination efforts at the time he wrote the letter. His letter was published in an Albany, New York paper Nov. 2, 1904.

37 *Ibid.*

38 Schurz was one of the original vice-presidents of the Anti-Imperialist League, an officer of the New York and the American Anti-Imperialist Leagues, and perhaps the leading publicist of the Anti-Imperialist cause. He was a former Major-General in the Civil War, Minister to Spain, Senator (1869-75), and Secretary of the Interior in the Hayes Administration. (Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 127, 9, 51; Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, chapter 2; Carl Schurz, *American Imperialism*, Chicago, 1899; Carl Schurz, *Our Future Foreign Policy*, New York, 1898.) He was president of the National Civil Reform League from 1892-1901 (Joseph Schafer, *Carl Schurz: Militant Liberal*, Evansville, Wisconsin, 1930, p. 251.) and was a Mugwump independent. (Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement....," p. 217.) Schurz's "Law" on imperialism, stated briefly, was that the United States could never rule other peoples undemocratically and at the same time remain true to its political principles; so if any areas were annexed they must be made into equal states; but such incorporation of tropical peoples would destroy the framework of American government; so the only alternative was to leave these people as their own masters. (Beisner, p. 22. See also Carl Schurz, "Manifest Destiny," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, 87 (October, 1893), pp. 737-46.) He also feared that an American-controlled Canal would lead to the control of the area down to it. (Schurz, *Our Future Foreign Policy*, p. 9.) However he was not against expansion into the contiguous "fit" area of Canada. (Healy, *United States Expansionism*, pp. 214-15, 216.) He also argued that colonies were not necessary for foreign markets. (Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire*, pp. 413-14.) William Appleman Williams sees Schurz and others advocating a sophisticated kind of empire based on economic power. (William Appleman Williams, *The Contours of American History*, London, 1961, p. 367.)

39 Parker to Schurz, August 29, 1904, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC. Schurz had declared himself for Parker because of his currency, imperialism, and civil service positions. (Schurz to Parker, July 11, 1904, Reel 112, Schurz papers, LC--clipping from the *Morning Sun*, Oct. 3, 1904.)

40 Schurz to Parker, August 31, 1904, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.

41 Carl Schurz, *To the Independent Voter: An Open Letter*, New York, October,

- 1904.
- 42 *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 48 *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36--quote p. 36.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 52 *Ibid.*
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 41. See the first c. 30 pages of Schurz's "Open Letter" where he assailed these and other Republican policies.
- 54 *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- 56 Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, p. 972.
- 57 New York *Evening Post* editorial, Oct. 3, 1904, in Reel 97, Schurz papers, LC.
- 58 Parker to Schurz, October 5, 1904, Reel 80 and Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.
- 59 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 128.
- 60 Gamaliel Bradford to Schurz, October 7, 1904, Reel 80, Schurz papers, LC. It was published in October.
- 61 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 136-38.
- 62 W. A. Croffut to Schurz, October 8, 1904, Reel 80, Schurz papers, LC.
- 63 Storey to Schurz, October 25, 1904, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.
- 64 Adler to Schurz, October 8, 1904, Reel 80, Schurz papers, LC. Adler was a vice-president of the original Anti-Imperialist League. (Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 128.)
- 65 E. V. Abbot to Schurz, October 8, 1904, Reel 80, Schurz papers, LC. See Reel 80 for other praises and criticisms of the "Open Letter". Theodore Roosevelt's comment was that Schurz's opposition was rather an old story, Schurz having opposed him when he ran for office in 1886, 1898, and 1900. (Roosevelt to Bishop, October 5, 1904, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, pp. 972-73.) For other criticisms of Schurz by Roosevelt see Roosevelt to Josephine Shaw Lowell, August 1, 1904, in *ibid.*, p. 875; Roosevelt to Lodge, August 11, 1904, in *ibid.*, p. 888; and Roosevelt to Hay, August 12, 1904, in *ibid.*, p. 888. To Hay, Roosevelt wrote: "The professional goo-goo, the professionally and virtuous neurotic of the Carl Schurz-*Evening Post* stamp...some of these professionally virtuous impracticables are supporting Parker on the ground that he and the Democracy represent a higher type of morality than I and the Republican party represent."
- 66 Springfield *Daily Republican* article in Box 7, Storey papers, LC.
- 67 "The Conspiracy," *The Nation*, 79 (October 27, 1904), p. 328; "Mr. Hay on Panama," *The Nation*, 79 (November 3, 1904), p. 348; "Belated Panama Scruples," *The Nation*, 79 (October 27, 1904), pp. 328-29.
- 68 "Mr. Hay on Panama," *The Nation*, 79 (November 3, 1904), p. 348.
- 69 Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, p. 344; Edgar Eugene Robinson, *The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932*, Stanford Un., 1934, pp. 46-53. Parker won in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas. (Robinson, pp. 47-53.)

- 70 Latané, "America as a World Power, 1897-1907," pp. 235-36; Hollingsworth, *The Whirligig of Politics*, pp. 228-31; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, pp. 264-267. Both parties repudiated all connections with trusts, and they were not as far apart on the Philippine issue as in 1900. However trusts became the most important issue near the end of the campaign, with the Democrats charging that the great corporations were contributing heavily to the Republican campaign fund while Roosevelt was undertaking to show he was a "trust buster." Insinuations were made that the recent Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Cortelyou, now chairman of the Republican campaign committee, was using his inside knowledge to get contributions from big business. Parker and Roosevelt carried on a confrontation over this issue in the last week before the election. (Latané, pp. 235-38; Hollingsworth, pp. 229-32; Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, pp. 342-44; Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, pp. 328-36; *New York Times*, Nov. 6, 1904, p. 6.) One contributor to Republican funds was railroad magnate Edward H. Harriman, who raised 250 thousand dollars to help in the New York state campaign. (Roseboom, p. 344.)
- Parker finally left his home porch in Esopus, New York, to speak in Connecticut and New Jersey. (Hollingsworth, pp. 229-30.) Bryan had commented earlier: "I am willing to be the Aaron of the party if our Moses, who has been slow of speech, will but lead the people out of the wilderness." (Koenig, *Bryan*, p. 396.)
- 71 Latané, "America as a World Power, 1897-1907," p. 239; Hollingsworth, *The Whirligig of Politics*, p. 234; Henry Litchfield West in *The Forum*, 36 (January, 1905), pp. 325-26; Coletta, *William Jennings Bryan: I*, p. 351. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin the Socialist vote was larger than the Democrat vote. Socialist leader Eugene Debs received throughout the country 402,460 votes for President, compared to his 94,768 votes in 1900. (Coletta, p. 351; Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, p. 344--footnote.)
- 72 Coletta, *William Jennings Bryan: I*, p. 345.
- 73 Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, p. 344.
- 74 *New York Times*, Nov. 10, 1904, in Schlesinger, *History of American Presidential Elections*, III, p. 2038. See also West in *The Forum*, 36 (January, 1905), p. 324.
- 75 Williams, quoted in Coletta, *William Jennings Bryan: I*, p. 345.
- 76 Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, November 10, 1904, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, p. 1024.
- 77 Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, November 10, 1904, in Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, p. 335.
- 78 Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Cabot Mills Lodge, November 10, 1904, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, p. 1025.
- 79 *Ibid.* In the whole country Parker got 1,400,000 fewer votes than Bryan in 1896 and 1,300,000 fewer than Bryan in 1900. (Koenig, *Bryan*, p. 396.)
- 80 George S. Boutwell, in Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League November 26, 1904 and It's Adjournment November 28 (The Anti-Imperialist League, Boston, n.d.), p. 5. The New England Anti-Imperialist League now changed it's name back to The Anti-Imperialist League.
- 81 Boutwell, in *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
- 82 Rev. A. A. Berle, in *ibid.*, p. 23.
- 83 Frank B. Sanborn, in *ibid.*, p. 25.
- 84 Sanborn, in *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
- 85 Storey to Schurz, November 14, 1904, Reel 95, Schurz papers, LC.

Chapter IX: Aftermath

- 1 New York Times, Nov. 12, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 14, 1903, pp. 1-2; Nov. 19, 1903, p. 2; Nov. 21, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 22, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 23, 1903, p. 1; Nov. 26, 1903, p. 1; Dec. 1, 1903, p. 6; Dec. 9, 1903, p. 1; Dec. 10, 1903, p. 1; Dec. 12, 1903, p. 1; Dec. 15, 1903, p. 3; Dec. 22, 1903, p. 1; Dec. 24, 1903, p. 3; Jan. 1, 1904, p. 4; Jan. 13, 1904, p. 2; Jan. 14, 1904, p. 2.
- 2 Richard D. Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1973, pp. 156-58. As far as the Panama Revolution itself is concerned, Challener believes the Navy served simply as the executive agent for a Presidential policy. (*ibid.*, pp. 154-55.)
- 3 E. Taylor Parks, *Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934*, New York, 1968, pp. 429, 428. For Latin American and European reaction to the Panama Revolution see John Patterson, "Latin-American Reactions to the Panama Revolution of 1903," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 24 (May, 1944), pp. 342-51; Louis E. Van Norman, "Latin-American Views of Panama and the Canal," *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, 29 (March, 1904), pp. 334-37; "South American Press on the Isthmian Coup," *Literary Digest*, 27 (December 26, 1903), pp. 909-10; Francisco Escobar, "President Roosevelt's Message and the Isthmian Canal," *North American Review*, 178 (January, 1904), pp. 122-32; Abelardo Aldana, *The Panama Canal Question: A Plea for Colombia*, Cardiff, Wales, 1903; "European Insinuations in the Panama Affair," *Literary Digest*, 27 (December 5, 1903), p. 782. Aldana, Colombian consul at Cardiff, quotes from at least 27 British newspapers all critical of the U. S. action. (Aldana, pp. 22-43.) Escobar felt that in after years Roosevelt would "wonder what evil spirit ever moved him to write the Message of December 7th, 1903. He will wish then that records of such documents were not kept, and that the printing press had never been invented." (Escobar, p. 122.) Patterson found Latin American opinion divided but without any universal burst of indignation. (Patterson, pp. 342, 351.) The *Literary Digest* found condemnations here and there in Europe but no universal chorus (*Literary Digest*, December 5, 1903, p. 782.), and while quoting South American newspapers both ways it saw the lack of an explosion of indignation. (*Literary Digest*, December 26, 1903, p. 909.) Van Norman found the earliest Latin American comments as very mild, but later there appeared, he says, a spirit of animosity, aroused no doubt by reports of opposition to the President in the United States. He was not surprised to find so few expressions of fear and dislike toward the part the United States had played, as the Canal would so plainly and largely benefit the entire southern continent. (Van Norman, p. 335.)
- 4 Reyes to Hay, December 23, 1903; Hay to Reyes, January 5, 1904; Reyes to Hay, January 6, 1904; Hay to Reyes, January 9, 1904; Reyes to Hay, January 11, 1904; and Hay to Reyes, January 13, 1904, in Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, III, pp. 78-90, 90-105, 105-109, 109-10, 110-13, 113. Hay wrote to President Roosevelt on December 4, 1903: "Can you receive Reyes to-morrow, Saturday? If so, at what hour? Permit me to observe, the sooner you see him, the sooner we can bid him good bye.

I have a complaint to make of R[oot]. I told him I was going to see Reyes. He replied, 'Better look out! Ex-Reyes are dangerous.'

Do you think that, on my salary, I can afford to bear such things?" (Hay to Roosevelt, December 4, 1903, in John Hay, *Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary*, III, New York, 1969, p. 287.)

- 5 New York Times, Jan. 12, 1904, pp. 1, 6.

- 6 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *The Panama Gateway*, London, 1913, p. 138; Norman J. Padelford, *The Panama Canal in Peace and War*, New York, 1942, p. 22; Miles P. DuVal, Jr., *And the Mountains Will Move: The Story of the Building of the Panama Canal*, New York, 1968, pp. 130-31.
- 7 DuVal, *And the Mountains Will Move*, p. 132.
- 8 New York Times, May 10, 1904, p. 3. This was the largest warrant ever drawn by the Treasury Department up to that time. (*ibid.*)
- 9 Maron J. Simon, *The Panama Affair*, New York, 1971, p. 253; McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, pp. 400-01; Arthur H. Dean, *William Nelson Cromwell, 1854-1948: An American Pioneer in Corporation, Comparative, and International Law*, New York, 1957, p. 146. At least 70% of the stockholders of the New Panama Canal Company had been stockholders from the time of the organization of the Company. Simon says it was never disclosed who the other 30% of the stockholders were, with Cromwell refusing to identify the stockholders and these lists not being given to the United States as part of the New Panama Canal Company's archives. (Simon, pp. 253-54.) William G. Fletcher of Yale Un. asked Bunau-Varilla in 1938 whether he got any money out of the deal. He answered no, only the \$ 115,000 worth of stock that he saved. In 1912 Bunau-Varilla had told a Congressional investigating committee that his stock was worth \$ 100,000. (Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation*, New York, 1967, footnote p. 410.)
- 10 Bishop, *The Panama Gateway*, pp. 324-29. Bishop, secretary of the Commission, was chairman of this special committee. (*ibid.*, p. 324.) In 1909 a special committee computed the total volume of French excavation at 59,749,950 cubic meters or 78,146,960 cubic yards (66,743,551 cubic yards by the de Lesseps Company and 11,403,409 by the New Panama Canal Company). But only 29,708,000 cubic yards, about 40%, could be incorporated into the U. S. lock canal. (Mack, *The Land Divided*, p. 485.) See also Frank H. Taylor, "What We Are Buying at Panama," *Appleton's Magazine*, 3 (February, 1904), pp. 227-33.
- 11 Hay to Bunau-Varilla, May 12, 1904, Box 6, Philippe Bunau-Varilla papers, LC.
- 12 New York Times, May 22, 1904, p. 1--six million dollars was invested in mortgages on first-class New York City property and some was kept on deposit with J. P. Morgan and Co.
- 13 House of Representatives, Report No. 32, 62d Congress, 2d Session: *The Story of Panama: Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives*, Wash., D. C., 1913, p. 722. For the Taft Agreement 1904 on Canal Zone tariffs and importations, etc., see R. R. Baxter, *The Law of International Waterways, With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals*, Cambridge, Mass., 1964 pp. 75-76.
- 14 LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 42. This Article passed 17-14. (*ibid.*) The Panama Constitution was signed February 13, 1904 and put in force February 15. Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero was inaugurated as the first President on February 20. (Bishop, *The Panama Gateway*, p. 139.)
- 15 LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, p. 43; Baxter, *The Law of International Waterways*, p. 72. See also Ralph Eldin Minger, "Panama, the Canal Zone, and Titular Sovereignty," *Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (June, 1961), pp. 544-54. A treaty between the United States and Panama in 1936 said that the Canal Zone constituted "territory of the Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of the United States of America." (Baxter, p. 73.)
- 16 New York Times, May 10, 1904, p. 3; May 11, 1904, p. 8.
- 17 DuVal, *And the Mountains Will Move*, p. 132.

- 18 W. H. Chaloner, "The Birth of the Panama Canal, 1869-1914," *History Today*, 9 (July, 1959), pp. 482-92; Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*, New York, 1926, p. 528.
- 19 For changes in the neutrality of the Panama Canal during war time, placing restrictions on belligerent enemies of the United States, see Padelford, *The Panama Canal in Peace and War*, pp. 142-44, 181. The United States insisted on the right to fortify the Canal under the 2nd Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (Lester D. Langley, *Struggle for the American Mediterranean: United States-European Rivalry in the Gulf-Caribbean, 1776-1904*, Athens, Georgia, 1976, p. 178.), and it opened fortified. (Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea*, p. 110.) For arguments against fortification see Richard Olney, *Fortification of the Panama Canal*, reprint from *The American Journal of International Law*, April, 1911, pp. 298-301, in Box 156, Olney papers, LC; "Fortifying the Canal," *The Nation*, 92 (January 19, 1911), pp. 52-53; *The Nation*, 92 (January 26, 1911), p. 75. The section of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912 exempting U. S. coastwise trade from Canal tolls, to which Great Britain protested as a violation of the 2nd Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, was repealed in June, 1914 at the urging of President Wilson in a Message to Congress of March 5, 1914. (President Wilson's Message of March 5, 1914, in Commager, *Documents of American History*, II, p. 93; Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, pp. 210-14; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 78-81.) For further arguments against the toll exemption see Lassa F. Oppenheim, *The Panama Canal Conflict Between Great Britain and the United States of America: A Study*, Cambridge, 1913, pp. 15-17; *British Review of Reviews*, XLIX (April, 1914), pp. 267-68; *The Nation*, 95 (August 15, 1912), p. 135. The cost of the Canal and opening date are taken from Richard B. Morris, *Encyclopedia of American History*, New York, 1965, p. 298. For the story of the building of the Panama Canal itself under George W. Goethals, and the fight against yellow fever and malaria under Dr. William Gorgas, see such sources as McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas*, and DuVal, *And the Mountains Will Move*.
- 20 President Roosevelt at Capitol Square, Richmond, Virginia, October 18, 1905, in W. F. Johnson (ed.), *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, New York, 1909 p. 462. For other Addresses by the President in 1905 linking the Panama Canal to U. S. strategic interests in the area, and the need for a large Navy, see in *ibid.*, pp. 508-09, 516, 547, 603. See also Francis B. Loomis, "Attitude of the United States Toward Other American Powers," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 26 (July, 1905), p. 24.
- 21 Henry G. Granger, "The Stain on Our Flag," *Independent*, LXXI (August 17, 1911), p. 352.
- 22 James Brown Scott, "The Treaty Between Colombia and the United States," *American Journal of International Law*, 15 (July, 1921), pp. 436-37.
- 23 William Ward Sullivan, "A Study in the Relations Between Colombia and the United States, 1900-1924: An Abstract," Urbana, Illinois, 1926, p. 13; Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, pp. 434-35; Senator Lodge in U. S., *Congressional Record*, 67th Congress, Special + 1st Session, LXI, p. 158 (April 12, 1921); Scott, "The Treaty Between Colombia and the United States," pp. 437-38. Some Colombians conscientiously objected to the stipulations in the treaties, others were still bitter against the United States, and others wanted to overthrow the dictatorship of Reyes. Reyes resigned and fled the country. (Parks, p. 435.) The stipulations included the opening of

- Colombian ports as places of refuge for vessels using the Canal without payment of anchorage or tonnage dues, which was seen as an opening wedge to U. S. influence over Colombia; and it was also feared that terms providing for arbitration of the limits of the Jurado region could lead to the loss of the Atrato canal route. (Sullivan, p. 13.)
- 24 New York Times, quoting another New York paper [theWorld] of Jan. 17, 1904, on Jan. 18, 1904, p. 6; New York Times, Febr. 9, 1904, p. 8--quoting American banking sources; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 62-63--on the charges of the New York World.
 - 25 Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography*, New York, 1931, p. 333. Senator Morgan produced an agreement dated Nov. 21, 1899 in which Cromwell was empowered to form a syndicate for the "Americanization" of the Canal. This American corporation was to obtain the French concessions. Cromwell declined to testify regarding it, but did say it never matured into anything and was obsolete. (*ibid.*) Cromwell was examined February 26, 27, 28, and March 1, 2, and May 9, 11, 1906. (House of Representatives, Report No. 32, 62d Congress, 2d Session: *The Story of Panama: Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives*, Wash., D. C., 1913, p. 532.) See also *Refusal of William Nelson Cromwell to Answer Certain Questions, etc.*, Sen. Doc. 457, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 25, 1906), in Box 26, John T. Morgan papers, LC.
 - 26 Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 335; John L. Heaton, *Cobb of "The World": A Leader in Liberalism*, New York, 1924, p. 1; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 68.
 - 27 Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 335-36; Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, pp. 1-2. On October 3, 1908 the New York World had published an article stating Cromwell had filed a complaint with District Attorney William Jerome of New York on October 1 regarding a blackmail plot whereby Douglas Robinson, Charles P. Taft, and Cromwell would be accused of participation in a syndicate which had taken over the French rights. The World made no accusations against any of the above in this article, and a later edition the same day carried a denial by Cromwell that he had profited from the Panama transaction. (Pringle, p. 334.) The World later also accepted and published Charles Taft's denial of any involvement in the transaction. (Referred to in New York World, Dec. 16, 1908, in Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, p. 11.)
 - 28 New York World, Dec. 8, 1908, in Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, pp. 2-8--quote p. 8.
 - 29 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 68; Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, pp. 306-07.
 - 30 New York World, Dec. 16, 1908, in Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, pp. 9, 11.
 - 31 Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, p. 2; Mack, *The Land Divided*, p. 484; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 68-69. On the Indianapolis decision see New York World, June 3, 1909, Oct. 14, 1909, and Oct. 24, 1910, in Heaton, pp. 17-25.
 - 32 New York World, Feb. 18, 1909, in Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, pp. 12-13. See also New York World, Feb. 23, 1909, in *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
 - 33 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 69; Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, p. 307; Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 337.
 - 34 Earl Harding, *The Untold Story of Panama*, New York, 1959, p. v. Harding, who spent two years investigating the antecedents of the Panama Revolution for the World (*ibid.*, p. v.), says that the original syndicate was formed in 1898, reorganized in 1900, and reorganized again on June 6, 1901. (*ibid.*, p. 61.) For the evidence he presents see *ibid.*, pp. 55-64, especially pp. 58-59.

- 35 Theodore Roosevelt, March 23, 1911, quoted in Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 73.
- 36 *New York Times*, March 24, 1911, p. 1.
- 37 *New York Times*, March 25, 1911, p. 10.
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 *The Nation*, 92 (March 30, 1911), p. 307.
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 Granger, "The Stain on Our Flag," p. 347; Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 437.
- 43 Diez, "Opposition to American Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1898-1932," footnote p. 50. For two Panama sources on the secession of Panama written in 1911 see Harmodio Arias, *The Panama Canal: A Study in International Law and Diplomacy*, New York, 1970--copyright 1911; and Federico Boyd, *The Secession of Panama*, Panama, 1911. Arias, President of Panama, states: "It is impossible to say to what extent, if at all, representatives of interests in Panama made overtures to the Washington Cabinet in order to ascertain the specific course that the United States would take in the event of a revolution for the independence of the Isthmus. We can only be guided in our conclusions by the overt acts of the United States...." (Arias, p. 65.) Boyd, Vice President and Minister for Foreign Relations, and a participant in the Revolution (Boyd, p. 22.), notes that Amador met with Bunau-Varilla, who offered to work through a high friend in Washington (Boyd, p. 27.), but says that the independence was accomplished without any material aid from foreigners, pecuniary or otherwise. (Boyd, pp. 33, 40.)
- 44 Henry G. Granger, "The Stain on Our Flag," *Independent*, LXXI (August 17, 1911), pp. 347-48, 355.
- 45 Theodore Roosevelt, "How the United States Acquired the Right to Dig the Panama Canal," *Outlook*, 99 (October 7, 1911), p. 316. In his rough draft of his Message to Congress given December 7, 1903, Roosevelt says "either we should drop the Panama Canal project and immediately begin work on the Nicaraguan Canal, or else we should purchase all the rights of the French company, and, without any further parley with Colombia, enter upon the completion of the canal which the French company has begun. I feel that the latter course is the one demanded by the interests of this Nation, and I therefore bring the matter to your attention for such action in the premises as you may deem wise. If in your judgment it is better not to take such action, then I shall proceed at once with the Nicaraguan Canal." (Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*, New York, 1926, p. 530.)
- 46 Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*, New York, 1926, p. 548. Roosevelt defended himself more than once before his Cabinet after the Revolution, leading to some amusing stories. Attorney-General Knox is supposed to have said in Cabinet, "Oh, Mr. President, do not let so great an achievement suffer from any taint of legality." And another story has Roosevelt turning to Root and saying: "Well, have I answered the charges? Have I defended myself?" To which Root replied, according to the story: "You certainly have, Mr. President. You have shown that you were accused of seduction and you have conclusively proved that you were guilty of rape." (Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, I, Archon Books, 1964, pp. 404-05.)
- 47 Leander T. Chamberlain, "A Chapter of National Dishonor," *North American Review*, 195 (February, 1912), p. 172.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 171.

- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 174. Chamberlain's article was reprinted as a Senate document. (Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 273.)
- 50 A. T. Mahan, "Was Panama 'A Chapter of National Dishonor'?", *North American Review*, 196 (October, 1912), p. 567.
- 51 *Ibid.* See also Mahan, "The Panama Canal and Sea Power in the Pacific," *Century Magazine*, 82 (June, 1911), pp. 240-48; and Mahan "The Panama Canal and the Distribution of the Fleet," *North American Review*, 200 (September, 1914), pp. 406-17. Roosevelt was still reading Mahan, writing Lodge on June 12, 1911: "Have you seen in the last *Century* Mahan's admirable article on Panama? I wish you would read it." (Roosevelt to Lodge, June 12, 1911, in Lodge, *Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, II, p. 404.)
- 52 Diez, "Opposition to American Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1898-1932," p. 50; "Minister Ospina's Impudence," *The Nation*, 94 (February 22, 1912), pp. 178-79.
- 53 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 62d Congress, 1st Session, XLVII, p. 113 (April 6, 1911).
- 54 *The Story of Panama*, No. 1. Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives January 26 and February 9, 1912. (Wash., D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1912), p. 3, in Box 156, Richard Olney papers, LC.
- 55 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 68, 72. Rainey was the Democratic House floor leader in 1908. (*ibid.*, p. 68.)
- 56 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 62d Congress, 1st Session, XLVII, p. 113 (April 6, 1911). House Res. No. 32.
- 57 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 73, 74.
- 58 House of Representatives, Report No. 32, 62d Congress, 2d Session: *The Story of Panama: Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives* (Wash., D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1913). Hereafter *The Story of Panama*, 1913.
- 59 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 73; Harding, *The Untold Story of Panama*, p. v.
- 60 For example, *The Story of Panama*, 1913, pp. 156-59, 166-67--on the switch from the Nicaragua to the Panama route; pp. 710-23--on the origins of the Revolution and the Revolution itself.
- 61 *The Story of Panama*, 1913, pp. 710-11--quote p. 711. See also Harding, *The Untold Story of Panama*, pp. 72-73, for how he obtained this letter from the son.
- 62 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 74; *Statement on Behalf of Historical Truth* (two papers presented by Bunau-Varilla for the Library of Congress to accompany his personal documents, Box 16 + 17, Bunau-Varilla papers, LC.), p. 16, paper No. 2, Box 16, Bunau-Varilla papers, LC. Bunau-Varilla defends himself throughout this statement against the charges made by the Rainey Committee, etc., and denies involvement in a syndicate. (*ibid.*) Harding presents in his 1959 book evidence which he says could not be disclosed to the Committee in 1912, but instead was kept in fireproof storage. (Harding, *The Untold Story of Panama*, p. v--see pp. 55-64 on the syndicate, including the names of the signers of the syndicate agreement which he professes. See also the above discussion on the *World's* libel case.)
- 63 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 74.
- 64 Sulzer, Gallinger, Newlands, and Bacon, quoted in Granger, "The Stain on Our Flag," pp. 353-54.
- 65 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 437.
- 66 James T. Du Bois, *Ex-U. S. Minister to Colombia* James T. Du Bois on *Colombia's Claims and Rights*, Hallstead?, Pa., 1914, p. 1.

- 67 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 438.
- 68 Scott, "The Treaty Between Colombia and the United States," p. 438.
- 69 Du Bois, *On Colombia's Claims*, p. 5.
- 70 *Ibid.* Du Bois says that President Restrepo told him in reply, in effect: "President Roosevelt took Panama, our richest asset, and now you are sent here to take our islands, and the only canal route we have left. Is there anything else that the northern Colossus would like to separate us from?" (*ibid.*)
- 71 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 438.
- 72 *Ibid.*, pp. 438-39.
- 73 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 74-75.
- 74 Watt Stewart, "The Ratification of the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty," *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly*, 10 (March, 1930), pp. 417, 416.
- 75 Scott, "The Treaty Between Colombia and the United States," p. 430.
- 76 U. S., *Congressional Record*, 67th Congress, Special and 1st Session, LXI, p. 482 (April 20, 1921). Hereafter CR, 67-1.
- 77 CR, 67-1, p. 484 (April 20, 1921).
- 78 Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, p. 497.
- 79 CR, 67-1, p. 482 (April 20, 1921).
- 80 CR, 67-1, p. 485 (April 20, 1921).
- 81 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 76.
- 82 Stewart, "The Ratification of the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty," p. 419.
- 83 *Ibid.*
- 84 *Ibid.* Bryan was also busy making a treaty with Nicaragua, the Bryan-Chamorro Convention, signed August 5, 1914 and ratified February 18, 1916, which granted to the United States in perpetuity rights to construct, operate and maintain a canal across Nicaragua, as well as leases on the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands and a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca. Nicaragua received 3 million dollars. Negotiations for such a treaty had begun under the Taft Administration, with an agreement signed by Secretary Knox February 18, 1913. (Bryan-Chamorro Convention in Commager, *Documents of American History*, II, p. 94; Selig Adler, "Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetration," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 20 (May, 1940), pp. 216-17, 206.)
- 85 Roosevelt in *Outlook*, May 23, 1914, quoted in Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 331.
- 86 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 442.
- 87 Du Bois, *On Colombia's Claims*, p. 2.
- 88 *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
- 89 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
- 90 *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.
- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 92 Storey quoted in Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, pp. 69-70. However intervention in Haiti 1915 and Dominican Republic 1916 shattered Storey's faith in the Wilson Administration. (*ibid.*, pp. 70-71.)
- 93 Moorfield Storey, "President Wilson's Administration," *The Yale Review*, New Series, V (April, 1916), p. 460.
- 94 "Our Panama Regrets," *Literary Digest*, 48 (May 2, 1914), p. 1035. Among those supporting the Treaty (with the party affiliations those given by the *Literary Digest*) as either an act of justice, for fairness, for good relations, or for its effect on Latin America, it found the: *Macon Telegraph* (Dem.), *Hartford Post*, *Chicago News*, *Philadelphia Record* (Dem.), *Baltimore*

American (Rep.), *Boston Christian Science Monitor* (Ind.), *New York Times* (Ind. Dem.), *Philadelphia Public Ledger* (Ind.), *Baltimore Sun* (Ind.), *Indianapolis News* (Ind.). Other supporters included: *Spokane Spokesman-Review*, *Hartford Times* (Dem.), *New York Evening Post* (Ind.), *New York World* (Dem.), *New York Journal of Commerce*, *Brooklyn Eagle* (Ind.Dem.), *Troy* (N. Y.) *Record* (Ind. Rep.), *Richmond Times-Dispatch* (Dem.), *Atlanta Journal* (Dem.), *St. Joseph News-Press* (Ind.), *Springfield Republican* (Ind.). Against payment of 25 million dollars as a subsidy, a payment of blackmail, a raid on the U. S. Treasury, were the: *Buffalo Express* (Rep.), *New York Tribune* (Rep.), *Newark Star* (Dem.), *Philadelphia Inquirer* (Rep.), *Washington Post* (Ind.), *Colombus Dispatch* (Ind.), *Louisville Post* (Ind.), *Memphis News-Scimitar* (Progressive), *St. Louis Globe Democrat* (Rep.), *Chicago Tribune* (Prog.), *Colorado Springs Gazette* (Prog.), *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (Ind. Rep.), *Portland Oregonian* (Ind. Rep.), *San Diego Union* (Rep.). Against an apology, with the question of money not so important, were the: *Boston Transcript*, *Albany Journal* (Rep.), *Paterson Call* (Rep.), *Syracuse Post-Standard* (Rep.), *New York Press* (Prog.), *Philadelphia Press* (Rep.), *Grand Rapids Press* (Ind.), *Indianapolis Star* (Prog.), *Des Moines Register and Leader* (Ind. Rep.). *Detroit Free Press* (Ind.). Also against an apology were the: *Philadelphia Inquirer* (Rep.), *New York American* (Ind.), *Louisville Post*, *New York Evening Mail* (Prog.), *Chicago Inter Ocean* (Rep.), *Washington Herald* (Ind.). (*ibid.*, pp. 1035-36.)

- 95 *Current Opinion*, LVII (July, 1914), p. 6.
- 96 *Ibid.*
- 97 *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
- 98 Hannis Taylor, *Why the Pending Treaty with Colombia Should Be Ratified*, Wash., D. C., 1914, pp. 14, 1. Another 1914 source of criticism of the Panama events was Norman Thomson, *Colombia and the United States*, London, 1914, who says the Treaty of 1846 was treated as another "scrap of paper." (Thompson, pp. 170, 148-49.) He also refers to the indemnity Treaty. (*ibid.*, p. vii.)
- 99 Theodore Roosevelt, "The Panama Blackmail Treaty," *Metropolitan*, 41 (February, 1915), p. 8.
- 100 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 77.
- 101 Roosevelt to Thayer, July 2, 1915, in William Roscoe Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, II, Boston, 1915, pp. 327-28.
- 102 Theodore Roosevelt, "The Panama Canal," in H. M. Stephens and Herbert E. Bolton (eds.), *The Pacific Ocean in History...*, New York, 1917, p. 149.
- 103 Joseph C. Freehoff, *America and the Canal Title*, New York, 1916, pp. 1-2.
- 104 Freehoff, *ibid.*, p. 15, quoted in Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 76.
- 105 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 442.
- 106 *Ibid.*, 447; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 77.
- 107 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 448; Stewart, "The Ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty," p. 420--quote from here; Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, pp. 157-58 (April 12, 1921).
- 108 Lodge, in *CR*, 67-1, p. 158 (April 12, 1921).
- 109 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 449; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, pp. 77-78.
- 110 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 449; Stewart, "The Ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty," pp. 420-21; Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, p. 159 (April 12, 1921).
- 111 U. S. Memorandum, Bogotá, October 20, 1919, in Senate Doc. 64, 68th Congress, 1st Session (1923-24): *Diplomatic Correspondence with Colombia in Connection with the Treaty of 1914, and Certain Oil Concessions*, p. 55--this memorandum is

- an enclosure in U. S. Minister Hoffman Philip to Pomponio Guzmán, October 21, 1919, in *ibid.*, pp. 53-54.
- 112 Guzmán, Colombian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Philip, October 28, 1919, in *ibid.*, p. 56.
- 113 The Petroleum Law is contained in *ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
- 114 Memorandum of the President of Colombia to Minister Philip, January 9, 1920, in *ibid.*, pp. 57-58.
- 115 Memorandum of Minister Philip to President Suarez of Colombia, January 20, 1920, in *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.
- 116 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, pp. 450-51; Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 78; Stewart, "The Ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty," p. 421.
- 117 Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, pp. 158-160 (April 12, 1921). He used the Du Bois report for the figures he quoted: Railroad \$ 16,446,942.75; Canal rights \$ 17,500,000.00; Railroad annuities \$ 16,000,000.00; Cost Loubet arbitration \$ 200,000.00. (*ibid.*, p. 160.)
- 118 Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, p. 160 (April 12, 1921).
- 119 Lodge in *ibid.*
- 120 Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, p. 161 (April 12, 1921).
- 121 Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, pp. 161-162 (April 12, 1921).
- 122 Lodge insertion in *CR*, 67-1, pp. 164-165 (April 12, 1921).
- 123 Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, p. 162 (April 12, 1921).
- 124 *CR*, 67-1, p. 159 (April 12, 1921). Roosevelt said in part: "I, of course, most earnestly hope that your negotiations for a new and proper treaty will be successful." And: "If some such treaty, as you suggest, could be negotiated, it would be a capital thing."
- 125 *CR*, 67-1, pp. 163, 166-167 (April 12, 1921)--quote from p. 167. Fall also cites his proposals made in March, 1917. (p. 163.) For a U. S. proposal in 1919 of a protocol to include real estate, mines, minerals, and petroleum deposits, or other similar products in the term "property" of Article 13 of the Treaty of 1846, see Senate Doc. 64, 68th Congress, 1st Session (1923-24): *Diplomatic Correspondence with Colombia in Connection with the Treaty of 1914, and Certain Oil Concessions*, p. 53. For U. S. fears of British oil and other concessions in Colombia before U. S. entrance into World War I, see Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, pp. 444-46.
- 126 McCumber in *CR*, 67-1, p. 442 (April 19, 1921).
- 127 *Ibid.*
- 128 *Ibid.*
- 129 *Ibid.*
- 130 Shortridge in *CR*, 67-1, pp. 426 + 425 (April 19, 1921).
- 131 New in *CR*, 67-1, p. 391 (April 18, 1921).
- 132 Knox in *CR*, 67-1, p. 242 (April 14, 1921).
- 133 *Ibid.*
- 134 *Ibid.*
- 135 Sterling in *CR*, 67-1, pp. 479-480 (April 20, 1921).
- 136 Pomerene in *CR*, 67-1, p. 226 (April 14, 1921).
- 137 *Ibid.*
- 138 *Ibid.*
- 139 Smith in *CR*, 67-1, p. 482 (April 20, 1921).
- 140 Williams in *CR*, 67-1, p. 392 (April 18, 1921).

- 141 Williams in *CR*, 67-1, p. 395 (April 18, 1921).
 142 Ransdell in *CR*, 67-1, p. 436 (April 19, 1921).
 143 Wolcott in *CR*, 67-1, p. 449 (April 19, 1921).
 144 Kellogg in *CR*, 67-1, p. 191 (April 13, 1921).
 145 Borah in *CR*, 67-1, p. 248 (April 14, 1921).
 146 Johnson in *CR*, 67-1, p. 305 (April 15, 1921).
 147 Johnson in *CR*, 67-1, p. 307 (April 15, 1921).
 148 Kenyon in *CR*, 67-1, p. 472 (April 20, 1921).
 149 *Ibid.*
 150 *Ibid.*
 151 *Ibid.*
 152 Lenroot in *CR*, 67-1, p. 313 (April 15, 1921).
 153 Norris in *CR*, 67-1, p. 468 (April 20, 1921).
 154 Norris in *CR*, 67-1, p. 466 (April 20, 1921).
 155 Watson in *CR*, 67-1, p. 314 (April 15, 1921).
 156 *Ibid.*
 157 *Ibid.*
 158 *Ibid.*
 159 Reed in *CR*, 67-1, p. 443 (April 19, 1921).
 160 *Ibid.*
 161 Reed in *CR*, 67-1, p. 444 (April 19, 1921).
 162 Reed in *CR*, 67-1, pp. 445-446 (April 19, 1921).
 163 Reed in *CR*, 67-1, p. 447 (April 19, 1921). Senator Lodge had stated: "I have heard it said that the oil interests are supporting this treaty. I do not know whether they are or not. No one interested in the production of oil has ever spoken to me on the subject so far as I am aware, but I know, and everybody else who has studied the subject knows, that the question of oil is one that is vital to every great maritime nation." (Lodge in *CR*, 67-1, p. 161 (April 12, 1921).)
 164 *CR*, 67-1, p. 482 (April 20, 1921).
 165 *CR*, 67-1, pp. 482, 484, 485 (April 20, 1921).
 166 *CR*, 67-1, p. 482 (April 20, 1921).
 167 *Ibid.*
 168 *CR*, 67-1, p. 484 (April 20, 1921).
 169 *CR*, 67-1, p. 486 (April 20, 1921).
 170 *CR*, 67-1, pp. 483, 485, 486 (April 20, 1921).
 171 *CR*, 67-1, pp. 485-486 (April 20, 1921). Poindexter was from Washington. Ransdell also offered an amendment whereby Colombia was to assist the United States in defending the Panama Canal; and another one whereby Colombia was to agree that no canal in Colombia, including by the Atrato River Valley, would be constructed without the approval and cooperation of the United States, and the Providence and St. Andrews Islands were to be ceded to the United States. Both were defeated. (*CR*, 67-1, p. 486 (April 20, 1921).) The mutual Canal defense and Atrato River canal option were among the ideas presented by Fall to Roosevelt in March, 1917. (Fall cites these proposals in a letter to Lodge, March 21, 1921, in *CR*, 67-1, p. 163 (April 12, 1921).)
 172 *CR*, 67-1, p. 487 (April 20, 1921).
 173 Parks, *Colombia and the United States*, footnote p. 456.
 174 Ealy, *Yanqui Politics*, p. 78.
 175 "The Colombian Treaty: A Poll of the Press," *Outlook*, 128 (May, 1921), pp. 13-15.
 176 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
 177 *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

- 178 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 179 *Ibid.*
- 180 *Ibid.*
- 181 *Ibid.*
- 182 *Ibid.*
- 183 *Ibid.*
- 184 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 185 *Literary Digest*, 69 (May 7, 1921), p. 11, quoted in Stewart, "The Ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty," p. 427.
- 186 *Literary Digest*, 68 (March 26, 1921), p. 12, quoted in *ibid.*
- 187 "A Vindication," *New York World*, April 24, 1921, in Heaton, *Cobb of "The World"*, pp. 32-35--quote p. 34.
- 188 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
- 189 *Ibid.*
- 190 Senate Doc. 64, 68th Congress, 1st Session (1923-24): *Diplomatic Correspondence with Colombia in Connection with the Treaty of 1914, and Certain Oil Concessions*, p. 1. See quotes from this document above.
- 191 Lloyd C. Gardner, Walter F. LaFeber, and Thomas J. McCormick, *Creation of the American Empire: U. S. Diplomatic History*, Chicago, 1973, p. 367.

Chapter X: In Retrospect

- 1 Roosevelt to Henry White, March 20, 1896, in Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, Baltimore, 1956, pp. 32-33.
- 2 Theodore Roosevelt, "Expansion and Peace," published in *The Independent*, December 21, 1899, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses*, London, 1903, p. 32.
- 3 Theodore Roosevelt, "National Duties," Address at the Minnesota State Fair, September 2, 1901, in *ibid.*, p. 289.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 291.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 293-94.
- 6 President Roosevelt, Message communicated to Congress, signed December 2, 1902, in W. F. Johnson (ed.), *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, II, New York, 1909, p. 624.
- 7 Julius Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, Chicago, 1964, pp. 20, 9-10.
- 8 John W. Burgess, *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, I, Boston, 1890, p. 47.
- 9 Burgess quoted in Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, pp. 9-10.
- 10 David H. Burton, "Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist," *Review of Politics*, 23 (July, 1961), p. 371.
- 11 Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, November 4, 1903, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 644. Already on September 13, 1903 Secretary Hay had written to the President: "Something we shall be forced to do in case of a serious insurrectionary movement in Panama, [is] to keep the transit clear. Our intervention should not be at haphazard, nor, this time, should it be to the profit, as heretofore, of Bogotá." (Hay to Theodore Roosevelt, September 13, 1903, in Samuel Flagg Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, IX, New York, 1958, p. 164.)
- 12 Theodore Roosevelt to George Harvey, December 19, 1903, Reel 413 (Series 3B), Theodore Roosevelt papers, LC.
- 13 See chapter 2. While Elihu Root, Secretary of War at the time of the Panama Revolution, but abroad at the time of its occurrence (Jessup, *Elihu Root*, I, p.

- 401.), denied that the U. S. Government had participated in bringing about the Revolution and insisted that it had maintained perfect impartiality, he added: "The things done by our officers might not have been permissible in the territory of a country of strong and orderly government possessing and exercising the power to prevent lawless violence and to protect the lives and property of citizens and foreigners alike: but action of this character is, according to the universal rules obtaining among civilized nations, not only permissible, but a duty of the highest obligation in countries whose feeble governments exercise imperfect control in their territory." (Elihu Root in a speech before the Chicago Union Club entitled "The Ethics of the Panama Question," quoted in *New York Times*, Feb. 23, 1904, p. 1.)
- 14 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency*, Boston, 1973, p. 83.
 - 15 William Roscoe Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Intimate Biography*, Boston, 1919, p. 190.
 - 16 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 1909, quoted in Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, p. 55. See also Theodore Roosevelt to Lodge, January 28, 1909, in Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, p. 89.
 - 17 Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, pp. 23, 25.
 - 18 Nicholas Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: The Man As I Knew Him*, New York, 1967, pp. 151-52.
 - 19 Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, p. 59.
 - 20 Bailey, *A Diplomatic History*, pp. 488-89.
 - 21 See chapter 2 for statements by Mahan and Adams on the necessity of the Canal, and on the Roosevelt reviews of Mahan's publications. Roosevelt reviewed *The Law of Civilization and Decay* by Brooks Adams, published in 1895, in "The Law of Civilization and Decay," *Forum*, XXII (January, 1897) and Adams became an adviser to Roosevelt after 1901. (William A. Williams, "Brooks Adams and American Expansion," *New England Quarterly*, 25 (June, 1952), pp. 217-20, 225.) For further discussion of Mahan's influence on Roosevelt see Walter LaFeber, "A Note on the 'Mercantilistic Imperialism' of Alfred Thayer Mahan," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 48 (March, 1962), p. 674; William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1947, pp. 113-14, 52, 231, 232; and Harbaugh, *The Writings of Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 36.
 - 22 President Roosevelt in his Message to Congress, January 4, 1904, in *CR*, 58-2, p. 424 (January 4, 1904). For economic influences for a trans-Isthmian Canal see for example Paul J. Scheips, "United States Commercial Pressures for a Nicaragua Canal in the 1890s," *The Americas*, 20 (April, 1964), pp. 333-58; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire*, pp. 189, 411. For strategic influences see for example Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, pp. 382, 387, 128, 140, 143ff.; Julius W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment*, New York, 1951, p. 84; Laurence Duggan, *The Americas: The Search for Hemispheric Security*, New York, 1949, p. 47. For direction from intellectual influences see Julius W. Pratt, "The 'Large Policy' of 1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 19 (September, 1932), pp. 242, 238-41; Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," p. 184-Hofstadter sees Theodore Roosevelt as the central figure in this group of imperialists, who among other things wanted an Isthmian Canal.
 - 23 Wallace Thompson, "The Doctrine of the 'Special Interest' of the United States in the Region of the Caribbean Sea," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 132 (July, 1927), p. 155. Bemis, in *The Latin American Policy*, p. 387 says that "on the Panama Canal, was based the strategic

imperialism of the first two decades of the twentieth century."

- 24 Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*, Baltimore, 1935, p. 347.
- 25 Theodore Roosevelt at Jacksonville, Florida, October 21, 1905, in Johnson, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, pp. 508-09.
- 26 *Ibid.*, pp. 509, 510--quote p. 510. William B. Hixson, Jr., in *Moorfield Storey and the Abolitionist Tradition*, New York, 1972, p. 69, puts it this way: "With the protection of the Canal as its objective, and the techniques of financial control and military occupation (already developed in Cuba) as its implements, the Corollary would become the basic rationale for United States policy in the area for the next quarter-century."
- 27 Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism*, New York, 1925, p. 263.
- 28 Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, p. 296; Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 238; Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 259. See also Rystad, "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism," pp. 15-16.
- 29 Welch, *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans*, p. 281.
- 30 Hixson, *Moorfield Storey*, p. 71.
- 31 Elmer Ellis, *Henry Moore Teller: Defender of the West*, Caldwell, Idaho, 1941, p. 356.
- 32 *Springfield Republican*, Feb. 24, 1904, in Fox, *President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat*, p. 30.
- 33 *Springfield Republican*, Feb. 14, 1904, in *ibid.*, p. 28.
- 34 *Public Opinion*, XXXV (November 19, 1903), p. 643, quoted in Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, p. 543.
- 35 Henry Litchfield West, in *The Forum*, 35 (April, 1904), p. 496. West was *The Forum's* political analyst.
- 36 *Ibid.*
- 37 "The President's Position," *The Nation*, 77 (December 17, 1903), p. 478.
- 38 George W. Lyons, Jr., editor of the Nuckalls County *Herald*, Nelson, Nebraska, to George W. Norris, December 19, 1903, in Box 465, George W. Norris papers, LC.
- 39 Whitelaw Reid to President Roosevelt, November 9, 1903, in Reel 38 (Series 1), Theodore Roosevelt papers, LC.
- 40 *CR*, 58-2, p. 319 (December 17, 1903).
- 41 W. G. McAdoo, president of the New York and Jersey Railroad Company, to President Roosevelt, November 16, 1903, in Reel 38 (Series 1), Theodore Roosevelt papers, LC.
- 42 Emory R. Johnson, "The Nicaragua Canal and the Economic Development of the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 7 (January, 1896), p. 39; Warner Miller, "The Nicaragua Canal and Commerce," *Forum*, 12 (February, 1892), p. 718.
- 43 Johnson, "The Nicaragua Canal and the Economic Development of the United States," pp. 39-40; Miller, "The Nicaragua Canal and Commerce," p. 716.
- 44 President Roosevelt at the Capitol Building, Montgomery, Alabama, October 24, 1905, in W. F. Johnson, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, p. 528; Emory R. Johnson, "The Nicaragua Canal and the Economic Development of the United States," p. 39; Miller, "The Nicaragua Canal and Commerce," p. 717; Charles M. Harvey, "The Panama Canal and the Mississippi Valley," *World's Work*, 7 (February, 1904), pp. 4425-4427; plus see the many quotes above in Southern newspapers, etc.

- 45 President Roosevelt in his Message communicated to Congress, signed December 3, 1901, in Johnson, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, II, p. 573; President Roosevelt at Jacksonville, Florida, October 21, 1905, in *ibid.*, IV, p. 506.
- 46 George L. Fox, letter to the editor, New Orleans *Times-Democrat*, Dec. 30, 1903, in Fox, *President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat*, p. 52.
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 Johnson, "The Nicaragua Canal and the Economic Development of the United States," pp. 40-41, 47-48.
- 49 Harvey, "The Panama Canal and the Mississippi Valley," p. 4425.
- 50 S. A. Thompson, "The Effect of Waterways on Railway Transportation," *Engineering Magazine*, 23 (July, 1902), pp. 583, 590, 588.
- 51 Archibald R. Colquhoun, *The Mastery of the Pacific*, London, 1902, pp. 37, 36.
- 52 President Roosevelt at the banquet of the Chamber of Commerce and Board of Trade, Denver, Colorado, May 9, 1905, in Johnson, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, p. 359.
- 53 Paul J. Scheips, "United States Commercial Pressures for a Nicaragua Canal in the 1890s," *The Americas*, 20 (April, 1964), p. 341.
- 54 Thomas Beer, *Hanna*, New York, 1973, p. 264.
- 55 Emory R. Johnson, quoted in Scheips, "United States Commercial Pressures for a Nicaragua Canal in the 1890s," p. 341.
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- 57 *Railway World*, in "Railways and the Panama Canal," *Literary Digest*, 27, (December 12, 1903), p. 816.
- 58 Charles H. Markham, "The Illinois Central System," in Albert Bushnell Hart (ed.), *American History Told by Contemporaries*, V, New York, 1953, p. 63.
- 59 For example: California, 1891, 1897, 1899; Alabama, 1892; Washington, 1895; Florida, 1897; Georgia, 1899; Idaho, 1899; Nevada, 1895, 1899; Oregon, 1895, 1899, 1901. (Scheips, "United States Commercial Pressures for a Nicaragua Canal in the 1890s," pp. 343, 347, 351, 352, 355-56, 358.)
- 60 For example: Portland, Oregon, 1894; Nashville, 1895; Seattle, 1895; San Francisco, 1898; Los Angeles, 1898. (*ibid.*, pp. 349-50, 353.)
- 61 For example: Northhampton, Massachusetts, 1895; Medina, Ohio, 1895; Indianapolis, 1898; Philadelphia, 1898. (*ibid.*, pp. 350-51, 353.)
- 62 At St. Louis, 1892; New Orleans, 1892; San Francisco, 1894. (*ibid.*, pp. 344-45, 346, 348.)
- 63 In 1893, 1898, 1901. (*ibid.*, pp. 348, 354, 358.)
- 64 In 1897, 1900. (*ibid.*, pp. 352, 356.)
- 65 For example in 1900 by the Republicans of Arkansas, California, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Vermont; and the Democrats of Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont. (*Chicago Daily News Almanac for 1901*, p. 91; *The Tribune Almanac for 1901*, pp. 83-118.)
- 66 William Roscoe Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, II, Boston, 1915, pp. 328-31; William Roscoe Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Intimate Biography*, Boston, 1919, pp. 184-90; Wolf von Schierbrand, *America, Asia and the Pacific*, New York, 1904, pp. 146-47; Robert A. Friedlander, "A Reassessment of Roosevelt's Role in the Panamanian Revolution of 1903," *Western Political*

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- 67 Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation*, New York, 1967, p. 151.
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- 69 Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Imperial Years*, New York, 1956, p. 253.
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 227.
- 71 Howard C. Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean*, New York, 1965, p. 68
- 72 William H. Harbaugh (ed.), *The Writings of Theodore Roosevelt*, Indianapolis, 1967, p. xlii.
- 73 Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, p. 55.
- 74 J. Fred Rippy, *The Capitalists and Colombia*, New York, 1931, pp. 89-90. See also the statements on imperialism by William D. McCain and William Appleman Williams in chapter 2.
- 75 Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography*, New York, 1931, pp. 308-09.
- 76 Elmer Ellis, *Henry Moore Teller: Defender of the West*, Caldwell, Idaho, 1941, p. 355.
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- 78 Miles P. DuVal, Jr., *And the Mountains Will Move: The Story of the Building of the Panama Canal*, New York, 1968, pp. 129-30.
- 79 Matthew Josephson, *The President Makers: The Culture of Politics and Leadership in an Age of Enlightenment, 1896-1919*, New York, 1940, p. 187.
- 80 For example: Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, New York, 1940, p. 540; Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean*, p. 65; Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*, Baltimore, 1935, p. 426.
- 81 Helen Dwight Reid, *International Servitudes in Law and Practice*, Chicago, 1932, pp. 123-25. Reid points out that the idea that the United States had a construction servitude to build the Canal without further authorization was put forth by John Bassett Moore. (*ibid.*, p. 123.) Moore's Memorandum of August, 1903, part seven, asserted that the engagements under Article 35 of the Treaty of 1846 "constituted a sort of supportant partnership in sovereignty with that country [Colombia], and that the object in assuming this burden was to secure primarily a canal...." (Moore's Memorandum of August, 1903 in *ibid.*, p. 242; and in John Bassett Moore, *The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore*, III, New Haven, 1944, p. 104.)
- 82 For example: Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean*, pp. 66-67; Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, pp. 544-45; George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912*, London, 1958, p. 154; Latané, "America as a World Power, 1897-1907," pp. 219-20; Tyler Dennett, *John Hay: From Poetry to Politics*, New York, 1933, pp. 382-83; Dwight Carroll Miner, *The Fight for the Panama Route: The Story of the Spooner Act and the Hay-Herrán Treaty*, New York, 1940, pp. 388-89.
- 83 E. Taylor Parks, *Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934*, New York, 1968, pp. 395-426.
- 84 *Ibid.*, p. 426.
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- 86 Ernest R. May, *From Imperialism to Isolationism, 1898-1919*, New York, 1964,

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